A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
on
COURSES OF ACTION RELATIVE TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA

January 12, 1951
WASHINGTON
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NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
COURSES OF ACTION RELATIVE TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA

The enclosed memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject is transmitted herewith, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, for the information of the National Security Council. The enclosure is also being referred to the Senior NSC Staff for use in connection with the report on "Possible U. S. Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression" currently under preparation by the Senior NSC Staff at the direction of the President for consideration at the next Council meeting on January 17, 1951.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director of Defense Mobilization
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

SUBJECT: Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have tentatively agreed upon the following objectives relative to Communist China and Korea, together with the actions to be taken to attain them with some indication as to the timing.

2. Objectives:
   a. Maintain the security of the off-shore defense line: Japan - Ryukyus - Philippines.
   b. Deny Formosa to the Communists.
   c. Delay a general war with Russia until we have achieved the requisite degree of military and industrial mobilization.
   d. Prevent, by all appropriate means, the further spread by force of Communism on the mainland of Asia, particularly into Indochina, Siam and Malaya.
   e. Support the South Koreans as much and as long as practicable; keeping alive an exile government of Korea, if forced to evacuate Korean territory.

3. Actions to be taken:
   a. With the preservation of the combat effectiveness of our forces as an overriding consideration, stabilize the situation in Korea or evacuate to Japan if forced out of Korea.
   b. Limit major U. S. ground forces in the Far East to those now committed, unless:
(1) The outcome of the present Chinese offensive should indicate that we can profitably remain in Korea with the number of U.S. divisions now committed, in which event, if the Army could provide them and at the same time meet our commitments in Europe, not to exceed two partly trained divisions might be deployed to Japan to increase its security.

c. Expedite the build-up of Japanese defense forces.

d. Move troops to Japan from Korea as necessary to defend Japan.

e. Continue and intensify now an economic blockade of trade with China.

f. Prepare now to impose a naval blockade of China and place it into effect as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized, or when we have evacuated Korea, and depending upon circumstances then obtaining.

g. Remove new restrictions on air reconnaissance of China coastal areas and of Manchuria.

h. Remove now the restrictions on operations of the Chinese Nationalist forces and give such logistic support to those forces as will contribute to effective operations against the Communists.

i. Continue to bomb military targets in Korea.

j. Press now for UN action branding Communist China as an aggressor.

k. Send a military training mission and increase MDAF to Chinese Nationalists on Formosa.

l. Furnish now all practicable covert aid to effective Nationalist guerrilla forces in China.

m. Initiate damaging naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China at such time as the Chinese Communists attack any of our forces outside of Korea.

B. Increase MDAF to Indochina and assist training of Viet Nam forces if requested by French authorities.
D. Consult with Siamese authorities and, if requested, furnish a military mission and increase MDAP aid to Siam.

E. Strengthen the Philippines primarily by exerting pressure on the Philippine Government to establish internal security.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ General Omar N. Bradley

OMAR N. BRADLEY,
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff