Introduction

The smoke was still rising over Warsaw from artillery fire and aerial bombardment when a conference was convened in Paris on September 21, 1939, devoted to the Jewish problem in occupied Eastern territories. The same day, upon conclusion of the conference, the Chief of the Security Police Heydrich sent out an urgent letter to the chiefs of all Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police relaying the basic resolutions adopted at the conference and the corresponding instructions. This circular letter (No. 40/397-1) stresses, above all, that "the total measures planned (i.e., the final aim) are to be kept absolutely secret." Indicating that the final measures cannot be laid down in detail, since they require a thorough preparation both from the technical and economic point of view, Heydrich calls attention to the fact that "the first necessity for the attaining of the final aim is the concentrating of the Jewish population in big towns." Thus, Eastern Prussia, Posen, Lower and Upper Silesia were to be cleared of Jews who in turn were to be sent to a limited number of concentration towns. This concentration of Jews in a few centers was intended in order to facilitate the implementation of later measures. The letter further states that only such towns must be chosen which are either railroad junctions or lie on a railway. In the first place, Jews from Jewish communities of less than
100 families were to be deported to the concentration points and these communities were to be "eliminated." Secondly, the conference recommended that every Jewish community immediately set up a Jewish Council of Elders. It was to be composed of rabbis and dignitaries. These councils were to be made fully responsible for the exact and practical carrying out of all ordinances issued by the German authorities. The main duty of these councils consisted in taking a census of the Jews according to sex and age groups. Moreover, special emphasis was laid on efforts helping the evacuation of Jews and their re-settling in new places. The evacuation was to be justified by the fact that Jews allegedly participated in "blood-thirsty attacks and pillage." The Council of Elders was responsible for the compliance, on the part of the Jews, with orders concerning internal administration. Jews were permitted to take along their movable possessions, as far as transportation means were available. However, the remaining commercial and industrial undertakings were to be speedily organized. The "most strict punishment" was to be inflicted upon those who attempted to evade evacuation.

As we see, this letter contained general instructions for the establishment of ghettos. It served as a pattern for the occupation authorities of Poland and Germany in establishing local ghettos, while granting vast authority to the local stooges in selection of further persecution measures.
The question unmissably arose as to what the conference meant by final aim. Did it refer to the physical extermination or to mere evacuation of Jews to special reservations similar to that of Lublin, establishment of ghettos on a large scale, or expulsion of Jews from Europe to some island like Iceland, as was widely reported?

On the basis of documentation submitted by the prosecution we can reach the conclusion that in September 1939 there was not as yet an official plan or order for the extermination of Jews. unquestionably, there were discussions about it.

Repeatedly there appeared in the press demands of extermination of Jews, and Hitler himself, in his Führer's speech of January 30, 1939, warned of the extermination of the Jewish race in Europe. At that time the question of the extermination of Jews was discussed only as a probability and not as a final decision. In his affidavits Raymond R. Gedrit, U.S. Consul to Venice, stated that Dr. Hauselbacher, head of the Jewish section of the Gestapo, had told him: "But Germany would be saved from Jews; so that all Jews who failed to leave Germany would be exterminated." This statement was made in 1938, long before the establishment of death camps, and Consul Gedrit emphasizes that "this statement of Hauselbacher clearly indicated the eventual consequence of extermination in accordance with the general Nazi plan (see, 1929-39, Nazi Genocide and Persecution, Vol. IV, p. 302 - italics ours)."
But there was no final decision as to mobilization, nor was there any plan as to its implementation. Later on, when dealing with evidence of the trial in
regard to the physical extermination of Jews, we shall dwell on the evidence of
Nazi propaganda in this respect and on the place the above concerning the exter-
mination of Jews occupied in Nazi ideology. At this time, we shall limit our-
ourselves to stating that on the basis of the trial evidence this intention cannot
be included in the September, 1939 period or the period preceding it. To reach
this conclusion on the basis of the voluminous minutes of the "Political-Crime"
of May 30, 1942, conducted by Governor General Frank. The meeting was attended by
representatives of the administration and all SS members, and Frank spoke to
them in a very outspoken and confidential manner:

"I admit frankly that this (purification process of Poland) will
result in the death of a few thousand Poles, above all of those be-
longing to the intellectual and spiritual leadership.

