CONFLICTS AND \nCHRISTIAN VIOLENCE

Over and above the eight successive charges listed above, the Germans are also guilty of a series of crimes that were limited to no one period or area, but were characteristic of the entire era of Nazi dominance. These crimes, which may best be described as organized violence, represent a unique creation of the Nazi regime. Elaborately planned campaigns were carried out with devastating effect upon the victims and宗旨and as spontaneous outbursts of just wrath. Two examples illustrative of this technique are the boycott of 1 April 1933 and the pogrom of November 1938.

The boycott of 1 April 1933 constitutes the first overt campaign in the German criminal conspiracy against the Jews. It represented a preliminary test of strength in which the Nazis sought to ascertain how far world public opinion would allow them to proceed toward their goal of eliminating the Jews.

The overwhelming support given the first Fasch in the March 5,
1933, elections gave the leaders a powerful incentive to proceed with
the realization of the Party’s program. In the words of the official
announcement of the April 1 boycott, entitled “Reasons for the
Boycott Action,” published on 29 March, “the communciation of
the national revolution thereby became a demand of the people.”
And the elimination of the Jews from every sphere of German life
had been from the start one of the cardinal elements of the creed of
the “national revolution.” The boycott of April 1 thus became the
first step in the way of the cross of German (and ultimately
European) Jewry.

To the German public and the world at large the boycott was
presented as a necessary retaliatory measure against, first,
alleged Jewish “lies and vilifications of downright hair-raising
perfidity” in the shape of “dirty stories,” spread by
“unsungulous criminals,” and directed against Germany, and second,
against the “international boycott” being organized against German
goods by “Jewish intellectual instigators.” The boycott was thus
reported as "defensive struggle against a grave crime."

The organization and execution of the boycott was not left to chance, and for good reason. For as much as the boycott was intended to frighten the Jews of Germany and abroad, it stood crucially as much to demonstrate to the world the power, discipline, and effectiveness of the Party organization. For that reason there was no need to feign "accidents," as was the case during the 1933 pogroms. Since, further, the German leaders decided that the boycott was not to be accompanied by violence to Jews and their property, there was no need for secret instructions, as was the case, again, in 1935.

Accompanying the already cited pamphlet ("Reasons for the Boycott Action"), which merely stated the reasons for the boycott, was another proclamation entitled "Nine Points," also published on 29 March, outlining the procedures for the practical and systematic execution of the boycott of Jewish goods of business, Jewish merchants, Jewish physicians and
Jewish lawyers. For added assurance that the boycott would be

carried out with the necessary ruthlessness, Julius Streicher was

made chairman of the Central Committee to Combat Atrocity and

Boycott Agitation, and charged with the overall execution of

the boycott. Streicher, in his turn, issued eight regulations,

each containing detailed instructions as to the means and measures
to be employed in enforcing the boycott.

In substance, the "Eleven Points" directed that throughout

the country—even in "the smallest villages"—action consistent

should be favored and charged with full responsibility for the

execution of the boycott; that it should begin "not in a sporadic

manner, but at one stroke, at 10 a.m., sharp," with SS and SA men

stationed at all indicated places; that the workers should be told

that the boycott was necessary for the "protection of German labor,"

while the rural elements are to be enlightened that the boycott

was "forced" on Germany as a "defensive measure;" that "tens of

thousands" of meetings should be held at which resolution were to
be adopted depending. "for the present," a superimposed for
Jews in high schools and universities; that no foreign businesses,
including those owned by foreign Jews, should be selected, as the
boycott is "purely a defensive measure against German Jews." that
newspapers failing to publicize the boycott should in turn be
boycotted thereafter; that all the measures are to be executed
with "complete accuracy and the strictest discipline...Not a
single hair of a Jew shall be harmed."

