MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FAY

SUBJECT: Replies of the Army and Navy to Mr. Johnson's May 11 Memo

I. The Navy

The additional upward steps proposed by the Navy in its reply to Secretary Johnson’s May 11 Memo are substantially those proposed by the Committee in its “Initial Recommendations.” The Navy does not mention the equal entry scores for all three services. It does, however, propose a job and pay analysis to determine what positions in the Navy can be filled by men with a qualification score of less than 45 — Navy equivalent 90 — without impairing the service. Presumably the Navy will use men below 90 in those positions for which they are fitted.

This would seem to meet the aim of the Committee, which is not — as one in the Navy apparently feared — to force upon the Navy men of inferior quality from the Navy could not profitably use. The Committee, of course, does not insist that the Navy should be forced to take all men below 90 who may want to enlist, nor even to take an arbitrary percentage of men below 90. The Committee is interested only in matching men to the job, and this objective applies to all three services.

In one respect the Navy goes beyond the initial recommendations of the Committee by proposing to abolish the separate training facilities for Negroes in the Marine Corps. It does not indicate, however, whether there will be separate Negro units in the regular Corps following training.

II. The Army

General Comment
The Army proposes to work within the policy of Circular 124, as amended "to assure continued progress by providing utilization of the Negro soldier on the broadest possible professional scales." Thus the objectives set by the Army and the objective of the Committee's recommendations are identical.

To achieve this objective the Army proposes:

A. Opening all MOS to qualified personnel regardless of race. (This is discussed in detail later.)

B. Normal segregation of Negroes at the company level rather than the battalion level as at present. (This is discussed in detail later.)

C. The creation of additional Negro T/C & X Units.

The Army does not propose to:

A. Abolish the 10 percent quota system even if there were parity of entry scores.

B. Abolish Negro quotas in Army School courses for replacement stream students.

C. Use Negro specialists upon completing school courses in other than Negro T/C & X or overhead units.

Detailed Comment:

A. The initial and ultimate objectives of Circular 124 (Page 1, para 2)

The Committee has given considerable thought to the meaning of the initial and ultimate objectives of the Gillies Board report. The original classified report, the correspondence upon that report at the secretarial level, some testimony before the Committee by those who handled Negro problems during the war -- all have led the Committee to believe the ultimate objective of the Army, in event of war, was the use of all manpower on a non-racial basis.

The Committee has noted that the Gillies Board did not attempt to set up intermediate objectives but merely suggested that "timely phasing" be used in interpreting adjustments between the immediate and ultimate objectives.

As you know, the Committee has felt that, without definite intermediate steps, the initial objective (a Negro quota in Negro units) would never be translated into the ultimate objective. In fact, without intermediate steps, the initial objective would forestall the realization of the ultimate objective.
In order that the transition to the eventual objective of the Army might be evolutionary, the Committee concentrated in its initial recommendations on increasing the opportunity for qualified Negroes to attend schools. The Committee believes that the best way to approach the objective which the Army set for itself in the Gillian report is to promote mutual respect and trust on the job. It was the Committee's intention in setting such intermediate objectives that not only the Negro would benefit by these wider opportunities, but that the Army itself would benefit.

B. Changes in War Department Circular 124 (Page 2, para 3)

As stated before, the objectives of the Army and the Committee are the same. The Army does not particularize here what it will do to broaden Negro utilization.

C. Equality of Treatment and Opportunity (Page 3, para 4)

The Army says a proportionate number of spaces in the troop basis -- "including all grades and type jobs" -- are reserved for Negroes. Negroes are found in all grades in the Regular Army up to lieutenant colonel and in the Reserve up to colonel. But they are not found in all type jobs, nor are spaces reserved for them in all type jobs -- if I understand the meaning of "type jobs." A quick check on the so-called "A" report will reveal that there are great many MOS which have no authorized or actual Negro representation.

Moreover, there are great many Job in the Army which are currently below their white authorization and which do not have any Negro authorization. Whether or not Negroes could be found or trained for all these specialties I do not know. The fact is, however, that there are no authorized spaces for Negroes in these MOS, as the attached chart makes plain.

D. Negro units as a training ground for Negro officers (Page 3, para 5, a (2))

The Army says:

"The Regular Army must be a corps of leaders. The quality of leadership in small units on the battlefield is an unfailing yardstick of success in battle . . . . Against the direct competition of the better educated white soldier, the average Negro soldier would find it difficult to rise above the level of service tasks. The present system of segregated units guarantees that Negro soldiers will be
given the opportunity to develop leadership, unbiased and unsheltered from overshadowing competition they are not yet equipped to meet... The Army's position is that the utilization of its manpower must be towards attaining success on future battlefields.

