MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PAX

Analysis of

SUBJECT: Replies of the Army and Navy to Mr. Johnson's May 11 Memo

I. The Navy

The additional forward steps proposed by the Navy in its reply to Secretary Johnson's May 11 Memo are substantially those proposed by the Committee in its "Initial Recommendations." The Navy does not mention the equal entry score for all three services. It does propose a job and a test analysis to determine that positions in the Navy can be filled by men with a qualification score of less than 45 -- Army equivalent 90 -- without impairing the service. Presumably the Navy still uses men below 75T 90 in those positions for which they are fitted.

This would seem to meet the aim of the Committee, which is not -- as some in the Navy apparently feared -- to force upon the Navy men of inferior quality when the Navy could not profitably use. The Committee, of course, does not intend that the Navy should be forced to take all men below 90 who may want to enlist, nor even to take an arbitrary percentage of men below 90. The Committee is interested only in matching men to the job, and this objective applies to all three services.

In one respect the Navy goes beyond the initial recommendations of the Committee by proposing to abolish the separate training facilities for Negroes in the Marine Corps. It does not indicate, however, whether there will be separate Negro units in the regular Corps following training.

II. The Army

General Comment

CONFIDENTIAL
The Army proposes to work within the policy of Circular 124, amended "to assure continued progress by providing utilization of the Negro soldier on the broadest possible professional scale." Thus the objectives set by the Army and the objective of the Committee's recommendations are identical.

To achieve this objective the Army proposes:
A. Opening all MOS to qualified personnel regardless of race. (This is discussed in detail later.)
B. Removal of segregation of Negroes at the company level rather than the battalion level as at present. (This is discussed in detail later.)
C. The creation of additional Negro T/6 & X Units.

The Army does not propose to:
A. Abolish the 10 percent quota system even if there were parity of entry scores.
B. Abolish Negro quotas in Army School courses for replacement or training students.
C. Use Negro specialists upon completing school courses in other than Negro T/6 & X or overheard units.

Detailed Comment:
A. The initial and ultimate objectives of Circular 124. (Page 1, para 2)

The Committee has given considerable thought to the meaning of the initial and ultimate objectives of the Gillen Board report. The original classified report, the correspondence upon that report at the secretarial level, some testimony before the Committee by those who handled Negro problems during the war -- all have led the Committee to believe the ultimate objective of the Army, in event of war, was the use of all manpower on a non-racial basis.

The Committee has noted that the Gillen Board did not attempt to set up intermediate objectives but merely suggested that "finely phased" be used in interpreting adjustments between the immediate and ultimate objectives.

As you know, the Committee has felt that, without definite intermediate steps, the initial objective (a Negro quota used in Negro units) would never be translated into the ultimate objective. In fact, without intermediate steps, the initial objective would forestall the realization of the ultimate objective.
In order that the transition to the eventual objective of the Army might be evolutionary, the Committee concentrated in its initial recommendations on increasing the opportunity for qualified Negroes to attend schools. The Committee believes that the best way to effect the objective which the Army set for itself in the Gilliam report is to promote utmost respect and trust on the job. It was the Committee's intention in setting such intermediate objectives that not only the Negro would benefit by these wider opportunities, but that the Army itself would benefit.

D. Changes in War Department Circular 124 (Page 3, para 3)

As stated before, the objectives of the Army and the Committee are the same. The Army does not particularize here what it will do to broaden Negro utilization.

C. Equality of Treatment and Opportunity (Page 3, para 4)

The Army says a proportionate number of spaces in the troop basis -- "including all grades and type jobs" -- are reserved for Negroes. Negroes are found in all grades in the Regular Army up to lieutenant colonel and in the Reserve up to colonel. But they are not found in all type jobs, nor are spaces reserved for them in all type jobs -- "if I understand the meaning of 'type jobs.'"

A quick glance at the so-called "14" report will reveal that there are a great many MOS which have no authorized or actual Negro representation.

Moreover there are a great many MOS in the Army which are currently below their white authorization and which do not have any Negro authorization. Whether or not Negroes could be found or trained for all these specialties I do not know. The fact is, however, that there are no authorized spaces for Negroes in these MOS, as the attached chart makes plain.

D. Negro units as a training ground for Negro officers (Page 3, para 5, "2")

The Army says:

"The Regular Army must be a corps of leaders. The quality of leadership in small units on the battlefield is an un-failing yardstick of success in battle. . . . Against the direct competition of the better educated white soldier, the average Negro soldier would find it difficult to rise above the level of service tasks. The present system of segregated units guarantees that Negro soldiers will be
given the opportunity to develop leadership, un- 
blinded and unfiltered by overshadowing competition 
they are not yet equipped to meet . . . The army's 
position is that the utilization of its manpower must 
be towards attaining success on future battlefields."