As expected, his audience in awe to carry out these terrorist measures,
fully convinced that, though difficult, they would fulfill their duty with honor
worthy of SS men,

"I appeal to you, as fighters for National Socialism, and
there is no need to add anything else. To carry out
these measures..." (p. 86)

[1] Describing the German policy in the occupied territories, Frank addressed the
audience with the following rhetorical question: What not I had been, in this
country, the Nazi police and in guard of long standing at my disposal, with
then would I be able to put into effect this policy?"
Speak more of the liquidation of the Polish intelligentsia only, whereby he pointed out that he had no intention of creating concentration camps. Wherever we suspect shall be liquidated at once" (p. 30).

As to the Jews, BrigadierGeneral Heydenreich stressed the interest which the Jewish ghetto represents as a source of manpower. "The establishment of ghettos proved to be very valuable" (p. 31). At the same time, however, he expressed fear that some day millions of Jews will become a burden to the Government General. After all, we cannot just let them starve. The resources which are at our disposal are quite limited" (p. 32). Governor for, however, praised the Jewish labours and pointed out that the demand for them on the part of German firms by far exceeded the supply (p. 33).

The commandante was of the opinion that it was necessary to reserve Jews for war purposes, and the future harrassment of the Warsaw Ghetto at that time did not anticipate the further developments of their activities.

Erich Mielke (one of the closest collaborators of Himmler - head of the Gestapo Devizes dealing with Jewish and Church Affairs (Section IV B. 7 (b)) surmised the Gestapo activities and described under with the following...
"Until the year 1942 the general policy was in Norway and in the occupied countries to Nelson this through planned liquidation. The second phase, the concentration of Jews in Poland and the rest of the occupied territories in the East, began to have an impact in adjoining. This period was approximately until the beginning of 1942, and the third phase, the final solution of this problem, the planned destruction of the Jewish race. This period covered the period until October 1944, until after the order to begin this period of destruction or extermination. (Off. No., pp. 239-357).

This description of the witness is, on the one hand, constant in regard to 0 time where mass extermination of Jews began immediately upon the invasion of the Soviet territories; on the other hand, it is too schematic. As we shall see further, during the period 1940-1942 the Nazi plans referred not to liquidation, as the witness wrongly indicated, but to extermination. There were also cases, and not isolated cases, of mass extermination. Therefore, it appears to be more appropriate to subdivide the history of the German General into two periods: the period of mass extermination and that of concentration camps with their technical equipment for mass extermination.

EXPLANATIONS

If the aforementioned letter of Heydrich in the first official order concerning the establishment of ghettos, that does not imply that the idea itself was born only with the beginning of the war. Already during the period of war preparations, in the months of November, 1938, when Nazis passed in review their power in order to test the degree of the preparedness of the German people to participate in the annihilation of the Jewish people, the question of ghettos was
discussed. Thus, at the historic meeting of November 13, 1938,bruary himself,
was against the setting up of ghettos not for humanitarian but for administrative
reasons. The head of the German police was concerned about the difficulties which
might arise in the ghettos in covering "Jewish criminal elements" and the possible
statistical creation of a criminal net where Jews cover one another. At the same
meeting June expressed his doubts as to the advisability of such a measure from the
point of view of supplying food to the ghettos. It is interesting to note that even
after the establishment of ghettos protests were voiced against them. Represen-
tatives of social agencies, the care at the service of Nazi manpower, noticed that
though segregating Jews in ghettos the government still left a fighter for com-
communication with the outside world. "A food supply," says Germany, "can be
attained to a limited extent. Jews are organic units. Conversely, the "individuals"
mere persuaded by the fact that "Jews could have to supply Jews with food."

