FAR EAST

AN ARMISTICE IN KOREA

On June 23, 1951, Jakob Malik, the Russian delegate to the United Nations, delivered a radio speech in New York which had as its theme the Soviet Union's continuing struggle to strengthen peace and avert a new world war. He concluded by stating: "The peoples of the Soviet Union believe that it is possible to defend the cause of peace. The Soviet peoples further believe that the most acute problem of the present day—the problem of the armed conflict in Korea—could also be settled. This would require the readiness of the parties to enter on the path of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The Soviet peoples believe that as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel. Can such a step be taken? I think it can, provided there is a sincere desire to put an end to the bloody fighting in Korea." Immediately thereafter Malik became "indisposed" and did not expand upon his remarks either officially or for the benefit of the press. The Department issued the following press release on June 23: "If Mr. Malik's broadcast means that the Communists are now willing to end the aggression in Korea we are, as we have always been, ready to play our part in bringing an end to hostilities and assuring against their resumption. But the tenor of Mr. Malik's speech again raises the question as to whether this is more than propaganda, if it is more than propaganda, adequate means for discussing an end to the conflict are available."

Soviet Clarification. Not wishing to embark upon negotiations without knowing more about the matters alluded to by Malik, we decided that it was desirable to limit discussions at that stage to efforts to obtain a clarification. To this end our Ambassador in Moscow was instructed to ascertain from the Russian Government the answers to certain questions. Our Ambassador asked what Malik meant by the "Soviet peoples believe", and whether what the Soviet people believe was also what the Soviet Government believed, and, if so, would the government be willing to lend its support to a peaceful settlement. Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko replied that Malik's phrase was self-explanatory and thus carried a direct answer. As to the views of the Soviet Government itself, Gromyko stated that they had been put forward long ago and that the Soviet Government had reacted favorably to the British initiative in 1950, but had received
no positive response. Commenting upon Mr. Malik's phrase "cease-fire and armistice", Gromyko indicated that a cease-fire was part of what he termed an "interim military armistice" to be concluded by the parties in the field in Korea. Such an agreement would be limited strictly to military questions and would not involve political or territorial matters, he stated, adding that assurances against any resumption of hostilities would be a matter for discussion between the commands in formulating the terms of a military armistice. In response to our question concerning the significance of Malik's phrase "to enter on the path of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question", Gromyko said that the conclusion of a military armistice would of itself be an "entering on the path of a peaceful settlement". He added that the Soviet Government had no proposals to make in this regard, that it was up to the parties in Korea to decide and that special arrangements would have to be made for political and territorial settlements. He denied knowing the Chinese Communist view of Malik's statement and suggested that the US ask the Peiping Government. Gromyko's clarification of Mr. Malik's reference to "belligerent parties" specified that the proposed meeting should be held between the military representatives of the United Nations Command and of the South Korean Command on the one hand, and the military representatives of the "North Korean People's Republic" and of the Chinese "volunteer" units on the other.

Peking's Views - The Soviet Union's radio and press gave immediate and heavy play to Malik's address, but the Peiping radio remained silent on the statement for almost 48 hours. When it broke its silence it quoted an editorial in the official Chinese Communist organ in Peiping, to the effect that the "Chinese people completely accepted" Malik's proposal. The editorial stated that "this is another test for America, to see whether she accepts the lesson of the past and whether she is willing to settle the question peacefully." The editorial alluded to various pronouncements by Foreign Minister Chou En-lai and others which "all firmly upheld that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Korea and that the Korean people should be allowed to settle the Korean question themselves." The editorial went on to say that "the Chinese people have always resolutely supported these just and reasonable standpoints and proposals. It was only because the unscrupulous United States Government repeatedly refused to accept them, continued to extend the aggressive war in Korea, directly threatened China's security, and jeopardized China's peaceful construction, that the Chinese people could tolerate it no longer and that they volunteered to resist America, aid Korea, and defend their homes." Considering it to be "obvious that the United States finds it beyond its
capacity to undertake an extensive expansion of the war," the editorial stated that if the US were prepared to end the war, then it should speedily seek a peaceful solution of the Korean issue in accordance with the just and reasonable measures which have been repeatedly advanced by the People's Republic of China, the USSR and other nations desiring peace." The Peking radio then lapsed back into silence on the subject.

