Darling,

Back in Tokyo after the better part of two days in Korea it seems good to get back to the already familiar surroundings even though there is something so basically stimulating about a war that Tokyo just does not have. We saw a lot in Korea because we were all over the place and I ran across my first large lot of Chinese prisoners and was not very impressed. They have been fairly tough but they are not very likely to give it up as a bad job. I wrote the notes for the General's Ken Day press conference and they were largely based on what I saw and learned the last couple of days in Korea. I thought that they were a large contribution to our psychological warfare against the Chinese and the rest of the Communists. For the family record I am enclosing my version of the notes with the parts that the General underlined for own emphasis. I bust into the press conference with him and afterward had to go home to change from my field clothes. I got my high praise during the period while I was changing my boots. He asked D. Surles how the Conference went. Day said that he thought General Marshall would approve. The General said, "I don't give a damn about General Marshall. What did Jim think."

How distinguished can you
Suggest that a press conference be held upon return to Tokyo going direct to Radio Tokyo Building, about three blocks from Dai Ichi, where a briefing room is available. There can be readily put there a map of the enemy and friendly situation in broad terms.

The major portion of the conference could be devoted to a review of the tactical situation. While men in Korea are familiar with this procedure it will be brand new to the Tokyo bureau chiefs and the special correspondents.

The major point is the major victory which has been won in the last two Communist offensives. Those victories have been significant in several ways.

1. For the first time we have had Chinese Communists surrender in large numbers. Many of these were deserters and stragglers who stated that the problem of desertion is a major one in the Chinese Communist Army among troops north of the battle zone. Apparently the accounts of the great pounding which the UN Forces have been inflicting on the CCP have gotten back to the rear areas and the Communist soldier is showing less stomach for it. We don't know the extent of this dissidence in the Chinese Communist Army, but it appears to be growing. It will take a long time to know the full significance of this development. I think it is a safe assumption that the great losses of the Chinese Communist Army on the field and the reports of thousands of executions of Chinese civilians in China proper must raise among the Chinese people some questions as to the beneficence of their Communist masters.

2. For the first time we have captured large amounts of enemy materiel including artillery. While the Communist withdrawal in
has been orderly it has been a rout in some others. The capability for replacement of material is not very high in the Communist armies and those losses will be severely felt.

3. Again the promised air support and armored forces have failed to appear. During the past many weeks prisoners have told us that the next offensives would include air support and great armored forces. These assurances of support to their front line troops have proven as empty this time as they have been on previous occasions. The Communist troops must have some feeling of disillusionment as to the reliability of the promises of their own high command.

4. Our great stress on the employment of our maximum fire power has paid off. Prisoners are unanimous in their respect for the great effectiveness of our artillery. The American doctrine of massed fires is proving a sound one. The Communists have tried to match our fire power with masses of manpower. The results have been a slaughter which is appalling. The reckless and cynical disregard for human life is simply incredible to us.

5. We cannot properly label these operations as victory but the Eighth Army has achieved a major tactical success. The Communists have taken the worst beating of their Korean adventure in the extension of Communism by force of arms. Their potential remains high if they choose to commit new forces. We do not know what the decision of the Communist masters will be on that point.