Dear Mr. President:

I am attaching, for your approval, a draft directive to the Commander of the United Nations' Forces in Korea implementing the primarily military aspects of NSC 61/1 which contains the agreed U.S. policy on future courses of action in Korea.

The Secretary of State and I have concurred in this directive, which was prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff except for the final paragraph proposed by the Department of State.

Your approval would permit the Commander of the United Nations' Forces in Korea to conduct the necessary military operations north of the 38th to destroy North Korean forces, subject to the conditions specified in paragraph 2 of the directive.

With great respect,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure

G. C. MARSHALL

The President

The White House

"Approved - 9/27/50 - HARRY S. TRUMAN"

DIRECTIVE TO THE COMMANDER OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA

1. This directive, based on NSC 81/1, is furnished in order to provide amplifying instructions as to further military actions to be taken by you in Korea. These instructions, however, cannot be considered to be final since they may require modification in accordance with developments. In this connection, you will continue to make special efforts to determine whether there is a Chinese Communist or Soviet threat to the attainment of your objective, which will be reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of urgency.

2. Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces. In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38° parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea. Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of the 38° parallel will not include air or naval action against Manchuria or against USSR territory.

3. In the event of the open or covert employment of major Soviet units south of the 38° parallel, you will assume the defense, make no move to aggravate the situation and report to Washington. You should take the same action in the event your forces are operating north of the 38° parallel and major Soviet units are openly employed. You will not discontinue air and naval operations north of the 38° parallel merely because the presence of Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is detected in a target area but if the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists should announce in advance their intention to reoccupy North Korea and give warning, either explicitly or implicitly, that their forces should not be attacked, you should refer the matter immediately to Washington.
4. In the event of the open or covert employment of major Chinese Communist units south of the 38th parallel, you should continue the action as long as action by your forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance.

5. In the event of an attempt to employ small Soviet or Chinese Communist units covertly south of the 38th parallel, you should continue the action.

6. You should immediately make an intensive effort, using all information media available to you, to turn the inevitable bitterness and resentment of the war-victimized Korean people away from the United Nations and to direct it toward the Korean Communists, the Soviet Union and, depending on the role they play, the Chinese Communists.

7. On the principle that the treatment of POW's shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes, you should set up on a pilot plant scale interrogation, indoctrination and training centers for those POW's now in your hands in Korea.

8. When organized armed resistance by the North Korean forces has been brought substantially to an end, you should direct the Republic of Korea forces to take the lead in disarming remaining North Korean units and enforcing the terms of surrender. Guerilla activities should be dealt with primarily by the forces of the Republic of Korea, with minimum participation by UN contingents.

9. Circumstances obtaining at the time will determine the character of and the necessity for occupation of North Korea. Your plans for such occupation will be forwarded for approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. You will also submit your plan for future operations north of the 38th parallel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that instructions are now being formulated on the governmental level regarding:

   a. Armistice terms to be offered by you to the North Koreans in the event of sudden collapse of North Korean forces; and

   b. Course of action to be followed and activities to be undertaken during the post-hostilities period.
12. As soon as the military situation permits, you should facilitate the restoration of the Government of the Republic of Korea with its capital in Seoul. Although the Government of the Republic of Korea has been generally recognized (except by the Soviet block) as the only legal Government in Korea, its sovereignty north of the 38th parallel has not been generally recognized. The Republic of Korea and its armed forces should be expected to cooperate in such military operations and military occupation as are conducted by the United Nations Forces north of 38th parallel, but political questions such as the formal extension of sovereignty over North Korea should await action by the United Nations to complete the unification of the country.