Armistice Parley - Since we had received all the clarification from the Soviet Union we would get and since we had received no information on the precise steps the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists were willing to take in order to achieve an armistice in Korea, we decided to move on the assumption that the Communists wished a bona fide armistice. General Ridgway was instructed to issue a statement, the purpose of which was to discover whether the Communist commander would be interested in a meeting in the field to arrange for armistice talks.

To this end, General Ridgway issued the following statement on June 30:

"To the Commander-in-chief, Communist forces in Korea. As Commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following: I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice. Upon receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired I shall be prepared to name my representative. I would also at that time suggest a date at which he could meet with your representative. I propose that such a meeting could take place aboard a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor." The statement was broadcast throughout the day. At 11:00 p.m., July 1, Tokyo time the following message was monitored:

"To General Ridgway, Commander-in-chief of the United Nations Forces:

Your statement of June 30 this year concerning peace talks has been received. We are authorized to inform you that we agree to meet your representative for conducting talks concerning cessation of military action and establishment of peace. We propose that the place of meeting be in the area of Kaesong on the 38th parallel. If you agree our representatives are prepared to meet your representatives between July 10 and 15, 1951. (Signed) Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army; Peng Teh-huai, Commander of the Chinese Volunteer Forces." There followed an exchange of messages as a result of which it was agreed that the first meeting would be held in Kaesong on July 8 to make arrangements for the start of the negotiations. The initial meeting was held as planned in a cooperative atmosphere and arrangements for such mechanical aspects of the negotiations as guarantees of safe conduct, security, communications,
and the number of participants were agreed upon. The first substantive meeting was scheduled for July 10.

Our General Position on an Armistice - Our general approach to the conditions of an armistice, as revealed to the Ambassadors of those countries having forces in the United Nations Command, is as follows:

1. The negotiations at Kaesong will be confined to strictly military matters. Any agreement will be military in character and will not involve political questions. No commitment will be made involving a violation of the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of Korea or the announced policy of the United Nations in this regard.

2. No limitation will be imposed upon General Ridgway's conduct of the military campaign until an agreement is reached. Details of a military line and arrangements on the details of a demilitarized zone or buffer area must be left with some discretion to General Ridgway. A bare cease-fire, especially involving a cessation of United Nations air activity, during the negotiations, would place the United Nations in a disadvantageous position and permit an enemy build-up, and therefore neither a preliminary cease-fire nor the permitting of any change in the enemy's military position is contemplated. The forces of the United Nations are to remain in their present strong and favorable positions.

3. Final armistice arrangements will apply to all air, ground, naval and guerrilla units. Respect for the demilitarized zone, areas in the hands of the opposing forces and the territorial waters within the three-mile limit will be observed.

4. No military reinforcement, either in personnel or in the level of supply, will be permitted. Replacement on a man-for-man basis, such as the US rotation system, will be permitted.

5. Prisoners of war will be exchanged initially on a man-for-man basis since a wholesale repatriation of prisoners of war would virtually restore to North Korea forces equivalent to the number it possessed at the time of the initial aggression.

6. One of our greatest concerns is over proper supervision of the implementation of an armistice. Arrangements might be made for a mixed military commission for observation to assure each side that
the terms of the armistice were being carried out. Since the Soviet bloc in the past has not taken kindly to military observation teams having complete freedom of movement, arrangements might be made for the mixed military teams to observe at key points, such as the Yalu River bridges, port terminals, rail junctions and highway intersections. In addition, the Chinese Communists have consistently refused to recognize the legitimacy of UN agencies and therefore it is not contemplated at present that the UN per se will have an official connection with an armistice commission, at least in the beginning. We would be willing, however, to consider the possibility of the commission's being composed of parties neutral to the conflict.

As to any armistice agreement, we believe that it should be sent to the UN, either to the General Assembly or the Security Council, for approval but it is not contemplated that the armistice will be held up pending such approval and it is also not contemplated that the UN will act in such a way as to cast doubt upon the validity of any agreement reached.

