MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GENERAL WIREN

I want you to know that the situation in Korea is receiving the
utmost attention here and that our efforts are concentrated upon finding
the right decisions on this matter of the gravest importance to the future
of America and to the survival of free peoples everywhere.

I wish in this telegram to set you have my views as to our basic
national and international purposes in continuing the resistance to
aggression in Korea. We need your judgment as to the maximum effort
which could reasonably be expected from the United Nations forces under
your command to support the resistance to aggression which we are trying
rapidly to organize on a world-wide basis. This present telegram is not
repeat not to be taken in any sense as a directive. Its purpose is to
give you something of what is in our minds regarding the political factors.

1. A successful resistance in Korea would serve the following
important purposes:

(a) To demonstrate that aggression will not be accepted by us
or by the United Nations and to provide a rallying point around which
the spirits and energies of the free world can be mobilized to meet
the world-wide threat which the Soviet Union now poses.

(b) To deflate the dangerously exaggerated political and military
prestige of Communist China which now threatens to undermine the
resistance of non-Communist Asia and to consolidate the hold of
Communism on China itself.

(c) To afford more time for and to give direct assistance to
the organization of non-Communist resistance in Asia, both outside
and
and inside China.

d) To carry out our commitments of honor to the South Koreans and to demonstrate to the world that the friendship of the United States is of inestimable value in time of adversity.

e) To make possible a far more satisfactory peace settlement for Japan and to contribute greatly to the post-treaty security position of Japan in relation to the continent.

f) To lend resolution to many countries not only in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East who are now living within the shadow of Communist power and to let them know that they need not now run to come to terms with communists on whatever terms they can get, meaning complete submission.

g) To intensify those who may be called upon to fight against great odds if subjected to a sudden onslaught by the Soviet Union or by Communist China.

h) To lend point and urgency to the rapid build-up of the defenses of the western world.

i) To bring the United Nations through its first great effort in collective security and to produce a free-world coalition of incalculable value to the national security interests of the United States.

j) To alert the peoples behind the Iron Curtain that their masters are bent upon wars of aggression and that this crime will be resisted by the free world.

2. Our
2. Our course of action at this time should be such as to consolidate the great majority of the United Nations. This majority is not merely part of the organization but is also the nations whom we would desperately need to count on as allies in the event the Soviet Union moves against us. Further, pending the build-up of our national strength, we must act with great prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or Western Europe in large-scale hostilities.

3. We recognize, of course, that continued resistance might not be militarily possible with the limited forces with which you are being called upon to meet large Chinese armies. Further, in the present world situation, your forces must be preserved as an effective instrument for the defense of Japan and elsewhere. However, some of the important purposes mentioned above might be supported, if you should think it practicable, and advisable, by continued resistance from off-shore islands of Korea, particularly from Cheju-do, if it becomes impracticable to hold an important portion of Korea itself. In the worst case, it would be important that, if we must withdraw from Korea, it be clear to the world that that course is forced upon us by military necessity and that we shall not accept the result politically or militarily until the aggression has been rectified.

4. In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall have to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for a rapid expansion of our armed forces to meet this great danger.

5. I am
5. I am encouraged to believe that the free world is getting a
much clearer and realistic picture of the dangers before us and that
the necessary courage and energy will be forthcoming. Recent proceedings
in the United Nations have disclosed a certain amount of confusion and
wishful thinking, but I believe that most members have been actuated by
a desire to be absolutely sure that all possible avenues to peaceful
settlement have been fully explored. I believe that the great majority
is now rapidly consolidating and that the result will be an encouraging
and formidable combination in defense of freedom.

6. The entire nation is grateful for your splendid leadership in
the difficult struggle in Korea and for the superb performance of your
forces under the most difficult circumstances.

January 13, 1951