Therefore, he advocated complete exclusion of Jews from Europe. The chief

2) See Doc. 1564-70, Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel. Apparently, Germany was
one of the chief objects of Germany. Earlier, at a meeting on October 15,
1938, under Göring's chairmanship, this question was already discussed and
he proposed that in an emergency situation ghettos should be created in the
individual large cities (Doc. 1564-70, Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel).

3) P. F. von Ribbentrop, "Menschenrechte und rassenpolitischer Probleme einer
aristokratischen Gesellschaft im Sinne der Judenfrage," Halilmat, 1941, Vol. 1,2,
pp. 47-51. The same number publishes an article by Walter Gross, "Die rassenpoliti-
sche Ausrichtung der Leitung der Judenfrage" (pp. 52-60), where he also tries
to prove the necessity of exclusion of Jews.
Ideologists for the establishment of ghettos and the spiritual father of the Lodz Reservation was Rosenberg. As early as February 7, 1939, Alfred Rosenberg made a solemn declaration in Berlin before a special audience of foreign diplomats and representatives of the foreign press, to the effect that Jewish nationalities should aspire territory outside Europe as a basis for all Jews, and that the territory should by no means be called a Jewish state but simply a Jewish reservation under German control.

But the establishment of such a reservation did not, apparently, satisfy Governor General Frank. In his Diary of October-November, 1939, entitled "Government Minutes" (pp. 29-30) he read the following:

"For one thing, all the Jews are chased to an old part of the town, the locality of which they admitted without protestation, but there is still no Jewish district as yet."

In regard to habitation circumstances does not play a decisive role, explains Dr. Rosenberg, mayor of Lodz, for the Jews do not dare to leave the town districts assigned to them. Moreover, the situation existing in the Jewish districts of the town are a serious menace which demands not only isolation but deportation of Jews.

In his Diary of Dec. 25, 1938, we find the following statement made by Dr. Rosenberg, mayor of Lodz:

"That the resettlement in the Lodz district had also had particularly ominous results, had already been voiced."

1) Rosenberg, Lodz, February 7, 1939.
Among the documents found in the files there was a memorandum which stated as follows:

After the customary removal of Jews from all public offices, the Jewish question will have to be solved. Policies through the institution of ghettos (Res. 124/11 and 124/12, Office of the Chief of Council).

Orders were set to, but still prior to their official establishment, by decree of November 20, 1938 (Res. 120/13, 120/12, 120/11) government of provinces, mayors, and local officials were empowered to exclude Jews from certain localities and to prohibit their appearance in public at certain times. By ordinance of December 20, 1938 orders decreed to proceed in individual cases in such a way that Jews will live together in one house, as much as possible under rental conditions (Res. 62/28, Office of the Chief of Council).

So early as November 1, 1938, 14:19 the months after the beginning of the war and a few weeks after the end of the tragic and hopeless flight for Europe, German newspapers reported a communication intercepted over the radio regarding the necessity of prohibiting marriages for Jews in Germany and other cities.

"The inhabitants of these cities must be completely isolated. This is not a problem of forbidding marriages between these and members of other races, it is not a question of a single individual who carries a price, but of the houses from which all others have their origin. These people must be completely isolated or the state of Europe would be ruined."

So early as November 7, 1938 Governor Dr. Stühsar stressed that a special ghetto must be formed for the Jews, and finally in his capacity as Governor General, approved these measures (Rundbrief, First volume, p. 23).
While reviewing the medieval acts of ghettos, Karl Kautsky noted it necessary to examine the fact that they did not follow the old pattern. Through the ages, as in medieval times, social and sexual relationships between Jews and non-Jews were governed.

Kautsky further observes that the policy was fundamentally different in spirit. In the Middle Ages, it is true, the Jews were subject to high walls and were not allowed to mingle with the general population. On the contrary, they were restricted to the quarter outside the city walls, which enabled the Jews to become a considerable political power. In Germany of today a Jew cannot and need not play such an insignificant part in the economic life, nor share in public and cultural life of the country. Until their final expulsion, Jews are to live separate, without any association with the outside world, under the supervision of the German authorities.

