The Jewish Question as an International Problem

Until the Nazis acquired confidence behind the seal of state and while they were still learning to steer cautiously between the simple and complex of foreign policy, their statement as to the aims and tasks of Nazism were not only more coherent but often concealed the truth of their actual intentions. They followed these tactics in regard to the geographical limitations of Nazism as well, as early as September, 1933, Rosenberg delivered an important speech at the Reichstag, in the presence of leading members of the Party, asserting that Nazism is a purely national affair depending on the history of the people, which, like France, is not designed for export. But considering Nazism as a purely national phenomenon, biased in all colors of Nazi folklore, Rosenberg did not conceal that foreign policy must depend on national ideology, for "Without a thorough knowledge of this question (i.e., national theory) one cannot understand history and therefore foreign policy."  

1) National Socialism is thus an autarchically German phenomenon. It can be explained only by German circumstances and motives. In this connection, one might apply Mussolini's saying on Fascism that "It is not an article for export." Ausgekreuzte und Holzkohlenzüge: Die Ideologie der neuen Welt. 20 monographien Hohler, Poeschler Nachfolger, Munich, 1932.

Despite the fact that in 1933 Rosenberg, in order to appease European and American conservatives, asserted that the Jewish question was a purely domestic affair, in February 1939, in the presence of foreign diplomats and the press:

"The solution of the Jewish question is a problem not limited to Germany, but represents an international problem of the greatest importance."

The interest the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed in the Jewish problem and the importance it attached to it even prior to the war, may be seen from the memorandum of January 25, 1938, submitted by the U.S. Prosecutor under Document 2153-PS. This memorandum addressed to "All German Jewish authorities and Zionist Bureau for Foreign Affairs" emphasized, first of all, the link between the realization of the idea "of Greater Germany" and the solution of the Jewish question. It explains it by the fact that the Jewish policy was the result of an event which occurred in 1936 and at the same time influenced them.

3) Document 2153-PS, Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel. Rosenberg further elaborated the same idea: "The Jewish question has never been confined to one country or one nation, and even to those who failed to realize the international character of this problem."

4) "It is certainly no coincidence that the year 1936 has brought about the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realization of the 'idea of Greater Germany', since the Jewish policy was both the cause and consequence of the events of the year 1936."
The memorandum attaches decisive importance to the evacuation of Austria and the subsequent anti-Jewish legislation which purged the economic life of Austria and Germany from Jews, and organized nearly the entire trade and industry. This situation was to develop further and "in a measurable time there will no longer be any talk of Jewish property in Germany." The memorandum makes the final goal of migration of all the Jews living in Reich territory, but remarks that emigration encountered difficulties by the non-desirability of Jews to leave Germany even after the promulgation of the Nuremberg laws. The memorandum explains it by the fact that the Jews did not want to part with their property: "The struggle hitherto employed in Jewish property were in every case aimed at race emigration of Jews than at the transfer of Jewish property." But actually the Jewish property was taken away from the German people by Jewish methods — that is why it would not be expedient to permit its removal from Germany.

Yet emigration of Jews not only from Germany but also from Poland, Hungary and Rumania became more and more pressing and assumed an international character. The task of Nazis consisted in furthering emigration suit of wealthy Jews that of the mass of Jews without means. This type of emigration will contribute to the increase of anti-Semitism in immigration countries and the task of the German foreign policy must be to further this wave of anti-Semitism." The memorandum concludes with the following words:
The trend to burden the democratic countries with the unprepared and lost.

Casual bystanders can explain away the move of Hitler, designed first of all to destroy the rear of the future enemy in preparation of an aggressive war. Dr. Buß, member of the U.S. Prosecution, who submitted the Tribunal the document in question, said that he did it to add something "to the proof with reference to the persecution of the Jews as related to crimes against peace" (Off. Tr., p. 813).

In view of the general economic crisis in Europe, vast unemployment, struggle of political parties which presented the creation of a stable government, tens of thousands of hungry people, unable to find work, not having the language of the customs, and the resources of Europe which generously offered their hospitality, burdened even more her economic life.

