1. To estimate possible further Soviet moves and assess and appraise the position and actions of the United States with respect thereto in the light of the Korean situation.

ANALYSIS

Introduction

2. In determining our position and our actions in the present crisis we must bear in mind that the fundamental objective of the United States is to maintain the integrity and vitality of its free society and the measure of world order necessary thereto. This involves the willingness to fight for that objective if necessary. We must accept the probability that as the aggressor will continue his policy of expansion, we must accept the possibility-of-local conflicts-and counter-strike-even within-the-limit of our capabilities. As a deterrent, and also in preparation for possible eventualities, the degree of our capabilities readiness should be increased as rapidly as practicable. Although a global war has not necessarily begun in Korea and may not eventuate, the U.S. has nevertheless been indirectly as engaged in a limited war for some time. Moreover, as a result of this situation, the United States must now decide whether purely passive, defensive measures, even supported by a strong military posture, are sufficient to reduce to manageable proportions the Soviet threat.
In our free society, The United States must consider whether it should not now prepare for and launch, by means short of war, a political, economic, and psychological offensive against the USSR designed to interfere with the Kremlin's program for world domination as a threat to our free society.

3. The United States is not now capable of conducting immediately a general military offensive against the USSR because our forces are either not appropriately positioned or are too inadequate to be incapable of effective action. In the present crisis, while the United States forces in the Far East are proportionally stronger than in any other overseas area, effective action against the North Koreans in Korea can be accomplished only by diversion of United States forces from existing missions in the Far East and by the reinforcement of such forces from the United States or elsewhere. In certain other areas of the world where United States forces are now located, these forces might be strong enough to take effective action against local indigenous forces but could not act on a scale comparable to that in Korea.

General

4. It is a tenet of communism that war between communist and non-communist countries is inevitable. This premise is an integral element in the determination of Soviet policy, although history has shown that Russia can be influenced to delay action or retreat from local objectives if strongly opposed. The Kremlin is determined first to protect and to preserve its regime in Russia and second to promote world communism. The USSR is the implacable enemy of the United States and the non-communist world. Therefore, the degradation, weakening and ultimate destruction of the United States are primary intermediate aims of the USSR.
5. In assessing the danger of further aggressive moves directed by the USSR, it is essential to take into account both estimated-Soviet-intentions and Soviet military capabilities. And, insofar as possible, to assess Soviet intentions. The USSR has the military capability to occupy any country on its periphery, to invade all of Western Europe and the Near and Middle East, to make direct attacks upon the United Kingdom and Alaska the North American continent and upon west shipping, and to reinforce strongly the communist military effort in the Far East. The USSR also has the capability of initiating limited-scale air attacks on the United States and Canada. The USSR is not, however, believed to have the capability of preventing the U.S. from carrying out an atomic attack. On the other hand, the USSR may have the capability of reducing or of immediately compelling our industrial potential. The USSR, by provoking insurrections and satellite armed actions simultaneously on many fronts, and without openly committing its own forces, would confront the U.S. and its allies with the following alternatives: abandoning positions of vital political and strategic importance, committing and disrupting available capabilities, strength on the many fronts chosen by the USSR, or undertaking global war.

6. Given these capabilities, which have existed for some time and are progressively increasing, an attempt must be made in the light of the present situation to analyze and evaluate further possible aggression moves by the USSR; to answer the question whether the Soviet-inspired hostilities in Europe indicate a change in immediate-Soviet-intentions. This analysis — attempts to gain only the immediate-future rather than a period several-years-ahead.
7. The opening of hostilities in Korea could conceivably mean that the Kremlin intends to embark on any one or a combination of the following courses of action:

a. To initiate global war.

b. To employ Soviet forces, alone or with satellite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks against local and limited objectives, not designed to bring on global war.

c. To inspire further aggression using only satellite forces, but not using USSR armed forces.

d. To probe U.S. determination and military effectiveness.

