Introduction

The smoke was still rising over Warsaw from artillery fire and aerial bombardment, when a conference was convened in Berlin on September 21, 1941, devoted to the Jewish problem in occupied Eastern territories. The same day, upon conclusion of the conference, the Chief of the Security Police Heydrich sent out an urgent letter to the chiefs of all Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police relaying the basic resolutions adopted at the conference and the corresponding instructions. This circular letter (No. 85-397-1) stresses, above all, that "the total measures planned (i.e., the final aim) are to be kept strictly secret." Indicating that the final measures cannot be laid down in detail, since they require a thorough preparation both from the technical and economic point of view, Heydrich calls attention to the fact that "the first necessity for the attaining of the final aim is the concentrating of the Jewish population in big towns." Poland, Eastern Prussia, Posen, Lower and Upper Silesia were to be cleared of Jews who in turn were to be sent to a limited number of concentration towns. This concentration of Jews in a few centers was intended in order to facilitate the implementation of later measures. The letter further states that only such towns must be chosen which are either railroad junctions or lie on a railway. In the first place, Jews from Jewish communities of less than
The first duty of these councils consisted in taking a census of the Jews according to sex and age groups. However, special emphasis was laid on efforts helping the evacuation of Jews and their re-settling in new places. The evacuation was to be justified by the fact that Jews allegedly participated in "frenzied assault and pillage." The Council of Elders was responsible for the compliance, on the part of the Jews, with orders concerning internal administration. Jews were permitted to take along their movable possessions, as far as transportation means were available. However, the remaining commercial and industrial undertakings were to be speedily organized. "The most strict punishment" was to be inflicted upon those who attempted to evade evacuation.

As we see, this order contained general instructions for the establishment of ghettos. It served as a pattern for the occupation authorities of Poland and Lithuania in establishing local ghettos, while granting vast authority to the local officials in selection of further persecution measures.
The question undoubtedly arises as to what the conference meant by "final solution". Did it refer to the physical extermination or to mass evacuation of Jews to special reservations similar to that of Lublin, establishment of ghettos on a large scale, or expulsion of Jews from Europe to some island like Iceland, as was widely rumored?

On the basis of documentation submitted by the prosecution we must reach the conclusion that in September 1939 there was not as yet an official plan or order for the extermination of Jews. Unquestionably, there were discussions about it.

Repeatedly there appeared in the press demands of extermination of Jews, and Hitler himself, in his Reichstag speech of January 30, 1939, warned of the extermination of the Jewish race in Europe. As that time the question of the extermination of Jews was discussed only as a probability and not as a final decision. In his affidavit Raymond E. Geist, U.S. Consul in Venice, stated that Dr. Eichmann, head of the Jewish section of the Gestapo, had told him "that Germany would be saved 'Judenrein'; that all the Jews who failed to leave Germany would be exterminated." This statement was made in 1938, long before the establishment of death camps, and Geist emphasizes that "the statement of Eichmann clearly indicated the eventual program of extermination in accordance with the general final plan. (See, 1979-75, Nazi Concentration and Persecution, Vol. IV, p. 102 - italics ours)."
But there was no final decision as to occasion, nor was there any plan as to its implementation. Later on, when dealing with evidence of the trial in regard to the physical extermination of Jews, we shall dwell on the isolation of Nazi propaganda in this respect and on the place the police occupying the extermination of Jews occupied in final ideology. At this time, we shall limit ourselves to stating that on the basis of the trial evidence this intention cannot be included in the September, 1939 period or the period preceding it. To reach this conclusion on the basis of the voluminous minutes of the “Political-Situation” of May 30, 1940, compiled by Governor General Frank, the meeting was attended by top-ranking officials of the administration and all SS members, and Frank spoke to them in a very outspoken and confidential manner:

"I admit frankly that this (purification process of Poland) will result in the death of a few thousand Poles, above all of those belonging to the intellectual and spiritual leadership."

He appealed to his comrades in arms to carry out these terrorist measures, fully convinced that, though difficult, they would fulfill their duty with honor worthy of SS men:

"I appeal to you, as fighters for National Socialism, and there is no need to add anything else. To carry out these measures..." (p. 6)

1) Describing the German policy in the occupied territories, Frank addressed the audience with the following rhetorical question: "What if I had liked, in this country, the Nazi police and the guard of long standing at my disposal, with whom could I be able to put into effect this policy?"
Speak more of the liquidation of the Polish intelligentsia only, hereby be pointed
out that he had no intention of creating concentration camps. "Whereas we suspect,
shall be liquidated at once" (p. 30).

