Much of the MacArthur controversy developed out of differences of opinion over the conduct of the fighting in Korea. Believing that the American people should be fully informed as to the issues and should have the answers as to how their Government was handling the Korean conflict, the Committees examined thoroughly the relations between the Commanding General in Korea and his superiors in Washington. They also studied the directives and instructions which were issued to the Theatre Commander and his manner of operating, under them. They scrutinized the policies governing the fighting in Korea, particularly and those which General MacArthur opposed, and the manner in which these policies were determined.

Full Support and Wide Latitude for Theatre Commander.

The hearings established that General MacArthur at all times received complete support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from other agencies of the Government. At the time of the Wake Island Conference, General MacArthur stated that "no commander in the history of war has ever had more complete and adequate support from all agencies in Washington than I have." The testimony overwhelmingly confirms this statement.

One specific charge made was that General MacArthur had called for reinforcements and was told that there were none available. The record indicates that the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnished reinforcements to the maximum extent possible. For example, on January 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to send two National Guard Divisions to Japan in order to release troops there for duty in Korea. They further proposed in early January 1951 to arm roughly 200,000 RKK conscripts.
General MacArthur, however, vetoed this proposal. The Joint Chiefs of Staff turned down General MacArthur's request to use Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea. The reasons for so doing were sound. Such a move would have dangerously weakened the defenses of Formosa. These troops were of uncertain quality and their employment in Korea would have simultaneously complicated our relations with our allies and increased the risk of all-out war.

General MacArthur was fully informed on all matters of policy and military planning. His views were solicited and given every consideration. This was made clear in a compilation of messages between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the beginning of the Korean hostilities which was furnished the Committee. The compilation shows also that in connection with every major problem relating to the Korean conflict, and many minor problems as well, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought General MacArthur's views and recommendations.

The testimony and the documents before the Committee disclosed also that while the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised the responsibility of providing broad guidance for the conduct of the campaign, they allowed the Commanding General in the field the widest possible latitude in the conduct of operations. Directives were couched in general language, more as advice and suggestions than as precise categorical instructions or orders. Indeed, it is apparent from the testimony that the leeway given to General MacArthur exceeded the normal relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a theater commander.
MacArthur Not Fully Responsive to Instructions.

Perhaps because of the unusual latitude given him, the record shows General MacArthur treated his directives with considerable independence. He tended to stretch his directives as far as possible, to broaden their intent, to exploit the leeway given him. Indeed, there is serious question whether in a number of instances he showed a proper sense of responsibility in disregarding "suggestions" from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In one instance he openly violated a policy of which he was advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The testimony revealed that late in September 1950, when United Nations forces were marching northward, authorities in Washington were concerned over the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention. In order to reassure the Chinese that United Nations forces had no designs against China, and to avoid the danger of provoking Chinese Communist intervention, it was decided that only Korean troops should advance to the Manchurian frontier. On September 27 the Theatre Commander was informed of the policy and of the reasons for it. On October 24, however, on his own initiative and without asking or advising the Joint Chiefs in advance, General MacArthur sent the American forces to the Yalu. The Joint Chiefs advised General MacArthur that this violated his directives, but the action had already been taken and was not countermanded.3

Similarly, late in November, more than ever aware of the possibility of Chinese intervention, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested to General MacArthur that his forces stop short of the Yalu. Again General MacArthur insisted that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and our allies were wrong and that the suggested steps would have undesirable military and political consequences. Instead, he marched his forces to the Yalu, where they collided with a massive Chinese offensive. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then warned General MacArthur that the lack of coordination between the Eighth Army and the Tenth Corps in Korea exposed the latter to an enemy flanking movement. The Joint Chiefs advised that he extricate the Tenth Corps. General MacArthur rejected the warning. The Chinese Communists passed between the two United Nations forces and outflanked the Tenth Corps which had to be evacuated with heavy losses.

Instructions to Instructions.

General MacArthur also failed to pay sufficient heed to instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 27 to analyze the threat of Chinese or Soviet intervention and report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of urgency. While General MacArthur was not alone in failing to anticipate Chinese Communist intervention, it appears that his command shares much of the responsibility for failing to anticipate and prepare for this development. At no time did he inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to their instruction, that he was unable to ascertain Chinese Communist intentions. In fact, he assured the President, at the Wake Island Conference in October, that the Chinese Communists would not intervene. The record before the Committee shows that a great deal of evidence was available in Tokyo on the capabilities of the Chinese Communists for massive intervention. The presence of Communist units in Korea was known in late October and indeed General MacArthur himself reported their existence in
significant numbers early in November. Nevertheless, he went ahead with his attack on November 24 which was announced as a campaign to end the war in a very short time.

