

~~TOP SECRET~~

NLT (PSF-GEN) 193

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

27 August 1951


Dear Mr. President:

The attached personal letter from General Eisenhower to me was held for my return from leave. That portion reflecting Eisenhower's review of the European Army has been seen by Bradley and the Joint Chiefs in addition to key personnel in the State Department.

Please have your people send the letter back to me when you are through with it.

With great respect, I am

Faithfully yours,



The President

The White House



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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
DOD Directive 5100.30, ~~June 1979~~ 9-9-81
By NLT-HL NARS, Date 1-17-83

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Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe
3 August 1951

Dear General:

From time to time, I have been sending to Averell Harriman informal reports, which frequently consist of nothing more than current observations on the European situation. I believe that he has normally shown these to the President. While I realize that I may be bothering you unnecessarily by addressing this particular communication to you, it is nevertheless possible that you might like to be informed as to random phases of my reactions to existing factors in the European defense problem, whether or not you consider it advisable to present to the President such a rambling combination of fact, opinion, and assumption.

So many of our difficulties have their source in the existence of a badly divided Western Europe that on July 4th, I delivered myself of a fairly impassioned statement to this effect. While, of course, I did not expect any immediate and drastic results, still I thought that the effort might have a bit of effect in promoting a clearer understanding of this particular difficulty and this, in turn, could be most helpful as we attack some of our problems of organization and administration. Certainly the occasion gave me the opportunity to state publicly, to Europe's several governments, that they could by no means assume that they are now performing at the maximum in developing security. Daily, of course, we run smack up against a myriad of difficulties that would not exist at all if this region were only reasonably unified.

One that is bothersome right now is a conclusion of the American MDAP group in Norway that the existing personnel programs of that country are so inadequate that we shall probably have to curtail American munition deliveries during the coming year. Manifestly, when this becomes generally known, the possible results could be serious for the European program, particularly in those countries where population morale is not yet as sturdy as it ought to be. Such an eventuality would be all the more disappointing because of the spirit of determination and courage in Norway. But manpower resources in that country are meager; it is quite possible that there is validity in their present conclusion that they cannot expand their training program. Obviously, we must not give equipment to anyone except where we know it will be used at maximum effectiveness in common defense. But we must be sure that Norway is doing its utmost to train the men. I have tendered the good offices of my headquarters in the matter, and certainly we shall leave no stone unturned in an effort to produce an acceptable answer. It is easy to see that if Norway were merely a part of a Western European political unit, the problem would not exist. In Italy there are almost 3,000,000 unemployed!

Such examples are multiplied every day. Because of the great efficiency, economy, and general progress that could result from a more effective union of these separate countries, I recently decided to intervene in the plan for developing a "European Army." For a long time, I was firm in my refusal to get tied up in the project because it seemed, almost inherently, to include every kind of obstacle, difficulty, and fantastic notion that misguided humans could put together in one package.

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E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402

DDO Directive 5100.30, June 18, 1970

By NLT AK NARS, Date 1-17-83



I then felt that the attempt to develop a European Army might be more divisive than unifying in its effect on the Western European countries and this, of course, was an added reason for avoiding encouragement or personal participation. Moreover, it seemed to me that the plan was not above the suspicion that it may have been put forward in the certainty that it could not be achieved; thus a rebirth of any German military power would be avoided, but by such methods as to escape the onus of deliberate opposition.

Of course, the administrative difficulties are real and many; the risk still exists that the plan might create more antagonism than friendship, and we can never be certain that we shall not encounter double dealing. But, contingent upon unequivocal commitments from the new French Government, when formed, that it will support the program to the limit, and will address itself to problems of joint financing, etc., and quit blocking progress because of inconsequential military details, I am shifting my position. The reasons are:

a. I have come to believe that at least most of the governments involved are sincere in their efforts to develop a so-called European Army.

b. Some spectacular accomplishment is vitally necessary to us if we are to get this whole security program moving with the kind of rapidity that will generate confidence both here and in the North American Continent.

c. The plan offers the only immediate hope that I can see of developing, on a basis acceptable to other European countries, the German strength that is vital to us.

d. I am certain that there is going to be no real progress toward a greater unification of Europe except through the medium of specific programs of this kind. Consequently, believing that we have nothing much to lose except possibly patience, disposition, and effort, I shall, subject to the proviso stated, get behind this program with an auxiliary purpose of bringing about constantly increasing amalgamation of European resources and strength.

The French delay in organizing a new Government is bad. Progress in our air-base program is stagnated and nothing decisive can be done at this moment. The key position of France in any adequate security structure in this region is, of course, obvious. For this reason, I feel that her plans, and her ability to carry out plans, should be a matter of special concern to the United States. We should frequently sit down with her Government in combined diplomatic, economic, and military conferences to work out exactly what she is to do in order to perform to her own maximum in defending Western Europe and because of the effect that her example will have on other countries. Mr. Moch, who I understand is departing soon for the United States, may or may not be included in a new Government. (He has told me he would not serve in a government headed by M. Peche.) But I think that United States authorities might seize the opportunity presented by his Washington visit to have some very plain down-to-earth talks with him. Nothing that I am saying here should be taken to mean that any French official is backward in pledging to me his utmost cooperation. But it would manifestly be fatal to this whole development if we should accept lip service at the expense of solid achievement.



Throughout West Europe, there is needed greater understanding, greater fervor, greater faith. Our leadership must exert itself to create these. We must impart a sense of urgency to the solution of problems, and we must show every nation that it is serving its own interests when it places NATO matters in top priority. I have given some effort toward establishing a "framework of leadership," to be devoted to securing fervent European adherence to the essentials of the NATO concept. I want to get Stikker, Plevin, Lange, Spaack, Van Zeeland, DeGasperi, etc., each to surround himself with a group of young men, all dedicated to the task of educating populations in the basic factors of our problem. So far, I've talked to three of these men, but cannot feel that I've had more than meager success.

Sherman's death was a blow to us. He was understanding and cooperative - and, in his dealings with me, always presented a viewpoint bigger than a single service! You will miss him!

Encouraging signs in almost every category of moral, economic, and military progress continue to accumulate, but they are far from being what they could - and, therefore, should - be. In this connection, General Sarnoff is just starting home after spending four weeks or more in Europe. His impressions and convictions seem to me to be down to earth, comprehensive, and as accurate as one man's conclusions on such vast subjects could possibly be. I suggest you ask him to lunch some day for a chat.

There is no use enumerating our various problems, internal and external. The staff is getting really efficient (I'm still operating a total of 225, which astounds everybody including the staff itself). Our relations with cooperating and political agencies are good. Ulcers are no more prevalent than in most places. That reminds me that I wish Bedell Smith would come over for a month!

Mrs. Rosenberg has been here. She and I talked a couple of hours, after which she tackled the staff. Her approach to difficult questions is refreshing - and sound!

Please convey my greetings to Mrs. Marshall. With personal regard,

Sincerely,

/s/ Eisenhower

Honorable George C. Marshall
Secretary of Defense
Room 3E880, Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.



8351 (in red pencil)