To enable one to attempt to analyze whether the means and ways used by Nazis for the establishment of ghettos corresponded to their aim of "complete extinction of Jews," offering there, however, a possibility to live within their own limits, or whether the establishment of ghettos from the very first beginning was designed by Nazis as one of the means of physical extermination of Jews,

What were the economic possibilities of Jewish immigrants into the ghettos? As soon as the Nazis entered Poland, the first measure taken by them in regard to Jews was the closing of banking accounts. Jews were allowed to have cash not exceeding 300 złote (2) and to draw from their accounts not more than 50 złote (3). They were allowed to draw from the bank a weekly account not exceeding 200 złote (4).
By decree of November 29, 1939 Jews were compelled to register their jewelry, exceeding the value of 5000 marks. This was the prelude to their enforced exile.

In 1940, a law was enacted on January 26, 1940, an ordinance was issued concerning the general registration of real and personal property, claims to claims, deposits and for nickels. Failure to comply with this ordinance could result in confiscation of property, in addition to imprisonment and fine.

On March 7, 1940 an ordinance was issued prohibiting the collection of chattels from Jewish residential areas. Anticipating the possibility of converting the confiscated money into gold or other precious metals, a further ordinance prohibited Jews to purchase such metals without permits. Such permits, obviously, were never granted. By the end of 1940 all Jewish credit cooperatives were closed.

Thus Jews who were in possession of any means which they might have invested in industrial or commercial undertakings within the ghetto were placed there completely destitute, unable to take part in the economic activities of the ghetto. Those transferred to the ghetto were denied the use of any means of transportation and were allowed to take with them only personal belongings not exceeding 25-30 pounds. Those restrictions, however, appeared insufficient to the Nazis and...
On September 13, 1942, a general ordinance (Verordnung über die Abwanderung der Juden aus dem Generalgouvernement) was issued by virtue of which — if circumstances so required — the concerned persons might be compelled to leave their personal belongings and other property if the property was to be found in a district harmed to them.

The ordinance states further that no claims for compensation of expenses incurred to this conclusion can be advanced.

Jewish trade and industry in Poland was completely destroyed. Mordekhai Garbacz, Governer of Warsaw, noted that after abolition of Jewish social services business that severe punishment could be inflicted upon more than mere they not to observe strictly anti-Jewish measures and extend help to Jews. Out of 119,600 commercial retail enterprises

133,000 belonged to Jews before the war. In 1946, the number of such undertakings decreased to 53,000. It is to be presumed that virtually all Jewish enterprises had been closed. In 1920, there were 500 Jewish enterprises in Warsaw. In 1941, there remained only 350 of these shops in the ghetto, and these, too, were gradually liquidated.

Even the few enterprises which still existed in the ghetto were permitted to trade within the boundaries of the ghetto only. Not only the sale of merchandise, but even gifts, outside the ghetto were declared unlawful and subject to a fine.

7) Verordnung über die Abwanderung der Juden aus dem Generalgouvernement (No. 25, 1942).
up to 1000 close and isolated, and persons between the ages of 14 and 60 were subject to forced labor.

By the end of 1942 all Jews in the occupied territory of Poland were killed in 11 ghettos and 12 Jewish localities, from where they were forbidden to leave under the threat of death penalty. Prior to the war there were about 1000 Jewish women on the same territory.

The ghettos meant not only the exile of Jews from the rest of the population, but, indirectly, the destruction of Jews by means of starvation, miserable sanitary conditions, and exposure to illness.

Among the documents submitted by the Prosecution we find a memorandum written by Remerberg (Doc. 214-305, Exhibit of the Chief of Counsel) in which he states the following:

"All rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They are to be placed in ghettos and at the same time are to be separated according to sex."

As to food rations for the ghetto inhabitants, special meetings presided by Frank were devoted to this question (October 14-15, 1941). Speaking of the necessity of a stricter isolation of ghettos, in view of the spreading epidemics of spotted fever,

Frenk announced the food ration for Jewish laborers who were needed for the war industry and added:

10) Siedlce, Poland, Woynow, February 23, 1941.
When the food supply is not sufficient for maintenance, it is necessary that whenever possible special attention be paid to the
ghetto. No doubt the death rate will increase during the winter 
but this was a reminder that Fray in the condition. (Sec. 1931-32, 
Office of U. S. Chief of Co)

Shortage of food supplies in the ghettos and lack of care for the sick and elderly,

stated facilities were admitted by the Administrators of the Government General.

On pages 68-69 of Fray's Diary for 1931 we read the following:

"The quality of the inhabitants of the ghettos was insufficient. 
AIDS, which was the lack of cleanliness, sanitation and overcrowding 
or living quarters?"

Syphilis was most common among the victims, daily and threats facing the non-Jewish 
population. Dr. Sarnat, chief of the Administration in Cracow, as submitting a report 
on the Cracow ghetto saying:

"The conditions of the ghettos in the ghetto was a blessing in itself. 
The complete sterility of the ghettos was now essential."

In this connection Dr. Sarnat also reported on the practical effects of imposing 
death penalty in cases of leaving the ghettos illegally and expressed regret that 
despite the fact that three chambers has already been set up for the investigation 
of these cases, the examination proceeded very slowly. Only 40 sentences of death 
penalties were being passed daily, of which only 0 were being carried out. An ef-
fective isolation could be attained by judicial penalties only.

"The procedure up to liquidation was too prolonged, it was 
burdened with too many formalities and led to a simplification."
Somehow or other, the Allied occupation and the German surrender legislation of the Reich on a legal-administrative basis on the physical extinguishment of its territorial integrity and the establishment of the occupation commission by the chief of the regular police for the order "by virtue of which Jews could be shot at on the high road" might seem to these doubts.

The German government of Jews from Germany and Austria to Poland caused the administration of the General Government to accept the exchange of this transfer on July 10, 1942, which was the day that the commission to be set up

On that day, General Eisenhower in the course of which the letter indicated on the low possibility of the further transfer of Jews to Poland.

Given the situation of Jews from the General Government, planned prior to August, will no longer be carried out since all Jews, including those living in the General Government, are to be deported to the Ghetto Bolkenhorst. The Jewish Government has to surrender the Ghetto to Germany for this purpose (Doc. 234-250, Office of U.S. Dist. of Congress).

Reactions opposed this idea and maintained by saying

No area of the German territory again to the possibility of the deportations of the Jews (Lentz), the Jews will be deported to the place by place, man by man, house by house, family by family, until there is a chance that these have to be charged for these (main language):

11) On July 17, 1942, Frick again referred to the situation on the territory to the district colonists. Volunteer had been reported, which Jewess could have to give up for this purpose. There would be sufficient room there, in case of the Ghetto, to accommodate a few million Jews. I should like to obtain permission for the Jews of the Government Council to share this advantage of building up a new life for Jews. This has been granted, so that Jews also there will be a colonist able to the work for very long (Doc. 234-250).

Embassies, 1942, took after the 1942 experience with Germany, because the Jewish autonomy of the idea of expulsion of Jews from Europe and the belief that "the Jewish question is only then solved when the last Jew has left the
By the end of 1940 the situation in the Warsaw ghetto became catastrophic and at that time already arose the question of its liquidation. In his diary of December 29, 1940, Frank writes he postponed the decision until his visit to Ebensee and concluded by saying that “in any event he [Frank] could not permit of a town such as Ebensee being completely annihiliated.

However, one year later Frank's operations caused a different turn in his mind and he no longer directed toward Ebensee where the Jews were to establish a new and "happy" life.

In a closed cabinet meeting of December 29, 1941 held in Ebensee, Frank made the following statement:

"What should be done with the Jews? Do you think they will be settled down in the "Aland," in villages ("Gehäuchterdorf")? That is what we were told in Berlin: "Why this bother? We can do nothing with them either in the "Aland" or in the "Polish territories." So, eliminate yourself.

"Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourself of all feeling of pity.
We must annihilate the Jews wherever we find them and wherever it is possible, in order to maintain there the structure of the Reich as a whole.

"...We cannot save our nation those 3,500,000 Jews, but we shall nevertheless be able to make commoners which will have to obey to their annihilation, and this in connection with the planned resources to be determined in discussions from the Reich. The General Government must become free of Jews, the case in the Reich. Where and how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices which we must appoint and order here..."

The question of the final liquidation entered into a new phase. Even before the establishment of gas chambers and crematoria, mass extermination of Jews began in the Government General. The measure suggested by Dr. Rasch regarding the further intensification of the positive courts was rejected by Frank..."
Much activity where cannot be related to such gigantic and violence events, do not find at any place a way which leads to the goal, and my thought are moving in that direction.

The destruction of the ghetto with the simultaneous annihilation of its inhabitants was the result of thoughts of this \textcolor{red}{[censor who requested]}

mise accomplice to the extermination of Jews to agree on the following principles:

"We shall have pity only for the German people and for no one else in the world."

A vast collection of reports regarding the life in ghettos has nothing meanwhile and hardly anything new could be added to these human documents describing immense sufferings. An official report by Erelman, Lt. General of the Police, addressed to Krassnow, General of the Police Force, on June 30, 1943, under the title "Solution of Jewish Question in Galicia," was used at the Nuremberg Trial.

This report most eloquently describes the conditions prevailing in ghettos:

"Nothing but catastrophic conditions were found in the ghettos of Rzeszow and Belzec. The Jews of Rzeszow, fearing the evacuation, and concealed Jews suffering from spotted fever, in underground houses. When evacuation was to start the police found that 3,200 Jews suffering from spotted fever lay about in this ghetto... In order to destroy this center of pestilence at once every police officer came loaded against spotted fever, was called into motion. Thus we succeeded to destroy this plague-outlet, thereby saving only one officer..." (Stib. L-19, Misc. Evidence, 146, vol. 2103, p. 76-77).

The general calls particular attention to the fact that

"...the surprising fact arose that we were able to catch about 15,000 Jews instead of 22,000 Jews who had registered. We had to kill no less than 5,000 Jews, some of whom were suffering from the plague, they had committed suicide by taking poison..." (Stib. 14, p. 770).

\textcolor{red}{[b] Justice Jackson characterized the ghetto as "the laboratory for testing punitive measures" (N.Y.T., p. 157).}
The purge which began in Galicia by the middle of 1942 was completed by June 1943. General Katzenmam was then able to report the following:

"In the meantime further evacuation (Transportation) was executed with energy, so that by the end of June 1943 all Jewish Resistance Elements would be eliminated. Therefore I report that in the district of Galicia, with the exception of those few living in the camps being under the control of the SS and Police Leaders, I have no Jews.

"We have still caught in small numbers are given special treatment by the competent detachments of Police and Rosenberg."

"On 17 June 1943 altogether 404,687 Jews have been evacuated (transferred)" (Doc. 37-107, United States of America, Vol. IV, p.768).

Enumerating the SS forced labor camps for Jews, he indicated that they contained altogether 21,166 Jews and hastened to add "This number is being reduced constantly" (p.768).

The fate of these 21,166 evacuated persons remains a secret of General Katzenmam.

Of quite unusual interest is the report by Kremer, Leader of SS and Police

Formation in the Warsaw District, of Brigade Leader and Major General of Police addressed to Krueger on May 16, 1943. The report is entitled, "The Warsaw Ghetto is No More," and describes all "military" actions undertaken by units of the German Army composed of 86 officers and 234 men against the inhabitants of the Warsaw Ghetto. The detachment was composed not only of 86 men and members of the police but also included regular army personnel assigned to Railway Armed Train and a special unit of "Foreign Naval Battalion." (Doc. 1061-PS, United States of America, Vol. IV, p.768).