Chinese Communist Position - Upon the eve of the first substantive talks in Kaesong, we have little confirmed information of what attitude the Chinese Communists will take and what conditions they will demand, other than those revealed in their past record and those alluded to in their propaganda. It does appear that the Chinese Communists desire the talks since they have abandoned their previous condition that no negotiations could take place without first having a cease-fire. They have also redefined their war aim which they now state to be driving the "United States aggressors" across the 38th parallel instead of driving the aggressors into the sea. There are indications that the communist negotiators will insist upon the 38th parallel as a line of demarcation. After the communist acceptance of General Ridgway's June 30 suggestion for holding talks, the Peking radio again became vocal on the subject of an armistice in Korea. Once again quoting an editorial in the official Communist organ in Peking, the radio stated that "the negotiations for an armistice, though strictly military in character, must involve certain important questions, such as the specific arrangements for a cease-fire, the determination of a non-military zone, and so on. How these questions are dealt with will be a concrete test of the sincerity of the intention of the American Government, and other governments, to end the bloody conflict in Korea." The editorial, as broadcast, cautioned the Chinese not to give up their struggle because...
"a cease-fire and an armistice are at present not yet facts, and there is still war". It also stated that the people must absolutely not relax in the least in the work of resisting America and aiding Korea before a cease-fire and an armistice are realized, and added that 'even after an armistice in Korea the people must make unflinching efforts to push forward the various present patriotic campaigns, and particularly the work to consolidate the national defenses.'

Future Problems - That the Chinese people are being prepared for a possible military settlement, for interpreting such a settlement as a communist military "victory", and for an intensification of the tensions over the familiar political and territorial problems appear demonstrated by another commentary broadcast by the Peking radio which stated: "In spite of the fact that the imperialists have now learned their lesson of defeat and have conceded to cease the war of aggression in Korea, this is far from a complete settlement of the Korean question and much further from the recovery of Taiwan, the just solution to the question of a Japanese peace treaty, and other important questions in the Far East. The imperialists still occupy our country's Taiwan and still control South Korea and Japan. They continually scheme to launch aggression and undermine the People's Republic of China." It is clear from the Chinese Communist propaganda that the Peking regime does not consider that the armistice in Korea will settle the various problems in the Far East. It is also clear that they intend to press, if only for propaganda purposes, for a settlement of certain problems. Other problems may be raised by various governments. Still other problems may rise automatically if an armistice is agreed upon.

UN Problems - It is to be expected that in such circumstances the quasi-existent issue of Chinese representation in the UN may be revived by some members either for general discussion or for action by the inactive General Assembly Committee on Chinese Representation. If an armistice is agreed upon, an effort may be made to have the Additional Measures Committee recommend, under the General Assembly Resolution of May 21, 1951, a relaxation of the present strategic embargo imposed on trade with Communist China and North Korea. An effort may be made to lift the charge of aggression brought against the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China by the General Assembly Resolution of February 1, 1951. An effort may also be made to have the Additional Measures Committee suspend its work or be discontinued. Some countries not yet participating with armed forces in the UN Command in Korea may
conclude that contributions are unnecessary despite the Secretary General's recent appeal for additional troops. UN policy and resolutions call for the unification, independence and sovereignty of Korea as a political objective and these objectives will undoubtedly again become the subject of debate in the UN as well as a subject of negotiations under a possible revival by the communists of proposals for the calling of conferences of the "Seven Powers", the "Five Powers" or other groupings. In this connection, we may expect extreme resistance on the part of the Republic of Korea to any settlement based on the 38th parallel and to any conference or negotiations which would include Communist China or the North Korean regime and which would threaten the national unity of the Republic.

Japanese Problems - The recent Soviet note with regard to the Japanese Peace Treaty together with statements emanating from Peiping and P'yongyang indicate that the communists attach considerable importance to the negotiation of a Japanese Peace Treaty. The communists may take the occasion of an armistice in Korea to make new approaches in the matter of the treaty which might lead some of the nations that have agreed to the draft treaty to favor postponing action in the hope that agreement could be achieved with the Chinese Communists and with the Soviet Union. In Japan itself, we may expect renewed activity on the part of the communists to put forth the proposal for an "over-all peace", and efforts probably will be made to convince the Japanese of the advantages of a peace treaty signed by the Soviet Union and Communist China which would give Japan greater security than the present draft. The Japanese, under present arrangements, will have to determine whether a separate bilateral peace treaty is to be signed with the Chinese National Government. Japan's natural interest in redeveloping its historic trade pattern with China may be played upon by the communists to convince the Japanese of communist sincerity. An end to the hostilities in Korea might appeal to the Japanese to offer economic advantages, especially to offset the economic gains now being enjoyed by the Japanese in furnishing supplies and facilities to the UN armed forces. In addition, an armistice may afford the communists an opportunity to play upon Japanese hopes for peace with the possible result that the Japanese would become reluctant to become committed to the security arrangement with the US now envisaged.