Possibility of Global War

5. It has been our estimate that the Kremlin did not intend to engage in a major war and might be deterred from initiating such a war in the future if confronted with sufficient political, economic and military strength employed as the power base for a dynamic foreign policy designed to force the continuing retreat of Russian Communism. This estimate has not necessarily been invalidated by the events of the past few weeks, which are consistent with the following interpretation:

6. In causing the attack to be launched in Korea, the Kremlin did not intend to bring about a global war and did not expect, although militarily prepared for, United States military involvement in Korea. The probable aim of the Kremlin was simply to gain control of the entire Korean peninsula and to strengthen materially its strategic position in Northern Asia with global political and military results.

7. The Kremlin seems to have calculated its moves with a view to keeping the responsibility of the Soviet Government unengaged and its own military forces uncommitted.

9. On the other hand, the events of the past few weeks could be interpreted as the first phase of a general Soviet plan for global war. Should the Kremlin in fact be desirous of or
reconciled to a global war, of which the Korean situation is the first phase, the following considerations might govern its actions in the near future:

a. The Kremlin might be disposed to forego any action which is calculated to provoke global war until such time as the United States had reached the point of maximum diversion and attrition of its forces-in-being without involvement of the military forces of the Soviet Union. For example, as long as we are being forced to commit ever greater increments of our forces-in-being in Korea, the Kremlin might not hesitate the outbreak of general hostilities since the USSR would be increasing its own capabilities as those of the U.S. diminished. This could change, however, at the point where the Kremlin estimated that our maximum weakness had been reached, and that further passage of time leading to the material strengthening of the relative position and military posture of the United States would not work to Soviet advantage.

b. The Kremlin might undertake near-the-minimum-initial-adversary-by-immediate and simultaneous attack in all possible theaters of action on the European continent: Germany, Austria, Trieste, the Balkans, the Near and Middle East, the Far East, and the British Isles. If overt attacks by organized Soviet military forces (as distinguished from satellite forces) were to occur against the territory of any North Atlantic Treaty power, or against the forces of any NATO power in Europe or in Asia, or upon South Korea, Iran, Turkey, Greece, or Yugoslavia, the only prudent basis for U.S. action would be the assumption that global war was imminent probable.

c. It is also possible that the actions described in b above would be accompanied or be followed presently by a direct attack upon the continent of North America. A surprise Soviet attack upon United States territory as well as upon its armed forces abroad is a Soviet capability.

ultimate victory, the possibility must be factored bore in mind that the Kremlin might decide to initiate global war by a direct surprise attack upon the territory of the United States before taking the actions outlined in a or b above.

10. Global war could come in one of three ways: (a) by Soviet design; (b) by a progression of developments growing out of the present situation; or (c) by miscalculation on the part of either the U.S. or the USSR. If there were evidence justifying the assumption of immediate global war by Soviet design, the only course for the United States would be full preparation at full speed. The present question is one of degree. While not ruling out the possibility that global war is imminent, it is not yet a sufficient certainty to be the assumption on which U.S. action should be based. Our efforts should be directed toward increasing our war capabilities and preventing global war from developing by improving the relative power position of the anti-communist forces which is the base from which our foreign policy must operate.

Isolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or with Satellite Forces to Achieve Local Objectives Not Designed to Affect or Involve U.S. Forces

11. U.S. action in regard to Korea, and its employment of satellite forces there, should be regarded not as an isolated phenomenon, but possibly as part of a general plan which might involve correlated action in other parts of the world. A danger of direct involvement of Soviet forces is in Korea itself where actual conflict is in progress between the United States and a Soviet satellite. A successful repulse of the North Korean invasion would not merely reverse the status quo; United States troops would be back in force in South Korea, and a buildup of military strength in certain of the non-Communist areas of the Far East would have taken place.

12. The Kremlin might be prepared to accept an initial defeat by committing a local ground attack in order to obtain objectives nearer to territory regarded as of importance to the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Union forces be expected to accept greater risks to obtain objectives of fundamental importance in the basic purpose of communism.
military value. Without automatically starting global war by attacking American troops or a country covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the principal areas where actual Soviet forces could be employed for a local purpose are Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Finland. In addition to any one or more of these local operations, the Soviets would still be capable of engaging in surprise operations simultaneously in Germany and Austria, in the Near East and the Far East, and against the United Kingdom and the North American continent. Soviet forces are already deployed in sufficient strength to give the military capability to act in many cases elsewhere.

