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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

FROM: CINCPKO JRAAN
TO: DEPTMAR WASH DC FOR CSUSA FOR JCS

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It is impossible at this time to authoritative apprise the actualities of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea. Various possibilities exist based upon the battle intelligence coming in from the front.

First, that the Chinese Communist Government proposes to intervene with its full potential military force, openly proclaiming such course at what it might determine as an appropriate time; second, that it will covertly render military assistance, but will, so far as possible, conceal the fact for diplomatic reasons; third, that it is permitting and accepting a flow of more or less voluntary personnel across the border to strengthen and assist the North Korean remnants in their struggle to retain a nominal foothold in Korea; fourth, that such intervention, as exists, has been in the belief that no UN Forces would be committed in the extreme northern reaches of Korea except those of South Korea. A realization that such forces were insufficient for the purpose may well have furnished the concept of salvaging something from the wreckage.

The first contingency would represent a momentous decision of the gravest international importance. While it is a distinct possibility, and many foreign experts predict such action, there are many fundamental logical reasons against it and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant its immediate acceptance.

The last three contingencies or a combination thereof, seem to be most likely condition at the present moment.

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I recommend against hasty conclusions which might be premature and believe that a final appraisal should await a more complete accumulation of military facts.