Formosa - An armistice in Korea may influence India's wishes through UN channels, to have the US rescind its orders concerning the Seventh Fleet off Formosa. Although it may be possible to
retain the Seventh Fleet in position until an entire settlement of the Korean question is arrived at, its future withdrawal is publicly associated with the termination of hostilities in Korea. We may expect continued and increased pressure from other UN members for its withdrawal. We may expect the Peiping regime to pursue the most vigorous campaign by political and military means to achieve possession of Formosa. We may also expect increasing sentiment on the part of certain other governments to permit Communist China to gain Formosa. Furthermore, should an invasion be attempted by the communists, the US might expect little support on the part of UN members for resistance to such an invasion.

Southeast Asian Problems - An armistice in Korea may create problems and add to the existing tensions in Southeast Asia. Build-ups on the Burmese and Indochinese borders and recent reports of clandestine aid to the Burmese and Vietnamese communists suggest the possibility of an armed attack in the area. In making decisions to invade, the communists would take into consideration the strength and likelihood of resistance to such efforts, particularly by the US and the UN, and the repercussions such intervention would have elsewhere in Asia. An attack upon Burma would have great effect in India, and would harden the attitude of Southeast Asian states against communism and might be a step toward the formation of a common anti-communist front among those nations. In the event of a Chinese Communist attack upon Indochina, we could expect an immediate appeal by the French to the UN, and the amount and nature of assistance to be given by the US would have to be decided. Even without any evidence that the Chinese Communists are actually preparing to invade Vietnam, the French can be expected to be apprehensive over an armistice merely because of the number of Chinese Communist troops which would be released. It is possible that the French would be willing to agree to a Peiping regime's representation in the UN and to support Peiping's claims to Formosa in return for assurances that Indochina would not be attacked. The Indonesians may be expected to welcome an armistice and they would strongly disapprove any Chinese Communist move against Burma. Their reactions toward a major Chinese Communist move against Indochina would probably be mixed because of their feeling that French policies in Indochina are stifling the growth of true nationalism. Thailand, once its pre-occupation with the internal situation has passed, will probably approve the US position, while at the same time keeping its eyes upon developments in Indochina.
This line of argument, however, was seriously undermined when the Federation of Labor, chief supporter of the Labor Party, decided to support the Government in its action against the dockworker's union. The Labor Party was thus thrown off balance and its supporters were left divided and confused. When collapse of the strike appeared inevitable in early June, the Labor Party Parliamentary leader reversed his previous stand and in a public speech stated that the Government was justified in declaring a state of emergency. This has served only to compound the confusion in the Labor Party's ranks.

FAREAST

PROGRESS IN THE KOREAN TRUCE TALKS

The first official meeting between the United Nations truce negotiators and the representatives of the North Korean regime and the Chinese Communist "volunteers" was convened in Kaesong on July 10. At the initial meeting the credentials of the two delegations were exchanged and the opening remarks of the principal delegates of each side made. The UN delegation then presented its proposed agenda for the talks which included these items:

1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Location of, and authority for International Red Cross representatives to visit, prisoner of war camps.
3. Limitation of discussions at this and all subsequent meetings to purely military matters related to Korea only.
4. Cessation of hostilities and of acts of armed force in Korea under conditions which will assure against resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force in Korea.
5. Agreement on a demilitarised zone across Korea.
6. Composition, authority and functions of Military Armistice Commission.
7. Agreement on principles of inspection within Korea by military observers teams, functioning under a Military Armistice Commission.
8. Composition and functions of these teams.
9. Arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war.