The report describes the organization of the Ghetto and the procedure followed in placing Jews in the ghettos, and then goes on to say:
"It was brought clear, however, that not all damage had been
suppressed by this confining the Jews in one place the
security considerations required removing the Jews from the city of Warsaw
altogether." Denver to this effect was issued after Szmul visited Warsaw in
January, 1943. He ordered the transfer to Lublin of all remaining factories work-
ing for war needs including their raw materials. This order was to be carried out in all
two days, but only when Sec. Strong arrived in Warsaw on April 19, 1943 had the
actual "operations" begun. He regarded his assignment as a purely military one
and called all the inhabitants of the Ghetto, including men and children,
"enemies" who as a result of the measures taken by the Germans forced to retire from
the roofs and climbed back to the basements, attics and cellars. From these
elevation they launched partisan attacks against the regular German army, and they were
defeated not by the numerical strength of the foe or the superiority of their arms,
but because Sec. Strong, seeing the formidable resistance put up, ordered setting
the ghetto on fire. As it is, after Szmul, on April 29 -- the fourth day of a
fight which the Germans regarded as not quite "satisfactory" -- issued the order
"to complete the burning out of the Warsaw ghetto with the greatest severity and
relentless tenacity." Thus, in the midst of a raging fire, children, women and
aged men jumped from the upper stories and with broken bones tried to scant across
the street into buildings not yet set on fire in order to not to fall alive in the
hounds of the Nazis. Many committed suicide. The General claims in his report that
"the Anglo-Germans asked the people's fathers to drive out the Jews," so a treaty
"the victims faced non-registered Jews and those who fleeing hadee, met with
an earlier death in the street."

In conclusion Gen. Strong praised the "millions" with which his troops fought

"the longer the resistance lasted, the tougher the gun of the Binett
five. Police and sailors became; they fulfilled their duty redding
rigidly in faithful complete and stood together as men and
mambers of civilians. Their only hope was that death away coming until
late at night. At night, search parties with venge would round their
first rounds at the feet of the Jews and gave them no quarter. Not
sufficiently they stopped and killed Jews who used the night hours for
anonymously bringing their stature from abandoned buildings and for contacting
neighboring groups or exchanging notes with them."

The General emphasized that this "horror in eight killing of Jews had been
confirmed once by men who had been trained for three to four weeks and therefore
"their credit should be given for the planks, courage, and devotion to duty which
they showed."

Does not this render witness to either a severe contradiction of the German
soldiers, police, or even Germans who freely recruited, although no training,
proved, imbecile, and from that very by themselves, without hesitation, to kill
women and children and to fire living, tortured and persecuted people?

By the 27th, 1943 he made daily reports indinizing in detail the arrested
and killed Jews. On May 30 he made the final account which reads as follows:
With military courage he enumerated his military booty: 7,500 rifles, 1 licorne rifle, 1 German rifle, 27 pistols of various calibres, and so on.

The more than insect quantity of arms to explain by the fact that these and others were thrown away into lakes and holes which could not be discovered.

The arms which we had developed in theSnow were prevented from discovering and capturing the arms.

With German thoroughness the General enumerated the looted Jewish property:

1,740 used uniforms besides 500 pairs of used trousers; 100 horses, 6 of them in the former Ghetto. Each in possession of the 500,930 former inhabitants of the Ghetto at the time of its destruction amounted to about 15 million sliacy and 20,000 dollars, in addition to a large amount of valuables (white, chains, matches, etc.). The report does not state, however, for what kind of purpose these valuables were used.

Nothing but ruins received from the Ghetto, according to the report, with the exception of 6 buildings, "the Ghetto has been completely destroyed."

But the Army General concludes his report by the following reassuring statement:

...the ruins still contain enormous amounts of bricks and empty material which could be used."[13]

13) 43 pictures illustrating the Jewish tragedy were attached to the report. Among others these are: "Jews in Siberia," "Holocaust, Terror," and "The Story of the Jews and..."