The Jewish Question as an International Problem

Until the Nazi's acquired confidence behind the veil of state and while they were still learning to steer cautiously between the sides and subtleties of foreign policy, their statement as to the aims and tasks of Nazism were not only more than separate but often concealed the truth of their actual intentions. They followed these tactics in regard to the geographical limitations of Nazism as well, as early as September, 1932, Rosenberg delivered an important speech at the Reichstag, in the presence of leading members of the Party, assuring that Nazism is a purely domestic affair depending on the history of the peoples, which, like France, is not designed for export. But considering Nazism as a purely internal phenomenon, biased in the colors of these folkways, Rosenberg did not conceal that foreign policy must depend on racial ideology, for "without a thorough knowledge of this question (i.e., racial theory) one cannot understand history and therefore foreign policy." 2

1) National Socialism is thus an abnormally German phenomenon. It can be explained only by German circumstances and motives. In this connection, one must apply this principle saying as Venda and that "It is not an article for export." Sonderstoß und Polizeimission. In Herbert von Huth, 20 von反应ktionen. Munich, 1932.
Despite the fact that in 1933 Rosenberg, in order to oppose European and
American democracies, asserted that the Jewish question was a purely domestic
affair, in February 1938, in the presence of foreign diplomats and the press
he stated as follows:

"The solution of the Jewish question is a problem not limited
to Germany, but represents an international problem of the greatest
importance."

The interest the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed in the Jewish
question and the importance it attached to it even prior to the war, may be seen
from the memorandum of January 21, 1938, submitted by the Chief Prosecutor under
Document 3112-PS. This memorandum addressed to "All Senior Jewish authorities and
Union Bureau for Foreign Affairs" emphasized, first of all, the link between
the realization of the idea "of Greater Germany" and the solution of the Jewish
question. It explains it by the fact that the Jewish policy was the result of
the event which occurred in 1938 and at the same time influenced them.

3) Document 3112-PS, Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel. Rosenberg further
elaborated the same idea: "The Jewish question has never been confined to
either country or one nation, and one to those who failed to realize the interna-
tional character of this problem" (ibid., Rep. 4-3, 1941, p.

4) "It is certainly no coincidence that the setback in 1938 was brought
about against the solution of the Jewish question simultaneously with the realiza-
tion of the idea "of Greater Germany," since the Jewish policy was both
the basis and consequence of the events of the year 1938" (ibid., p.3).
The memorandum attaches decisive importance to the economic life of Austria and
the economy anti-Semitic legislation which purged the economic life of Austria and
Germany from Jews, and organized nearly the entire trade and industry. This ob-
tivation was to develop further and "in a measurable time there will no longer be
any talk of Jewish property in Germany." The memorandum makes as the final goal
emigration of all the Jews living in Reich territory, but remarks that emigration
encountered difficulties by the non-desirability of Jews to leave Germany even after
the proclamation of the Newenburg laws. The memorandum explains it by the fact that
the Jews did not want to part with their property: "The Jewish authorities employed in
Jewish properties were in many cases already less at mass emigration of Jews than at the
transfer of Jewish property," but actually the Jewish property have been taken away from
the German people by Jewish business methods — that is why it would not be expedient
to permit its removal from Germany.

Not emigration of Jews not only from Germany but also from Poland, Hungary and
Romeo became more and more pressing and assumed an international character. The
task of Nazis consisted in furthering emigration not of wealthy Jews but of the
mass of Jews without means. This type of emigration will contribute to the increase
of anti-Semitism in immigration countries and "as task of the German Foreign Policy
must be to further this wave of anti-Semitism." The memorandum concludes with the
following words:
The trend to burden the democratic countries with the responsibility and cost of

refugees was an able strategic move of Hitler, designed first of all to
destroy the rear of the future enemy in preparation of an aggressive war. Mr. Fuchs,
member of the British delegation, who submitted to the tribunal the document in question,
said that he did it to add something "to the work of reference to the persecution
of the Jews as related to crimes against peace" (Off. Tr., p. 212).

In view of the general economic crisis in Europe, vast unemployment, struggles
of political parties which prevented the creation of a stable government, tens of
thousands of hungry people, unable to find work, not having the language or the
customs of France which generously offered them hospitality, burdened even more her
economic life.

