MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: The Position of the United States with Respect to Korea

RECOMMENDATIONS:
A. NSC 8/1 and 8/2
B. NSC Action No. 195

The attached views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 8/1 on the subject were considered by the National Security Council and the proposed changes incorporated as amendments to that report as adopted by the National Security Council at its 56th Meeting.

The enclosure is accordingly circulated as a matter of information and record.

[Signature]

STEVEN W. SINES
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
NSC LTR 46-473
SECRET ART 92-32
REMARKS files 7-7-79

TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Subject: The Position of the United States With Respect to Korea

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied NSC 8/1, a report by the Secretary of State on The Position of the United States With Respect to Korea, and would suggest changes in the Conclusions along the following lines:

a. Change reference in the last line of the Conclusions in subparagraph 2d to read "2d(1)(a), (b), and (c) above."

REASON: To clarify the reference.

b. Delete subparagraph 2e of the Conclusions and substitute therefor the following statement:

"Preparations for withdrawal of remaining United States occupation forces, including consultation with the United Nations Commission on Korea and the Korean Government, should be undertaken to permit completion of the withdrawal on or about but not later than 30 June 1949."

REASON: To avoid the projection of military occupation commitments into fiscal year 1950 and to eliminate the implication that withdrawal of United States forces is subject to consultation with the United Nations Commission on Korea and the Korean Government.

c. Delete subparagraph 3d of the Conclusions and substitute therefor:

"Prior to the final withdrawal of such United States forces there should have been transferred to the Government of the Republic of Korea equipment for its security forces (army, coast guard, and police) and a stockpile of maintenance supplies adequate to cover six month's replacement and consumption requirements together with an emergency reserve."
REASON: To clarify and to state more definitely the equipment, stockpile of maintenance supplies, and reserve which should have been transferred to the Korean Government prior to the withdrawal of remaining United States occupational forces.

g. Change subparagraph 3g as follows:

Delete the word "(Navy)", and in order to avoid any implication of United States support of a Korean Navy, add the following sentence at the end of this subparagraph:

"The implication should not be left in the minds of the Koreans that the United States will support a Korean Navy."

h. Change subparagraph 3g(1) as follows:

"(1) a well-trained and -equipped Army of 65,000 men, including air detachments, capable of maintaining internal order under conditions of political strife and inspired disorder and for maintaining border security;"

REASON: In the interest of clarity.

i. Delete subparagraph 3g(2) and substitute therefor:

"(2) a coast guard suitable for suppression of smuggling, piracy, illegal entry, and hostile infiltration by sea into South Korea."

REASON: To provide a better definition of the mission of the Korean Coast Guard.

j. Delete subparagraph 3g(3) and substitute the following therefor:

"(3) support in small arms and ammunition for a 35,000 man police force suitable for performing normal police functions of law enforcement and for cooperating when necessary with the Korean Army in the preservation of public order."

REASON: To indicate the size of the force and extent of the support.
In consonance with the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommend that subparagraph 2b(6) of the Analysis be amended by substituting the phrase "Coast Guard" for the word "Navy" each of the three times the word "Navy" appears in that subparagraph, and by deleting the phrase "(formerly Coast Guard)" at the end of the first sentence of that subparagraph.

Subject to incorporation of the substance of the changes suggested above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the Conclusions to this report.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

//s// OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.