MEMORANDUM FOR

FROM: Col Davis

SUBJECT: Ideas with Respect to Truce Negotiations

1. The following represents the individual thinking of Edmund Taylor and myself and has no official sanction from PSB.

2. There is in effect a "little balance of power" in Korea which in many ways augurs in the mutual interests of the US and the communists to continue admodus vivendi. Our chief reason for wanting a settlement is lack of commensurate military power to achieve complete victory. A settlement would, however, permit the communists to increase their military strength with impunity, whereas at present we may undertake military operations as it suits our convenience.

Should we not look upon continuation of the negotiations as an opportunity for enhancing our propaganda position? If we accept this position, we should negotiate with patience rather than with intermittent flare-ups of apprehension and demonstrations of our frustration. In continuing the negotiations we should, of course, envisage a date by which our military build-up would permit the application of greater pressure to force a settlement or a rupture. This would depend upon our willingness to commit sizable forces to the Pacific theater.

3. Whether the above suggestion proves valid or not the following might be tried during the period of negotiations:

a. Edmund Taylor suggests that the President announce that he has requested all his Ambassadors to obtain the views of the philosophical and religious leaders of the countries to which they are accredited on our position with respect to repatriation of prisoners of war. He might include Moscow so that the Soviet leaders would be embarrassed in selecting persons of prestige who could speak as individuals and so that their comments might be compared with those of leaders within the free world. Dr. Taylor’s approach is based upon the view of Ambassador Bowles that in making our policy-decisions we will win greater support, particularly from neutralistic countries such as India if we approach our decision with an air of humility and an indication that we are seeking advice rather than that we are confident that we know all the answers.
b. We might propose to the United Nations that the Vatia, the King of Seatin and the Prime Minister of India appoint a Joint Observation Team to report on the recommendations and recommend a basis of settlement.

c. Whatever policies we do ultimately adopt must be made palatable to all critical audiences. Whatever policy is ultimately adopted, it will be unpopular with some audiences.

5. The above proposals have, of course, not been fully examined and are suggested only as starting points for the working group being formed in Satau.