During the very critical days, when the threat of war gradually becomes an
inevitable reality, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had a conversation with
von Ribbentrop concerning refugees. Mr. Kennedy, U.S. ambassador, reported to
Washington about this conversation which shows the apathy of Germany's
representation. In view of the extraordinary interest it represents, we quote here
a few examples:
Although, when pressed, had said to express that the Jews in Germany could be admitted as peddler, merchants and tailors. The property they possessed had been acquired illegally. The German Government had therefore decided to actuate them with the original elements of the population. The property which they had acquired illegally would be taken from them. They would be forced to leave in districts frequented by the original classes. They would be either police or other criminals were obliged to do. The German Government could not help it if some of these criminals escaped to other countries which seemed to anxious to have them. It was not, however, willing for them to take the property which had resulted from their illegal operations with Jews. (Cf. V., p. 224-225.)

If for the purpose of evacuation it appeared sufficient to prevent the aforementioned documents, without clarifying the statement to the effect that the Jews

allegedly were put in a hurry to leave Germany even after the evacuation of the

Hamburg Jews, we believe that for the correct illustration of the historical facts

it is necessary to mention, along general lines, the Nazi Annihilation policy, and

to point out its connection with the aims of aggressive war.

As to war, beginning with May 1935 Jews were barred from military service.

It appears that Germany did not need Jews of military age and would be glad to

get rid of them. Yet, at the end of March 1936 an order was issued, according to

which Jews of military age were to obtain an exit permit both from civil and military

authorities. This purpose of this decree was obvious. War preparations were launched.

On the other hand, Himmler tried to explain that the confiscation of a part

of property of the non-Jewish Jews served one of the ‘aims’ to help the

poor Jews at the expense of the rich ones. Through the Jewish Schulgesellschaft,

a certain amount of money from the rich Jews was raised to emigrate,

for capital this amount, and an additional sum of foreign currency, they made it

possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to help the rich

Jews leave but to get rid of the Jewish ones.” (Cf. V., p. 225.)

4) M. J. Goldman: Jehovah, April 1, 1935.
and Germany did not want the Jews emigrating youth to enlist voluntarily or be drafted to serve in countries which offered them asylum. The strict control of both civil and military authorities had the purpose of stopping emigration of young Jews for good.

In the event of war, concentration camps were already prepared. These preventive measures, taken long before the war, were particularly strictly observed during the war.

On June 2, 1942 the German Consul General of Casablanca wrote a letter to Berlin which was submitted to the Jewish Tribunal. In describing emigration to the United States, he said among other things:

"There is no occasion to suspect that young people of reliable age have left Casablanca with the desired intention of entering the military service on the enemy side. We suspect the military authorities to advise it." (Mrs. Le., p. 3931).

In the meantime, the Army of persecution was increasing. Rallidt Waltz, President of the Jewish Community in Berlin, speaking from the pulpit of the Frauenwasser synagogue declared:

"There is no future for the Jews in this country. Changes cannot be forthcoming for we will not probably be better."

Jews appealed to foreign countries for asylum as immigrants, while begging the Hitler Government not to deprive Jews remaining here of all possibilities of making a living. In reply to this appeal, a decree was promulgated by which all foreign passports were to be withdrawn from Jews on the ground that all passports

7) B.N. Herald Tribune, January 29, 1938
8) B.N. Herald Tribune, January 29, 1938
And to be countersigned also by the Ministry of the Interior.

But along with these government measures, various Party organizations persistently demanded expulsion of Jews from Germany. At the beginning of May, 1938, the "Münchner Rundschau" published an article entitled "How it is Getting Worse," in which it stated among other things the following:

"Now here they can't get out. If they had not known it before, they know it now. There is no place in German territory for a foreign race which hates us. We don't want to have Jews among us... How the Jews see we see in return. We only love how they will shake from their feet the dust of this for their inexcusable land."

The "Münchner Rundschau" suggested that Jews be sent to places which were not yet colonized by Gypsies.