The following specific areas apply for Iran, Turkey, the Balkan area, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Finland, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

1. In the case of Iran, it is possible that the Soviet Government would regard the risk of general war as relatively small while at the same time the acquisition of the Iranian oil fields and the reduction of a threat to the Baku oil region of the Soviet Union are important Soviet objectives.

2. In the case of Turkey, the control of the Dardanelles and the approaches to the eastern Mediterranean represent very important military considerations from the point of view of Soviet defense as well as a traditional and long-seated Russian objective. The canal of Soviet control of the Dardanelles is vital to the security interests of the United States. Therefore, direct U.S. attack on Turkey, wholly or however involving various types of pressures or provocations, would be a serious military consideration, since the United States is at close military association with France and has common French-French interests.

3. In the case of Greece, the control of the Peloponesus and the Greek Islands would present to the USSR very important military and political advantages. Geographically, Greece is a gateway to the rings of pro-communist states which enclose the Soviet hegemony, and its possession would provide the USSR access to the Mediterranean Sea as well as
a strategic position with respect to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near East, and the Dardanelles. Direct USSR attack upon Greece would definitely precipitate global war because of the political commitments and military associations of the United Kingdom and the United States with Greece.

2. Reestablishment of Soviet control over Yugoslavia would bring definite military advantages to the USSR. At the same time, the Kremlin would have to weigh the political advantages of eliminating a dangerous source of Communist heresy against the political disadvantages of a Soviet armed assault on a communist regime, which would tend to deepen rather than heal the disruptive affect of independent tendencies in the communist parties in the Free world. Unless such an assault were quickly successful, the repercussions throughout the foreign communist parties would be harmful to the Kremlin's prestige and control of the international communist movement. Success in Yugoslavia would enable the communists to renew guerrilla operations against Greece from Yugoslavia as well as from Bulgaria and Albania. Direct USSR attacks on Yugoslavia would include a risk of involving the Western Powers and might lead to global war.

3. Occupation of Finland, while completely within Soviet capabilities, would undoubtedly encounter fierce and continued Finnish guerrilla resistance, which might render Finland less useful to the USSR for the immediate future than the present state of Soviet-Finnish relations.

4. Afghanistan and Pakistan are of strategic value to the USSR because of their geographical position. Afghanistan could be occupied with little effort. An attack on Pakistan would require much more effort and would issue serious risk of global war because of Pakistan's membership in the British Commonwealth.

5. Unless the Kremlin is willing to accept global war it will not commit Soviet armed forces to action in Germany and Austria.
Soviet Insured Aggression Using Satellite Forces

14. The USSR might gain considerably from a policy of initiation of piecemeal attacks by present or created satellite forces against Yugoslavia, Iran, Greece, Turkey, or other states around the Soviet periphery. Further, it might be distinctly to the political and military advantage of the USSR to involve the allied nations progressively in conflict without a declaration of war on the part of the USSR or without commitment of its military forces. Such action might leave the allies with the alternative of fighting an undeclared war, or of being open to the charge of aggression by initiating a declaration of war. None of these areas is one in which the USSR particularly needs the advantage of surprise. Furthermore, the military and political capabilities of the USSR and its satellites are so great as to permit it to direct piecemeal action against isolated areas while still retaining the capability of strategic surprise. A progressive series of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the USSR would confront the United States and its allies with the issue of whether they are willing to accept global war.

15. According to present estimates, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, without military assistance and leadership from the USSR comparable to that provided the North Koreans, do not possess together sufficient military capabilities for a successful assault on Turkey, in 1965, although they could overrun Turkey in Europe with relative ease. However, a satellite attack on Yugoslavia is a possibility. There have been indications of possible preparations for some satellite incursion against Greece. A resumption of fighting in Greece is also a possibility.