This is a recurring Army argument but it seems to me to be dangerous doctrine. The Army says: (1) battle success must be the measure of manpower policy; (2) battle success depends largely upon the leadership of small units; (3) in open competition the average Negro could not rise above a service rank; (4) therefore Negroes must be protected from such competition by being placed in separate units, and Negro leadership must be developed within such units.

The question is, Can the Army for the sake of developing Negro leaders—lame men as that objective is—afford to obstruct men’s lives to inferior leadership and jeopardize battle success?

If the Army believes that Negroes are incapable of leading men, then there should be no Negro officers. The Committee’s aim is not preferential treatment for the Negro, but equal opportunity. If, when offered equal opportunity, Negroes suffer a loss in the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, that may be regrettable, but it is hardy discriminatory. If the aim of the Army is maximum military efficiency, it is hard to see how this can be secured under conditions of preferential treatment for the Negro.

E. Proportion of Negroes in combat and service units (Page 4, para 5, 6, 7)

I do not presently have this proportion, but since the Army says that for the first time the number of Negroes in combat units compares favorably with the number in service units, I will ask for a breakdown of Negro percentages as contrasted with whites. I do not think this is necessarily significant, however. If a Negro, by his aptitude, belongs in a service unit, that is where he should be put. I do not think Negroes should be put in combat units because they are Negroes but only if they are potentially good combat soldiers.

F. The unit of Negro segregation (Page 4, para 5, 8, 9)

I have mentioned before that, since visiting some installations, I have had some doubts of the wisdom of making the unit of segregation smaller than the company. A company is the smallest administrative unit. By segregating Negroes on the platoon level, you would have, in my opinion, a much higher likelihood of trouble than in
man-to-man integration. In a paper which General James E. Harvav3 wrote for the War College in 1922, he said that he thought most racial friction developed between groups rather than individuals. I really don't see much advantage in company segregation.

G. Negroes and Army schools (Page 4, para 5, 6 (4))

Negroes are not barred from Army schools because of color. But they are barred from many courses in Army schools because those courses have no Negro quotas, and because Negroes are schooled only for positions in overhead installations and in Negro T/O & R units. If you will refer again to the quotes for replacement stream students for the school period beginning April 44 you will see how few school courses are open to Negroes from the training divisions in this quarter. The number of the men is 1860-680,413 (47 War 49) CR 19140 - 3.

H. Negroes and career fields (Page 4, para 5, 8 (5))

The Army says that "there are Negroes in every career field so far introduced and in process of formulation." This is true but it is not significant. There have been introduced so far four career fields -- Food service, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Negroes have been in cavalry and infantry regiments by statute since 1854. They have been in food service for many years. They have been in artillery units since World War I.

That a Negro is in a career field means very little. How will the qualified Negro advance up the career ladder in his field unless the appropriate MOS is open to him, unless he can be assured of going to the necessary schools, and unless he is assigned according to his training regardless of racial units -- these are the relevant points.

I. Negroes and MOS (Page 4, para 5, 9 (6))

The Army says that "as of the latest report" Negroes are serving in 654 out of 541 job descriptions. The latest report available to the Committee is the February "R" report. (The latest "R" report is that of March, and I have written to SARS for it.) In the February report there are roughly 530 MOS excluding the teaching MOS and special categories which are not relevant to our study. Of these 320 there were 479 without Negro representation.

This figure of 179 is deceptive, however, and hardly fair to the Army, for it includes MOS in which there are often only one or two whites. To be absolutely fair, it is necessary to take account only of those MOS in which there is a fairly substantial white representation and no Negroes at all. Using such a criterion, I found 1 MOS in which Negroes were not represented -- which is above the figure given by the Army.
But this is only a very large number of Negro in which there is an authorization for Negro of only one or two -- merely a token representation. This is particularly true of the Signal Corps.

If you will look at the accompanying chart, you will see the result. There is an authorized white strength for BNS 272 -- heavy punch operator -- of 70. Actual strength is 28. By December, 1945, it will be down to 14. And yet there is no Negro authorization for BNS 272. Instances of this kind, where the Army is short of men in an NBN, and yet has set up no Negro authorization or merely a token authorization, can be multiplied by the dozen.

