Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantively cleared South Korea of organized communist forces.

The enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left him troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces became accustomed to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are not contributing to his plemental losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigorous climate, terrain and battle.

If even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear realization that this war enemy, red China, of such segregated and wanted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

He lacks manufacturing bases and labor raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even modest air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as trucks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset vulnerability inherent in such activities. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human life.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since 1950 when entered upon its undeclared war in Korea.

Few under responsibilities with such war activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish the forces of arms the conquest of Korea.

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from the inherent effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through cessation of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases would doom red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insurmountable difficulty arising at decisions on the Korean problem, and the issues are resolved on their own merits without being hampered by extraneous factors not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's east in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern, apart from the military aspect of the problem where the issue is resolved in the course of events, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stood ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the army forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly have exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.