16. The use of Polish and Czechoslovakian troops is always a military possibility in any action in Europe. However, withdrawal of large numbers of troops from Poland and Czechoslovakia, particularly the latter, might require the employment of other forces to maintain the present communist regime.
17. The use of the East German para-military forces against allied troops in Germany is another possibility. It is doubtful that this force would undertake a direct attack on any of the western zones. Such an attack could not easily be undertaken without directly involving the Soviet Union. If all or a large part of this force were sent into the western sectors of Berlin it might overcome the small forces of the western powers there. Such overt action by the East German police force would again be difficult without directly involving the Soviet military authorities. The East German forces might be useful to the Soviet Union in connection with a blockade of Berlin.

18. Use further use of the Chinese communists, including the employment of organized Chinese communist forces against South Korea and Southeast Asia, is a strong possibility. They are the only satellite force in Asia which could commit any acts of aggression. The Chinese communists are anxious to control Formosa (including the Pescadores) and have announced their determination to do so regardless of U.S. decisions or actions. The Chinese communists have the military capability of assaulting Formosa. An early attack on Formosa is a continuing strong possibility, its success would be doubtful unless accompanied by a collapse of the Nationalist regime.

19. There is also a strong probability of a sustained Chinese communist attack on the islands near China held by the Nationalists can be expected to continue.

20. Chinese communists, in addition to an attack on Formosa, have the military capability to enter directly the Korean war and to initiate military action against Indochina or Burma or Tibet. Any or all of these actions are possible. A move against Tibet may be expected in the near future.
21. Chinese communists have the military capability to capture Macao and Hong Kong. Civil disorder, subversion, and sabotage, appear to be the more likely actions, particularly in Hong Kong, since these could in all probability eventually achieve the objective without military involvement.

22. The capabilities of the Chinese Communists outlined above contribute to the over-all capabilities of the USSR since any military action by these forces in the Far East adds security to the Soviet eastern flank and lessens the probability that the Soviets may have to fight on two fronts simultaneously.

23. Considerable numbers of Japanese prisoners remain under Soviet control and constitute a potential communist army-military force for the invasion or infiltration of Japan. Newly-created conditions in that country invite such action.-The diversion of U.S. occupation forces from Japan to Korea; the lack of Japanese defense forces; and the inadequacy of Japanese police; heighten the military capability of Japanese forces under Soviet control to attack.

Probable Non-Military Moves by the USSR

24. The USSR will undoubtedly direct communist parties and subversive groups abroad to embarrass us in every conceivable way. Intensified communist subversive or revolutionary activity might fully engage local military resources throughout Asia, as well as involve additional United States and allied military resources.

25. The following examples will provide some in point. Current conditions in Iran, though improving, still provide wide opportunities for subversive and communist infiltration, particularly for attempted seizure of the government by the communist-dominated Tudeh Party. In addition, a revolt overseas warfare fostered by the Soviets might be successful.
break-out in Azerbaijan. The testing of our firmness in other areas may take every form known to communist ingenuity. The present denial of electric power to Western Berlin may be in part an expression of this. Other provocations and annoyances may occur, even up to and including an attempt to reimpose the Berlin blockade or to blockade Vienna.

26. 26. If any weakness or hesitation on the part of the U.S. is encountered anywhere it will be instantaneously exploited by the communists to undermine confidence in and support of the United States everywhere.

27. 27. In addition, the USSR may well seek to create division in the UN membership with respect to the police action in Korea by playing upon hopes of a peaceful settlement, creating the impression that major concessions to the UN position may be forthcoming, or even by offering such concessions in a context in which the USSR would gain substantial though perhaps not immediately obvious advantages if such a settlement were made. If the UN forces are dislodged from the peninsula the threat of accepting a fait accompli will certainly be played for all it is worth. It is also to be anticipated that the USSR will make every effort to divide the U.S. and other non-communist powers on the issue of Formosa. In general there will also no doubt be a continuance of the peace offensive designed both to divide the U.S. and its allies and to create domestic division between elements determined to resist Soviet aggression and elements which lack such determination.