As to the Jews, Alfred Rosenberg Heidenreich observed the interest which the
Jewish ghetto represents as a source of manpower. "The establishment (of ghettos)
promised to be very valuable" (p. 31). As the time wore on, however, he expressed fear
that some day millions of Jews will become a burden to the Government General.

After all, we cannot just let them starve. The resources which are at the disposal
of the Jews are quite limited" (p. 33). Governor Dr. von Samson praised the Jewish
labourers and pointed out that the demand for them on the part of German firms by
far exceeded the supply (p. 33).

The conferees were of the opinion that it was necessary to reserve Jews for
new purposes, and the future fates of the Warsaw Ghetto at that time did not antici-
patate the further developments of their activities.

Erich Matthesy (one of the closest collaborators of Himmler - head of the
Gestapo Division dealing with Jewish and Church Affairs (Section IV B.4. KdF))

surrounded the Gestapo activities and reported under the following
"Until the year 1942 the general policy was in Germany and in the occupied countries to settle this through planned emigration. The second phase, the concentration of Jews in Poland and the rest of the occupied territories in the East; to large scale transportation to thence. This period was immediately until the beginning of 1942, and the third phase, the final solution of this problem, the planned destruction of the Jewish race. This period covered the period until October 1941 until Himmler gave the order to drain this period of destruction or annihilation? (O.Y. 21, pp. 226-227).

This description of the victim in, on the one hand, innocent in regard to 0 time where mass extermination of Jews began immediately upon the invasion of the UNR territories; on the other hand, it is to conclude. As we shall see further, during the period 1940-1942 the Nazi plans referred only to emigration, as the victims wrongly indicated, but to emigration. There were also cases, and not isolated ones, of mass extermination. Therefore, it appears to be more appropriate to subdivide the history of the German General into two periods: the period of ghettoisation and that of concentration camps with their technical equipment for mass extermination.

After the aforementioned letter of Heydrich in the first official order concerning the establishment of ghettoes, that does not imply that the idea itself was born only with the beginning of the war. Already during the period of war preparations, in the long days of November, 1938, when Nazis passed in review their power in order to test the degree of the preparedness of the German people to participate in the annihilation of the Jewish people, the question of ghettoes was
discussed. Thus, at the historic meeting of November 13, 1938, Bormack himself was against the setting up of ghettos not for humanitarian but for administrative reasons. The head of the German police was concerned about the difficulties which might arise in the ghettos in overcoming "Jewish criminal elements" and the possible artificial creation of a criminal spot where Jews cover one another. At the same meeting Bormack assumed his duties as to the acceptability of such a measure from the point of view of supplying food to the ghettos. It is interesting to note that even after the establishment of ghettos protests were voiced against them. Representatives of social sections, the core of the service of food issues, advised that though segregation of Jews in ghettos the government still left a chance for communication with the outside world. "If food segregation," says Calmus, "can be obtained in a limited extent. Some are organic solutions," Calmus, then he concluded, "some are produced by the fact that there could have to supply Jews with food."

Therefore, he advocated complete exclusion of Jews from Europe. The chief

2) See Dec. 1939-46, Office of H.O., Chief of Security. Apparently, ghettos was one of the desired steps of Germany. Earlier, at a meeting of October 13, 1939, under Bormack's chairmanship, this question was already discussed and he proposed that in an emergency situation ghettos should be created in the individual large cities (Dec. 1939-46, Office of H.O., Chief of Security).

3) P.H. Gerds, "Neuordnung und sozialwirtschaftliche Probleme einer atomistischen Gesellschaft," Zeitschrift für Politik, 1941, pp. 1-2, pp. 26-31. The same number publishes an article by Walter Ossen, "Die auswirtschaftliche Neuordnung zur Lösung der Judenfrage" (pp. 36-42), where he also states to prove the necessity of exclusion of Jews.
Ideologues for the establishment of ghettos and the spiritual father of the Jewisa
Reserve was the Temporaries, as early as February 1, 1939, Alfred Rosenberg made a
solemn declaration before a special audience of foreign diplomats and
representatives of the foreign press, to the effect that Jewish alllemacnes
should acquire territory outside Europe as a basis for all Jews, and that the
territory should by no means be called a Jewish state but simply a Jewish reserva-

4) tion under German control.

