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By DEB NLT, Date 6-12-85

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SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS

WESTERN EUROPE

We have instructed our Deputy on the North Atlantic Council on the position he should take in the meeting of the Council Deputies today on the question of German participation in western European defense, which concurs in general with the course of action he had proposed but provides additional guidance with respect to: 1) the size of the German units to be contributed; 2) the need for the early appointment of a Supreme Commander; and 3) the timing of various steps for the creation of a defense force. Our Deputy is to make it clear that nothing less than units of the minimum effective size, which in our view is a division, will be acceptable for integration into the NATO defense force; however, during the transitional period the German contribution could be in terms of smaller units provided it is clearly understood that these units must be assembled into divisional units for effective use as soon as the Supreme Commander determines that this is necessary. During the buildup phase, recruitment and training of German units, not carried out by the Supreme Commander, would be performed by a German Federal Agency controlled by the High Commissioners with the control of production and supply of pertinent military material being vested in the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) agencies. While we would agree that the French would convene the European powers to negotiate on the creation of European political institutions and the eventual integration of military forces of a European rather than a national character into the NAT integrated force, integration of such forces would have to be contingent upon the European contribution being militarily effective. If the French should fail to obtain agreement on these political institutions by the time the Supreme Commander has determined that a decision with respect to the disposition of German units is required, it will be necessary for military reasons to proceed with the grouping of German units into German units of minimum effective size. This action would be without prejudice to future success which

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the French would have in implementing their proposals. In the meantime the situation undoubtedly will be clarified with the appointment of the Supreme Commander.

In discussing these proposals informally with French Deputy Alphand, our Deputy received the impression that: 1) Alphand is in favor of some transitional arrangement and felt that US and French views were developing along the same lines; 2) the French will want strong support from us for their efforts in the direction of a European army and political institutions; 3) as part of the transitional plan, the French will probably attempt to obtain a quick transfer of responsibility for German recruitment and training to a European High Commissioner before the rest of the political superstructure is worked out and to condition the size of units to some definite point of progress in the development of the political superstructure; and 4) while the size of the military units will continue to be a difficult program, it should not be insoluble if other points of issue can be resolved.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Bruce in Paris has expressed the view that greater attention should be given to the morale and psychological values involved in the French position, pointing out that French Foreign Minister Schuman is deeply convinced that the political features of the Pleven plan offer the only real hope for safely incorporating western Germany into the society of free nations. He believes that we cannot afford to take a position that what the French might do toward the realization of the broad plans of the Pleven plan is a matter of indifference to us. On the contrary, he believes that, if we accept the principle of further integration of Europe through military efforts, we should reaffirm to the French and to their potential partners in the formation of a European army that we would regard with great favor the carrying out of the plan for an integrated European army provided a mode of operation could be found which would be militarily effective and would not delay the rearmament of the NAT countries and western Germany.

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