Schlesier's "Fourteen Points" added that converted Jews
are to be considered Jews; that posters with a black background
and yellow stars (reminders of the medieval yellow badge) should
be affixed to all Jewish establishments; that a list of suspended
aliens be paraded through the streets. Point 8 specified that
the boycott would continue until its termination is ordered by
the Party. Regulation 9, however, decreed its interruption at
the end of the first day, until 5 April, so as to give the foreign
press time to stop its alleged anti-German agitation. "If this,
however, is not the case," Schlesier told the foreign press on 31
March, "the boycott will be resumed on Wednesday (5 April) at 20
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"Glance, but then with an inquins and venomous libelous unheeded ar..."

From the standpoint of the German leaders the boycott was an unqualified success. The chief aim of the boycott—to show the world the Nazis' firm grip on the land, to make the boycott a continuous process, and to strike terror in the hearts of the Jews—have been achieved. The Kuhlbrand, Jochmann was satisfied to note on 3 April that the boycott brought about “the humiliation of the Jews of Germany.” The Nuremberg laws, two years later, largely cost in legal form what had already been in operation.

The American charge d'affaires reported (on 4 April) that “with few exceptions the boycott was carried out without disturbances,” in Berlin proper, but that acts of violence had taken place in other cities. Reporting on Central Germany, the American Consul in Leipzig stated that in Leipzig the boycott was carried out on two days, March 1 and 1 April, and was accompanied by much violence. 

Both to Jewish persons and property. He named many cities in Central Germany in which the boycott was merely a culmination of
state of physical assault, blame to negro, arrest and extortion
that has been in vogue for some months. It should also be noted
that the above-cited American diplomatic representatives con-
cluded their reports with an identical observation that, irrespective
of the boycott, the Jews of Germany have to all intents and purposes
been deprived of "elementary civil rights," and that there was
little hope of any improvement in the future. According to the
American Consul in Leipzig, the chief purpose, and undoubted
achievement, of the boycott was to prosecute and stigmatize
publicly all the Jews of Germany by making the people aware of
the racial and religious identity of their fellow citizens.

That state of violence against Jews had been present prior to
the proclamation of the boycott with the tacit approval of the
police can be gathered from the declaration made by Göring, then
Minister of the Interior of Prussia, three weeks before the boycott
(on 10 March).
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"The police are not a defense squad for Jewish stores... They tell me I must call out the police to protect those (the Jew). Certainly, I shall employ the police; and without mercy, wherever German people are hurt, but I refuse to turn mercy, wherever German people are hurt, but I refuse to turn mercy.

The action is necessary. The case was the people... You can settle accounts with the typhus... We stand by our word. Accounts are being settled.

On March 21, 1935, Goring told a representative of the "Telegraph of Amsterdam:"

"It is true that the department stores were attacked. I was certainly opposed to force being used to settle against these undertakings, but I do not see who is responsible to warn people against buying in Jewish department stores."

Public statements by the head of the police in the largest state in Germany that the Jews would receive no police protection could only serve as a goad when signal for the part of the bourgeoisie.

The American Council in Leipzig, referring to conditions in Central Germany, wrote that "the persecution and killing of Jews in this region has been systematically and brutally carried out and continued." The attacks, assuming the form of arrests, beatings, extortion, public degradation, desecration of synagogues and cemeteries, while inevitable, still were without central direction.
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and coordination. Their over-all purpose was, however, unmistakable:

to make life for Jews as intolerable that they would have no taste to
leave Germany. Restrictive legislation, designed to punish them,
combined with physical harassment, practiced without let-up but not
yet in so violent and concentrated form as to antagonize sharply
world opinion which still had to be courted, were hoped to be
sufficient to cause a mass exodus.

By the fall of 1938 the world situation had changed slightly
in favor of Germany. Austria has been absorbed, to the accompaniment
of violence against Jews as a cycle not hitherto attempted in Germany.

More significantly, the rape of Czechoslovakia opened the gates for
the conquest of Eastern Europe. Since, moreover, both of these
actions were achieved with the concurrence of three very powers
whose favor led to be courted up to them, no psychological barrier
existed any longer to the execution of the long professed aim,
namely the elimination of the Jews from Germany. Physical suppression
in the shape of territorial victories induced simultaneously a

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psychological retribution from deference, however slimy, to
world opinion. On 14 December 1938, the British Consul General
in Frankfurt indeed reported to his government that "the rulers
of Germany appear at present to be contemptuous of world opinion."

