Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy’s lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy’s human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces became accustomed to this form of warfare. His tactics of infiltration are not contributing to his pleasurable losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigors of climate, terrain and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revolution that this new essay, led China, of such aggregated and wanted military power, lends the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war.

He needs manufacturing bases and lines of raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap; but with the development of gigantic methods of mass destruction, mere numbers do not affect vulnerability inherent in such activities. Control of the air and water, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy’s case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human life.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since last China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under conditions with no restricted activity of the United Nations Forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has shown its complete inability to accomplish its forces of arms the conquest of Korea.

The enemy therefore must be now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depict from the inherent effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through cessation of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insurmountable difficulty arising as decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China’s seat in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so brutally ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stood ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the allied forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no notice may possibly have amounted, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.