TO:  GINSEKI  TOKYO  JAPAN

MR:  DIF  09410  26  AUG  50

From  BRIEF  Johnson  PERSONAL  FOR  MacArthur

The  President  of  the  United  States  directs  that  you  withdraw  your  message  for  National  Reacquaintance  of  Veterans
of  Foreign  Wars,  because  various  features  with  respect  to
Formosa  are  in  conflict  with  the  policy  of  the  United  States
and  its  position  in  the  United  Nations.
HERE IS THE TEXT OF GEN. MAC ARTHUR'S MESSAGE TO THE 51ST
NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS: GIDEON A.
LEWIS, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE
UNITED STATES

YOUR INSPIRING MESSAGE OF THE 17TH HAS MOVED ME DEEPLY
AND I TRUST THAT YOU WILL COMMUNICATE THIS TO ALL OF MY COMMANDS-IN-
ARMS OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS ASSEMBLED ON THE
OCCASION OF OUR 51ST ANNUAL NATIONAL ENCAMPMENT. MY Assurance
THAT THEIR CONFIDENCE AND SUPPORT WILL GIVE THIS COMMAND
MUCH ADDITIONAL STRENGTH TO MEET THE TESTS WHICH LIE
IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. TELL THEM THAT I AM HAPPY TO REPORT
THAT THEIR SUCCESSORS IN ARMS ARE ENGAGING THE ENEMY ALONG
OUR BATTLE LINES IN SOUTH KOREA ARE EXEMPLIFYING THAT SAME
HIGH STANDARD OF DEVOTION, FORTITUDE AND VALOR WHICH
CHARACTERIZED THEIR OWN SERVICE TO VICTORY. THEY THEMSELVES
ENGAGED IN COMBAT IN THE FIELD. FROM SENIOR
COMMANDERS THROUGH ALL RANKS, THEIR TACTICAL SKILL, THEIR
INVINCIBLE DETERMINATION, AND THEIR FIGHTING QUALITIES
AGAINST A FANATICAL FOE, WELL TRAINED, EXPERTLY DIRECTED
AND HEAVILY ARMED, HAVE UPHOLD OUR COUNTRY'S FINEST
TRADITIONS. TOWARD VICTORY, HOWEVER DIFFICULT THE ROAD,
THEY ARE GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF THEMSELVES WHICH SHOULD MAKE
EVERY AMERICAN HEART BEAT WITH PRIDE AND INFINITE SATIS-
FACTION.

IN VIEW OF MISCONCEPTIONS CURRENTLY BEING VOICED CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORMOSA TO OUR STRATEGIC
PURPOSES IN
POTENTIAL IN THE PACIFIC, I BELIEVE IT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST TO AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO STATE MY VIEWS THEREON TO YOU, ALL OF WHOM HAVE FUGHT OVERSEAS UNDERSTAND BROAD STRATEGIC CONCEPTS. TO BEGIN WITH, ANY APPRAISAL OF THAT STRATEGIC POTENTIAL REQUIRES AN APPRECIATION OF THE CHANGES BROUGHT IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST WAR. PRIOR THERETO THE WESTERN STRATEGIC FRONTIER OF THE UNITED STATES LAY ON THE LITTORAL LINE OF THE AMERICAS WITH AN EXPOSED ISLAND SALIENT EXTENDING OUT THROUGH HAWAII, MIDWAY AND GUAM TO THE PHILIPPINES. THAT SALIENT WAS NOT AN OUTPOST OF STRENGTH BUT AN AVENUE OF WEAKNESS ALONG WHICH THE ENEMY COULD AND DID ATTACK US. THE PACIFIC WAS A POTENTIAL AREA OF ADVANCEMENT FOR ANY PREDATORY FORCE INTENT UPON STRIKING AT THE BORDERING LAND AREAS.

