MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services

26 May 1940

1. In compliance with your instructions, the Department of the Army has reviewed its practices and procedures in accordance with equality of treatment and opportunity in the Army, and the following review is submitted.

2. Concept of military policy. — a. Department of the Army policy on utilization of Negro manpower is contained in War Department Circular No. 124, 27 April 1946, and visualizes two objectives.

   (1) "The initial objective: The utilization of the proportionate ratio (1 Negro to 10 White) of the manpower made available to the military establishment during the postwar period."

   (2) "The ultimate objective: The effective use of all manpower made available to the Military Establishment in the event of major mobilization at some unknown date against an undetermined aggressor, the manpower to be utilized, in the event of another major war, in the Army without regard to antecedent race."

   "When and if such a contingency arises, the manpower of the nation should be utilized in the best interests of the National Security."

   "The (Military) Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this time intermediate objectives, between the first and ultimate objectives, timely planning may be interjected and adjustments made in accordance with conditions which may obtain at this undetermined date."

b. To attain the initial objective, the following statement of policy was announced (War Department Circular No. 124, 1946):

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"Negro personnel in the past war army will be utilized on a broader professional scale than has been obtained heretofore. The development of leaders and specialists based on individual merit and ability, to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded wartime army will be accomplished through the medium of installations and organizations. Grouping of Negro units with White units in composite organizations will be accepted policy."

o. (1) Where conditions make it desirable, War Department instructions permit the local commander to provide separate recreational facilities such as Army exchanges, theaters or sections of theaters for use of particular military units. However, it is the policy of the War Department that the provision of such separate facilities does not permit the exclusion on the basis of race or color of any member of the military unit from using any and all such facilities established in public buildings. (War Department Instructions No. 600-45, 16 June 1945.)

(2) No officer or noncommissioned officer's club, mess or similar association will be permitted by the post commander to occupy any part of any public building other than the private quarters of an officer or noncommissioned officer unless such club, mess or similar association extends to all officers or noncommissioned officers on duty at the post the right to full membership either permanent or temporary of such club, mess or association including the right equally with any and all other members thereof to participate in the management thereof, to hold office therein, and to vote upon any and all of the affairs thereof in which the officers or noncommissioned officers concerned have an interest. In the case of organizational clubs, messes and similar associations the right of membership must be extended to all members of the organization. (Paragraph 26, AR 210-10, 6 May 1947.)

d. Department of the Army Circular No. 121, 30 April 1945.

Personal Policy of the Army, states in part "The broad principles stated herein are Army policy, established to implement military procedures which will maintain the rights and privileges of Army personnel without discrimination."

3. Changes in War Department Circular 124.

Circular 124, quoted in part in paragraph 2b, above, will be amended to assure continued progress by providing utilization of the Negro soldier on the broadest possible professional scale.
4. Equality of Treatment and Opportunity.

By reserving a proportionate number of places in the troop basis (including all grades and type jobs) for Negro personnel, the Department of the Army ensures that the Negro will have an equal opportunity with the White to train for, and attain to, the position of responsibility he may be called upon to fill in event of mobilization. The Negro may and does participate on an individual basis in all forms of off-duty activities. These include the chapel, the post exchange, the theater, the club, team athletics, transportation and other recreational pursuits.

5. Practical Results of Army Policy to Date.

a. Regular Army.

(1) The Army has a Negro strength of 1,697 officers and 69,104 enlisted men. The Air Force has 2,67 officers and 21,039 men; the Navy has 2,67 officers and 17,008 men; the Marine Corps has 2,67 officers and 1,525 men. The Army Negro strength is more than twice that of the Air Force or Navy and almost double that of all other services combined. In actual strength or percentage-wise, whether in officers, noncommissioned officers, or privates, the Army in numbers exceeds by far any other comparable activity. There is almost as many Negro noncommissioned officers in the Army as there are officers of all ranks in the Air Force. The opportunity for a Negro soldier to advance to officer of noncommissioned grade is unparalleled. Tab A lists the strengths and percentages of officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates for the three major services on a comparative basis. It will be noted that Negro noncommissioned officers total 83,10, or 9.2 per cent of the total Negro officers in the Army. Negro officers total 2,67 or only 1.05 per cent of the total officer strength. However, in a Negro population 100,000 and an equal white population also, there will be 6.2 whites with 50 of 150, or higher (necessary for commission) for each Negro possessing that score. Therefore, competition is 6.2 to 1. Multiplying this factor reveals that 1.69 per cent is equal competitively to a 10.7 to 1 ratio, or slightly in excess of the total Negro strength ratio.

