SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 OCTOBER 1951

FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

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1. BACKGROUND.


B. Dictatorship of the Streets. The Mosaddeq government is the prisoner of the "streets." The "streets" are composed of two main groups: the followers of Musafer Kazemi and the Tudeh Party (with satellite fronts), both of which use exploiting to the fullest a wave of genuine nationalistic feelings of a broad section of the upper middle class. Although Kazemi's following is possibly more numerous than that of the Tudeh, the former has received the organization, discipline, non-revolutionary and constitutional training and experience of the latter. Accordingly, of the two, the more powerful is undoubtedly the Tudeh Party.

C. The Traditional Iranian Policy Is to Maintain the Balance of Power Between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The Iranian political pendulum is now swinging dangerously toward the Soviet Union but given opportunities the Iranians would act and turn toward the West for support (providing the West is not represented by Great Britain alone).


B. MODERN RELIGIOUS GROUPS, WHO AT ONE TIME WOULD HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM KASHAN AND FROM HIS PRO-MOSAHEB STAND, HAVE NOW RALLIED TO THE NATIONAL FRONT BANNER. IN A LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 1951, NAVAB SAFAVI, LEADER OF THE PERSIAN-IZI RELIGIOUS PARTY,joined with KASHAN; A LETTER FROM HEMANDI OGH (THE OUTSTANDING SPIRITUAL LEADER OF IRAN) TO THE SHAH URGED HIM TO SUPPORT MOSAHEB.

C. KASHAN'S DECREASING INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1951 BY THE GENERAL CLOSING OF THE BAZAAR BY THE ADJACENT MOSQUE AT HIS REQUEST AND BY THE ORDERING OF THE PARADES HE SPONSORED IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT ON THE SAME DAY.

D. THE SHAH HAS TAKEN A STAND IN FAVOR OF MOSAHEB AND AT LEAST SIXTEEN OF HIS PERSIAN ENTRAPERS HAVE JOINED THE GOVERNMENT. AT MOSAHEB'S REQUEST THE SHAH HAS ORDERED THE PRINCESS ABDRAF OUT OF THE COUNTRY (SHE LEFT IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1951), THERBY LEAVING THAT HE WOULD NO LONGER (WHAT IS, FOR THE TIME BEING) CONDONE COURT INTRIGUES IN POLITICAL MATTERS.


3. THE BRITISH POSITION IN IRAN HAS COLLAPSED.

A.

B. THE IMPLICATION OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY UPON THE SHAH AND HIS COUNCILS HAS PROBABLY CHANGED TO EXIST, MAINLY BECAUSE THE SHAH IS INSURMOUNTABLY AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE TUNDIS, AND FEARS THE TUNDIS AT PRESENT MORE THAN HE FEARS THE BRITISH. NO OTHER PRIME MINISTER PRIOR TO MOSAHEB COULD CLAIM SOME SPONSORSHIP. THE SHAH Dares NOT TAKE BACK OR STEP OUT OF LINE. HE IS FULLY AWARE NOW THAT THE POLITICAL WAY WHICH BRITISH MOSAHEB IS IN POWER WAS IN GREAT PART AN ARTI-COURT WAY.
C. THE CAMPAIGN OF INVIDIATION SUPPORTED BY CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AND CONDUCTED BY MILLAR KIAMAT (BUT NOT CONDUCTED BY MOOSADDEH) HAS CONTRIBUTED TOWARD CURRENT ELIMINATION OF BRITISH-SPIRED OPISTION.
(SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE).

1. THE SOVIET UNION IS IN A RELATIVELY STRONG POSITION TO BEEP ADVANTAGES.

A. THE TUDOR PARTY HAS THESE POTENTIALITIES. ALTHOUGH INSIDE INFORMATION IS INCOMPLETE, THE FOLLOWING CLUES ARE IMPORTANT:

(1) AS EARLY AS 1947 THE TUDOR HAD ORGANIZED WORKERS IN ARAHAN TO A POINT WHERE THEY SUCCESSFULLY STAGED A GENERAL STRIKE.

(2) SINCE THE BAHRAMI C(I)GET, THE TUDOR HAS ENJOYED GREATER FREEDOM OF ACTION WITH CORRESPONDINGLY INCREASED EFFICIENCY.

(3) IN 1950 THE TUDOR ORGANIZED PROTEST GROUPS.

(4) IN DECEMBER 1950 THE TUDOR WAS IN A POSITION TO STAGE THE ESCAPE OF TEN OF ITS LEADERS FROM THE PERAN JAIL.

(5) IN APRIL 1951 THE TUDOR QUICKLY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE DETERIORATION OF BRITISH LABOR RELATIONS IN ARAHAN TO STAGE ANOTHER SUCCESSFUL GENERAL STRIKE.

(6) IN JULY 1951 THE TUDOR WAS ABLE TO MUSSEN THOUSAND DETERMINED IN THE STREETS OF ARAHAN AND ORGANIZE THEM IN SEMI-MILITARY ORDER.

(7) IN THE LAST YEAR THE TUDOR HAS BEEN UNUSUSUALLY SUCCESSFUL IN CONDUCTING LARGE SCALE PROPAGANDA.

(8) AN ESTIMATE OF TUDOR AND PROTEST GROUPS FOR THE ARAHAN AREA IN SEPTEMBER 1951 WAS A MAXIMUM OF THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND, WHICH APPEARS TO BE A CO любимое ENCHANCE OVER A YEAR AGO.

(9) THE ECONOMIC SITUATION STANDS TO DETERIORATE FURTHER, WHICH PAVES THE WAY FOR FURTHER INCREASE IN THE POWER OF THE TUDOR PARTY.

B. THE POLICY OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AT THIS TIME PAYS DIRECTLY INTO SOVIET HANDS.

(1) IT HAS CAUSED MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN LONDON AND WASHINGTON.
THE BREACH COULD BE MADE TO WIDER FURTHER.

(2) IT CALLS FOR THE PHYSICAL EXUITION OF THE BRITISH FROM ARAHAN.

(3) IT HAS UNDERMINED THE PRESTIGE OF THE ANGLO-SOPHON POWERS IN THE NEAR EAST.
(1) It lays the groundwork for a common front of nationalist
in the Near East against Anglo-Saxon "imperialists." (This policy,
payable to the Soviet Union, can be carried out much more smoothly
by the Moslem government, a Moslem government, than by a Turk
government.)

(5) The Soviet "siding" with Iran at the Security Council in
early October 1951 has increased sympathy for the Soviets even in the
ranks of the National Front.

6. Note, however, that Soviet influence in Iran has to contend with:

1. The army, police, and gendarmerie which represent in the hands
of the Shah and the government comparatively well-organized, centralized,
and massive repressive forces with noteworthy shortcomings such as penetration
in certain quarters, corruption, and so forth.

2. Popular resistance to communism which stems from religious
sentiments and a revival of nationalism.

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