V. K. Krishna Menon of India spoke in the First Committee this afternoon in the general debate on the Korean question, to explain the draft resolution on the prisoner-of-war issue which the Indian delegation circulated on 17 November (Doc. A/871/734).

Mr. Menon emphasized that this draft resolution was "rather a way to a solution than a solution itself." It was "a way to a way out of a difficulty." It was not intended to transfer the armistice negotiations to United Nations Headquarters, but to provide the armistice negotiators with a basis for an agreement.

Commenting point-by-point on the proposals of his delegation, Mr. Menon said that these proposals were aimed at reducing certain conceptions to concrete terms without sacrificing any principles.

Marian Nacekiewicz of Poland, the first speaker this afternoon, said his delegation was studying the Indian plan with all the attention it deserved and reserved his right to state Poland's views on these proposals at a later stage.

The Polish representative charged that the United States was still bent on getting together a majority which would "slam the door shut to peaceful settlement" of the Korean question. The road to such a settlement was shown by the Soviet proposal, he said.

The list of speakers in the general debate was closed at 6:00 p.m. today. The Committee will meet again at 10:30 a.m. tomorrow, Thursday, 20 November. A second meeting is scheduled for 3:00 p.m. tomorrow.

# # #

(A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THIS MEETING IS GIVEN IN TABLES 1-10 WHICH FOLLOW THIS SUMMARY)
The First Committee met this afternoon to begin the 13th day of the general debate on the Korean question which began on 26 October. Listed to speak today are up to now the representatives of Poland and India.

The Committee agreed at its last meeting, on Monday, 17 November, to close the list of speakers in the general debate at 6:00 p.m. today. The Committee did not meet yesterday to give delegates opportunity to study the Indian draft resolution which deals with the prisoner-of-war issue and was circulated on Monday (Doc. A/613/73). Thirty-five delegations have up to now participated in the general debate which began on 26 October. Of those who spoke, 15 are co-sponsors of the 21-nation draft resolution (Doc. A/61/75) introduced by United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson on 26 October. They are the United States, Colombia, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, New Zealand, Turkey, Canada, Philippines, Uruguay, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.

Five delegations -- Sweden, Dominican Republic, Cuba, El Salvador, Panama -- have stated that they will vote for the 21-nation proposal.

The representatives of China and Lebanon endorsed the UN Command's stand on the prisoner-of-war issue.

The representative of Brazil expressed the hope that a workable solution would be found within the framework of the 21-nation draft.

The representative of Yugoslavia favored the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war but reserved his attitude toward the proposals before the Committee to a later stage.

The representative of Egypt made several suggestions (Press Release 474/2405) for the settlement of the prisoner-of-war issue without, however, making a formal proposal.

The representatives of Mexico (Docs. A/61/730 and A/61/731) and of Peru (Doc. A/61/732) submitted proposals dealing with the prisoner question.

The representative of Pakistan believed that an immediate cease-fire should be declared in Korea irrespective of whether agreement had been reached on the
question of prisoners of war. He favored the principle of voluntary repatriation.

The representative of Israel also was in favor of this principle. He outlined, without making a formal proposal, "key elements" which, he said, should be incorporated in a resolution to be adopted by the present Assembly session (Press Release GA/68/449). He suggested further that a drafting Sub-Committee be set up to attempt to find an agreed text.

Four delegations - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Byelorussia - supported the Soviet draft resolution introduced by Andrei I. Vyshinsky, Foreign Minister of the USSR, on 29 October (Doc. A/1417/79) and submitted in a revised form (Doc. A/1417/79/Add.1) when Mr. Vyshinsky spoke for the second time 10 November.

Yesterday the Soviet proposal was circulated in a corrected version (Doc. A/1417/79/Add.1). The correction was made in the translation from Russian of the last two lines of the proposal which deal with the terms of reference of the proposed commission with regard to the repatriation of prisoners of war.

...The meeting this afternoon was opened by the Chairman, Ambassador MAO TAILO, NUNES (Brazil), at 3:09 p.m.

(END OF TAKE 2.)
MARIAN BARKOWSKI (Poland) said that, while the debate was going on here for nearly a month, bloody battles were being fought in Korea, and the United States Air Force was still raining deadly bombs on Korean towns and villages.

The debate in the Committee, he said, had so far not promoted the end of hostilities, and the reaching of agreement. In view of the danger of a widening of the scope of the conflict and the heavy responsibility toward the long-suffering Korean people, the Committee was duty-bound to engage in a thorough and serious analysis of the situation.

The arguments advanced in support of Mr. Asahan’s views had been nothing more than “bare-faced allegations,” be said.

