

INTERROGATION OF KONTERADMIRAL (REAR ADMIRAL) GODT.  
Chief of Submarine Naval Operations OKM

Interrogated in Flensburg about 14 May 1945 by

Lt. Col. Paul C. Aitken - Interpreter Pfc. R.M. Kellerman.

This is the report of the interrogation with Konteradmiral GODT in condensed form.

The submarine Division was directly subject and responsible to Grossadmiral DOENITZ, who in turn conferred directly with ADOLPH HITLER. On account of the previous experience in the War 1914-18, it was decided to conduct the submarine warfare as the only possible means because the OKM realized from the beginning that they could not build as many ships and destroyers as the English and Americans could turn out. At the beginning of the war, Germany had 30 submarines ready for operation which were in perfect shape and in addition 20-40 submarines being used for training purposes. The program of production called for approximately 25 submarines per month. This quota was reached in some cases, but the average was about 21-22 submarines per month. At the end of the year 1944, the new type - 21 - was supposed to come into production and the quota was fixed for that type as 30 per month. This quota of course was never reached because the effects of our bombing enforced a lower number of submarines to be produced. Admiral GODT is not in a position to explain the effects of bombing on cities, shipyards, transportation system, individually, but only saw that he received less submarines for his operations. But he thinks that the most important factor in that connection was our bombing of the shipyards.

-1-

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) of 74  
OSD Series, Apr 12, 1974  
By NLT: RLC NARS Date: 3.14.79

The repair yards and also some shipyards were partly built in special bunkers (shelters or pill boxes) which had walls 3½ metres thick in the beginning and which were reinforced to 7 metres thickness afterwards. These special bunkers were never hit and could always function. They had them especially in the ports in France, like San Nazaire, Brest, Lorient, etc. Gasoline difficulties were only urgent in the last weeks and for operational purposes they always had available what they needed. They had to save for training purposes.

The shore patrols had the effect that the submarines had to operate more in the deeper ocean and were forced to operate toward the middle of the Atlantic. The new type of submarine could stay under water for a much longer time. Before this new type was introduced, which the Germans called SCHNORCHEL, they tried to stay on the surface and to defend themselves on the surface. This did not prove to be a success, because the armament which can be placed on a submarine is very limited on account of the shortage of space and it is also not quiet enough to employ the weapons accurately. They had one 20mm AA gun on board which is not sufficient to get an airplane down. Finally, they had one 37mm gun, but also this one was not sufficient. It was planned to employ two (2) AA guns of 37 mm each, but this never came into operation.

The fast operating airplanes were the most unpleasant ones and the slower planes of course did not do so much damage because the submarine had time enough to get under water.

At the moment when the Americans escorted the convoys with aircraft carriers, which made it possible that airplanes could escort to the middle of the ocean, the whole picture for the submarines changed. The German Navy had no air force of her own and they had to work together with the German Air Force. The planes had comparatively poor armament and could not successfully operate against American and English planes.

~~SECRET~~