During these very critical days, when the threat of war gradually becomes an inevitable reality, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had a conversation with von Ribbentrop concerning refugees. Dr. Kennedy, U.S. ambassador, reported to Washington about this conversation which shows the unusual interest of Germany's representatives. In view of the extraordinary interest it represents, we quote here a few examples.

"The sooner and the more the case becomes the design to let in the country absorbing him, the more strange this country will react and the case desirable is this effect in the interests of Germany's propaganda. The object of this move is to be the future international solution of the Jewish question, distinct not as false comparison for the United Nations Jewish minority but by the full consciousness of all peoples of the danger which it represents to the social condition of the nation."


...the authorities, when pressed, had to admit that the Jews in Germany at that moment were policemen, murderers, and thieves. The property they possessed had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore decided to confiscate them with the criminal elements of the population. The property which they had acquired illegally would be taken from them. They would be forced to live in districts frequented by the criminal classes. They would be either made as other criminals were obliged to be. The German Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed to insist on having them. It was not, however, willing for them to take the property which had resulted from their illegal operations with Jews (Sons Fr., pg. 375-376).

If for the purpose of accusation it appeared sufficient to present the above-mentioned documents, without clarifying the statement to the effect that the Jews allegedly were put in a position to leave Germany even after the violation of the Nuremberg laws, we believe that for the correct illustration of the historical facts it is necessary to mention, along general lines, the Nazi Displacement policy, and to point out its connection with the aims of aggressive war.

As is known, beginning with May 1935 Jews were barred from military service. It appears that Germany did not need Jews of military age and would not be glad to get rid of them. Yet, at the end of March 1936 an order was issued, according to which Jews of military age were to obtain an exit permit both from civil and military authorities. The purpose of this decree was evident. The preparations were launched.

On the other hand, Heydrich tried to explain that the confiscation of a part of property of the so-called Jews served one sole end, namely, to help the poor Jews at the expense of the rich. He said: "With the Jewish Ghetto fathers, we estimated a certain amount of money from the rich Jews was wanted to emigrate, for saving their money and an additional sum in foreign currency, they made it possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to take the rich Jews away but to get rid of the Jewish problem." (Sons Fr., pg. 375-376).

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N.Y. State Senate, April 1, 1935
and Germany did not want the Jews originating in countries which offered them asylum. The strict control of both civil and military authorities had the purpose of stopping emigration of young Jews for years to come. In the event of war, concentration camps were already prepared. These preemptory measures, taken long before the war, were particularly strictly observed during the war.

On June 3, 1940, the German Consul General of Bucharest wrote a letter to Berlin which was submitted to the Jewish Tribunal. In describing emigration to the United States, he said among other things:

"There is no occasion to suspect that any people of reliable age have left Bucharest with the annual intentions of entering the military service of the enemy side. No support the military authorities to advise" (St. Po., p. 3931).

In the meantime, the Jury of persecution was increasing... Nathan Stahl, President of the Jewish Community in Berlin, speaking from the pulpit of the Frauenstrasse Synagogue declared:

"There is no future for the Jews in this country. Either changes must be forthcoming, or we will not remain to better our Jewish repatriation to foreign countries for emigration as immigrants, while begging the Hitler Government not to deprive Jews remaining here of all possibilities of living and earning a living." In reply to this appeal, a decree was promulgated by virtue of which all foreign passports were to be withdrawn from Jews, on the ground that all passports

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5) New York Times, January 19, 1938
and to be countersigned also by the Ministry of the Interior.

Due along with these government measures, various Party organizations persistently demanded expulsion of Jews from Germany. At the beginning of May, 1938, the *Neue Deutsche* published an article entitled "How it is Getting Worse," in which it stated among other things the following:

"You have to get them out. If they do not know it before, they know it now. There is no place in German territory for a foreign race which hates us. We don't want to have Jews among us... Nor the Jews nor we are to ungrateful. To say how long they will shake from their roots the dust of this for their inexpressible land."

The *Neue Deutsche* suggested that Jews be sent to places which were not yet colonized by Germans.