CONCLUSIONS

Part I
Possible Further Soviet Moves
In the Immediate Future

28. 28. The USSR has materially increased its capability to wage global war. Even though there is no conclusive indication that whether or not the USSR intends to launch a global war at this time, the danger of the possibility of deliberate Soviet resort to war, either deliberately or by accident, exists as now greatly increased.

Top Secret
Use of Soviet forces alone or with satellite forces to achieve local objectives not designed to bring on global war

90. 91. 92. There is as yet no conclusive evidence that the Soviet Government has or has not decided to commit its forces, alone or with satellite forces, in isolated or placement attacks against local and limited objectives, without intending to bring on global war. However, if a decision should be made to use USSR Soviet forces in this manner, action could most-likely be taken with varying degrees of risk, in any or all of the following areas: Finland, North Korea, the Near and Middle East, and the Balkans.

Soviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces

90. 91. 92. Use of European and Asiatic satellite military forces against a variety of objectives is a possibility for the immediate future.

2. An immediate possibility is the use of Chinese Communist forces in Korea and against Formosa, but the latter is more probable. The success of an early attack on Formosa would be doubtful unless accompanied by the collapse of the Nationalist forces.

2. In addition, depending upon developments in the world situation, the USSR might inspire aggression by satellite forces against Western Germany (including Berlin), Austria, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Tibet, Burma, Indochina, Hong Kong, and Korea.

Probable Non-Military Moves by the USSR

90. 91. 92. We must also expect a variety of Soviet efforts to achieve victories by subversive action and tactical maneuvers in the "peace offensive" to keep us off balance, to divert our attention, to waste our resources, to test our firmsness, and to split the Free world.
Part II

U.S. Actions to Counter Further Soviet Moves in the Event the Future

15. Six 94. The following conclusions are addressed to possible actions to counter further aggressive moves made or inspired by the USSR in the near future. These actions which the United States and its allies should now be taking to regain the initiative, to deter further aggression, and to increase our ability to defeat aggression, are not alluded, although their critical importance should not be overlooked. The present situation requires any such measures, none of which are now being undertaken. Others are under study and will be the subject of subsequent recommendations. These measures should be taken regardless of future Soviet actions so long as the USSR retains its present capabilities and intentions to threaten the security of the United States. Such measures fall broadly into the following categories:

1. Actions to unite all nations and peoples, regardless of ideologies, type of government, color or creed, who see and will contribute to the military opposition to the threat of the Bloc.

2. Action to increase military strength of the United States and to apply the necessary pressure upon North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other allies to force a corresponding increase through their own efforts of their military capabilities and readiness.

3. Actions in the political, psychological, economic, and, in certain instances, the military fields directed toward gaining the initiative, thus putting the USSR on the defensive wherever possible.

17. Six 94. The United States would have to proceed on the assumption that global war is imminent in either of the following cases:

- 15 -

- 16 -
p. 1. Overt attack by organized USSR military forces.

2. Satellite aggression in several of the areas mentioned in paragraph 40 or in association in a significant number of these areas.

On that basis the United States should prepare to execute emergency war plans and should mobilize accordingly; but should, insofar as it has any choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the moment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light of the situation then existing. The United States should also immediately take steps:

3. To conduct a political offensive, particularly in the UN, designed to induce a retreat of the aggressor without global war and to insure the unity of the free world if war nevertheless follows.

4. While minimizing United States military commitments in areas of little strategic significance, to oppose the aggression to the extent and in the manner best contributing to the implementation of U.S. national war plans.

5. To coordinate United States plans with selected allies.

24. 25. In the event of any single overt act of military aggression by Soviet satellite armed forces, the United States should initially attempt to localize the conflict. To this end the United States should take all possible countermeasures short of seriously impairing the ability to execute emergency war plans. We should seek the support of our allies and take appropriate steps in the UN. We should concurrently recognize the greatly increased strain on the fabric of world peace arising from a further act of aggression following on the Korean episode and should accelerate and expand mobilization accordingly. The more important possibilities and the degree of the action to be taken is indicated in paragraphs 33-34 below.
26. By 36. Formosa

In the event of a Chinese Communist attack on Formosa or the Pescadores, the United States should repel the assault in accordance with existing directives. While the principle of attempting to localize the aggression would be applicable to such an attack on Formosa, the danger of larger involvement with the Chinese communists or with the Soviet Union would be increased and there should be a commensurate expansion of our mobilization measures.

b. If it should develop that the nationalist forces on Formosa can no longer be defended against direct attack by the Chinese communists, the matter should immediately be brought to the attention of the National Security Council for the earliest possible review of the United States commitment to protect Formosa and the Pescadores and of our general defensive position in the Far East.

36. By 36. Korea

In the event of the overtures of organized Chinese communist forces in Korea, the United States should:

1. Take appropriate retaliatory measures against communist China, in accordance with studies which are to be prepared as a matter of urgency.

2. Accelerate and expand our present mobilization to the extent necessary to meet the situation, as soon as possible short of formal commitment of all U.S. resources.

3. Review the U.S. military commitment in Korea in the light of circumstances then existing.

37. By 37. Yugoslavia

In the event of a Soviet satellite attack on Yugoslavia, the United States should:

1. Implement existing policy (HC 18/4) pending a review of that policy.
b. Accelerate and expand our present mobilization to the extent indicated by a review of the situation at the time, as much as possible short of formal announced mobilization of all U.S. resources.

20. GREECE. In the event of a Soviet satellite attack on Greece, the United States should:

a. Provide accelerated military assistance to Greece and give political support to U.N. police actions in accordance with plans which are to be prepared as a matter of urgency. If necessary, deploy such U.S. forces to the support of Greece as can be made available without unduly jeopardizing our national security.

b. Proceed to full mobilization. Mobilize to the extent necessary to meet the situation.

21. GERMANY--in the event of a major attack by East German para-military forces on Berlin or West Germany:

a. Existing U.S. plans and procedures under the North Atlantic Treaty should be carried out as appropriate.

b. The United States should proceed to full mobilization.

22. In the event of a major attack by East German para-military forces on Berlin:

1. Review the situation and in the interim institute appropriate mobilization measures but without full mobilization of all U.S. resources.

2. In the event of a major attack by East German para-military forces on West Germany:

   (a) Existing U.S. plans and procedures under the North Atlantic Treaty should be carried out as appropriate.

   (b) The U.S. should proceed to full mobilization.
g. Meanwhile the United States should press for the controlled rearmament and accelerate efforts to increase the ability of Western Germany so that it could assist in defending itself and so contribute to the defense of Western Europe.

40. 69. Berlin Blockade. In the event the USSR reimposes the Berlin blockade the United States should react strongly and at once, including appropriate mobilization measures, since the maintenance of our position in Berlin is of the utmost political importance. The reestablishment of the full-scale airlift would be militarily unsound and is impracticable under present conditions. A partial airlift should, however, be established by the United States, United Kingdom, and any other states able and willing to contribute, pending the completion of a study now under way regarding the measures to be taken to deal with a situation.

51. 69. Vienna Blockade. In the event the USSR should impose a blockade of Vienna, the United States should implement existing policy (Sec 46/1) and proceed to appropriate mobilization measures. In the event the USSR should impose a blockade of Vienna, the establishment of a full-scale airlift would be militarily unsound and is impracticable under present conditions. The U.S. should implement existing policy (Sec 15/6) to the extent feasible, utilizing a partial airlift to be established by the U.S., the U.K., and any other nation able and willing to contribute. The U.S. should accelerate and expand our present mobilization to the extent necessary at the time.
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The United States should take political action but would not expect to take military affirmative action. Our mobilization plans would not be affected.

j. If such aggression were directed against Burma or Hong Kong, the United States would expect the UK and the Commonwealth to take the initiative. In the case of Burma the United States, acting through the British, should accelerate its assistance to that government. In the case of Hong Kong, the United States should give political support to any UK political action. Mobilization should be increased accordingly. Consider furnishing relief assistance to the British and such military assistance as may be appropriate in the light of our own military commitments and new Military Assistance Act that time.