But the establishment of such a reservation did not, apparently, satisfy
Governor General Frank. In his diary of October-December, 1941, entitled
"Government Control" (pp. 29-30) he read the following:

"While enough, all the Jews are enclosed in an old part of the
town, the borders of which they may not cross without permission,
but there is still no closed ghetto as such."

In regard to the last circumstance does not play a decisive role, explains
Dr. Buchenau, mayor of Lodz, for the Jews do not dare to leave the town districts
assigned to them. Moreover, the evacuation of the Jewish district of the
town are a serious cause which demands not only isolation but deportation of Jews.
In his diary of May 31, 1943, to find the following statement made by Dr. Buchenau,
Secretary of State:

"That the resettlement in the Lodz district had also had
particularly abysmal results, but already been ended."

4) Buchenau, Buchenau, February 9, 1939.
Among Beobachtung's documents found in the files there are a memorandum which stated as follows:

"After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, the Jewish question will have to have a decisive solution through the institution of ghettos (Dec. 10/28, Office of Dr. Chief of Ghetto)."

"Ghettos were set up, but still prior to their official establishment, by decree of November 19, 1938 (No. 1, 1938, p. 1076) government of provinces, mayors, and local officials were empowered to exclude Jews from certain localities and to prohibit their appearance in public at certain times. By ordinance of December 12, 1938 meaning decreed to proceed in individual cases in such a way that Jews will live together in one house, as much as possible under normal conditions (Dec. 34/29, Office of Dr. Chief of Ghetto)."

"In early as November 28, 1939, i.e., ten months after the beginning of the war and a few weeks after the end of the tragic and hopeless flight for Europe, Beobachtung reported a communication intercepted over the radio regarding the necessity of introducing ghettos for Jews in Poland and other cities."

"The inhabitants of these ghettos must be completely isolated. This is not a problem of forbidding marriages between those and members of other races, it is not a question of a single individual who commits a crime, but of the house from which all crimes have their origin. Those people must be completely isolated or the state of Europe would be ruined."

"In early as November 7, 1939 Governor Dr. Böckler stressed that a special ghettos must be formed for the Jews, and Feuchtwanger in his capacity of Governor General, approved these measures (Handbuch, First Volume, p. 20)."
While reviewing the medieval laws of ghettos, Nazi bureaucrats found it necessary to assume the fact that they did not follow the old pattern. Though race,
as in earlier ages, social and sexual relationships between Jews and Germans were prohibited,

Nazi's policy was fundamentally different in spirit. In the Middle Ages, it is true, surrounded the Jews with high walls and they did not mingle with non-Jews. On the contrary, they encouraged him with the transmission of credits, an indispensable foundation in economic life, which enabled the Jews to become a considerable political power. In Germany of today, the Jew cannot and must not play the same insignificant part in the economic field, such as in public and cultural life of the country. Until their final liquidation, Jews are to live aggregated, without any association with the outside world, under the supervision of the German authorities.

The main instrument of analysis was the economic policies of the Jews as a means to make the Jews live in the ghettos. As soon as the Nazis entered Poland, the first measure taken by them in regard to Jews was the blocking of banking accounts. Jews were allowed to have only one exceeding 1,000 marks, and to draw from their accounts not more than 500 marks. They were allowed to draw from the bank a weekly account not exceeding 200 marks.

1) "Die Juden in der Geschichte der Neu-Germany," Perspektiven der Sozialfragen, Berlin, September 25, 1931 (italics here).

2) Perspektiven der Sozialfragen, Berlin, September 25, 1931 (italics here).
By October 25, 1939, Jews were compelled to register their jewelry, 

submitting the value to the Reich, thus raising the incidence of 

real estate tax. 

In February, on January 31, 1940, an ordinance was formed concerning 

the general registration of real and personal property, claims to third persons, 

dealing with the issue. Failure to comply with this ordinance could result in 

confiscation of property, in addition to imprisonment and fine. 

On March 2, 1940, an ordinance was issued prohibiting the unlimited exchange 

from gold to deutschmarks. Anticipating the possibility of converting the 

deprived money into gold or other precious metals, a further ordinance prohibited 

Jews to purchase such metals without permit, such permits, however, were never 

granted. By the end of 1940, all Jewish credit cooperatives were closed. 