The representative of the “Syngman Rhee clique” had “spilled the beans” in the Committee about the aggressive intentions of his regime. This “typical” statement was “unprecedented” in the history of the United Nations, an organization dedicated to the cause of peace, Mr. BARKOWSKI said. Syngman Rhee’s “appetite” went far as to demand the arming of additional 20 South Korean divisions.

The “American bosses of Syngman Rhee” were likewise working on plans to broaden the scope of their aggression, he charged. The United States Air Force was violating Chinese territory, he added. According to the French news agency, newsreel, United States General Vandenberg had on his Far Eastern inspection tour declared that the US Air Force was in a position to bomb Manchuria.

The “deadlock” in the armistice negotiations had been created by the United States with “premeditation” because the Korean war was necessary to fan the flames of war hysteria and international tension which in turn would promote further and larger armaments, he declared. The war in Korea had become “the axis of American policy of aggression” and the basis for American war prosperity.

The Korean war was also helping the United States “knock together more and more aggressive bosses.” Senator Styles Bridges had, in the American Mercury, openly said that the new United States President would be a “war President,” Mr. BARKOWSKI said.

(END OF TAKS 2)
MR. BASKOWSKI (Poland), continuing, said the issue of the so-called voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war had been "artificially dragged in" by the United States who, as a result of the concessions made by the other side, all American objections had been met.

This was clear, he said, from the background of the prisoner issue during the armistice talks. The relevant articles of the text of the armistice agreement did not speak of any voluntary repatriation but expressly stipulated that "all" prisoners were to be repatriated. The wording of these articles showed beyond the shadow of a doubt that "at a given moment both sides had agreed to the repatriation of all prisoners," he declared.

Further proof of this view, he said, was that provisions for voluntary repatriation in the Armistice Agreement (Article 59a) dealt exclusively with displaced Korean civilians. Mr. Fyshinsky's thesis that prisoners of war were in a "special category" and could not be treated the same way as civilians was the only correct one, Mr. BASKOWSKI contended.

There was not a single word in the Geneva Convention of 1949 to justify the forcible detention of prisoners by the detaining side. Contrary to what Mr. Martinez of Canada had said, the Polish delegation did not separate the terms "release" and "repatriation" of prisoners. Both were part of one whole. International law and practice had always regarded prisoners of war as members of the armed forces to be treated as such.

The United States attitude on the prisoners-of-war issue was in complete violation of the Geneva Convention, he charged. The screening of prisoners in United States camps was a violation of Article 17 of the Convention, which clearly stipulated the questions to which a prisoner should give an answer. The issue of forcible repatriation was "invented" by the Americans for the purpose of holding several tens of thousands of prisoners as "hostages," he asserted;

(End of take #2)
From the debate in the First Committee had not put an end to the "bloody persecution" of prisoners in United States camps, Mr. HASEKOWSKI (Poland) contended. This showed "how much Measure Clark and Van Fleet cared about our debates here," he said.

There could be no just and fair settlement of the Korean conflict without a fair and just settlement of the prisoners-of-war question in accordance with international law, he went on. The retention of prisoners in the hands of the United States would contain seeds of new conflicts, he declared.

The United States had followed the same policy with regard to Polish P.O.W.'s in Germany and Polish children forcibly taken by the Germans to Germany, Mr. HASEKOWSKI charged. It was hard to imagine a worse fate than that of a prisoner in American, German, Russian or Korean hands, he declared.

In spite of the universal desire for peace in the world and the true wishes of the American people, said Mr. HASEKOWSKI, the United States delegation had not changed its attitude in the course of the debate. The United States was still bent on getting together a majority which would "slam the door shut to a peaceful settlement." The road to peaceful settlement was shown by the Soviet proposal, he said.

Mr. HASEKOWSKI concluded by saying that his delegation was studying the Indian resolution with the full attention which it deserved and renewed its right to state its views at a later stage.

(END OF TALK #4)
V. K. KRISHNA Menon (India) said there was unanimity in the Committee that the fighting in Korea must come to an end.

In this debate and the "exchange of compliments" in the discussion, he declared, the main problem of Korea was often overlooked, the problem of making it possible for Korea to take its place among the nations of the world. However, the debate had been useful, he said.

"We have never disguised the fact that the absence of the Government of China in our councils is one of the obstacles" to reaching agreement, Mr. Menon said. He hoped that a Korean armistice would be the "first installment" to the settlement of this issue as well. He did not doubt that the United Nations would find a solution to the Korean problem and would thus pass the test and meet the challenge of Korea.

