Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleaned South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces became accustomed to this form of warfare. His attempts at infiltration are not contributing to his pioleeme losses, and he is shown less standing than our own troops under rigors of climate, terrain and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical successes has been the clear realization that today's enemy, Red China, of vast re-aggregated and abundant military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately any critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

He lacks manufacturing bases and lines of raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even modest air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as trucks, heavy artillery and other refinements which America has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone cannot offset vulnerability inherent in such advancements. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bribery, however imminent, or the most gross indifference to human life.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since hostilities entered upon the undeclared war in Korea. Even under conditions with whom restricted activity of the United Nations Forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea.

The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its inherent effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through cessation of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insurmountable difficulty arising as decisions on the Korean problem. If the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That in the present concern, apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
Within the area of my authority as military commander, how-
ever, it would be needless to say I stood ready at any time to co-oper-
in the field with the commander in chief of the armed forces in an
effort to find any military means whereby the realization of
the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no
notice may justly have been given, might be accomplished without
further bloodshed.