Gradually the Gestapo began to arrest Jews who in its opinion were capable to obtain immigration visas. Under this pretext, the only Jewish organization, the "Immigration Advisory Office" was closed down. The final notice in the immigration question was the bitter one of permitting Jewish immigration on the condition of forbidding German export trade. The German press informed that further notices could have 650,000 Jews if they would give an enough export service. Negotiations conducted in this effort by Senate remained without result. In individual cases,

10) E.W. World News, July 6, 1938
11) E.W. News, October 22, 1938
12) E.W. News, December 9, 1938
When Jews were permitted to emigrate, their property was almost entirely gone.

Displaced, cease, of a capital of 100,000 inhabitants — after all emigrating and

taking in — 75,000 frightened remained for the emigrants, leaving in 30% from

the sale amount of capital the emigrants received 50,000 and were permitted to take

goin all movable property. On the one hand, Germany wanted to get rid of the

Jews, and on the other side they needed the Jews for propaganda purposes and tried to

create disintegration among democratic countries.

The same policy of hindering the emigration of Jews, though wishing to get

rid of them once and for all, the Germans pursued not only in Germany but also

in the occupied territories from where some tens of thousands of Jews were

deported to Poland.

Dr. Max Brand, member of the French Parliament, saw in this fact

“proof of their (German) determination to exterminate the Jews and a mark of the

ferocity of their activity” (Dr. Fr. 9, 1939). In substantiation of the relation

Mr. Bode gave a few interesting examples.

According to Dr. Jean de Leeu, in his report to the occupying

authorities in Paris, stated that there were still 90 Jews in his district who

in his opinion, should be given an opportunity to emigrate rather than to transfer

to other departments or even into concentration camps. But his superiors
answered in the negative.

While this for the reason that the Reichsstatthalter Rausch has stated that no measures of principle that can radicalise the Jews residing in the occupied territories of the East, as well as the non-occupied territories of France shall be prevent the evacuation of Jews from Germany and from occupied countries (B.I.T./V.8., 6, 1939).

Another document, issued by the French Military Council on February 4, 1942, states the following:

"The Rhesus-Rausch, as Chief of the German Police, at the R.B.I. has given orders with a view to 'speeding up' the evacuation of Jews from Germany and from occupied countries (B.I.T./V.8., 6, 1939)

Germany's policy remained firm. They did not institute holidays in the face of the alternatives: to let the Jews migrate on to places into concentration camps; the latter alternative was chosen as the first step on the road of extermination.

B. Ideological Conceptions of World War II

Wherever the Nazi Government or its official representatives were unable to voice their views openly, the Nazi Party worked behind the scenes. The Propaganda submitted a "Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Office Bureau of the Party from 1933 to 1941" (Fed. 3355/48, Report, December 1939, Vol. III, pp. 37-40)
Particularly noteworthy, in this report, are the underlying activities of the Nazi in Russia, where they tried to unite the reactionary anti-Semitism movements, one headed by Joseph Goebbels and the other, by Prof. Gies. Thanks to the rivalry of the leaders, radical anti-Semitic measures were not introduced for a long time, but after the Nazis succeeded in uniting the two movements, they brought about the defeat of the liberal party at the elections, and in assuming a new government headed by Goebbels, the situation changed radically, and the report states with satisfaction.

"Thus a second movement of racial and anti-Semitic foundations and interests in Europe is a country in which such an event has been considered completely impossible by the end of 1937."

Anti-Semitism was to serve as a true front line state, divided the Allied armies from those of the Axis. Thus, adoption of racial legislation becomes compulsory. For the future benefit of others, in a conversation with Mme. Cavaliere, Countess

Minister of Foreign Affairs, after the announcement of the Eiffel Tower, Hitler declared:

"This war must be destroyed. The Jews are our sworn enemies, and at the end of this year there will not be a Jew left in Germany... We will give similar orders to Austria, Hungary, etc... Germany will have a clean slate of anti-Semitic nation, as she would not be able to treat as friends the nation in which the Jews, either through their economic activity or through their high positions, could exercise any kind of influence."

Hitler's anti-Semitism rejected any geographical boundaries and became an international weapon particularly designed for war aims. He expressed this idea as eloquently in the following fashion:

"The anti-Semitism of our people is among the most potent weapons of the nation... We appeal to all (Germans) for both moral reasons... and due to the demoralizing effect upon the enemy.

