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By DEB NLT, Date 9-10-85

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SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS

NATO ANNUAL REVIEW: Mr. Draper has reported an extensive conversation with Lord Ismay, Secretary General of NATO, concerning the background assessment paper which Ismay desires to prepare for the benefit of the North Atlantic Council permanent representatives in connection with the annual review. In outlining his thoughts for this paper Lord Ismay said that the first point he would make is that the Russians are not reckless adventurers but cold calculating men. Consequently, they will not strike unless they are sure to win and the North Atlantic Alliance has now acquired teeth which give them pause. From this he draws the conclusion that if we do not slacken our efforts or fail in our resolution, war is not inevitable but can be averted. This requires, however, an increased and a sustained defense effort and in planning it we must make sure that we do not in the process lose the cold war by straining our economic and social fabric.

Secondly, in his paper he will combat the insidious view, which incidentally he says is held in certain high governmental quarters in the UK that we should concentrate on the defense of Europe and somehow end the peripheral wars in Korea and Indochina. Lord Ismay said this point of view must be scotched "for we all know what happened when they called the Roman Legions home."

Finally, NAC should recognize that it is in effect the Cabinet of the North Atlantic Alliance and that one of its responsibilities is to develop from a political point of view and refine the directives to the military commanders. He then elaborated a thought he has expressed before that the present defense plans must be modified along lines of putting more in the shop window and less in the back of the store, on the basic assumption that if war comes the crucial battle will be fought in the first six weeks during which period retaliation would have a chance to make its weight felt. Lord Ismay believes that this would require a substantial revision of the composition of forces with a concentration on immediate mobilizable reserves and an increased emphasis on air.

Draper was impressed and encouraged by the fact that Lord Ismay's attitude was not one of discouragement and that he is increasingly conscious of the role of leadership which he must play in the Council.

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SOVIET NOTE

ON GERMANY: Our High Commissioner at Bonn has discussed in detail with Blankenhorn, Chief, Political Section, German Federal Republic Foreign Office, the latest Soviet note on Germany. Blankenhorn observed that the note represents an asset for the allied cause and that omission of reference to the German National Party was a retreat from the earlier Soviet position which had attraction for the Germans. He felt that the October deadline expressed in the note seemed a little ominous but was gratified by the lack of attention to this point in the initial German press reaction. He expressed surprise and gratification that the first press reports out of Paris indicated a firm French reaction and felt that the note was in large measure, designed to soften the French. Blankenhorn asserted that the Soviet note would not delay ratification of the defense arrangements by the Bundestag and reiterated that the Chancellor was determined to push through ratification as rapidly as possible. He felt we should not fail to respond to the note but should not, however, accept a conference on Soviet terms since that would be disastrous. He reported the German Chancellor wished to discuss the Soviet note with the three High Commissioners early next week and that the Federal Republic would withhold official comment on the note until it has fully ascertained allied views on the subject.