Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared North Korea of organized communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy’s lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy’s human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces become accustomed to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are not contributing to his plea salon losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rifle of climate, terrain and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such co-opted and wanted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately every critical item essential to the conduct of modern war.

He lacks manufacturing bases and lines raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even modest air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as trucks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not afford vulnerability amount in such a dimension. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential to decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy’s case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the meagre indifference to human loss.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under unrealistic with the restraint activity of the United Nations Forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to maintain its forces of arms the conquest of Korea.

The enemy, therefore, must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to deport from the Korean battle to contain the war to the area of Korea through cessation of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

Due to the facts just being established, there should be no insurmountable difficulty arising in decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Peking and China’s past in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That in the extreme concern, apart from the military areas of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it would be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the United Nations in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly have objection, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.