TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

 From: CINCP E TOJ O
to: DEPT MASH DC FOR CSUSA FOR JCS
Nr: 0 65255

U mag WAR 95790.

It is impossible at this time to authoritatively appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea. Various possibilities exist based upon the battle intelligence coming in from the front:

First, that the Chinese Communist government proposes to intervene with its full potential military force, openly proclaiming such course at what it might determine as an appropriate time; second, that it will covertly render military assistance, but will, so far as possible, conceal the fact for diplomatic reasons; third, that it is a permitting and abetting a flow of more or less voluntary personnel across the border to strengthen and assist the North Korean remnants in their struggle to retain a nominal foothold in Korea; fourth, that such intervention, as exists, has been in the belief that no UN forces would be committed in the extreme northern reaches of Korea except those of South Korea. A realization that such forces were insufficient for the purpose may well have furnished the concept of salvaging something from the wreckage.

The first contingency would represent a momentous decision of the gravest international importance. While it is a distinct possibility, and many foreign experts predict such action, there are many fundamental logistical reasons against it and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant its immediate acceptance.

The last three contingencies or a combination thereof, seem to be most likely condition at the present moment.

CM IN 8116 (4 Nov 50)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11950, Sec. 3-201
DOD Directive 5230.1, Jan. 18, 1973

By: NLH MSE

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. M-9

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-01-049688
I recommend against hasty conclusions which might be premature and believe that a final appraisal should await a more complete accumulation of military facts.