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**MESSAGE**

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NLT (RSP-SUBJ) 103

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

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STATE DEPT MSG

**FROM:** USUN NY SGD ACHESON  
**TO:** SECRETARY OF STATE  
**NR:** SECTO 40

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Department pass Paris, London, Defense; sent Department SECTO 40, repeated Paris unnumbered, London unnumbered, Defense unnumbered.

Following is summary of seventh session, tripartite meetings with Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers, September 22, 11:30 a.m.

Secretary reviewed the problem of European defense force for the benefit of the Defense Ministers and asked the Defense Ministers to advise the Foreign Ministers in making progress for decisions on the EDF.

Schuman noted that his personal views in the previous talks had been confirmed in consultations with French Government and by Moch. Minority in French Government would prefer to reject the proposal of use of German units for all time. Majority would allow discussion of German units if certain conditions are met.

1. A central European force must be created and be strong enough to be effective before German units can be considered.

2. The program of materiel, outweighing the question of manpower must be answered. Decision on German participation premature and dangerous and would not be advantageous in initial stages of planning. Decision impossible to keep secret and publicity would make achieving goal more difficult. Noted that there was a marked slow-down in general Schuman Plan discussions since start of talks on European defense force due to question in German mind as to necessity of making ef-

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forts in economic field if they become equals militarily. Believed it was premature to discuss question, much less make a decision now.

Bevin stressed prevention of World War III, the creation of a force as deterrent to USSR and noted growing impatience in UK with the slow progress in achieving unified force. Believes question of German participation academic but government tries to meet points of view of other two. Main consideration is the maintenance of initiative achieved in last few months by taking advantage of situation which has served to weld together the forces we need to meet all provocations. Pointed out steps taken to put US and UK troops in Europe and stated US and UK had right to a decision on German participation before troops were actually committed. These factors, along with arguments of the Dutch, has made UK Government agree in principle to participation of German units. Agrees that defense force should be strong enough for establishment of a central command before implementation of decision to which the Ministers should now agree in principle. Mentioned that political forces impel haste in deciding now on this question but stated that whatever government in power in UK British people were firmly opposed to leaving door open to possible future aggressions.

Secretary noted that NA Council had reached point where decision must be made for the guidance of the meeting of Defense Ministers in October. Agreed with Bevin integrated force must exist before German units participate. Noted area of agreement on questions raised by French on supplying material and the priority of NAT countries in obtaining armaments. At Secretary's question Schuman agreed that France did not mean to wait until the completion of the medium term plan before deciding on use of German units. Secretary stated that if US Government goes to people with this unprecedented commitment of US forces and takes responsibility in the command it must not leave in doubt the ability to receive the military help the US thinks is necessary because of indecision among Allies.

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Moch noted that the Government of France unanimous in backing Schuman's statements and except for Communists there would be unanimity in Parliament on German question. Stressed adverse effects in increased USSR psychological warfare if decision were known. Manpower was not prime consideration in total western defense problem. France has 1,200,000 trained men which can be called upon and is prepared to provide the 20 divisions required of them. The real problems to be faced were:

- (1) Acceleration of efforts to complete MTP by 1952 or end 1951.
- (2) Necessity for strategic placement of forces in Germany regardless of present zones.
- (3) Need for decisions on types of equipment necessary to get armament production under way in France.
- (4) The problem of financing which Moch did not wish to discuss at this time.
- (5) Economic steps to be taken to prevent more rises in prices of raw materials.

Moch concluded that there were two urgent questions needing study before consideration of German participation: first, overcoming obstacles to the achievement of MTDP, and second, German participation in the initial phase in production and infrastructure.

Note: Relayed to Paris, London, and Department Defense.

ACTION: G3

INFO: CSA, G2, G4, JCS, SDLO, NAVY, SEC DEF, OAGO, OMA,  
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