

~~TOP SECRET~~

Palastina

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1948

Memorandum for Mr. Connelly:

Secretary Marshall asked me to see that
the attached message from Senator Austin is
brought to the immediate attention of the
President.

MSC per STM
Marshall S. Carter
Special Assistant to the Secretary

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) of (E)
Dept. of State letter, *7-15-75* Aug. 9, 1973
By NLT *[signature]*, NARS Date *2-26-75*

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE—DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

TELEGRAPH BRANCH

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Control 6186

Rec'd May 19, 1948
2:54 p.m.

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Action: UNA

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FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 674, May 19, 2:15 p.m.

FOR MARSHALL FROM AUSTIN.

For your personal information and that of the Department, the following appraisal of the present position of the US in the UN is transmitted with a view to its utility in framing further instructions for the guidance of the Mission in regard to the Palestine case and other political issues in the SC, the IC, and in the next session of the GA.

It is our best estimate recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel last Friday evening has deeply undermined the confidence of other delegations in our integrity and that this is a factor which the Department will want to keep in mind in the immediate future and for some time to come.

The following is our estimate of the way in which a large number of delegations view the sequence of events in the special session of the GA culminating in the announcement of our recognition of the Provisional Government:

1. Recognition constituted reversal of US policy for truce plus trusteeship as urged in special session of GA and, in later stages, US compromise resolution laying stress on truce plus mediation;

2. Concerning efforts to secure truce, both in SC and in informal truce negotiations, we had heavily emphasized that there should be no action of a political character which would alter the status quo or prejudice the rights, claims or positions of either Arabs or Jews. This was generally understood to apply primarily to the establishment of the

Jewish state.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973

By NLT- , NARS Date 26.75

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DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 9, 1973
By NLT/LL, NARS Date 4-26-75

-2- #674, May 19, 2:15 p.m., from New York.

Jewish state. SC truce resolution which had our strong backing included appeal to all governments to take all possible steps to assist in implementation of truce;

3. In carrying through this truce program under instructions which we understood had highest clearance, we persuaded other delegations of correctness of our position and induced them to come forward and carry a large share of the burden. They thus became publicly identified with our position;

4. The feeling is that although the Jews had not accepted the truce they disregarded the admonitions of the SC, violated spirit of truce effort, and prevented conclusion of formal truce. US immediately not only condoned but endorsed these violations, thus striking heavy blow at prospect of concluding any truce and equally heavy blow at prestige and effectiveness of SC and UN generally;

5. US by its immediate act of recognition of the Provisional Government, violated the terms of the SC truce resolution;

6. The consequence of foregoing is a lack of confidence in the integrity of US intentions and disbelief of further statements of future US intentions and policies;

7. This attitude in turn leads to strong desire to avoid being committed to any US position which might be reversed without notice;

8. As a further consequence, other governments feel the necessity of recapturing their own freedom of action to make spot decisions instead of supporting us or relying on UN, since this appears to them to be current US attitude;

9. An important contribution to foregoing attitude was failure of US to inform or consult before announcement of final step. We had developed here closest and most friendly relations large number other delegations which desire to support our foreign policies not only in UN but generally. We had kept each other informed, working out mutually acceptable points of substance, strategy, and tactics. Method by which US recognition action was taken without prior notice or consultation deeply offended many of those who had collaborated closely with us;

10. With two or three exceptions our closest and most consistent supporters among other delegations, while expressing friendly personal feeling are manifestly mistrustful of continuing cooperation on basic questions of policy or strategy,

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Dept. of State letter, 7-15-75
By NLT: HLC, NARS Date 2-26-75

-3- #674, May 19, 2:15 p.m., from New York.

or strategy, or even of tactics.

It, of course, was to be anticipated that the delegations of the Arab states would be particularly bitter, but the reaction of other delegations such as those of Canada, China and a number of the Latin American states is not based on the merits but is due to a feeling, frankly expressed by them, that they have been double-crossed.

With particular reference to our immediate policy on Palestine and specifically the resolution which we have introduced in the SC calling for action under Chapter VII, the situation in our estimation is that if we press this to a vote it will not receive more than three or four affirmative votes. Delegations of governments which are generally well-disposed and friendly feel that a finding of breach of peace under Article 39 is unrealistic unless sanctions, if necessary, will be assured. In this connection delegations are completely mistrustful of our readiness to participate in sanctions. Current newspaper comment concerning possible US action on the existing arms embargo is an element mentioned by other delegations as contributing to their mistrust.

In the long run, of course, identity of interest between the US and various other governments will tend to outweigh current reactions, but it will take time to diminish current attitude of distrust. This means that positions taken by the US on a variety of topics may continue to be viewed with suspicion, and that other delegations will not be inclined to support us for fear that a change in our position will leave them vulnerable. We must, I feel, exercise particular care not to advance major proposals on political issues, particularly in the SC, without careful previous canvassing of delegations here. In many cases our objectives might best be obtained through support of proposals introduced by other delegations. In general, I believe we should be responsive to indications of fear of Russian expansion on the part of many delegations, and their underlying conviction of identity of interest with us.

AUSTIN

LMS:ECW

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