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Department of State

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SENT TO: Amembassy, ROME - TOSEC 63 PRIORITY

November 26

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EYES ONLY THE SECRETARY

8:25 p.m.

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Following discussion November 16 indicating JCS would review position re inspection in Korean armistice negotiations, if UK commitment could be obtained to support enlarged military action by UN against China in the event renewal Communist attack following conclusion armistice, Matthews called in Brit Amb November 21.

Matthews informed Brit Amb we were considering situation which would follow conclusion armistice, what could be done if renewal attack by Communists and relationship of this to degree of inspection and acts to be prohibited under armistice agreement. Also as no reasonable possibility satis Korean political settlement following armistice, essential some UN forces be retained in Korea for some time strength such UN forces being related program strengthening ROK forces. Therefore, if following armistice Communists launched attack against UN forces in Korea situation considerably different from that at time original attack and in some ways comparable to Berlin where deterrent to attack is not strength of forces in Berlin but realization by other side hostilities could not reasonably be expected be localized. Therefore if Chi Communists attack UN forces in Korea following armistice Chi itself could not expect remain immune consequences such action. Tentative US thinking in



List Desired (Offices Only)

Dictated by: FE:UAJohnson:mw 11/26/51 Telegraphic transmission and Mr. Johnson
classification approved by:

Retyped DC/T 11/26/51, mam

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3.402
State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
By AC NLT, Date 3-16-84

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such event as we would want consider imposing naval blockade and carrying out air attacks at least on Chi air bases. Therefore particularly desire Brit views on Naval blockade and air action against Chi in this event, as well as retention of BC forces in Korea following armistice. Matthews also indicated if agreement foregoing points reached with UK and subsequently some other countries, we contemplated public statement some kind not necessarily detailing agreed action but making Chi conscious serious consequences any renewal attack. In reply Brit Amb's question Matthews also indicated our decision on public statement this should not contain any particular time limitation nor should they necessarily constitute unlimited future commitment regardless circumstances elsewhere.

While of course giving no official reaction or even PERS indication possible view UK GOVT AMB expressed thought UK might have more difficulty with naval blockade which might offend QTE friends, that is India UNQTE, than with air attacks CHI bases in which Soviet reaction WLD be principal factor. AMB also expressed PERS view that apart from question size forces UK WLD recognize and accept principle retaining some BC forces in Korea.

Confidentially understand from BRIT EMB that London has referred question to Eden with unfavorable recommendation and that Eden expected act within next 48 hours. As TELAC 48 indicates CONTD importance inspection question, anything you may be able do influence Eden's view this matter will be helpful further consideration armistice problem.



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