C. Excerpts from Recent Speeches

In the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs listened in silence to Hitler's statement about the number in which the countries friendly to Germany must solve the Jewish problem. Dr. Schuschnigg, Deputy Prime Minister of the Foreign Ministry, in his statement crypto to Germany's policy to solve the Jewish problem, Dr. Schuschnigg, Deputy Prime Minister of the Foreign Ministry, in his statement made to foreign correspondents to make

"The Jewish problem will be solved similarly to that in Germany."

(Dec. 1941-23, Office of the
Chief of Protocol)

In a special authorization granted to Abele, an Austrian Ambassador to France, one of his main tasks consisted in

"...announcing and securing... of Jewish anti-Nazi property on the basis of adequate laws specially given for the matter." (Dec. 1941-21, Office of the
Chief of Protocol)

17) May 5, 1941. In connection with Hitler's foreign policy concerning the Jewish question, the British Chief Propagandist, Sir Acheson, added: "Moreover, it is clear that, since 1930, has been considering the situation in his Ministry and is anxious to the world to accelerate the execution of such "political measures," that is, measures of racial extermination." (Off. Tr., July 1939)

In his closing speech, the prosecutor also quoted Hitler's conversation with Goebbels: "Anti-Semitism is a useful revolutionary weapon. Anti-Semitic propaganda is an almost indispensable weapon in the continuation of our political campaign... It is beyond question the most important weapon in my propaganda arsenal." (Off. Tr., July 1939). Major J.R. Morris, in his book,
As is known, these instructions were actually orders for confiscation of Jewish property in general and of Jewish cultural and artistic treasures in particular.

However, Ribbentrop took an interest not only in Jewish property but also in the fate of the Jews themselves. In a telegram dated October 1, 1938, addressed to his leading colleagues in Germany, including Ribbentrop, he wrote that

"The solution of the Jewish problem in the occupied territories requires rapid and far-reaching action. As a result of the situation existing in the occupied territories, the Jewish quota must be reduced as soon as possible. The measures proposed here above are to be considered as merely the first step toward the solution of the entire problem. I refer to myself to make other proposals." (OFL, Tr. 66093, Dec. 12-55, Nazi Documents and Accusation, Vol. 551, p. 272).

These were preparatory measures to the deportation of Jews from France to Poland.

Hitler attached great importance to the deportation of Jews from allied or occupied countries and, apparently, Ribbentrop was to be credited with the original idea of deports. In October, several of the French provinces, presenting an order

It is

issued by Hitler on September 24, 1938, in which he stated that

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs has instructed me today by telephone to issue an order to evacuate as many as possible of the Jews to the occupied territories in Europe, since it is certain that Jews exist in every country and must be made responsible for acts of espionage and subversion,"

The order states that some countries were in process of

German, Austrian, Belgian, and assorted provisional countries, instructs the Bulgarian, Hungarian and other Governments to approach with the goal of getting the evacuation started in these countries. (OFL, Tr. 66093, Dec. 12-55).

(21) Denying that in this case it referred to deportation to Poland, Ribbentrop asserted that it had referred to evacuation of Jews to North Africa.
In February 1943 Ribbentrop had a conversation with Mussolini on the unsatisfactory situation of the Italian reserve concerning Jewish emigration.

Mussolini replied that Germany had already introduced anti-Jewish legislation...

...which were extremely useful. They were only temporary, because here too the final solution would be in the deportation of the Jews to the East. Mussolini did not agree with the criticism of the Italian minister, and turned it back to the French minister of foreign relations between Germany and Italy" (Off. Tr., p. 626A).

In 1944 Hitler met with the Hungarian Regent in the presence of Ribbentrop.

On this occasion Hitler formulated a new German anti-Semitic legislation. Then Hitler, visibly very excited, asked: "What shall I say of what I suppose to say as I suppose to say this to Munich? The Foreign Ministry turned to the Regent and asked: "What?"

There are only two possibilities — either that or to intern the Jews."

Lajos August, Chief Commissioner for the Netherlands, also referred to a conversation with Hitler concerning the internment of Jews from countries who wished to maintain friendly relations with Germany. Hitler said:

...wanted to know that the Jews could be settled in the eastern regions of the German empire and as far as they could not contribute to other causes of the world" (Off. Tr., p. 316B).