Korean Policy

General MacArthur stated that the intervention of the Chinese Communists required new policy decisions which were not made and that the United States had no policy for ending the war in Korea. The testimony before the Committee, and particularly the compilation of messages between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur, made it clear that these charges were without foundation.

The evidence presented revealed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave continuous consideration to the problem which Chinese Communist intervention created. General Collins made two trips to Korea and Tokyo in order to discuss the new situation with General MacArthur. In December and January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to General MacArthur four basic military directives setting forth in detail full guidance for the conduct of operations in the light of the new situation. On January 13 the President sent a personal message to General MacArthur containing a full and comprehensive exposition of our purposes, policies and objectives in the Korean conflict. General MacArthur was also regularly informed of the views expressed and the measures taken in the United Nations to meet the new situation.

United States policy for the conduct of hostilities in Korea was aimed at achieving the objectives, as laid down by the United Nations, i.e., to repel the armed attack against the Republic of Korea and to restore peace and security in the area. The goal is to show the enemy that his aggression cannot
succeed and to force him to abandon it. General MacArthur and the other witnesses agreed that what is sought is to bring the enemy to a conference table, where the war could be terminated in accordance with the United Nations objectives and principles.

**Military and Political Objectives Distinguished.**

The hearings clarified the relationship between military and political objectives in Korea. A unified Korea is a political aim of the United States and the United Nations. These efforts were not successful because of Communist obstructionism. There was never any suggestion, however, that force be used to bring about unification.

The testimony disclosed that after the success of the Inchon landing, because the enemy refused to give up the fighting, the United Nations forces had to enter into North Korea in order to restore peace and assure against the resumption of aggression. Some nations questioned the authority of United Nations forces to cross the 38th parallel. Therefore it was decided to gain a clear expression of approval for this step from the United Nations in the form of a General Assembly resolution. At this time it appeared that incidental to accomplishing its military objective in Korea the United Nations might also be able to fulfill its political objectives. The same General Assembly resolution, therefore, also made provision for possible unification. The General Assembly did not, however, alter the military objectives.

When Chinese intervention made it clear that unification could not be readily achieved, the United Nations ceased to talk about unification as an incident of the Korean fighting. The objective of the fighting, therefore, continues to be and
remains that of repelling the aggression against the
Republic of Korea and restoring peace and security in the
area.

Attainment of Objectives is Victory.

The hearings made it clear that the responsible leaders
of this country are agreed that what we seek in Korea is not
conquest or unconditional surrender but the achievement of
the objectives of the United Nations—repelling aggression
and restoring peace. To General MacArthur’s phrase that
"war’s very object is victory," General Bradley responded
that victory can mean anything: "From being willing to accept
a rather small thing that you start out to connect, up to
an objective which we set in World War II of unconditional
surrender. There are many variations in between the two." An
end to the fighting, with the enemy driven out of the
territory of the Republic of Korea, with its troops and U.N.
forces in positions which can be defended and with satisfactory
safeguards that aggression will not be resumed, is a victory.

No Allied or U.N. Interference with Military Operations.

The testimony showed conclusively that neither the U.N.
nor our Allies have attempted to impose restrictions on Korean
military strategy. The United Nations laid down the objectives
and has given general guidance. It assigned the conduct of
the fighting to the United States and requested the United
States to designate the Commanding General. The United States
has offered the general policies of the United Nations, and
has paid a decent respect to the opinions of other nations,
particularly those with troops in Korea. But the conduct of
operations in Korea has been the responsibility of this
Government alone. Questioning at the hearing revealed no
instance in which the United States has had to forego a measure which it deemed desirable because of the objections of the United Nations or of any of its members with a single minor exception - the matter of "hot pursuit".

In November 1950, shortly after we had obtained clear evidence of Chinese intervention, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered permitting United Nations airforce pilots to pursue enemy planes across the Chinese frontiers for a few minutes flying time. This would have enabled our pilots to destroy additional enemy planes and ended the pilot's sense of frustration when he had to break off a chase at the Chinese frontier. The Department of Defense and the Department of State agreed that such a policy would be desirable but felt that some of the countries with whom we were working most closely should be polled for their views. The six nations who were informed unanimously and vigorously opposed. At that time, in mid-November 1950, there was still considerable doubt about Chinese Communist intentions. There was still a chance that they might be persuaded to withdraw. In the face of this opposition and the considerations set forth, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held the question in abeyance. During the retreat from the Yalu more urgent problems demanded attention. The question as such was not raised again with our Allies. As the military situation changed, the question of hot pursuit became part of the entire question of limiting hostilities in Korea. That, as indicated below, was a policy followed by the United States quite apart from the views of other nations.

At the hearings General Vandenberg stated that the practice of hot pursuit would have had morale value for our air force but could not be considered militarily decisive.
It is worth nothing that General MacArthur at no time recommended or requested authority to institute the practice of hot pursuit.

