INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

FROM: New Delhi

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1409, OCTOBER 2, 9 P.M.

DEPT PASS TOKYO; SENT 1409, RPTD INFO LONDON 67, TOKYO 13

In our conversation yesterday morning I reviewed with Nehru the Korean situation in considerable detail. He had read three proposals recently made at Panmunjom for handling prisoners and he most forthcomingly stated they seemed reasonable and was glad we had put them forward.

Pointing out one of the proposals almost exactly as he had made it to me last April.

Asked him tell me frankly how he could improve handling of armistice negotiations. I added although we often frustrated we knew only hope was patience and still more patience.

He said he had no (rpt no) suggestions nor did he have any criticism and would only emphasize we must maintain our patience.

I asked him what he thought stood in the way of settlement problem. He said he simply did not (rpt not) know; one week had one theory and another week had a different theory.

Asked him his best guess as to Soviet attitude. Nehru stated our estimate shld be better than his but he inclined feel Soviets did not (rpt not) want armistice this time; first because are able to tie down UN troops without any loss to themselves; second because were able to test out new military equipment; third because continuing war game them leverage Chinese Commies because their dependence on Soviets for military supplies. Stated with some feeling he been disappointed recent indications Soviet Chinese relations but he did not feel any of us had much idea of what went on Moscow.

Told him I glad he had reliable new Ambassador Peking and hopes as soon as he begins get meaningful reports from him he will be willing discuss them in confidence with me. Stated I felt conditions for settlement now (rpt now) at least as good and perhaps better than we could expect year from now (rpt now); that regardless political parties American leaders and people wanted truce in Korea to be fol by Korean peace and then broad Asian settlement.

Pointed out
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Pointed out that longer Korean struggle went on stronger would be arguments favor arming Japanese in order bolster security north and east Pacific and takes some of pressure of US. Said we realized this would lessen whatever small chance there might be Russia and China pulling apart; that although unlikely any decisions would be made near future this future possibility that from practical point of view we all had to face.

Said Chinese must understand our reasoning well as we and if they had slightest desire for real settlement now (rpt now) time to let us know. I emphasized that I giving him only my personal opinions; that was in no (rpt no) way speaking for my govt.

Nehru appeared very thoughtful and said he understood our problem but that we shld likewise understand Chinese Commie concern over ring US bases just off China coast.

I said we had been forced fight our way 6,000 miles across Pacific to stop Asian aggression of few years ago; that our lack defenses had cost us hundreds of thousands American lives and we not (rpt now) prepared repeat this same old process. Added US bases were threat to Chinese only if Chinese had aggressive plans and that he himself had been unable tell us how we old persuade Chinese Commies only solution is broad Asian agreement starting with peace in Korea.

In my view Nehru will cable Ragavan in Peking for report and possibly ask him to again ask Chinese Commies what they intend to do. Even though he does nothing, such conversations effective in convincing Nehru our earnest desire for peace; in associating with us psychologically in discussing possible approaches to difficult Chinese; and in facing ones more squarely on Chinese for continued lack agreement.

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NOTE: Relayed to Tokyo 1/2/52 10:40 p.m. 30.

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