Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organised Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply, caused by our round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations.

This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces became accustomed to this form of warfare. His tactics of infiltration are not contributing to his plessorial losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under siege of climate, terrain and battle.

Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revolution that this new army, led China, of such re-agitated and wanted military power, lends the industrial capacity to provide adequately every critical item essential to the conduct of modern war.

He bases manufacturing bases and lines raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even modest air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as troops, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.

Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, munition alone does not effect vulnerability inherent in such developments. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past.

When this control exists as in our case and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss.

These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since hostilities entered upon the undeclared war in Korea. Under conditions with no restriction applies of the United Nations Forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrued to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish its forces of even the smallest campaign.

The enemy therefore must now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its inherent effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through cessation of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.

These basic facts being established, there should be no insurmountable difficulty arising in decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being bedeviled by extraneous factors not directly related to Korea, such as prestige and China's past in the United Nations.

The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is in no permanent concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere.
Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stood ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the armed forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly have exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.