After a delay extending over the August recess, the communist delegation presented its proposed agenda which included these items:

[Date and information, probably July 8, 1952]
State Department publication.
1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Establishment of the 38th parallel as the Military Demarcation Line between both sides and establishment of a demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.
3. Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea.
4. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease-fire and armistice in Korea.

The second meeting on the following day was taken up with a discussion of the proposed agenda items. The UN delegation attempted to explain its agenda items, while the communist delegation insisted upon its items relating to the 38th parallel as a dividing line and to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. The UN delegation maintained that it could not accept these items, since the first embodied a conclusion and the second involved a political matter and was therefore out of place at the cease-fire talks. The UN delegation reported that it quickly became evident that the North Korean general, Nam Il, was the head man of the communist delegation and that the Chinese Communist "volunteers" occupied a secondary role.

Difficulties Arise - At the time Kaesong was first mentioned as a possible site for the cease-fire negotiations, the city was unoccupied and UN patrols were able to enter the city freely. However, when the UN liaison group reached Kaesong to take part in the preliminary talks on July 8, they found that the communists had sent military forces into the area and armed guards into the city. The presence of these forces raised the question of the UN delegation's freedom of access to the conference site. The UN delegation, during the first two sessions, was confined to a specified house in the city and a well-guarded pathway from there to the conference building, thereby giving rise to the question of the UN delegation's freedom of movement about the city. Moreover, during the course of the first meeting, the UN delegation attempted to send a courier back to its base at Munsan, but the courier was not permitted to proceed, thus raising the question of the delegation's freedom to communicate with its own base. At the first meeting, just after the communist negotiators had presented their agenda proposals, a group of communist photographers burst into the conference room and, despite the protests of the UN delegation, took a series of pictures before retiring. The UN delegation thereupon said that it wished to bring a group of UN newsmen to the site of the talks. The communist delegate, after agreeing to this proposal, later withdrew the agreement. This raised the question of the UN Command's right to decide the composition of its own delegation.
Communists' Good Faith Questioned - The UN Command was bothered by the evident communist refusal to accord the UN reciprocity of treatment, since the issue was far broader than a question of having a certain number of press representatives present at Kaesong. The UN Command felt that reciprocity was important not only for itself but because the communists had taken advantage of our attitude to give the world a false picture of the talks. Shortly after the actual cease-fire talks began it became evident that the communists were making propaganda capital out of certain matters of form and procedure which we had been prepared to overlook in order to get down to the substance of a cease-fire. Communist propaganda pictured the UN forces as defeated and suing for peace and portrayed Kaesong as a communist-held city to which UN truce teams in jeeps bearing the white flag of surrender had been summoned. The UN Command was also bothered by the communist tactic of negotiating by propaganda broadcast, thus nailing themselves publicly to a fixed position from which they could retreat only with difficulty. Such a tactic, it was felt, was an indication that the communists had entered the talks in anything but a negotiating frame of mind.

The UN Command was also concerned over the consideration that all reports seemed to point to a continuing build-up of communist troop strength in Korea. While the communists were perhaps merely trying to influence the course of the talks, the fact was that their forces were in a position to launch an offensive at a time of their own choosing, either during or immediately following the talks. The UN Command was also worried over the fate of the prisoners of war and the civilian internees in the hands of the communists. Since a considerable period would elapse before any exchange of prisoners could be effected and since it was felt that something should be done to ameliorate the condition of these men immediately, the UN delegation had placed an item on the prisoners' agenda. The communists had been both sensitive and obstructive on this point stating that the problem of the prisoners of war was a military one but that the question of sending representatives of the international Red Cross to go to prisoner of war camps was a political question and therefore out of place.