ALL OF THIS WAS CHANGED BY OUR PACIFIC VICTORY. OUR STRATEGIC FRONTIER THEN SHIFTED TO EMBRACE THE ENTIRE PACIFIC OCEAN WHICH HAS BECOME A VAST BOAT TO PROTECT US AS LONG AS WE HOLD IT. INDEED, IT ACTS AS A PROTECTIVE SHIELD TO ALL OF THE AMERICAS AND ALL FRONTIERS OF THE PACIFIC OCEAN. WE CONTROL TO THE SHORES OF ASIA BY A CHAIN OF ISLANDS EXTENDING IN AN ARC FROM THE ALBATRANS TO THE MARINAS HELD BY US AND OUR THREE ALLIES. FROM THIS ISLAND CHAIN WE CAN DOMINATE WITH AIR POWER EIGHT ASIATIC PORTS FROM VLADIVOSTOCK TO SINGAPORE AND PREVENT ANY HOSTILE MOVEMENT INTO THE PACIFIC. ANY PREDATORY ATTACK FROM ASIA MUST BE AN AMPLIFIED EFFORT. NO AMPHIBIOUS FORCE CAN BE SUCCESSFUL WITH OUR...
CONTROL OF THE SEA LAKES AND THE AIR OVER THESE LAKES IN ITS
AVERAGE OF ADVANCE. WITH NAVAL AND AIR SUPREMACY AND MODERN
GROUND ELEMENTS TO DEFEND BASES, ANY MAJOR ATTACK FROM CON-
TINENTAL ASIA TOWARD US OR OUR FRIENDS OF THE PACIFIC WOULD
COME TO FAILURE. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS THE PACIFIC NO
LONGER REPRESENTS HABITATING AVENUES OF APPROACH
FOR A PROSPECTIVE INFLATOR — IT ASSUMES INSTEAD THE
FRIENDLY ASPECT OF A PEACEFUL LAKE. OUR LINE OF DEFENSE IS
A NATURAL ONE AND CAN BE MAINTAINED WITH A MINIMUM OF
MILITARY EFFORT AND EXPENSE. IT INVOLVES NO ATTACK
AGAINST ANTOHE NOR DOES IT PROVIDE THE BASTIONS ESSENTIAL
FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, BUT PROPERLY MAINTAINED WOULD BE
AN INVINCIBLE DEFENSE AGAINST AGGRESSION. IF WE HOLD THIS
LINE WE MAY HAVE PEACE — LOSE IT AND WAR IS INEVITABLE.

THE GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF FORMOSA IS SUCH THAT IN THE
HAND OF A POWER UNFRIENDLY TO THE UNITED STATES IT CONSTIT-
UTES AN ENEMY AILMENT IN THE VERY CENTER OF THIS DEFENSIVE
PERIMETER, 100 TO 150 MILES CLOSER TO THE ADJACENT FRIENDLY
SEGMENTS — OKINAWA AND THE PHILIPPINES — THAN ANY POINT
IN CONTINENTAL ASIA. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE IS ON FOR-
MOSA A CONCENTRATION OF OPERATIONAL AIR AND NAVAL BASES
WHICH IS POTENTIALLY GREATER THAN ANY SIMILAR CONCENTRATION
OF THE ASIATIC MAINLAND BETWEEN THE YELLOW SEA AND THE
Straits of Malacca. ADDITIONAL BASES CAN BE DEVELOPED IN A
RELATIVELY SHORT TIME BY AN AGGRESSIVE EXPLOITATION OF ALL
WORLD WAR II JAPANESE FACILITIES. AN ENEMY FORCE UTILIZ-
ING THESE INSTALLATIONS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE COULD INCREASE
BY 100 PERCENT
BY 100 PERCENT THE AIR EFFORT WHICH COULD BE DIRECTED
AGAINST OKINAWA AS COMPARED TO OPERATIONS BASED ON THE MAIN-
LAND AND AT THE SAME TIME COULD DIRECT DAMAGING AIR ATTACKS
WITH FIGHTER TYPE AIRCRAFT AGAINST FRIENDLY INSTALLATIONS
IN THE PHILIPPINES WHICH ARE CURRENTLY BEYOND THE RANGE OF
FIGHTERS BASED ON THE MAINLAND. OUR AIR SUPREMACY AT ONCE
WOULD BECOME DOUBTFUL.