Gradually the Gestapo began to arrest Jews who in its opinion were unable to obtain immigration visas." Under this pretext, the only Jewish organization, the  

"Emigration Advisory Office" was closed down. The final action in the immigration question was the further ban of permitting Jewish immigration on the condition of surrendering Jewish export trade. The German press informed that further actions could have 650,000 Jews if they would give an enough export order. Negotiations conducted to this effect by semenis remained without results. In individual cases,

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10) *Y.B. Berliner*, July 5, 1936
11) *Y.B. Berliner*, October 22, 1938
12) *Y.B. Berliner*, December 2, 1938
when Jews were permitted to emigrate, their property was almost entirely gone.

Examined, these, of a capital of 100,000 francs ... for the emigre, whereas in 1913, from the total amount of capital the emigre received 25,000 and was permitted to take along all movable property. On the one hand, Germany wanted to get rid of the Jews, and on the other she needed the Jews for propaganda purposes as a tool to cause disintegration among democratic countries.

The same policy of helping the emigration of Jews, though unable to get rid of them once and for all, the Germans pursued not only in Germany but also in the occupied territories from where some tens of thousands of Jews were deported to Poland.

Mr. Edouard Janss, member of the French Profession, one in this field and "proof of their (German) determination to exterminate the Jews and a mark of the ferocity of their activity" (Off. Fr., p. 3972). In substantiation of his opinion, Mr. Janss gave a few interesting examples.

Chairman of the Jews in Paris, stated that there were still 50 Jews in his district who, in his opinion, should be given an opportunity to emigrate rather than be transferred into other departments or even into concentration camps. But his answer
answered in the negative.

...and by a decree of principle that all emigration of Jews residing in the occupied territories of the West, as well as in the non-occupied territories of France shall be prevented" (Op. Cit., p. 316).

Another document, issued by the French Military Council on February 4, 1943, states the following:

"The High Command of the Army and Chief of the Gendarmerie, at the E.D.A.N., has given orders with a view to expediting in a general fashion any emigration of Jews from Germany and from occupied countries" (D.T./T., p. 336).

Germany's policy remained firm. They did not hesitate between the two alternatives: to let the Jews emigrate or to place them into concentration camps; the latter alternative was chosen as the final step on the road of extermination.

B. Ideological Conception of World War II

...and the Government or its official representatives always made it known that the Party stood behind the masses. The Prosecution submitted a "Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Office Bureau of the Party from 1933 to 1941" (Doc. 35-802, Add. Document 174, Appendices, Vol. III, pp. 57-60).
Particularly noteworthy, in this report, are the underlying activities of the Nazi in Austria, where they tried to unite the reactionary anti-Semitic movement, one headed by Czecho-Slovakia and the other, by Prof. O. K. Thanks to the rivalry of the leaders, radical anti-Semitic measures were not introduced for a long time; but after the Nazis succeeded in uniting the two movements, in bringing about the defeat of the liberal party at the elections, and in summoning a new government headed by Engel, the situation changed radically, and the report states with satisfaction:

*Thus a second movement on racial and anti-Semitic foundations had appeared in Europe, in a country where such an event had been considered absolutely impossible (by the end of 1929)* (p. 36).

Anti-Semitism now served as a true front line state divided the Allied armies from those of the Axis. Thus, adoption of racial legislation became compulsory.

For the future benefit of others, in a conversation with Mr. Osválde, Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, after the accession of the Sudetenland, Hitler declared:

*This war must be destroyed. The Jews are our sworn enemies, and at the end of this year there will not be a Jew left in Germany... We will give similar orders to Hungary, Bulgaria, etc., Germany still seeks to daze a chain of anti-Semitic nations, as she would not be able to treat as friends the nations in which the Jews, either through their economic activity or through their high positions, could exercise any kind of influence.* (The Frankfurter Zeitung, 1937, 266, cited by the authority of the French Government).
Elhaida's anti-Semitism rejected any geographical boundaries and became an international weapon particularly designed for her use. She expressed this idea very eloquently in the following fashion:

"The anti-Semitism of a people is among the greatest reserves of the nation... No appeal to all [Jews] will both rouse numerous... Jude must die to save humanity."[1]

C. Propaganda in Actual Action

As the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs listened to Hitler's statement about the murder in which the countries friendly to Germany must solve the Jewish problem, Dr. Beneš, Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, in his statement made to Foreign Minister to add:

"The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in Germany." [Dec. 1938, Office of P.M. Chief of Protocol]

In a special authorization granted to Abetz, as German Ambassador to France, one of his main tasks consisted in

"...morning and evening... of Jewish anti-Semitic property on the basis of exclusive ideas specially given for the matter." [Dec. 1939, Office of Chief of Protocol]

11) New Jersey, Apr. 5, 1944. In connection with Hitler's Foreign policy concerning the Jewish question, the British Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Catterick, added: "Naziism in all its forms has been spreading the American and European throughout Europe to accelerate the execution of such "humanitarian measures," that is, measures of racial extermination."" [Cf. p. 74, L.H.]

In his closing speech, the prosecutor also quoted Hitler's conversation with Brandt: "Anti-Semitism is a useful revolutionary weapon. Anti-Semite propaganda in all countries is an almost indispensable weapon in the extension of our political campaign... It is beyond question the most important weapon in my propaganda arsenal." [Cf. p. 1413]. Major J.H. Widdow, in his book,
As is known, these instructions were actually orders for confiscation of Jewish property in general and of Jewish cultural and artistic treasures in particular.

However, Ribbentrop took an interest not only in Jewish property but also in the fate of the Jews themselves. In a telegram dated October 1, 1939, addressed to his leading officials of Germany, including Ribbentrop, he wrote that

"The solution of the Jewish problem in the occupied territories of France requires boldness. It is necessary to register as soon as possible the citizenship status of the racial German Jews who were living here at the beginning of the war. The measures proposed here above are to be authorized as fully the first step toward the solution of the entire problem. I refer to myself to make other proposals." (OFF, IV., p. 2679, Doc. 68-256, Nazi Germany and Occupation, Vol. 2, p. 262).

These were preparatory measures to the deportation of Jews from France to Poland.

Hitler attached great importance to the deportation of Jews from all occupied countries and, apparently, Ribbentrop was to be credited with the original idea of deportations. Mr. Fauré, member of the French Government, presented an order that was issued by Hitler on September 24, 1939, in which he stated that

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me today by telephone to take all possible measures to evacuate the Jews living in the occupied territories in Europe, since it is certain that Jews who are not German are at present under the control of the German authorities and must be held responsible for acts of sabotage and subversion."

The order demanded that, first and foremost, that such measures were to be carried out in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and occupied Norway, and that the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Danish Governments be approached with the aim of getting the evacuation started in those countries. (OFF, IV., p. 2679, Doc. 68-256, Vol. 2, p. 262).
In February 1938, Ribbentrop had a conversation with Mussolini on the unsatisfactory situation of the Italian resources concerning Jewish emigration. Mussolini insisted that France had already introduced anti-Jewish measures.

"...those were extremely useful. They were only temporary, because here too the final solution would be in the deportation of the Jews to the East." Mussolini did not agree with the criticism of the Italian measures, and quoted in this respect the French policy of ensuring cooperation between Germany and Italy. (Spg. Tr., p. 6296).

In 1940, Hitler met with the Hungarian Regent in the presence of Ribbentrop. On this occasion, Hitler insisted on a new anti-Semitic legislation. Then Hitler, visibly very excited, declared: "You know very well what it is going to be. I have noted that you have turned to Hitler and said: "There are only two possibilities — either that or to return the Jews."

Lampe-Inquart, Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands, also referred to a conversation with Hitler concerning the evacuation of Jews from countries who wished to maintain friendly relations with Germany. Hitler remarked: "I don't want to see that the Jews could be settled on the eastern borders of the German Reich. Let them be placed as far as possible to other parts of the world."