19 This conversation was referred to during the trial by the British Chief Prosecutor, who had Prof. Laski, who served as an interpreter of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in that capacity was present at the above mentioned conversation (Off. Tr., p. 657A). He also the speech of the British Chief Prosecutor (Off. Tr., p. 1430A).
The Jewish problem occupied an outstanding place in the forum, and his faithful aide, Ribbentrop, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaboration within a number of organizations and persons whose aims were directed toward the extermination of Jews. Ribbentrop, who regarded Hitler as the "symbol of Germany," and denied his participation in the regime's anti-Jewish legislation, could not deny the anti-Semitic activities of his Ministry.

"It is perfectly clear that because of the principle, or the anti-Semitic tendency of German policy, this would seem to all departments, and that, of course, in some sphere or other, every department could come in contact with these matters" (SFR Tr., p. 681).

The extent to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was fully engaged in anti-Semitic activities may be seen from the (confidential) minutes of the Working Section of the commissaries on Jewish Questions of the German Missions in Europe, held in France, based on April 3 and 4, 1933 (Doc. 3389-PS, Office of the Chief of Counsel).

31 representatives of various foreign offices attended this conference and made detailed reports on their anti-Semitic activities in various European countries, and particular reference was made to deportations. Part of the points of the discussion was the question of the possibility of carrying out more severe measures against Jews in the various countries by using diplomatic channels. The angle under which the 16) "I saw in Adolf Hitler the symbol of Germany and the only man who could save this war for Germany, and therefore I did not want to make any difficulty for him, cause him any difficulty, and remained loyal to him unto the end."

(Tr., p. 697)."
work of this conference was carried out may be deduced from the problem raised there, namely, that "the physical elimination of the Jewish people would involve loss of its biological reserves."

The Prosecution submitted also other documents which showed how anti-Jewish activities beyond Germany's borders and in their tests the further developments of these activities. The documents also revealed that a special staff of consultants on questions dealing with organization of property was established. In order to

"collect within the limits all questions connected with the anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, a number of the Gauwürter to be appointed, consultants for Jewish questions."

At the same time preparations had begun for the establishment of a special Jewish bureau to collect all historical and contemporary materials, books, and the like, and conserving Jewish life, culture, literature.

At the session held on April 8-9, the questions raised about the organization of an international anti-Jewish network. This plan was highly advanced on already on June 13, 1939, one of the heads of the department subordinates to Rosenberg sent out a direct instruction informing that the National annual. Remarkably the state anti-Jewish network."

(Inc. 1939-40),
All the technical precautions were made, the city "safe from air-raid" content, and the names of delegates as well as honorary guests from home and abroad indicated. The organizers of the Congress were guided by the fact that there was hardly any increase of anti-Semitism in democratic countries, and they felt it necessary to illustrate how a strategic retreat on all fronts did not mean an ideological retreat. It was necessary that the feeling caused by every propaganda, that National Socialism in retracting on all fronts be refused by this great anti-Semitic Congress — the circular motion. In addition, it was important for Germany to create the impression that the armed forces were concentrating on the "unregarded" Siegfried Line not to fight against the barbarian Germany, but to fight for world Jewry. However, the events developed so rapidly that they had to abandon the idea of convening the Congress.

The German foreign policy in regard to the persecution of Jews in connection with planning and waging an aggressive war was just as radical and consistent as the internal policy. It was based on the conviction that the anti-Semitism preceding Hellenism — wherever and whenever applied — had one basic fault: the application of anti-Semitic measures was geographically limited, and with but one exception (the Spanish Inquisition) were only half-measures.

17) For further details see Max Neussmann, "The Jews' Professor," Jewish Scientific Institute (JWI), New York, 1945, pp. 223-225.
That in day the Jews expelled from one country easily found shelter in another, no
resistance was offered to the new settlers and settled without difficulty. That in all
states under German influence were to introduce martial legislation and help to
make the extermination of Jews. That in also day the German Ministry of Foreign
affairs not an affiliation of the Jews and diplomats, like Hitler, von Rath, von
Payer and Daxer (ambassadors who was turned over to the French court) conducted the
foreign policy of Germany and represented her abroad.