The members of the Committee signing this report have arrived at certain general conclusions along with specific findings on particular points of controversy. The body of fact and informed opinion developed by the record is immense and, despite the extraordinary volume, should be of great assistance to the American people in gaining an understanding of the purposes of American foreign policy and the various actions which have been taken to achieve our aims. It is impossible to place too much emphasis on the necessity for public understanding and support of the foreign policy pursued by the government of the United States. Without such backing no policy can be effective. Such backing cannot develop unless the people know the facts.

The signatories are confident that a second general finding they have reached has been overlooked in the heat of the controversy and, yet, is one which is bound to get the concurrence of any person making an objective study of the testimony. In the numerous sequences of events which followed the Communist attack on the Republic of Korea war erupted before the committees, there was portrayed a stirring picture in which every citizen of this land, as well as of other lands in which the lamp of liberty still burns, can be justly proud. It was a picture of democracy in action. It was a picture to comfort the fearful, and to give courage to the faint of heart. It showed representative government in crisis. It showed this government moving to meet the emergency and acting decisively, quickly and with balance. Moreover, the moves made here passed the test. They are a part of history, and history will testify to their success.

1. The signatories believe the evidence establishes that the situation required the President to relieve General MacArthur. Beyond serious question, there were deep and basic differences between the General and the Joint Chiefs over
the strategy to be followed in the Korean conflict. General Bradley offered a capsule summary of the General’s proposals which is a prediction of the gap that separated the Joint Chiefs and the former Far Eastern Commander. MacArthur’s proposals would involve us in “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”

The General’s pursuit of his policy to the point of a public dispute with his responsible superior raised grave doubts with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs as to whether the General could be trusted to exercise the freedom of judgment normally given a theatre commander. His recall was thus a necessity.

2. We find that the assertion that the relief of General MacArthur was the result of pressure from our allies is completely belied by the testimony.

3. We find that the assertion that the recall of the General damaged American prestige in the Far East, and hurt troop morale is entirely unsubstantiated. The assertion becomes ridiculous before the magnificent performance of the troops under General Ridgway during his command of the Eighth Army and his tenure as Commanding General of the United Nations Forces in Korea.

4. We find that the decision of the President to come to the aid of the Republic of Korea was a courageous move that was closely linked to the interests of the national security and that of the free world. We further concur with the Governor’s determination to limit the conflict to Korea, in so far as it lies within U.S. power to do so. It is our opinion that the proposals to bomb
Hence, and participate with the Nationalists in foreign agin against the mainland, involves enormous risks with the promise of limited gains.

5. We are convinced that General W. H. Halsey, Admiral Styer and the members of the Geneva Peace conference are more alert to the evil of appeasement than the committee of the Truce efforts, and equally, if not more, concerned that if a settlement is reached, it will be a just and honorable one. On the basis of the testimony we find, further, that a geographical settlement at or north of the 38th parallel accompanied by adequate political safeguards would satisfy in their entirety the military objectives of the United Nations. A settlement which met these requirements cannot honestly be construed as anything but a victory.

6. The testimony bearing on United States policy toward China in the post-war period leads us to the frank conclusion that the collapse of the Nationalists, and the Communist rise to power, should be laid at the door of the principles in China rather attributed to American policy. The Chinese situation, the evidence establishes, was properly due to a combination of factors which lay entirely outside the orbit of effective American action. These factors are:

1) the persistent misadministration and the widespread corruption of the Nationalist regime,

2) the skillful exploitation of the depressed living conditions of the Chinese people and the perversion of the surge toward Nationalism by a well-organized and fanatic Communist faction.
3) the refusal of the Soviet Union to honor its Far Eastern commitments. The testimony proved that extensive material, financial and political assistance given the Nationalists by the United States Government could not of itself counteract these factors. We can only characterize assertions to the contrary as a form of exception that rejects unpleasant facts in favor of a dangerous illusion as to American capacity to affect the course of events in other regions of the world.

7. We are agreed that Formosa is of strategic importance to the United States and conclude that the stiffening of American policy toward that island will continue at a pace consistent with the development of N.W. strength necessary to back up the policy. We conclude from the testimony that the determination to deny Formosa to the Communists still prevails, and that the conditions which, at one period, gave rise to doubts that it was within American capacity to do so, no longer apply. As evidence of this development we cite the material aid now going to the Formosa garrison and the training offered by the American military mission there.

8. The hearings confirmed our views that foreign policy cannot be examined in watertight compartments. In accord with this position, Far Eastern policy must be evaluated for its validity in the context of a world policy. U.S.S.R. dictates that our diplomatic commitments do not exhaust the resources available to fulfill them. For this reason, we continue in the continuing effort to build the collective strength of the free world through such measures as.
Greek Turkish Aid Program
The European Recovery Program
The North Atlantic Treaty
The Mutual Defense Assistance
Support for the United Nations
Resistance to Aggression in Korea.

We conclude that the measure of devotion to American security and the struggle for freedom in the support given these moves.

At the hearings, we were impressed by General Bedell Smith's analysis of the collapse of the Chinese Nationalists despite their overwhelming superiority of arms as a practical demonstration of the fact that 'military force in itself will not eliminate Communism.' Projected to a world scale, this principle shows that the programs cited in the foregoing must proceed arm in arm with measures designed to convince the peoples of the world that closer relations with the United States means a better chance to earn a decent living, to enjoy the dignity of free men and to realize their legitimate national aspirations.