This is a recurring army argument but it seems to me to be 
dangerous doctrine. The army says: (1) battle success must be 
the measure of manpower policy; (2) battle success depends largely 
upon the leadership of small units; (3) in open competition the 
average negro would not rise above a service status; (4) therefore 
Negroes must be protected from such competition by being placed 
in separate units; and Negro leadership must be developed within 
such units.

The question is, can the army for the sake of developing 
Negro leaders -- lendable as that objective is -- afford to con- 
struct men's lives to inferior leadership and jeopardize battle 
success.

If the army believes that Negroes are incapable of leading 
men, then there should be no Negro officers. The Committee's aim 
is not preferential treatment for the Negro, but equal opportunity.
If, when offered equal opportunity, Negroes suffer a loss in the 
number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, that may be 
regrettable, but it is hardly discriminatory. If the aim of the 
army is maximum military efficiency, it is hard to see how this can 
be secured under conditions of preferential treatment for the Negro.

e. Proportion of Negroes in combat and service units (Page 4, para 
5, 40)

I do not presently have this proportion, but since the army 
says that for the first time the number of Negroes in combat units 
composes army as with the number in service units, I will ask for 
a breakdown of Negro percentages as contrasted with whites. I do 
not think this is necessarily significant, however, if a Negro, by 
his aptitude, belongs in a service unit, that is where he should be 
put. I do not think Negroes should be put in combat units because 
they are Negroes but only if they are potentially good combat 
soldiers.

f. The unit of Negro segregation (Page 4, para 5, 40)

I have mentioned before that, since visiting some installations, 
I have had serious doubts of the wisdom of mixing the unit of segre-
gation smaller than the company. A company is the smallest admin- 
istrative unit. By segregating Negroes on the platoon level, you 
would have, in my opinion, far more likelihood of trouble than in
man-to-man integration. In a paper which General James L. Aronson
wrote for the War College in 1922, he said that he thought most
racial friction developed between groups rather than individuals.
I really don't see much advantage in company segregation.

G. Negroes and Army schools (Page 4, para 5, a (4))

Negroes are not barred from Army schools because of color. But
they are barred from many courses in Army schools because these
courses have no Negro quotas, and because Negroes are scheduled only
for positions in outboard installations and in Negro 7/8 & R units.
If you will refer again to the notes for replacement stream stu-
dents for the school period beginning April 24, you will see how few
school courses are open to Negroes from the training divisions in
this quarter. The number of the mes is 3642-822463 (27 Mar 49).

H. Negroes and career fields (Page 4, para 5, b (5))

The Army says that "there are Negroes in every career field
so far introduced and in process of formulation." This is true
but it is not significant. There have been Negroes in all four
career fields -- food service, infantry, cavalry, and artillery.
Negroes have been in cavalry and infantry regiments by statute
since 1866. They have been in food service for many years. They
have been in artillery units since World War I.

That a Negro is in a career field means very little. How well
the qualified Negro advances up the career ladder in his field un-
less the appropriate MOS is open to him, unless he can be assured
of going to the necessary schools, and unless he is assigned accord-
ing to his training regardless of racial units -- those are the
relevant points.

I. Negroes and MOS (Page 4, para 5, c (6))

The Army says that "as of the latest report" Negroes are serv-
ing in 143 out of 441 job descriptions. The latest report available
to the Committee is the February "45" report. (The latest 45 report
is that of March, and I have written to TAB for it.) In the February
report there are roughly 230 MOS, excluding the teaching MOS and
special categories which are not relevant to our study, of these
230 there are 379 without Negro representation.

This figure of 179 is deceptive, however, and hardly fair to the
Army, for it includes MOS in which there are often only one or two
Negroes. To be absolutely fair, it is necessary to take account only
of those MOS in which there is a fairly substantial white represen-
tation and no Negroes at all. Using such a criterion, I found 31
MOS in which Negroes were not represented -- which is almost the
figure given by the Army.
BUT this is a very large number of Ns in which there is no authorization for Negroes of only one or two -- merely a token representation. This is particularly true of the Signal Corps.

If you will look at the accompanying chart, you will see the result. There is an authorized white strength for NS 2/2 -- any push operator -- of 97. Actual strength is 20. By December, 1943, it will be down to 11. And yet there is no Negro authorization for NS 2/2. Instances of this kind, where the Army is short of men in an NS, and yet has set up no Negro authorization or merely a token authorization, can be multiplied by the dozen.