It was important to remember that "substantial agreements" had been reached in the armistice negotiations, Mr. Menon observed. While it would be unrealistic to overlook the difficulties, it would be equally unrealistic to overlook the fact that these agreements had been reached. Korea was not an exclusively Asian problem, "it is a United Nations problem," he said. All nations had to contribute to its settlement.

India, he said, approached the problem in "a total belief in the bona fides of all." It also believed that both parties were anxious to put an end to the conflict.

Much time had been devoted, and rightly so, to the consideration of the legal aspects of the prisoner problem, Mr. Menon said. It was the business of the advocates of both sides to present such legal arguments effectively and fully. It was, however, essential to preserve the true proportions of these arguments and not lose sight of the problem itself. It was not his intention to follow or comment on the different legal arguments, the Indian representative said.

(END OF TALK 2)
CONTINUING, MR. MENON (India) said that the question of principle, overlapping sometimes the legal aspects, was even more difficult. It was necessary, however, to understand the essential elements of a principle, and that varying points of view could be reconciled without sacrificing the principle itself.

Turning to the Indian resolution itself (Doc.14/C.1/74), he said that while his delegation was alone responsible for the contents — and it was by no means a “composite effort” — he wished to pay tribute to the thoughts and comments of many delegations. It was not the intention of India to have the armistice negotiations conducted at UN Headquarters, he declared.

The resolution was divided into two parts, he recalled. The first part referred not only to the UN Korean Commission’s Report of 1952, but also to other “relevant reports” relating to Korea. It then stressed with approval the “considerable progress” made during the armistice negotiations.

All parties agreed that the prisoner issue was the “lone obstacle” to an armistice, Mr. Menon went on. However, even on this issue there already existed a “considerable measure of agreement” on the principles for the settlement of this problem. Article 60 of the draft armistice agreement mentioned in the first part of the resolution was a “great achievement,” and it placed the armistice agreement on the general plane of UN policy.

The two last clauses of the first part of the resolution were the essential elements of the resolution, he said. There was no provision of sending the proposals to both sides as the UN itself was one side.

These proposals were “rather a way to a solution than a solution itself,” which must come by negotiations, MR. MENON said. They were to form a basis for any agreement. All these proposals were equally applicable to both parties and were not addressed to only one of them. This was the reason for the proposed setting-up of a Repatriation Commission, MR. Menon declared.

(END OF TALK #6)
Mr. MENON (India) went on to recall that, in 1959, the Chaco settlement between Bolivia and Paraguay had also set up a Repatriation Commission comprised of other countries, and one of the Commission's sides had been at the time "the then Captain Mijangos." Thus this procedure was not without precedent. It was most appropriate in the present case, in view of the charges made and the difficulties that had arisen.

Of the four Commission's members, he said, two were closer to one side; the two others closer to the other side; but none of the four was participating in the conflict. An alternative composition of the Commission was provided, if these powers did not wish to take over the responsibility. He hoped this would not be the case.

Regarding Point 2 of the proposals, Mr. MENON said that the question whether or not anyone had notified the Geneva Convention did not arise, as in the Nuremberg Trials it had been established that matters of this kind were to be tried in accordance with the "well-established principles and practice of international law."

"With great respect," he said, "I wish to say that they must try to get behind the words used here: "voluntary repatriation" and "forcible repatriation."

The Chinese had repeatedly said that no one demanded forcible repatriation, he went on. Therefore, to avoid any ambiguity or equivocation, the resolution said that "force shall not be used against the prisoners of war..."

There could be no question of detaining prisoners by force either, as both sides did not claim that force or compulsion should be used. This duty was "enjoined upon the Repatriation Commission.

(End of Hansard)
The machinery and procedure of Point 4 of the Indian proposals was "inherent" in the attitudes of both sides, continued Mr. MENON (India). The clause calling for the release of prisoners from military control and custody of the detaining side was applicable against both sides.

There was some doubt as to what the term "agreed numbers" in Point 4 meant, he noted. What was meant was that all prisoners could not be moved on that day.

He then went on to explain:

Point 5: the letters of Kim II Sung and Peng Teh-kuai were "purposely cited" to avoid any misunderstanding.

Point 6: there would be no restriction on the men to go home. They could go "forthwith." There was no question of forcible detention.

Point 7: An important paragraph, he said. The prisoner was not anymore in the custody of the detaining side, he was on his way home. This should be made known to every prisoner of war so that he would have the possibility to exercise his free will. This clause had been inserted because there had been complaints that prisoners had not always been aware of their status and rights. It would be possible, for instance, for the Chinese side to explain the amnesty so that the prisoners should have no fear to go home. This was not a process of screening of prisoners, Mr. MENON emphasised.