Limiting Hostilities to Korea.

With the full approval of the United Nations, the United States has made every effort to avoid the extension of hostilities and a possible world war. The hearings before the committees made clear, however, that quite apart from United Nations policies and the views of other nations, the policy of limiting hostilities to Korea is the considered policy of this Government, in which the President, the Executive Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have all fully concurred. General Bradley gave a pungent summary of any contrary policy which he stated "would involve us in the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." 7

General MacArthur favored several courses inconsistent with that policy, including the bombing of targets in China, a naval blockade against China unilaterally, if necessary, and "taking the wraps off" Chiang Kai-shek and his forces on Formosa. He declared that this strategy would bring a quick victory in Korea. He stated that his program would "not necessarily" mean Soviet intervention in the fighting. He indicated that if the United Nations and the other free nations opposed this course, then we ought to "go it alone".

The hearings established that General Marshall, General Bradley, and each of the Chiefs of Staff definitely and firmly opposed this program and sharply disagreed with General MacArthur's evaluation of the significance and the consequences of those steps. General MacArthur based his statement that the Joint Chiefs agreed with him on a paper prepared by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12, in which these steps appear. The document actually contained 16 points and was a study, suggesting a possible course of action in the event that our forces were forced to evacuate Korea. Thereafter it was made quite clear to General MacArthur that the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed his program.

**Joint Chiefs Oppose Bombing Chinese Territory.**

General Marshall, General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs all opposed the bombing of targets in China at this time. They stated clearly that such bombing in no sense offered the prospect of a quick victory. General Vandenberg referred to the proposal as "peeking at the periphery" and warned that to have any substantial effect it would require more and more of our air power and would eat away at our air force. General Bradley also pointed out that strategic bombing is directed at targets producing war materials and that Communist China received its war materials from the Soviet Union. General Marshall, General Bradley, General Collins, General Vandenberg and Admiral Sherman further agreed that bombing Manchuria would substantially increase the danger of general war with China and of Soviet intervention.

Further, the testimony disclosed that while the Communists enjoy sanctuary in Manchuria, U.N. forces have also enjoyed a sanctuary. The Communists have not bombed our bases in Japan, or our naval vessels in Korean waters. They have not used substantial air power against our ground forces.

**Chiang Kai-shek Venture Against Mainland Also Opposed.**

General MacArthur explained what he meant by "taking the wraps" off Chiang which went beyond terminating the neutralization of Formosa and leaving Chiang free to do as he sees fit.
General MacArthur advocated placing entirely under Chiang's control our air and naval forces, our ground service troops, and equipment.

General Marshall and the Joint Chiefs flatly opposed this proposal. They pointed out that the forces on Formosa are essential to its defense, and that any ventures against the mainland would endanger the security of the island. Further, there was no firm evidence introduced that a Nationalist attack on the mainland would succeed in forcing a diversion of Communist troops from Korea. There was no solid indication also that the Chinese people on the mainland at this time would welcome Chiang.

It further appeared that without any promise of effect on the Korean fighting, the MacArthur proposal risked our forces under the leadership of General Chiang in a doubtful venture which could easily develop into a major commitment of support at great cost.

**Joint Chiefs Oppose Unilateral Naval Blockade.**

While the Joint Chiefs agreed to the desirability of cutting off supplies to China and welcomed the action of the United Nations in imposing a strategic embargo, they opposed a unilateral blockade. As General Marshall testified that an economic embargo serves the same purpose as a naval blockade without the same risks. Further, a complete blockade would affect Dairen and Port Arthur. Assurances were lacking that the Soviet Union would acquiesce. Admiral Sherman testified that a purely U.S. blockade was beyond our capacity to impose. It was also disclosed that unilateral action might alienate our Allies.
The testimony of General Marshall and the Joint Chiefs made clear that their disagreement with General MacArthur and his proposals was based on military as well as other considerations.

**Bombing Rashin.**

Early in the fighting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had cautioned General MacArthur against action close to the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers. In August, United Nations air forces bombed Rashin, in North Korea, some 17 air miles from the Soviet border. The Department of State objected to the bombing on the ground that the Soviet Union was highly sensitive and that the action might be interpreted as directed against them. The Department was also concerned that navigational errors might result in bombing Soviet territory and lead to Soviet involvement.

Testimony on the tactical importance of Rashin revealed differing opinions were held by the military. The question was left open for re-examination under new circumstances.

The signatories note that Rashin was bombed August 26, 1951.

1. P. 1276
2. Pp. 1032, 1196
3. Pp. 1316, 1288-1291, 1230-1235, 1300
4. Pp. 972-976, 1190, 1239
5. F. 961
6. F. 1366
7. F. 728