The President

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 1

A REPORT

TO THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

on

UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

November 21, 1950

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET
November 14, 1950

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

References:  
A. NSC Action No. 378  
B. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,  
   same subject, dated November 10, 1950  
C. NSC 81/1  
D. NSC 73/4

Pursuant to the action of the National Security Council at its meeting on November 9 (NSC Action No. 378), the enclosed interim report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treasury.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed report, it be submitted to the President for consideration, with the recommendation that he approve the courses of action proposed in paragraphs two and three thereof and direct their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

NSC 81/2
DRAFT

INTERIM REPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
UNITED STATES COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO KOREA

1. The National Security Council has reviewed the situation created by the intervention of Chinese Communist forces in Korea. It has had an opportunity to consider National Intelligence Estimate No. 2 and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated to the Council on November 10, 1950.

2. It is of the utmost importance that the real intentions of the Chinese Communists be ascertained as soon as possible. To that end, the National Security Council recommends to the President the following courses of action pending the completion, as a matter of urgency, of a Senior NSC Staff Study of the alternative courses of action open to the United States:
   a. Continue military operations in accordance with current directives.
   b. Intensify covert actions to determine Chinese Communist intentions.
   c. Political action should be continued in the United Nations to assure that a solid and overwhelming majority of Members demand the prompt withdrawal of Chinese forces now intervening unlawfully in Korea and support the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly of October 7, 1950.
d. Other available political channels should be used to ascertain Chinese Communist intentions and, in particular, to determine whether there is any basis for arrangements which might stabilize Sino-Korean frontier problems on a satisfactory basis.

e. The missions assigned to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, should be kept under review, but should not be changed for the present.

3. The United States should meanwhile develop its plans and make its preparations on the basis that the risk of global war is increased.