Thus Jews who were in possession of any money which they might have invested 

in industrial or commercial undertakings within the ghetto were placed there 

completely destitute, unable to take part in the economic activities of the ghetto. 

Thus transferred to the ghetto Jews were denied the use of any means of transportation 

and were allowed to take only one personal belongings not exceeding 

25-30 pounds. These restrictions, however, appeared insufficient to the final and 

7) "Verordnungsblatt der Generalgouvernement No. September 7, 1940. 

8) "Rundschau," No. 10, 1940.
on September 13, 1940 a general ordinance (Bommarakte unter Aufsicht des Generalgouvernements) was issued by virtue of which — if circumstances so required — the concerned persons might be compelled to leave their personal belongings and other property if this property was to be found in a district leased to them.

The ordinance states further that no claims for compensation of expenses incurred in this connection can be advanced.

Jewish trade and industry in Poland was completely destroyed. However, Governor of Warsaw, noted that after nationalisation and nationalisation (amendment) that severe punishment could be inflicted upon those who did not observe strictly anti-Jewish measures and extend help to Jews. Out of 195,000 commercial retail enterprises 125,000 belonged to Jews before the war. In 1941, the number of such undertakings decreased to 53,000. It is to be presumed that virtually all Jewish enterprises had been closed. In 1941, there were 8,690 Jewish smiths, shoemakers in Warsaw. In 1941, there remained only 359 of those shops in the ghettos, and these, too, were gradually liquidated.

Even the few enterprises which still existed in the ghettos were permitted to trade within the boundaries of the ghettos only. Not only the sale of merchandise, but even gifts, outside the ghettos was declared unlawful and subject to a fine.

9) "Bommarakte unter Aufsicht des Generalgouvernements" No 25, 1940.
up to 1000 closer and isolated, and between the ages of 14 and 65, were subject to forced labor.

By the end of 1939 all Jews in the occupied territory of Poland were barred in 11 ghettos and 12 Jewish towns, from there they were forbidden to leave under the threat of death penalty. Prior to the war there were about 1,000,000 Jewish residents in this area.

The ghettos meant not only the site of isolating Jews from the rest of the population, but, indirectly, the destruction of Jews by means of starvation, sterilization, sanitary conditions, and execution of ghettos.

Among the documents submitted by the Prosecution we find a memorandum written by Rosenberg (Doc. No. 701, Series of Dist., Chief of Current) in which he states the following:

"All rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They are to be placed in ghettos, and at the same time to be isolated according to race."

To speed relocations for the ghetto inhabitants, special meetings presided by Frank were devoted to this question (October 14-16, 1941). Speaking of the necessity of a strict isolation of ghettos, in view of the ensuing epidemics of spotted fever, Frank announced the food rations for Jewish laborers who were needed for the new industry and added:

10) Der Staat, Krakow, February 23, 1941.
...when the food supply is not sufficient for maintenance. It is necessary that whenever possible special allotments be made to the ghetto. So desk the death rate will increase during the winter.

To this we add a quotation from Zinck in the Daily News of Oct. 22, 1933:

Office of U.S. Chief of Co...

...shortage of food supplies in the ghettos and lack of the... this elementary.

...adequate facilities were admitted by the administration of the Government General...

On pages 68-69 of Frank's Diary for 1941 we read the following:

"The quality of the inhabitants of the ghettos was insufficient... need of clearing out stalls and overcrowding of living quarters..."

...every day claiming hundreds of victims daily and thus reducing the non-Jewish... population; Mr. Frusk, chief of the administration, in his report to the Supreme Council stated:

"The confinement of the Jews in the ghettos was a blessing in itself; the complete closing of the ghettos was now essential..."

In this connection Mr. Frusk then reported on the practical effects of imposing death penalty in cases of leaving the ghettos illegally... and expressed regret that despite the fact that these chambers had already been set up for the investigation of these cases, the examination proceeded very slowly. Only 60 sentences of death penalty were being passed daily, of which only 3 were being carried out. No effective isolation could be attained by judicial penalties only..."
Sooner or later we must come to grips with the reality of the situation. Legislation of the type on a legal-administrative basis is needed to establish the administrative relationship between the two countries and to make the necessary provisions to allow for the movement of goods and people. The establishment of such a relationship would greatly facilitate the process of repatriation and the establishment of normal relations between the two countries.