For the leaders of Germany the propitiatory concept had arrived
to deliver the Jews such a massive, concentrated, violent blow,
carrying so much physical and psychological impact, as would cause
them to depart in mass flight. The necessary opportunity was
provided by the death of Von Roth, third secretary of the Paris
Embassy, on 7 November, at the hands of Hereshel Grynman, a
17-year-old refugee who had become slightly unbalanced from the
tribulations he and his family had undergone. While, admittedly,
Nazi leaders, being totally devoid of scruples, never really be-
lieved that excuses are essential to their actions, hypocrisy
has long been recognized as a useful handmaiden of statescraft
the tribute that vice pays to virtue. In 1938 the orders for
the boycott were publicly announced because no violence was to

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The events of 10 November are well known. In a limited sense, they shook the world. Although the excesses that accompanied the occupation of Austria were no less violent, undoubtedly it was the burning of the synagogues, carried out simultaneously throughout the country, that gave special edge to the shock administered world opinion. No observer living at the time in Germany believed that the acts of violence were "spontaneous." The pattern was too uniform, clear-cut, universal; burning of the synagogues with
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neural and increasing harm at a specific time; the indifference
of the police; the passivity of the fire brigades, which limited
their efforts to protecting non-Jewish establishments; destruction
and looting of private homes; physical violence; the wholesale
arrests of special-age groups and their transportation to con-
centration camps. Ambassador Wilson (now recalled by President
Roosevelt) stated the State Department that he "was constrained
to report this evidence leads to the contrary conclusion," then
the "spontaneity" theory given by Goebbels. Reporting from Bremen,
the American Consul General stated that there is "sufficient
evidence that the destruction was not the work of a spontaneous
mob riotation, as claimed by some official authorities." In
his lengthy report of 21 November, the American Consul in Leipzig
described the accesses to that area as

"Constituting a narrative...that very probably has had no
counterpart in the course of the civilized world...\nAnd November 20, 1938, was accelerated a barrel of
blast as a way to break bitters in Germany,
or very likely anywhere else in the world since century,
if ever...The whole locksmith activity was organized in such
a sinister fashion as to lend credence to the theory that
the execution of it had involved studied preparations. It
was reported that the intended to the plan of
"spontaneous indignation" leaked out in Leipzig several
hours before news of the death of Von Muck has been heard."
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November 10, 1936. It is stated upon authority that the death toll on the island of Saipan has been high due to Japanese explosions and air attacks. The recent attacks on Saipan have caused widespread destruction and loss of life. The Japanese forces have been heavily engaged in retaking the island, and the situation remains tense.

SAPPAKA

November 10, 1936. The Japanese forces have been met with fierce resistance from the local population. The Japanese military has suffered significant losses in the recent engagements.

Stout

November 10, 1936. The latest reports from the Japanese forces indicate that the resistance on Saipan is strong and well-organized. The Japanese military is struggling to gain control of the island.

The reports of the above-cited sources are filled with lengthy descriptions of the outcomes.

Stout

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TO: All Gestapo offices, to all SS, OA, and all OK.

Urgent, urgent, submit at once!

Urgent to submit at once to the director (briet) or his deputy.

MEASURES: Measures against Jews this night.

On account of the attack on diplomatic security via both in Paris demonstrations against the Jews in the entire Reich are to be reported this night of Nov. 9/10 1938. To deal with these events the following directives are issued:

1). The directors of the Gestapo offices or their deputies have to protect immediately upon receipt of this telegram to inform the regional party offices, police districts of Freikorps, etc., and arrange with them for a meeting to discuss and agree upon the execution of the demonstrations. The regional commander or commander of the Freikorps is to be called in for the meeting. In the course of the conference the political leaders are to be advised, that the german police has received from the Reichsführer SS and chief of police the following directives and that the measures taken by the political agencies should be in accordance with them:

a). Only such measures are to be taken, which do not endanger German life or property (e.g., synagogues fires only if no fire danger for the neighborhood).

b). Stores and apartments of Jews may be destroyed but not looted. The police and Gestapo are to watch over the execution of this order and to arrest plunderers.

c). In the business section particular care has to be taken that armored stores are to be protected from damage under all circumstances.

d). Personal papers of foreign Jews are not to be neglected.