J. Negroes in overhead installations (Page 4, para 5, c (7))

The report referred to in this paragraph is one that was prepared by the G-2 at Fort Hood following a visit to that post by the staff of the FORT COMMISSION. On the whole this is a very creditable showing in the use of Negroes -- both civilian and military -- in the post overhead.

Of course, this depends largely on the individual commander. The 2120 Air at Knox, like the 2101 Air at Hood, is excellent. But there are very few Negroes used in the overhead of the 2nd Armored Division at Knox, or in the overhead of the Armored School there.

K. "Factors Affecting Policy" (Page 5, para 6)

This paragraph seems to make the following points: a sailor cannot run away without drowning; a soldier is not so restricted. Therefore, soldiers must have more confidence in their fellow than sailors in their shipmates. It is doubtful whether a sailor would subscribe to this view of his courage and initiative.

The Army says that since soldiers must eat, sleep and die together, they cannot risk friction which may jeopardize battle success. The Navy until 1942 always justified its non-use of Negroes in general service on the grounds that the close living conditions aboard ship invited friction which it could not risk. The Navy now uses Negroes aboard ship in general service ratings.

L. The Negro Quota (Page 5, para 6, b)

Admittedly the Army has a real problem while it takes men at 2117 90 and the other two arms can get call numbers at 007 90. Although Secretary Regan explicitly, and Acting Secretary Shade, by implication, said that the Army could abandon the quota if the entry scores were equalized, this offer is not now put forward to Secretary Johnson.
The Army says unless it maintains the quota, it may easily have 30 or 40 percent Negroes in the service. This figure has never been mentioned to the Committee, and it is unsupported by any evidence. None of the forecasts in the so-called Noble Report justifies a prophecy of this kind. I think the Committee might ask for a statistical defense of this figure.

Since the whole issue of the quota is as much in dispute, could not the Army be asked to make a valid test of non-quota enlistment, to determine whether their fears are well founded?

II. Comparison of NBR policy with Army practice (Page 4, para 7)

1. Negroes and whites attend the same schools; not necessarily the same courses. Assignments are made within racial units or overhand installations.

2. Negroes do not have equal opportunity for advancement while they are denied access to school courses.

3. Army policy on assignment of Negroes from schools.

   It is not exact to say that vacancies are reserved for Negroes with school training, as the Army claims, citing the policy order of March 4, 1948. That order reads:

   "For these reasons it is desired that when these school trained Negroes are allocated to your command, you provide appropriate destinations within your ranking level in your total overhead authorization, unless Negro V/NBR positions in these NBR areas are also open, where this personnel can actually be utilized in their school trained primary NBR, notwithstanding the fact that you will thereby be forced to convert existing white positions to Negro positions and reassign or report as surplus white personnel presently filling such positions. In providing assignment destinations you will bear in mind the fact that Circular 154 permits duty interspersal of white and Negro soldiers in all overhead positions. Consideration, however, should be given to the presence of a Negro company, detachment, or unit for housing and mess duties unless you have integrated these facilities at the installation provided as the assignment destination."

   There is nothing here which directs commanders to "reserve" spaces, or vacancies for Negroes. Quite candidly, I can't see why such spaces should be reserved. Vacancies in overhead installations should be filled with qualified personnel regardless of race. To reserve spaces for Negroes is to practice discrimination against the whites.
E. Summary (Page 7, para 2)

1. The Army says it is continuing to convert white into Negro Y/0 N units, both combat and service. Is there not a danger here? When a white unit is converted into a Negro unit, the positions and EEO required by that unit must be found among the Negro soldiers. Might not this result in taking Negroes of inferior qualifications and giving them jobs for which they are not yet completely trained or fitted—merely because it is a Negro unit. This was done in both wars, and the result was that the Negro was charged with insufficiency when often he had merely been given a post for which he was not trained. The Committee is not interested in creating jobs for Negroes but in seeing that qualified Negroes are allowed to fill jobs.

2. Fear of Army officers over inserting Negro units in white organizations. The records of the War College, the Command and General Staff School and the Historical Records Section of the G-3 are full of papers expressing expert military opinion that the use of Negroes in divisional units was not successful and recommending utilization of Negroes in smaller units within white organizations. The fear is expressed against such insertion of Negro units. If this means that the Army does not really believe the Negro can be effectively used as a combat soldier, then the Army policy should call for the use of Negroes only as service troops.

The Gillis Board, however, laid great emphasis on training qualified Negroes for combat, saying that this was where the Negro soldier had appeared at most disadvantageous.

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