Darling,

Back in Tokyo after the better part of two days in Korea as it seems good to get back to the already familiar surroundings even though there is something so basically stimulating about a war that Tokyo just does not have. We saw a lot in Korea because we were all over the place and I ran across my first large lot of Chinese prisoners and was not very impressed. They have been fairly tough but they are not like to give it up as a bad job. I wrote the notes for the General's K Day press conference and they were largely based on what I saw and learned the last couple of days in Korea. I think that they are large contribution to the psychological warfare against the Chinese and the rest of the Communists. For the family record I am enclosing my version of the notes with the parts that the General underlined for own emphasis. I burst into the press conference with him and afterward had to go home to change from my field clothes. I got my high praise during the period while I was changing my boots. He asked Dr. Surles how the Conference went. Day said that he thought General Marshall would approve. The General said, "I don't give a damn about General Marshall, what did I think." How distinguished can you be...
Suggest that a press conference be held upon return to Tokyo going direct to Radio Tokyo Building, about three blocks from Dai Ichi, where a briefing room is available. There can be readily put there a map of the enemy and friendly situation in broad terms.

The major portion of the conference could be devoted to a review of the tactical situation. While men in Korea are familiar with this procedure it will be brand new to the Tokyo bureau chiefs and the special correspondents.

The major point is the major victory which has been won in the last two Communist offensives. Those victories have been significant in several ways.

1. For the first time we have had Chinese Communists surrender in large numbers. Many of these were deserters and stragglers who state the problem of desertion is a major one in the Chinese Communist Army among troops north of the battle zone. Apparently the accounts of the great pounding which the UN Forces have been inflicting on the CCF have gotten back to the rear areas and the Communist soldier is showing less and less stomach for it. We don't know the extent of this dissidence in the Chinese Communist Army, but it appears to be growing. It will be wise to know the full significance of this development. I think it is a safe assumption that the great losses of the Chinese Communist Army on the field and the reports of thousands of executions of Chinese civilians in China proper must raise among the Chinese people some questions as to the beneficence of their Communist masters.

2. For the first time we have captured large amounts of enemy materiel including artillery. While the Communist withdrawal in many
has been orderliness it has been a rout in some others. The capability for
replacement of materiel is not very high in the Communist armies and these
losses will be severely felt.

3. Again the promised air support and armored forces have failed to
appear. During the past many weeks prisoners have told us that the next
offensives would include air support and great armored forces. These
assurances of support to their front line troops have proven as empty this
time as they have been on previous occasions. The Communist troops
must have some feeling of disillusionment as to the reli-
ability of the promises of their own high command.

4. Our great stress on the employment of our maximum fire
power has paid off. Prisoners are unanimous in their respect
for the great effectiveness of our artillery. The American
doctrine of massed fires is proving a sound one. The Communists
have tried to match our fire power with masses of manpower. The
results have been a slaughter which is appalling. The reckless
and cynical disregard for human life is simply incredible to us.

5. We cannot properly label these operations as victory but
the Eighth Army has achieved a major tactical success. The
Communists have taken the worst beating of their Korean
adventure in the extension of Communism by force of arms. Their
potential remains high if they choose to commit new forces. We
do not know what the decision of the Communist masters will be
on that point.