Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces became accustomed to this form of warfare. His tactics of infiltration are not contributing to his personnel losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigorous climate, terrain and battle.

Of even greater significance than the tactical success has been the clear realization that this new enemy, red China, of such segregated and wanted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

He lacks manufacturing bases and lines raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as troops, heavy artillery and other refinements which have introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not afford vulnerability inherent in such developments. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the superiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fantastic, or the most gross indifference to human loss.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since hostilities opened upon the undetermined war in Korea. Der underabilities within new restraint activity of the United Nations Forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to red China, its been shown to compel inability to accomplish its aims of arms the concept of Korea.

The enemy therefore must now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depopulate the Korean effort to contain the war in the area of Korea through conclusion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insurmountable difficulty arising at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's east in the United Nations.

The super-nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. Ties in the present concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of events, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
Within the area of my authority as military commander, how- 
never, it would be needless to say I stood ready at any time to confer 
in the field with the commander in chief of the army forces in an 
urgent effort to find any military means whereby the realization of 
the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no 
notice may justly have sanction, might be accomplished without 
further bloodshed.