Point 8 dealt with Red Cross teams.

Point 9 gave the prisoners the possibility of making representations and sending communications to the Repatriation Commission. They could thus express their desires without any questionnaires or pressure of any kind.

Point 10 was a very necessary paragraph. It made quite obvious that, without some discipline, rules and orders, large masses of prisoners could not be organised.

Point 11: prisoners of war had the right, under the Geneva Convention, to know the terms of the Repatriation Agreement.

(End of take #8)
Continuing the explanation of the points in his proposal, Mr. MENON (India) said Point 10 complemented preceding points.

He then turned to Point 13, and said if there were disagreement in the Commission, there could be no “steam-rolling” in view of the composition of the Commission. An “umpire” was provided by the resolution who would have the deciding vote.

According to Point 13, if “insurmountable” obstacles arose, the question of the appointment of an umpire would come back to the General Assembly. Until an umpire had been appointed, the Repatriation Commission would not come into being, and the Armistice Agreement could not be validated.

Point 15: In view of the “vast masses” of prisoners involved, bodies provided for incidentally by the Armistice Agreement would function as “repatriation committees,” Mr. MENON went on.

Point 16: The clause intended to make it clear that all the machinery necessary was provided in the Armistice Agreement and was only waiting for the removal of the last obstacles.

Point 17 (the last point of the proposal) was tied up with Paragraph 6 of the Preamble. If there were prisoners who did not want to go back for whatever reasons at the end of the 90 days, the Political Conference which was to deal with the Korean question as a whole should deal with this issue also. It was in no way the shifting of the responsibility from one body to another.

If this Conference quickly brings about peace, Mr. MENON said, the prisoner issue would assume a different aspect. The Conference should make recommendations with regard to the remaining prisoners. If neither side wants to be responsible for them, then the United Nations should take care of them, Mr. MENON declared. This was “not cutting any principle.” There was no question of people being further screened.

Mr. MENON then returned to Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the first part of the resolution. He said the question of forcible detention did not arise under the Indian resolution as the prisoners would be released from the custody of the detaining side.
CONTINUING, MR. MENON (India) said that no member of a civilized community could be called upon to use "extrajudicial force."

Force could be used only in the discharge of a legal duty, he said. This clause of the resolution was equally applicable to both sides. It did not on the other hand "cut in on the rights of states" with regard to repatriation, he said.

He said he submitted the proposals "with confidence and earnestness." He reiterated that the proposals were rather a way to a solution than a solution in themselves. The Indian delegation had tried to piece together ideas and bridge divergences. It had tried to reduce all conceptions to concrete and actual terms.

"Let us analyse the situation not alone in the context of clauses, not whether one word is better than another," said MR. MENON, "but in thinking of a country crying for peace. He asked, in conclusion, the Committee to give "earnest and anxious thought" to the Indian resolution which was "a way to a way out of a difficulty," and give it priority. (MR. MENON concluded his speech at 5:15 p.m.)

The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the list of speakers in the general debate would be closed at 6:00 p.m. today.

The meeting adjourned at 5:18 until 10:30 a.m. tomorrow, Thursday, 20 November.
Department of State

RE: DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE

FROM: Embassy New Delhi

TO: Department

SUBJECT: Indo-Pak Situation

The recent developments in the Indo-Pak situation have indicated a shift in the balance of power. The recent military exercises held by India have raised concerns among Pakistan, leading to a tense atmosphere on the border. The Indian military has been reinforced, and there is a possibility of an armed conflict.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has increased its military presence as well, indicating a readiness for a potential conflict. The internal political situation in Pakistan continues to be unstable, with widespread protests against the government's policies.

India's policy stance has been to maintain a strong military presence while also engaging in diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute peacefully. The United Nations' role in mediating the conflict has been limited, and there is a need for a stronger international intervention to ensure a peaceful resolution.

Economic consequences of a conflict are also a concern, as both nations are heavily dependent on their economies. A conflict could lead to a recession in the region, affecting the economies of India, Pakistan, and other neighboring countries.

In conclusion, the situation remains tense, and both India and Pakistan are preparing for a potential conflict. Diplomatic efforts are needed to prevent an armed conflict and ensure regional stability.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Redacted]
finger at SHAPE which we think will have opposite effect from that intended. IND CEL rejected both US drafts indicating they believed it was essential that RRF be directed specifically at SHAPE. It developed thereafter that IND had circulated other members Atlas-AFR blos their RRF and were too far obligated to withdraw from their position.

Separate TLR going in AMS OR queries NS Defclar.

Will continue efforts reach understanding with IND CEL on VN issues.