AS A RESULT OF ITS GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION AND BASE POTENTIAL,
UTILIZATION OF FORMOSA BY A MILITARY POWER HOSTILE TO THE
UNITED STATES MAY EITHER COUNTER-BALANCE OR OVERTHROW THE
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN FLANK OF
THE U.S. FRONT LINE POSITION. FORMOSA IN THE HANDS OF
SUCH AN HOSTILE POWER COULD BE COMPARED TO AN UNSTOPPABLE
AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND SUBMARINE TENDER IDEALLY LOCATED TO
ACCOMPLISH OFFENSIVE STRATEGY AND AT THE SAME TIME CHECKMATE
DEFENSIVE OR COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCES
BASED ON OKINAWA AND THE PHILIPPINES. THIS UNSTOPPABLE
CARRIER-TENDER HAS THE CAPACITY TO OPERATE FROM 10 TO 20
AIR GROUPS OF TYPES RANGING FROM JET FIGHTERS TO B-29 TYPE
BOMBERS AS WELL AS TO PROVIDE FORWARD OPERATING FACILITIES
FOR SHORT-RANGE COASTAL SUBMARINES. IN ACQUIRING THIS
FORWARD SUBMARINE BASE, THE EFFICACY OF THE SHORT RANGE
SUBMARINE WOULD BE SO ENORMOUSLY INCREASED BY THE ADDITIONAL
RADIUS OF ACTIVITY AS TO THREATEN COMPLETELY SEA TRAFFIC
FROM THE SOUTH AND INTERRUPT ALL SEA LANES IN THE WESTERN
PACIFIC.
PACIFIC. SUBMARINE BLOCKADES BY THE ENEMY WITH ALL ITS DESTRUCTIVE RAMIFICATIONS WOULD THEREBY BECOME A VIRTUAL CERTAINTY.

SHOULD FORMOSA FALL AND BASES THEREAFTER COME INTO THE HANDS OF A POTENTIAL ENEMY OF THE U.S., THE LATTER WILL HAVE ACQUIRED AN ADDITIONAL "FLEET" WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN GAINED AND CAN BE MAINTAINED AT AN INCOMPARABLY LOWER COST THAN COULD ITS EQUIVALENT IN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND SUBMARINE TENDERS. CURRENT ESTIMATES OF AIR AND SUBMARINE RESOURCES IN THE FAR EAST INDICATE THE CAPABILITY OF SUCH A POTENTIAL ENEMY TO EXTEND HIS FORCES SOUTHWARD AND STILL MAINTAIN AN IMPOSING DEGREE OF MILITARY STRENGTH FOR EMPLOYMENT ELSEWHERE IN THE PACIFIC AREA.

HISTORICALLY, FORMOSA HAS BEEN USED AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR JUST SUCH MILITARY ADMISSION DIRECTED AGAINST AREAS TO THE SOUTH. THE MOST NOTABLE AND RECENT EXAMPLE WAS THE UTILIZATION OF IT BY THE JAPANESE IN WORLD WAR II. AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE PACIFIC WAR IN 1941, IT PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART AS A STAGING AREA AND SUPPORTING BASE FOR THE VARIOUS JAPANESE INVASION CONVOYS. THE SUPPORTING AIR FORCES OF JAPAN'S ARMY AND NAVY WERE BASED ON FIELDS SITUATED ALONG SOUTHERN FORMOSA. FROM 1942 THROUGH 1944 FORMOSA WAS A VITAL LINK IN THE TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION CHAIN WHICH STRETCHED FROM JAPAN THROUGH OKINAWA AND THE PHILIPPINES TO SOUTHEAST ASIA. AS THE U.S. CARRIER FORCES ADVANCED INTO THE WESTERN PACIFIC, THE BASES ON FORMOSA ASSURED AN INCREASINGLY
Increasingly greater role in the Japanese defense scheme. Should Formosa fall into the hands of an hostile power, history would repeat itself. Its military potential would again be fully exploited as the means to breach and neutralize our Western Pacific defense system and mount a war of conquest against the free nations of the Pacific Basin.

Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate Continental Asia. Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grant that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership — to quickly turn on a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation — and they underestimate the Oriental mentality. Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position from future encroachment, for few of its people fail accurately to appraise the safeguard such determination brings to their free institutions. To pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy. It would shift any future battle area five thousand miles eastward to the coasts of the American continents, our own home coast; it would completely expose our friends in the Philippines, our friends in
OUR FRIENDS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, OUR FRIENDS IN
INDONESIA, OUR FRIENDS IN JAPAN, AND OTHER AREAS, TO THE
LUSTFUL THRUSTS OF THOSE WHO STAND FOR SLAVERY AS AGAINST
LIBERTY, FOR ATHEISM AS AGAINST GOD.

THE DECISION OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON JUNE 27 LIGHTED INTO
FLAME A LAMP OF HOPE THROUGHOUT ASIA THAT WAS BURNING DIMLY
TOWARD EXTINCTION. IT MARKED FOR THE FAR EAST THE FOCAL
AND TURNING POINT IN THIS AREA'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM.
IT SWEPT ACROSS IN ONE GREAT MONUMENTAL STROKES ALL OF THE
HYPOCRISTY AND THE SOPHISTY WHICH AS CONFUSED AND DELUSIONED
SO MANY PEOPLE DISTANT FROM THE ACTUAL SCENE. — END OF
MESSAGE.