(2) The Regular Army must be a corps of leaders. The quality of leadership in small units on the battlefield is an unalterable yardstick of success in battle. Because of social environment, few Negroes have had the opportunity to develop leadership. Against the direct competition of the better educated white soldier, the average Negro soldier would find it difficult to rise above the level of service tasks. The present system of segregated units guarantees that Negro soldiers will be given the opportunity to develop leadership, unhindered and untroubled by overwhelming competition they are not yet equipped to meet. This system has produced 13,97 officers and noncommissioned officers in the Army today. No other system will presently accomplish that result. The Army's position is that the utilization of its manpower must be towards attaining success on future battlefields.
(3) The Army has been able to organize Negro units in every arm and service, ranging from regiment to separate company, totaling 259 organizations. There are Negro regiments in white divisions, Negro battalions in white regiments, and some Negro companies in composite battalions. A roster of these units is attached to Tab B. It is significant that the Negro population of combat areas and combat support units for the first time in history composes directly and favorably with the Negro population of the so-called service-type units.

(a) There are no Army schools from which Negro officers and enlisted men are barred solely because of color. At present, there are 1,627 Negroes attending 46 different Army schools along with whites. Over 3,000 Negroes have attended Officer Candidate Schools, and 365 and 4 training schools are currently training. There are 9 cadets at the Military Academy. Officers are found in every grade up to colonel and in every branch of the service from the General Staff to the Nurse Corps and WAVES. Enlisted men are actually assigned to every arm and service.

Tab C shows 29 various sources used to secure 6,996 Negro officers during the war.

(5) The Army recently adopted a system of career fields for enlisted men whereby they would be assured the opportunity to advance in a specialized career for which fitted. There are Negroes in every career field so far introduced and in process of formulation. It is the intention of the Army to continue this policy.

(6) The Army is presently streamlining its system of MOS job qualifications and has reduced the number of separate MOS's to 401. As of the latest report, Negroes are qualified for and are serving in 305 of these MOS descriptions. Assignment to Service D will make available all MOS to fully qualified personnel regardless of race or color.

(7) Negroes are assigned to overhead installation jobs without regard to race and work alongside others performing this type of duty. A recent check of 44 such installations within the General Army revealed Negroes to be seasoned to all activities except few. Tab D lists these activities and the numbers of whites and Negroes working in each.

(6) Race reports from field commanders indicate that the reenlistment rate for Negroes in the Regular Army is the highest it has been in recent years, and exceeds that of the white soldier. This is a positive indication that the Negro soldier in general is satisfied with his present status in the Regular Army.
1. Reserve Officers Training Corps.—The Army has established R.O.T.C. units in 132 Negro colleges. The total enrollment of theses units is 3,312, which is very creditable for a period as soon after the war. It is expected that 186 Negroes will graduate this year. This compares most favorably with the other services since the Navy has no R.O.T.C. units and the Air Force has only two. The Department of the Army plans to establish even more R.O.T.C. units in required specialties as colleges attain the necessary qualifications and apply for such units.

2. Organized Reserve Corps Units.—There are activated at this time 186 Negro units within the Organized Reserve Corps, enrolling a wide range of activities. The authorized strength of these reserve units is 47,401, which is 10 per cent of the total authorized Organized Reserve Corps units. (See Tab B) There are 3,413 officers in the Organized Reserve Corps.

3. National Guard Units.—There are 43 National Guard organizations, including 122 company units, with an actual strength of 472 officers and 6,341 enlisted men. (See Tab C)

4. Factors Affecting Policy.

a. Each service has inherent problems peculiar to its method of combat. In shipboard, an individual serves in a small group in one compartment and goes wherever the ship goes. Similarly with air crews and air bases. The combat soldier, on the other hand, works as part of a large group in the open. Moreover his hopes and fears, his every thought and reaction, are shared with the rest of his group. It is his duty to keep up, all voluntarily. The soldier on the battlefield deserves to have, and must have, utmost confidence in his fellow soldiers. They must eat together, sleep together, and all so frequently die together. There can be no friction in their every-day living that might bring on failure in battle. A chain is as strong as its weakest link, and this is true of the Army unit on the battlefield. These factors are of tremendous influence on Army organization, doctrine, and assignment procedures.

b. The Army currently limits Negro enlistments to their civilian population rate, about 12 per cent. This is necessary for these reasons:

1. A study of Negro population will show that few Negroes (12 out of each 100) have an intelligence score of 90 or higher, and that the great bulk are between 55 and 75.

2. The Army and Air Force are in the fortunate position of being able to maintain an enlistment standard of 90 IQ or higher, which excludes most Negroes and those that exceed on the Army.

3. The Army is bound by the Selective Service Act to use G.I.T. 70 as its enlistment criteria before calling on Selective Service. Recently, the Army attempted to use a G.I.T. 90 score in recruiting, but could not get sufficient men and had to drop to 65. The standard will drop to 70 before Selective Service calls can be made. There is a
definite limit to the number of men with low GQ's so that the army can absorb. To accomplish that, further increasing the number of Negroes in unlimited quantity—the Negro being not yet fully developed for modern combat—i.e. to jeopardize the efficiency of the army, at the present time, my military advice and my commanders in the field are of the opinion that an army of over 15 percent Negroes suffers a jeopardizing decrease in efficiency. Without a quota system of any kind, Negro membership could rise easily to 30 or 40 percent.

