The members of the Committee signing this report have arrived at a
number of general conclusions, along with specific findings on particular
points of controversy. The body of facts and informed opinion developed
by the record is immense and, despite the extraordinary volume, should
be of great assistance to the American people in gaining an understanding
of the purposes of American foreign policy and the various actions which
have been taken to achieve our aims. It is impossible to place too much
emphasis on the necessity for public understanding and support of the
foreign policy pursued by the government of the United States. Without
such backing no policy can be effective. Such backing cannot develop
unless the people know the facts.

The signatories are confident that a second general finding they
have reached has been overlooked in the heat of the controversy and, yet,
is one which is bound to get the concurrence of any person making an objective
study of the testimony. As the numerous sequences of events which followed
the Communist attack on the Republic of Korea were unraveled before the
committee, there was portrayed a stirring picture in which every citizen of
this land, as well as of other lands in which the lamp of liberty still
burns, can be justly proud. It was a picture of democracy in action. It
was a picture to comfort the fearful, and to give courage to the saint of
heart. It showed representative government in action. It showed this
government moving to meet the emergency and acting decisively, quickly
and with boldness. Moreover, the moves made here passed the rigid test.
They are a part of history, and history will testify to their success.

1. The signatories believe the evidence establishes that the
situation required the President to relieve General Mac-
Arthur. Beyond serious question, there were deep and basic
differences between the General and the Joint Chiefs over
the strategy to be followed in the Korean conflict. General
Bradley offered a capsule summary of the General's proposals
which is a prediction of the gap that separated the Joint
Chiefs and the former Far Eastern Commander. MacArthur's
proposals would involve us in "the wrong war, at the wrong
place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

The General's pursuit of his policy to the point of a
public dispute with his responsible superiors raised grave
doubt with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs
as to whether the General could be trusted to exercise the
freedom of judgment normally given a theater commander. His
recall was thus a necessity.

2. We find that the assertion that the relief of General
MacArthur was the result of pressure from our allies is completely
rejected by the testimony.

3. We find that the assertion that the recall of the General
damaged American prestige in the Far East, and hurt troop
morale is entirely unsubstantiated. The assertion becomes
ridiculous before the magnificent performance of the troops
under General Ridgway during his command of the Eighth Army
and his tenure as Commanding General of the United Nations
Forces in Korea.

4. We find that the decision of the President to come to the aid
of the Republic of Korea was a courageous move that was clearly
linked to the interests of national security and that of
the free world. We further concur with the government deter-
nation to limit the conflict to Korea, in so far as it lies within
U.S. power to do so. It is our opinion that the proposals to bomb
Hence, and participate with the Nationalists in foreign against the mainland, involves enormous risks with the promise of limited gains.

5. We are convinced that General Hidaka, Admiral Joy and the members of the Sino-Japan delegation are more alert to the evil of appeasement than the Committeecriticsof the Truce effort, and equally, if not more, convinced that if a settlement is reached, it will be a just and honorable one. On the basis of the evidence we find, further, that a geographical settlement east or west of the 36th parallel accompanied by adequate political safeguards would satisfy in their entirety the military objectives of the United Nations. A settlement which met these requirements cannot honestly be construed as anything but a victory.

6. The testimony before the United States policy toward China in the post-war period leads us to the frank conclusion that the collapse of the Nationalists, and the Communist rise to power, should be laid at the door of the principles in China rather attributed to American policy. The Sino-Japan issue by the evidence establishes, properly due to a combination of factors which lay entirely outside the intend of effective American action. These factors are:

1) the persistent misadministration and the widespread corruption of the Nationalist regime,

2) the skillful exploitation of the depressed living conditions of the Chinese people and the perversion of the surge toward Nationalism by a well-organized and fanatical Communist faction.
3) the refusal of the Soviet Union to honor its Far Eastern commitments. The testimony proved that extensive material, financial and political assistance given the Nationalists by the United States Government could not of itself counteract these factors. We can only characterize assertions to the contrary as a form of exegesis that rejects unpalatable facts in favor of a dangerous illusion as to American capacity to affect the course of events in other regions of the world.

7. We are agreed that Formosa is of strategic importance to the United States and conclude that the stiffening of American policy toward that island will continue at a pace consistent with the development of P.M.'s strength necessary to back up the policy. We conclude from the testimony that the determination to deny Formosa to the Communists still prevails, and that the conditions which, at one period, gave rise to doubts that it was within American capacity to do so, no longer apply. As evidence of this development we cite the material aid now going to the Formosa garrison and the training offered by the American military mission there.

8. The hearings confirmed our views that foreign policy cannot be examined in vacuo. In accord with this position, our foreign policy must be evaluated for its validity in the context of a world policy. Whether dictators that our diplomatic commitments do not entitle us to fulfill them. For this reason, we agree in the continuing effort to build the collective strength of the free world through such measures as
Greek Turkish Aid Program
The European Recovery Program
The North Atlantic Treaty
The Mutual Defense Assistance
Support for the United Nations
Resistance to Aggression in Korea.

We conclude that the measure of devotion to American security and the struggle for freedom is the support given these moves.

At the hearings, we were impressed by General Johansen's analysis of the collapse of the Chinese Nationalists despite their overwhelming superiority of arms as a practical demonstration of the fact that "military force in itself will not eliminate Communism." Projected to a world scale, this principle shows that the programs cited in the foregoing must proceed arm in arm with measures designed to convince the peoples of the world that closer relations with the United States means a better chance to earn a decent living, to enjoy the dignity of free men and to realize their legitimate national aspirations.