UN Demands - In the light of these factors, the UN Command took the position that, if the talks were to continue at Kaesong, the town would have to be demilitarized, the UN delegation would have to have freedom of access to and freedom of movement within the city, the UN delegation would have to have freedom to communicate with its own headquarters, and, in short, the talks would have to proceed with each side receiving equal treatment and showing good faith. The UN negotiators were instructed to be firm and to insist on reciprocity. The talks having been broken off on July 12 over this lack of reciprocity, General Ridgway broadcast a message on July 13 to the
communist commanders in which he set forth the views of the UN Command and the prerequisites to resuming the talks. The communists replied on the morning of July 15, agreeing to General Ridgway's proposals in order not to let the conference break down on what they termed the minor problem of allowing newsmen to be attached to the UN delegation. The talks resumed that afternoon, at which time the UN delegation elaborated upon the prerequisites of reciprocity contained in General Ridgway's message. The communist delegates retired to discuss the proposals and returned after a short period to accept the proposals that: 1) the road leading to the conference site be left open to unrestricted use by the UN delegation; 2) a neutral area, five miles in radius around Kaesong, contain no armed personnel except the minimum needed for military police duties; and, 3) any personnel required for security at the conference site be unarmed, the conference site being defined as an area with a half-mile radius centered on the conference house.

Substantive Talks Resumed - After agreement was reached on the above-mentioned prerequisites, the delegations proceeded for the remainder of the meeting on the 15th and during the meetings on the 16th to discuss the matter of the adoption of an agenda. The discussions were general in nature and confined largely to the order of listing the various items. In a discussion of the UN proposed agenda, the communists, for example, saw no reason for including in the agenda an agreement to discuss only military matters since they maintained that agreement on that subject had already been reached by agreeing to hold the talks in the first instance. The UN delegation agreed to remove that proposal from the agenda. The question of prisoners of war was raised, and when the UN delegation asked the communists to convey to their superiors our request that the location of prisoner of war camps be transmitted to the International Red Cross, the communist officers appeared quite perturbed. They relaxed, however, when the UN delegation stated that high priority on the agenda had been given the item for humanitarian reasons and that the UN delegation would be willing to place the item lower on the agenda. The UN delegation also agreed to remove from the prisoner of war item the reference to the authorization for representatives of the International Red Cross to visit prisoners of war camps. In discussions of the communist proposed agenda, the communists, while indicating a willingness to modify their views somewhat and change the order of their items in order to reach an agreement, were persistent in their position that a settlement on the 38th parallel as a military demarcation line was basic to a cessation of hostilities. They also agreed that they could not give up their basic objectives—the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the establishment of a demilitarized zone. The UN delegation confined its remarks largely to the general purpose of an agenda, to the necessity for agreeing to an armistice, emphasizing that
the talks were not for the purpose of an over-all peace settlement, and to
criticizing the inclusion of the 38th parallel as a contentious item in the agenda.
The communist delegation's general remarks were largely in support of its conten-
tion that all foreign troops would have to be withdrawn from Korea as a basic
guarantee against the resumption of hostilities. The UN delegation mentioned
the need for an armistice commission and for military observation teams but
the communist delegation did not discuss this item. There was little discussion of
the location of a military line as such but the communists agreed to eliminate
any specific reference to the 38th parallel in connection with a military line as
an agenda item. Nevertheless, the general impression received by the UN
delegation was that the tone of the meetings was better than that prior to the
recess in the talks.

Modified UN Agenda - The UN agenda has now been modified
as follows:
1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Establishment of a demilitarized zone as a basic condi-
tion to cessation of hostilities in Korea.
3. Concrete arrangements for a cease-fire and armistice
in Korea with guarantees to insure against a resumption of hostilities pending
a peace settlement, including:
   a. the establishment of a military armistice commis-
sion
   b. the creation of military observation teams
4. Arrangements concerning prisoners of war.

Main Issues - From the course of the discussions held thus
far it appears that the main issues to be solved before an armistice agreement
can be realized are the location of a military demarcation line, the withdrawal
of foreign troops and the establishment of adequate inspection. In regard to the
first two the communists have thus far been unremitting in their substantive
position, and the third issue has not been discussed in detail. For our part we
are opposed to the communist proposal calling for the 38th parallel as a mili-
tary line and we cannot accept their proposal that all foreign troops be withdrawn
from Korea immediately. In the latter case we believe that such action would vi-
olate the aims of UN Resolutions on Korea and that this communist proposal is not
a matter for negotiation in the field, but part of a general peace settlement, in this con-
nexion it appears that the communists tend to regard the talks at Pusan in terms of a
permanent peace and settlement, rather than in terms of a military armistice. This being so,
they should be brought to realize that the UN has no intention of withdrawing its
troops except on a gradual and protracted basis as a result of a peace settle-
ment and not as a result of an armistice in the field.