On 15th February, the Minister for Foreign Affairs convened a meeting to discuss the possibilities of exchanging embassies. The meeting was attended by the representatives of both countries and was held in the presence of the ambassador of the United States. The meeting was participatory and aimed at finding a solution to the present crisis.

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By the end of 1940 the situation in the Eretz Yisrael became catastrophic and at that time already arose the question of its liquidation. In his Diary of December 20, 1940, Frank writes that he postponed the decision until his visit to London and concluded by saying that "in any event he (Frank) could not permit of a town such as Erez being completely contaminated..."

However, one year later Frank's opinion changed a different tone and he no longer directed towards Hagana, where the Jews were to establish a new and "happy" life.

In a closed cabinet session of December 16, 1941 held in London, Frank made the following statement:

"This is what should be done with the Jews. Do you think they will be settled down in the "Ghettos" in villages ("Kibbutzim")? This is what we were told in Berlin! Why did you believe me? I can do nothing with them either in the "Ghettos" or in the "Kibbutzim"?"

"Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourself of all feeling of prejudice. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and destroy them in such a way that it would be impossible, in order to maintain there the structure of the Reich as a whole..."

"You cannot count our power above 3,500,000 Jews, but we shall never be able to take measures which will have any effect, to their annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic resources to be utilized in discussions with the Jewish masses, to be determined in discussions with the Reich. The General Government must begin free of Jews, the case as the Reich. Where and how this is to be achieved in a matter of the offices which we must apply and must here...

The question of the final solution entered into a new phase. Even before the establishment of gas chambers and crematoria, mass extermination of Jews began in the Government General. The measure suggested by Dr. Eshel regarding the further intensification of the punitive courts was rejected by Frank..."
Such activities were not limited to such gigantic and unknown areas. We must find out any place a ray which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are moving in that direction.*

The destruction of the ghettos with the simultaneous annihilation of its inhabitants was the result of thoughts of this sort, which presented the possibility of extermination of the Jews to agree on the following principle:

"We shall have pity only for the German people and for no one else in the world."\(^{12}\)

A vast collection of negative regarding the life in ghettos was published meanwhile and hardly anything new could be added to those human documents describing immense sufferings. An official report by Eichmann, Major General of the Police, addressed to Krueger, General of the Police Force, on June 10, 1943, under the title "Solution of Jewish Question in Galicia," was used at the Nuremberg Trial.

This report most eloquently describes the conditions prevailing in ghettos:

"Nothing but catastrophic conditions were found in the ghettos of Rzeszow and Chlumiec. The Jews of Rzeszow, fearing the evacuation, had concealed their suffering from an apostle fever in underground houses. When evacuation was to start the police found that 30,000 Jews suffering from spotted fever lay about in this ghetto... In order to destroy this center of pestilence at once every police officer decorated against spotted fever was called into action. Then we succeeded in destroying this plague-beat, losing thereby only one officer..." (Ibid., L-14, Sett. Bureaus and Information, 961, pp. 76-77).

The General calls particular attention to the fact that

"...the surprising fact arose that we were able to catch about 25,000 Jews instead of 11,000 Jews who had registered. We had to pull in almost 5,000 Jews corpses out of every kind of hiding places; they had committed suicide by taking poison..." (Ibid., p. 790).

\(^{12}\) Justice Jackson characterized the ghettos as "the laboratory for testing regressive measures" (Ibid., p. 127).
The purge which began in Galicia by the middle of 1941 was completed by June 1943. General Katzenmure was then able to report the following:

“In the meantime, further evacuation (transportation) has continued with energy, so that with effect from 25 June 1943 all Jewish resident aliens would be evacuated. Toward the end of June 1943, I was informed that the entire Jewish population of Galicia was subjected to a mass evacuation with the exception of those living in the camps being under the control of the SS and Police Service, in

**From Panorama**

“...were still caught in small numbers, are given special treatment by the competent administration of Police and Security...”


Enumerating the 60 forced labor camps for Jews, he indicated that they contained altogether 13,360 Jews and hastened to add “this number is being reduced constantly” (p.1763).

The fate of these 13,360 evacuated persons remains a secret of General Katzenmure.

