REMARKS


1. Prior to World War II there were no degrees in the Air Force. By V-J Day, there were approximately 140,000 Negroes serving with the then Army Air Forces. Negro organizations included a fighter group which had completed eighteen months of service in the Mediterranean Theater, a Negro bombardment group which had been fully armed and equipped and was in the last stages of unit training, and a host of non-flying units in the United States. The non-flying units included Air Cargo, Amazonian, Ground Aviation, Maintenance Companies, Aviation Engineer Battalions, Signal Construction Battalions, Quartermaster Troop Companies (Armies), Air Security Battalion, Air Base Security Battalions, and Medical Bases. At the time approximately eight per cent of the Air Force were Negro. Negro strength had previously reached a peak of twelve per cent in 1946 and a low of approximately six per cent in 1949. The decrease in Negro strength may be attributed to increased standards for enlistment and re-enlistment which apply to Negro and white alike.

2. The Air Force has long recognized that the traditional utilization of Negro manpower primarily in Negro units has contained certain elements of waste and inefficiency. When the Air Force was designated one of the departments of the National Military Establishment, studies were initiated for the purpose of correcting this and other deficiencies. The current Air Force policy on Negro personnel, which was approved by the Secretary of Defense on 12 May 1951, is one of integration. Under this policy, personnel are assigned and utilized on the basis of the qualifications of the individual and the needs of the service, rather than on the basis of racial origin.

3. We believe that this policy provides the equality of treatment and opportunity desired by the President, and furthermore, that it will alleviate many of the problems of procurement, training and assignment which have previously been encountered in connection with the nonutilization of Negro personnel.

4. One of the initial actions to implement our policy was the inactivation of the only all-Negro Air Force combat unit, the 332nd Fighter Wing at Lockbourne Air Force Base, Columbus, Ohio. With the adoption of the integration policy, the personnel of the 332nd Fighter Wing were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFICER STATUS</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRADE AND ENLISTED OFFICERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. [Signature]
examined by a group of classification specialists and were reclassified as rapidly as circumstances would permit. Due to budgetary uncertainties, it could not be determined immediately whether Lockhorns Air Force Base would remain active or would be placed on an inactive status. Although this retained the redistribution of Lockhorns personnel some-what, the Base has now been placed on an inactive status and, except for the small caretaking detachment, the personnel have been reassigned throughout the Air Force world-wide.

5. For the present, a certain number of Negro service units will probably continue to exist, since they are efficiently performing a necessary Air Force function. Individuals in those units, however, may attend technical or other service schools which will enhance their qualifications without regard to the previous limitations imposed by Negro quotas and Negro vacancies. Since qualified Negro personnel are now assigned to fill any position vacated in any Air Force organization, and since all individuals are accorded equal opportunity and treatment, the principle of Negro quotas to maintain Negro units has, of necessity, been discarded. Racial quotas are not consistent with free competition on the basis of merit and ability.

6. How our current policies will affect the proportionate white and Negro strength of the Air Force we do not know, nor are we particularly concerned as long as there are no social or racist problems or problems of individual qualifications which adversely affect the efficiency of the Air Force.

7. The Air Force does not specifically designate certain units as Negro units. In the following statistics, units whose strength is over fifty per cent Negro are termed "Negro units." Assuming that the December 1948 statistics are representative of the pre-integration situation, the distribution of Negro personnel by unit at that time was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Negro units</th>
<th>118</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of white units containing Negroes</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of units containing Negroes</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Upon implementation of the integration policy and redistribution of Negro personnel, the total number of units containing Negroes increased as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>1,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>1,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>(Estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. During the same time the number of Negro units decreased.

During the same period, the number of Negro units decreased.

Part of the decrease was due to the inactivation of the various units.
comprising the 332nd Fighter Wing at Lockbourne. The decreasing number
of Negro units was as follows:

30 June 106
31 July 89
31 August 66
30 September 61
31 October 58
31 November 72
31 December (estimate) 67

10. All of the foregoing refers to numbers of units only. The
numbers of individuals assigned to the various units, as of
31 December 1949 are as follows:

a. Negroes assigned to Negro units — 5,503 — 7,492
b. Negroes assigned to white units — 16,361 — 11,666

Total assigned command strength, Negroes — 21,864 — 19,158

In the white units referred to above, there were an estimated
7,529 other-than-Negro personnel assigned.

11. The percentage of Negro enlisted strength has been running as
follows:

31 December 1948 (pre-integration) 6.25%
30 June 1949 6.25%
31 July 1949 6.25%
31 August 1949 6.25%
30 September 1949 6.25%
31 October 1949 6.25%
31 November 1949 7.25%
31 December 1949 7.25% 7.2%

12. One matter which is effecting the implementation of the inte-
gration policy is with regard to the overseas areas to which Negro
personnel are not being assigned. Through communications between the
Department of State and the Department of Defense, the situation has
gradually been clarified. The most recent communication from the State
Department did not specifically forbid the assignment of Negro personnel
in certain areas, but stated that the governments concerned should
first be consulted before assigning Negroes to certain areas. The areas
in question are as follows:

Iceland New Caledonia
Greenland Burma
Canada British possessions in the
Caribbean area

We plan to comply exactly with the State Department's instructions. When
Negro personnel, through normal assignment procedures, come up for assignment to one of these areas, we will hold the assignment in abeyance and through the Secretary of Defense and the State Department, query the government concerned.

13. Although the implementation of our current policies dates only from May of 1949, Negro personnel have been reassigned to over a thousand previously white units. We have requested our major commanders to give the implementation of this policy close personal attention and to report to this headquarters any incidents or disturbances which may be considered as racial in nature.

14. To date there have been only a very small number of incidents reported, and these have been inconsequential. Our commanders, without exception, are supporting and implementing the integration policy. We do not look upon this matter from a sociological standpoint. We adopted the integration policy as a solution, within the Air Force, of certain problems which may be peculiar to the Air Force. We feel that the effectiveness of the Air Force is our primary concern, and that our current policy should be regarded as an effort to achieve more efficient personnel management and utilization, rather than being a matter of social implications.