The President called a conference for 5 o'clock in the
Cabinet Room on Thursday, June 29, 1950, to discuss further some of
the questions raised at the National Security Council meeting on the
previous day.

A complete list of those attending the meeting is attached
as Annex "A".

The President opened the meeting by stating that he had
asked the group to get together to talk further on the subject of
Wednesday's meeting.

Secretary Johnson then read a letter which he had received
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, setting forth a directive to General
MacArthur. Mr. Johnson stated that the letter had been concurred in
by the Department of State. A copy of the letter is attached as
Annex "B".

The President interrupted Mr. Johnson as the latter was
reading paragraph __. The President stated flatly "I do not want any
implication in the letter that we are going to war with Russia at this
time." The President continued that he could be argued into accepting
the paragraph as it had been read but that he would not like it. The
President said: "We must be damn careful. We must not say that we are
anticipating a war with the Soviet Union. We want to take any steps we have to to push the North Koreans behind the line (i.e., 38th Parallel) but I don't want to get us over-committed to a whole lot of other things that could mean war."

Secretary Johnson said he understood the President's position, and he continued to read the letter.

When he had finished, Mr. Johnson stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed it essential to establish the beachhead in Korea and he asked Frank Pace for his comments.

Mr. Pace agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a beachhead was necessary. He had considerable reservations about putting any limitations in the directive to General MacArthur.

The President said that some reservations were necessary. He said that he just wanted to destroy air bases, gasoline supplies, ammunition dumps and places like that north of the 38th Parallel. He said that he only wanted to restore order to the 38th Parallel; he did not want to do anything north of it except to "keep the North Koreans from killing the people we are trying to save. You can give the Commander-in-Chief (MacArthur) all the authority he needs to do that, but he is not to go north of the 38th degree parallel." The President then turned to the Secretary of State and asked if he had heard from Moscow.
The Secretary of State, before answering the question,
made some general remarks on the directive to General MacArthur.
He said that the Department of State concurs in the Air Force taking
whatever steps are necessary north of the 38th parallel to attack
Communist bases. He said he had no objection to the Air Force acting
against North Korean airfields and Army units. If, for example, an
American plane saw Communist tanks coming down the road, they should
attack those tanks without much concern as to which side of the 38th
degree parallel they happen to be on. Mr. Acheson continued that he
was \textit{in complete agreement with what Secretary Pinetlter had said}
at the Security Council meeting the day before about the necessity for
freedom of action on the part of pilots. But, Mr. Acheson said, he
would have to insist that American planes \textit{not} go outside of North
Korea. No one would be able to foresee the consequences if one of
our planes got over into Manchuria.

Mr. Acheson then turned to the employment of United States
ground troops. He said he was willing for United States ground
forces to go into Korea. It would be a great disaster if we were
to lose now, and it was essential to give the Commander-on-the-spot
(MacArthur) whatever he needs to stop a disaster. As for paragraph _
about which there has been some question, Mr. Acheson said he thought
that our troops would have to be given the right to fight Soviet
forces if they encountered them. If an American unit found Soviet
forces, in Soviet uniforms, attacking them, they naturally had to
have the right to defend themselves.

Some discussion ensued at this point about the directive
to General MacArthur. It appeared that the President was under the
impression it was to be made public, and he had objected to para-
graph __ on the grounds that such a statement should not be made public.

He was assured by the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense that the document would remain top secret. Everybody
agreed that if General MacArthur's men met Soviet troops they should
defend themselves even if that meant actual engagement between United
States and Soviet forces.

The President again asked Mr. Acheson about Ambassador
Kirk's meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrew Gromyko.

Mr. Acheson then read a telegram which he had received
a short time before from Ambassador Kirk. A copy of this telegram
is attached as Annex XX. Mr. Acheson said that the Department
interpreted that as a clear statement that the Russians were not
going to put their armed forces in as their own forces. Mr. Acheson
said he was convinced that the Russians do not intend to enter
directly into the Korean dispute. Mr. Acheson said he thought
the interview with Gromyko ought to be considered in the light of
the statements being made by the Chinese Communists. Evidently
there was a scheme built up so that the Communists could say that
the United States is attacking China (i.e., Manchuria) so that the
Chinese Communists can have an excuse to enter the Korean dispute.

The President interposed to say "That means the Russians
are going to let the Chinese do the fighting for them."

Mr. Acheson asked for permission to release the telegram
exchanged with our Ambassador in Moscow and the President gave him
the permission.

Mr. Acheson reported that India had accepted the second
resolution of the United Nations Security Council, after a delay of
48 hours. The President and Secretary Johnson commented that that
was excellent news.

The discussion then turned to offers being made by
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Netherlands, for the use of
Naval facilities and planes.

The President told State and Defense to "take everything,
we may need them." Everything, he continued should be accepted as
a contribution to the work which General MacArthur is doing for the
United Nations. No offers of armed assistance should be accepted
as contributions to United States efforts, but only as contributions in support of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Secretary Acheson asked Secretary Johnson if it would be possible to get General MacArthur to report what was going on.

The President instructed Mr. Johnson to order General MacArthur, in the name of the President, to submit complete daily reports. The President remarked that it was just as hard to get information out of MacArthur now as it had been during the war.

Mr. Johnson remarked that Secretary Pace was coordinating all intelligence and information.

The President concluded the meeting by stating that he had no quarrel with anybody and that he did not intend to have any — he just wanted to know what the facts were, and, he concluded, "I don't want any leaks."

The meeting adjourned at 5:05 P.M.
Persons present at the President's meeting at 5 P.M., Thursday,
June 29, 1950, in the Cabinet Room.

From the White House:
The President
W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President
George N. Weym, Administrative Assistant to the President

From the National Security Council:
James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary

From the National Security Resources Board:
Stuart Symington, Chairman

From the Department of State:
Dean Acheson, Secretary
John Foster Dulles, Special Advisor to the Secretary
Philip C. Jessup, Special Advisor to the Secretary
W. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

From the Department of Defense:
Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense
Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army
Francis P. Biddle, Secretary of the Navy
Thomas B. Pinotter, Secretary of the Air Force
General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations
Brigadier General James H. Noms, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense