Routing Slip

FROM: Hechler

TO:
- Mr. Andrews
- Mr. Ayers
- Mr. Bell
- Mr. Connelly
- Miss Conway
- Mr. Dawson
- Adm. Dennison
- Mr. Elsey
- Mr. Feeley
- Mr. Hartman
- Mr. Hassett
- Mr. Hechler

- Mr. Hopkins
- Mr. Houston
- Gen. Landry
- Mr. Lloyd
- Gen. Maylon
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Nash
- Mr. Neustadt
- Mr. Niles
- Mr. Ross
- Adm. Souers
- Mr. Spingarn
- Dr. Steelman
- Mr. Stowe
- Gen. Vaughan
- White House Files

☐ For your information, and return.
☐ For your request.
☐ For your preparation of reply.
☐ For your comments.
☐ For appropriate handling.
☐ For your files.
☐ Per our telephone conversation.

Remarks:
I have not made any changes from the original State Dept. account.

K.W.H.
The statements that "The purpose of war is victory" and that "In war there is no substitute for victory" can be very misleading unless we are sure just how we are using words. We all want victory. But is it necessary an all-out military victory? This by itself can be dangerously sterile. In this atomic age such a victory might shatter the basis of our civilization. Or do we want victory for our foreign policy objectives by whatever honorable means this may be attained? There are times when this is possible through wise diplomacy and careful negotiations, in cooperation with military efforts that involve less than all-out victory.

From 1796 to 1800 we fought a limited naval war with France to protect our commerce and our shipping. Through the wise and temperate policy of President John Adams, we were able to negotiate a satisfactory treaty settlement with France which restored peace, brought better protection to our commerce, and released us from our alliance obligations under the Treaty of 1778. We did not carry the war to France. We could scarcely have done so if we had wished. Not all high officials agreed with President Adams in the pursuit of his moderate peace policies which resulted so successfully. Indeed, the President was compelled to dismiss Secretary of State Timothy Pickering who had insisted on an all-out war against France.

In the war of 1812 we fought the British on the sea and on our mainland with a view primarily to maintaining the security of our commerce and the safety of our nationals. We did not insist that military victory was essential. In fact, informal negotiations for peace were in process for a year before the signing of the actual treaty. A satisfactory settlement was obtained without fighting the war to a conclusive victory on the sea. This would probably have been unattainable in any case against the British Navy, which was considerably larger than our own.

In the war with Spain, our purpose was the limited one of freeing the Cuban people from the oppression of Spanish rule. Our military efforts were accompanied very soon by negotiations, and when it seemed that our humanitarian political objectives could be achieved, we were glad to make peace without carrying the war to Spain itself.
In the First World War President Wilson, during the period of our neutrality, insisted that the belligerents should agree to a "peace without victory". After we entered the struggle the President was constantly alert to secure a negotiated peace on terms satisfactory to ourselves and our Allies. The famous 14 Points were made known to the German people and the world in January 1918 with a view to bringing about a settlement on reasonable terms as soon as possible. The armistice of November 1918 was the striking consummation of this policy of peace through negotiations which brought a cessation of fighting before a decisive all-out military victory had been gained. Marshal Foch, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, defended this policy on the grounds of the great saving of lives which it involved. President Wilson, of course, wanted "victory" but the victory he wanted was the realisation of our peace objectives, not a mere military conquest.

The statement that "there is no substitute for victory" is deceptive. If a military victory in a limited area such as Korea should lead to a third World War, it might well be a Pyrrhic victory which would be ultimately disastrous for everybody concerned.

Lord Castlereagh, British Foreign Minister, at the Congress of Vienna, 1813-14, made the wise observation that "it is not our purpose to collect trophies but to bring the world back to peaceful habits". This idea is expressive of the policy of the United States and the cooperating members of the United Nations who are following the principle that there is no substitute for peace with honor and justice. Negotiations which might bring about a peace which is in line with our long-term foreign policy objectives should never be cavalierly dismissed,