2) On the condition that the directives mentioned under 1 are
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1. Immediately upon receipt of this telegraphic order, the police are to seize
2. all ancient and exotic items of Jewish religious significance in all synagogues and private homes. Cases of the demonstra-
3. tions to present themselves immediately in the course of the demonstra-
4. tions. This is an urgent matter of utmost importance, and re-
5. quirements. No delays are allowed.

6. The direction of all anti-Jewish activities, with respect to the
7. police, is to be handled by the Inspector General of the High-
8. Command. All orders are to be issued by the Inspector General, in
9. consultation with the Director of the High Command. All orders
10. are to be executed immediately. Any delay is prohibited.

11. The contents of this order are to be communicated to all
12. branches of the High Command. All telegraphic orders are to
13. be issued by the Inspector General of the High Command. All
14. orders are to be executed immediately. Any delay is prohibited.

15. The original of this telegraphic order is to be confirmed by the
16. Director of the High Command. All telegraphic orders are to
17. be executed immediately. Any delay is prohibited.

18. The above documents require no copy or elaboration.

For-despatch events to come to Poland, in accordance with the
Jews were evicted from their homes at night, made to carry away to the synagogue, and the rabbi forced to set off the fire. In Breslau the Jews were assembled to watch the synagogue go up in flames. Three days later they were taxed with 15,000 marks in payment for the removal of the wrecks.

The leaders stated on 11 November that "almost all the synagogues in every German town—very few were overlooked—were set on fire and destroyed." On the basis of eye-witness reports, it has been estimated that 425 synagogues went up in flames, but this is probably an underestimate. The extent of the damage wrought to private houses and business establishments cannot be estimated.

On 13 November 1938, a special decree ordered the Jews to pay for the clearance of all damaged property and simultaneously cancelled all insurance claims.

From the viewpoint of the German leaders the November pogroms were a total success. When the pogroms ended, the lot of the remaining Jews became one of utter and unmitigated desperation.
Their personal assets had been confiscated or destroyed and their religious shrines, consumed by fire. Worse yet, practically all men had been transported to the concentration camps of Buchenwald, Dachau, and Auschwitz, which had then been constructed. In fact, the worst periods in the history of the camps were the years 1938-1940. It is in these camps that the SS executioners and sadists received their brutal experience, their real training, with Jews as guinea pigs. They provided the facilities for the special schools for torture that were founded later. From the ranks of the Hitler youth who took part in the multitudinous acts of violence and minor pogroms of the interim years emerged the harsh nuclei involving hundreds of thousands of professional criminals. Without this nucleus of trained and tried executioners and sadists the vast army needed to exterminate the Jews of Europe could not have been formed in the brief period preceding the attack on Poland.

Most violence had, then, from the very start been purposeful, consistent, planned, directed, and coordinated. The German murderers had to learn by doing. Jews constituted their school of experience.
1. Exhibit No. 1, Rottkens v. Rottkens, 30 March 1923.
2. Exhibit No. 2.
3. Exhibit No. 3, 30 March 1873.
4. Exhibit No. 4.
5. Exhibit No. 5.
7. Exhibit No. 7, Germany, p. 11.
8. Exhibit No. 8.
10. Exhibit No. 10.
11. Exhibit No. 11.
12. Exhibit No. 12.
15. Exhibit No. 15, Germany, No. 2 (1924), p. 17, also page 16 on events.
16. Exhibit No. 16.
17. Exhibit No. 17.
18. Exhibit No. 18.
19. Exhibit No. 19.
20. Exhibit No. 20.
22. Exhibit No. 22.
23. Exhibit No. 23.
25. Exhibit No. 25.
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