Footnote 49: This conversation was referred to during the trial by the British High Court, who had been asked to serve as an interpreter of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in that capacity was present at the above-mentioned conversation (Offs. Tr., p. 1195). The same speech of the British High Prosecutor (Offs. Tr., p. 1196).
The Jewish problem occupied an outstanding place in the Fuehrer
and his closest aides at Ribbentrop. The German Ministry of Foreign
relations collaborated with a number of organizations and persons whose acts
directed toward the extermination of Jews. Ribbentrop (who regarded Hitler
10) "the symbol of Germany" and hosted his participation in the regime's anti-S.
Legislation, could not deny the anti-Semitic activities of his Ministry:

"It is perfectly clear that because of the principle, or the anti-
Semitic tendency of German policy, this would spread to all departments,
and that, of course, in some sphere or other, every department would
come in contact with these matters" (Bkh. Tr., p. 695).

The extent to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was busy in anti-Semitic
activities may be seen from the (confidential) minutes of the Inter-Session of the
representatives of the German Mission in Europe, held in Ankara
between April 2 and 6, 1944 (see 3151-PS, Office of the U.S., Chief of Council).

11 Some representatives of various foreign offices attended this conference and made
detailed reports on their anti-Semitic activities in various European countries, and
particular reference was made to deportations. One of the points of the discussion was
the question of the possibility of carrying out more severe measures against Jews
in the various countries by using diplomatic channels. The angle under which the

10) "I saw in Adolf Hitler the symbol of Germany and the only man who could win
this war for Germany, and therefore I did not want to make any difficulty for
him, cause him any difficulty, and remain loyal to him into the end"
(Bkh. Tr., p. 6957).
work of this conference can be deduced from the problem raised there, 

saying that "the physical selection of Eastern Jews would deplete even of its 

biological reserves."

The Prosecution submitted also other documents which showed how anti-Jewish 

activities beyond Germanic borders and as their task the furthest developments of 

these activities. The documents also reveal that a special staff of experts in 

questions dealing with organization of property was established, in order to 

"collect within the limits all questions connected with the anti-

Jewish action in foreign countries, a forecast of the situation in the 

countries concerned and to apply to the situation in the countries concerned."

At the same time preparations had begun for the establishment of a special Jewish 

archive to collect all historical and contemporary material, books, and the like, 

and, preserving Jewish life, customs, literature.

At the session held on April 2-3 the questions raised about the continuance 
of an international anti-Jewish campaign. This film was widely released and already 

on June 15, 1943, one of the heads of the department subordinates to Rosenberg cast out 

a demand against the Jews that the Reichs Eternal Lawform the state an anti-

All the technical preparations were made, the city "safe from air-raid" shown, and the names of delegations as well as honorary guests from home and abroad indicated.

The organizers of the Congress were guided by the fact that there was hardly any increase of anti-Semitism in democratic countries, and they felt it necessary to illustrate that in strategic retreat on all fronts did not mean an ideological retreat. It was necessary that the feeling caused by enemy propaganda, that National Socialist parties in retreating on all fronts be reduced by this great anti-Jewish Congress — the circular motion. In addition, it was important for Germany to create the impression that the alleged enemies were concentrating at the "unprovoked" Stolpker War and to fight against the barbarian Germany, but to fight for world Jewry. However, the events developed so rapidly that they had to abandon the idea of convening the Congress.

The German foreign policy regarding the persecution of Jews in connection with planning and waging an aggressive war was just as radical and consistent as the internal policy. It was based on the conviction that the anti-Semitism preceding fascism — wherever and whenever applied — had one basic fault: the application of anti-Semitic measures was geographically limited, and with but one exception (the Spanish Inquisition) were only half-measures.

17) For further details see Max Weizmann, "The Nazi Professors," Jewish Scientific Institute (ITI), New York, 1945, pp. 229-235.
That is why the Jews expelled from one country easily found shelter in another one, adapted themselves to the new surroundings and settled without difficulty. That is why all states under German influence were to introduce racial legislation and help to physical extermination of Jews. That is also why the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs run an affiliation of the Gestapo and diplomats, like Ribbentrop, Hauff, Pfeffer and More (who was turned over to the French Court) conducted the foreign policy of Germany and represented her abroad.