J. Negroes in overhead installations (Page 4, para 5, a (?))

The report referred to in this paragraph is one that was prepared by the G-2 at Fort Huachuca following a visit to that post by the staff of the Field Commissary. On the whole this is a very creditable showing in the use of Negroes -- both civilian and military -- in the post overhead.

Of course, this depends largely on the individual commander. The 2255 and 2301 at Fort Huachuca, as excellent. But there are very few Negroes used in the overhead of the 3rd Armored Division at Fort Huachuca, or in the overhead of the Armor School there.

K. "Factors Affecting Policy" (Page 5, para 6)

This paragraph seems to make the following points: a sailor cannot run away without drowning; a soldier is not so restricted. Therefore, soldiers must have more confidence in their fellow than sailors in their shipmates. It is doubtful whether a sailor would subscribe to this view of his courage and initiative.

The Army says that since soldiers must eat, sleep and die together, it cannot risk friction which may jeopardize battle success. The Navy until 1945 always justified its non-use of Negroes in general service on the grounds that the close living conditions aboard ship invited friction which it could not risk. The Navy now uses Negroes aboard ship in general service ratings.

L. The Negro Quota (Page 5, para 6, b)

Admittedly the Army has a real problem while it takes men at 001-90 and the other two arms can get enlisting at 002-90. Although Secretary Scalapino explicitly, and Acting Secretary Grey, by implication, said that the Army could abandon the quota if the entry sources were equalized, this offer is not now put forward to Secretary Johnson.
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The Army says unless it maintain the quota, it may easily have 30 or 40 percent Negroes in the service. This figure has never been mentioned to the Committee, and it is unsupportable by any evidence. None of the forecasts in the so-called Noble Report justifies a prophecy of this kind. I think the Committee might ask for a statistical defense of this figure.

Since the whole issue of the quota is as much in dispute, could not the Army be asked to make a valid test of no-quota enrollment, to determine whether their fears are well founded?

II. Comparison of HS policy with Army practice (Page 6, para 7)

1. Negroes and whites attend the same schools; not necessarily the same courses. Assignments are made within racial units or overhand installations.

2. Negroes do not have equal opportunity for advancement while they are denied access to school courses.

3. Army policy on assignment of Negroes from schools.

It is not meant to say that vacancies are reserved for Negroes with school training, as the Army claims, citing the policy order of March 4, 1948. That order read:

"For these reasons it is desired that when these school trained Negroes are allocated to your command, you provide appropriate destinations within your rating level in your bulk overseas authorization, unless Negro 7/MR positions in these HS are also open, where this personnel can actually be utilized in their school trained primary HS, notwithstanding the fact that you will thereby be forced to convert existing white positions to Negro positions and reassign or report as surplus white personnel presently filling such positions. In providing assignment destinations you will bear in mind the fact that Circular 154 permits duty interspersal of white and Negro soldiers in bulk overseas positions. Consideration, however, should be given to the presence of a Negro company, detachment, or unit for housing and mess purposes unless you have integrated these facilities at the installation provided as the assignment destinations."

There is nothing here which directs commanders to 'reserve' spaces, or vacancies for Negroes. Quite candidly, I can't see why such spaces should be reserved. Vacancies in overhand installations should be filled with qualified personnel regardless of race. To reserve spaces for Negroes is in practice discrimination against the whites.
1. The Army says it is continuing to convert white into Negro
7/0 a X units, both combat and service. Is there not a danger
here? When a white unit is converted into a Negro unit, the
positions and MOS required by that unit must be found among
the Negro soldiers. Might not this result in taking Negroes
of inferior qualifications and giving them jobs for which
they are not yet completely trained or fitted — merely because
it is a Negro unit? This was done in both wars, and the result
was that the Negro was charged with inefficiency when often he
had merely been given a post for which he was not qualified.
The Committee is not interested in creating jobs for Negroes
but in seeing that qualified Negroes are allowed to fill jobs.

2. Fear of Army officers over inserting Negro units in white
organizations. The records of the War College, the Command
and General Staff School and the Historical Records Section of the
are full of papers expressing expert military opinion that the
use of Negroes in divisional units was not successful and re-
commending utilization of Negroes in smaller units within white
organizations. The fear is expressed against such insertion of
Negro units. If this means that the Army does not really be-
lieve the Negro can be effectively used as a combat soldier,
then the Army policy should call for the use of Negroes only as
service troops.

The Gillen Board, however, laid great emphasis on training qual-
ified Negroes for combat, saying that this was where the Negro
soldier had appeared at most disadvantage.

R. E. Corman
Inclusive Secretary