7. 

Conclusions of the Policy with regard to Policy and Practice

(1) To meet the requirements of the services for qualified individuals, all personnel will be considered on the basis of individual merit and ability and must qualify according to the prescribed standards for enlistment, attendance at schools, promotion, assignment to specific duties, etc.

(2) All individuals, regardless of race, will be accorded equal opportunity for appointment, advancement, professional improvement, promotion and retention in their respective components of the National Military Establishment.

The foregoing is carried out in detail, as set forth in paragraph 5, above.

(3) Some units may continue to be manned with Negro personnel; however, all Negroes will not necessarily be assigned to Negro units. Qualified Negro personnel shall be assigned to fill any type of position vacated in organizations or overseas installations without regard to race.

The foregoing is carried out in detail, as set forth in paragraph 5, above.
8. In summary, since the adoption of the Gilleon Board Report in April of 1946, the Army has continuously and vigorously implemented measures for equality of treatment and opportunity for Negroes. It has drastically increased and continues to increase the spread of jobs which Negroes can and do occupy in the Army. It has expanded and continues to expand the range of Negro utilization into every major occupational job grouping. It has converted and continues to convert White T/OE8 units into Negro T/OE8 units, both combat and service, units in which Negroes had not hitherto served, units which contain skills which had not hitherto been performed by Negroes. It has converted and continues to convert certain installations and companies within its white combat units from White manpower to Negro manpower, thus increasing the number of Negroes found in an extended range of combat skills. It has opened every segment of its military schooling system until the present point has been reached where Negro can attend all Army schools. It has adapted and continues to stress the principle of duty intermixed in non-
T/OE8 units and in overseas installations. It has opened up for Negro troops duty employment, side by side with White troops, in that vast range of service skills found in those activities. It has required White personnel assuming a suitable number of overheard positions to be displaced in order to place therein school trained Negro personnel. It has raised and continues to raise Negro school quotas for courses producing skills in which Negroes have not hitherto been found in sufficient number in order to broaden increasingly the range of Negro utilization. It has accepted and enforces the principle of competitive equality in its Career Guidance Promotion System. It has conducted and continues to conduct special school recruitment campaigns for qualified Negroes to fill its T/OE8 units converted to Negro manpower and to provide equality required to fill its increased school quotas and expanded job utilization. It has abolished completely all discriminatory enlistment qualifications and opened up to Negroes within enlistment calling all of its enlist-
ment options. It has deliberately set out to place in each of its career fields an appropriate number of Negroes. This concrete implementation has been accomplished in the three short years since the Gilleon Board Report. This implementation and its continuation provide full equality of opportunity and treatment for Negroes without disturbing the principle of segregation specifically recommended by the Gilleon Board because of the inherent organizational structure required by the tactical mission of the Army. In this connection, it is pertinent to comment on the highly-publicized New Jersey experiment in eliminating segregation in its schools. Despite the fact that
non-segregation has been in effect for over a year, very little progress has been made in integration. Under a strictly voluntary system, on 15 April 1969 there were only 70 degrees in predominantly white units, 60 of whom were in the 114th RCT, and only 10 in all other units combined. In predominantly Negro units, there were few white officers and none white enlisted personnel. Total strength of the New Jersey Guard as of this date was approximately 11,000 of which 800 were degrees.

9. Further progress will be made in developing Negro techniques of executive type to the end that they may be used more abundantly in all essential R & R positions. The system is in operation and only time is required to accomplish this task. The next organizational step to be taken is the closing of all Negro companies in white battalions of the combat arms. By military officers and field commanders have realized that this step should not be taken until the requisite techniques to closing Negro battalions in white regiments and Negro companies in composite battalions (already accomplished) have been observed in detail over a period of time. They recommend to us that we do haste, although spectacular, my result in incidents detrimental to the progress to national security, and that the step-by-step method of progress hitherto employed should be adhered to. I adhere to their views.

10. It would not be proper to conclude this paper without informing you that there is a growing concern among many senior officers of the Army that we are proceeding to a dangerous degree the combat efficiency of our Army. These officers are familiar with the combat performance of Negro troops during our past Foes that we have already gone too far in integrating colored organizations in white combat units.

11. I am of the opinion that the Department of the Army wishes, to be well informed as indicated above, are in accord with Executive Order 9981 of 26 July 1948, and that the reorganization of the Executive policies announced in your memorandum of 6 April 1969. They will insure continued equality of treatment and opportunity, and will provide progress toward full equality objectives--the effective use of all troops now available in the event of a major mobilization with regard to antiseedant or race. The Army hopes in this manner to contribute its share toward the solution of this complex problem.

/s/ Gordon Gray

Gordon Gray
Acting Secretary of the Army

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