Of quite unusual interest is the report by Szpask, Leader of SD and Police in the Varma District, to Brigade Leader and Major General of Police addressed to Eichmann on May 26, 1943. The report is entitled, “The Russian Ghetto in Varma,” and describes all “military” actions undertaken by units of the German army comprised of 56 officers and 294 men against the inhabitants of the Kyiv Ghetto. The detachment was composed not only of SD men but members of the police but also included regular army personnel outside of Railway Armored Train and a special unit of “Foreign Walrus Battalion” (Doc. E-18, *Ruthenia and Occupation*, Vol. VIII, p.768).

The report describes the organization of the Ghetto and the procedure followed in placing Jews in the ghettos, and then goes on to say:
"It was becoming clear, however, that not all danger had been
removed by this confining the Jews to one place."

Security considerations required removing the Jews from the city of Warsaw
altogether. Orders to effect were issued after Himmler visited Warsaw in
January, 1943. He ordered the transfer to Lublin of all Jewish factories work-
ing for war needs including their workshops. This order was to be carried out in 5
three days, but only when Himmler arrived in Warsaw on April 19, 1943 had the
actual "operations" begun. He regarded his assignment as a purely military one
and called all the inhabitants of the Ghetto, including women and children,
"enemies" even as a result of the measures taken by him were forced to retire from
the roofs and climbed houses to the basements, attics, and cellars. Then these
"resistant" groups continued their fight against the regular German army, and they were
defeated not by the numerical strength of the foe or the superiority of their army,
but because they, too, were seeing the formidable resistance set up, ordered putting
the ghettos on fire. He did it, after Himmler, on April 27— the fourth day of a
fight which the German regarded as not quite "satisfactory"— issued the order
to complete the burning out of the Warsaw Ghetto with the greatest severity and
repetitive ferocity. Thus, in the midst of a roaring fire, children, women and
aged men jumped from the upper stories and with broken bones tried to smear across
the street into buildings not yet set on fire in order not to fall alive in the
hands of the Nazis. Many committed suicide. The General states in his report that
"it was always necessary to use noise, tokens, to drive out the Jews," as a tropically
the residents faced unexplained Jews and those who fled, fleeing beholders, not with
an earlier death in the ghetto.

In conclusion Gen. Strong praised the "villains" with which his troops fought

"The longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the concentration camps. Police and Gestapo became; they fulfilled their duty faithfully;

The General emphasized that this alleged eight killings of Jews had been
certified only by a man who had been trained for three to four weeks and therefore
"high credit should be given for the plans, courage, and devotion to duty which

They are not the yelling centaurs rather a severe condemnation of the German
soldiers, police, or storm-troopers who freely recruited, without any training,
propaganda, incitement, adequate skill were able, without hesitation, to kill
women and children and eat at fire brees of tortured and persecuted peoples.

By May 21, 1943 he made daily reports outlining in detail the arrested
and killed Jews. On May 22 he made the final account which read as follows:
The total of 39,869 caught, about 7,000 were destroyed in the former Hashana during large-scale operation; 4,000 were destroyed by transporting them to the sea; the rest of the 39,869 were destroyed in the former Hashana and therefore 13,000. Beyond the number of 39,000 an estimated number of 2,000 to 3,000 ears were destroyed by being blown up or by burning in the furnace. A total of 60,000 ears were destroyed.

With military accuracy he enumerated his military stock: 7,722 rifles,
10,000 shots, 1,000 shells, 2,000 pistols of various calibers, and so on.

The more than modest quantity of arms was explained by the fact that those and
hundreds of them were thrown away into innumerable and holes which could not be discovered.

The arms which we had destroyed in the former Hashana prevented our men from discovering and capturing the arms.

With German thoroughness the General enumerated the looted Jewish property:
1,500 used uniforms of men, 600 pairs of used trousers, 100 horses, 5 of them in
the former Hashana. Each in possession of the 300,000 former inhabitants of the
Hashana at the time of its destruction amounted to about 12 million drachm and
30,000 dollars, in addition to a large amount of valuables (gold, silver, matchlocks,
etc.). The report does not state, however, for what kind of "boiler" these valuable
were used.

Nothing but ruins remained from the Hashana, according to the report, with the
exception of 6 building, "the former Hashana has been completely destroyed."

But the party General concludes his report by the following reassuring statements:

"...the ruins still contain enormous amount of building and energy material which could be used."13)

13) 12 pictures illustrating the Jewish tragedy were attached to the report. Among
others, the following picture, "The Light and Shadow of the Foes", was