Chapter __

THE GILLEN HARD

In 1940, when the Selective Service Act was passed, the War Department had, as we have seen, a social rather than a military policy for the utilization of Negro troops. At that time the Army stated clearly that the Negro troop strength would be roughly in proportion to the Negro civilian population; that Negroes would not be intermixed with whites, and Negro units would not be used with white units in the same regiment; and that Negro officers would be assigned to Negro units.

Much less clearly formulated, however, were the Army's plans for the effective military utilization of its 10 per cent Negro strength. The Army declared in its policy statement of October 16, 1940, that Negro organizations would be established in each major branch of the service, combatant as well as non-combatant, but actually...
little forward planning had been done on the part of Negro units which would be formed, or even on a rough division of Negro troops between the branches. And although the Army promised Negroes the opportunity to qualify for Reserve commissions when officer candidate schools were opened, it had not considered how it might make most effective use of skilled Negroes, who had been trained between wars in increasing number by American industry and whose skills almost certainly would not find maximum employment within the traditional limitations of Negro units.

In the next five years, the Army had no time to develop a new and considered Negro policy. Driven by the pace and impatience of events, it improvised rather than planned; and as might be expected in a field where custom and prejudice obscured the lessons of experience, improvisation was based largely on practices which had been tried in the past and found wanting.

It is true that, under the pressure of Negro public opinion and the prodding of the McCloy committee, the Army made significant advances in its Negro policy. Such were the decisions to train Negro pilots, to
conducted its officer training program on an unsegregated basis, and
to abolish the racial restrictions on the use of post exchanges and
recreational facilities. There is no question that in the over-all
utilization of Negro strength, the Army improved upon its record in
World War I. While the Army ignored the provision of the Selective
Induction Act requiring non-discrimination in the training of selectees
and insisted on racial quotas in its call-up, it still increased its
inclusion in the repeated protests by Selective Service.

Negro quotas perpetuated the racial barriers of Selective Service.

Finally, the circulation of War Department letters and pamphlets on
the training and command of Negro troops undoubtedly helped to
reduce considerably some of the misunderstanding and prejudice which had always
hampered the effective use of Negro units.

Despite these advances and concessions in policy, the basic Army
policy remained unchanged throughout the war. The economy of national

The Army believed that the best use of Negro manpower comprising
10 per cent of the nation's manpower potential would require that this Negro strength be employed only in racial units.
Regarded from a strictly military viewpoint, this policy, on paper, was defensible. In practice, it revealed the same flaws and contradictions that it had in World War I. In total disregard of all the manpower studies prepared between wars at the War College, the Army formed Negro combat divisions. The battle record of one of these divisions was not distinguished. Only part of the other division was ever committed to battle, with indifferent results. Thus, while the Army maintained that the Negro must bear his proportionate share of the casualties, in point of fact he never did.

It is hardly surprising that in the midst of war the Army did not attempt a complete revolution in its Negro troop policy. The immediate demands of war induced an attitude of concentration rather than reform in personnel policies. And insofar as social factors enter into the military equation, it is probably asking too much to expect the Army to break sharply with custom, but considering only the overriding demands of military efficiency, it is to be wondered that the Army did not question a policy which was
practice over two wars had proved seriously ineffective. Yet, oddly enough, it was on the very ground of efficiency that the Army continued to defend its Negros policy. The one experiment of integrating Negro companies with white troops — the use of Negro platoons with white companies in the Battle of the Bulge — might have been expected to raise some doubt of traditional policy. On the contrary, the success of this experiment was set down to "special circumstances" — the voluntary recruitment of the men for front line duty, the relatively high number of the volunteers, etc. — and the whole experiment was dismissed as "unusual."

This was undeniably true, but for the very reason that it was untypical it contained a lesson for the future. Would Negro soldiers fight better in close association with their fellow white Americans? Would more intelligent, better qualified Negroes make better soldiers than unqualified whites? These were the questions which were raised by the experiment of the Negro platoons in white companies. But as the Army neglected to raise them, they never received an answer.

It is true, however, that these questions had been raised
During the war by some officers, some of whom even went so far as to counsel the tearing apart of the 92nd Division in order to give it the same distribution by mental grades as a representative white division. Other officers had recommended the dispersal of Negro troops -- one or two to a squad -- throughout white units. But it is not unfair to say that as V-J Day approached, the Army still rested on defense of its Negro troop policies on the same argument it had used in 1940 -- "This policy has proven satisfactory over a long number of years." The argument which had been accepted by military leaders in two wars.

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If the Army was content that its basic Negro policy -- despite the record of combat inefficiency in theatre reports and the ever-growing list of disorders and riots in camps within the Zone of Interior -- was still proving satisfactory, civilian officials in the War Department, diverted who were constantly hounded from more urgent tasks to deal with racial matters, had reached the conclusion by the middle of the war that, while a drastic overhaul of Army racial policy was impracticable during the conflict, the Army would, on the basis of its experience, have--
review that policy immediately upon the conclusion of the war, in
order that "a definite, workable policy" for the utilization of Negro
troops might be formulated for the postwar military establishment.

Because the Army, in spite of the numerous studies on Negro
utilization undertaken by the General Staff and the Army War College
between wars, "was unprepared to deal with the large number of Negroes
who entered the service under the provisions of the Selective Service
Act," Assistant Secretary McCoy, as was noted in the preceding
chapter, had proposed to the Special Troop Policy Committee as early as September
1, 1944, that the General Staff "review existing War Department policies
regarding such participation and that this review be based upon a study
which will include all our experiences during the present war, both
in this country and abroad." Although Assistant Secretary McCoy had
recommended that this study be started immediately, it was not until
January 10, 1945, that the Special Troop Policy Committee approved
this study, and Secretary Stimson initiated the Committee's recommendation.
commands throughout the world by the Adjutant-General, requesting a report on the performance of Negro troop units with recommendations on postwar policy.

During the summer of 1945, while the theater command was assembling their data in response to the questionnaire sent out by the Adjutant General, the results of which are described in Chapter _, officials in Mr. McCoy's office were devoting considerable thought to the problem of the postwar utilization of Negro troops. Much of this thinking found its way into interoffice memoranda.

(Civilian aide to Secretary Stimson.)
Thence, Mr. Truman Gibson in a long memo to McCoy on August 8 stated that, in the face of the unchanging Army attitude toward the utilization of Negroes, "there is growing doubt among representatives of Army officers whether the Army is making the most efficient use of the 10-12% of available manpower represented by Negroes." Gibson complained that all the studies conducted prior to 1940 took their start from the same basic premises, namely, that Negroes are unadaptable to modern combat, that they are, and must remain, second-class fighting

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material because of inherent moral and mental inferiority; that Negro

cannot be made into good officer material for the same reasons; and

that consequently Negro troops should be used sparingly in combat,

and then only in racially segregated units.

Gibson wrote, "As none of these earlier studies had inquired into two most relevant

questions: (1) Whether the policy of segregation itself had any bearing

upon the performance of Negro troops; and (2) What was the effect of

placing together in one organization large numbers of men whose ACOE

scores are low." Gibson had little faith that the questionnaire recently

provided a very reliable guide for future

policy because the questions were leading in nature, presented

and not framed to

elicit opinion on the effect

of segregation and the concentration of low score men in combat

units.

Therefore, Gibson proposed that, before formulating a postwar

policy, the Army should give some consideration to: (1) the present

policy of segregation and its possible effect on military efficiency.
(2) the advisability of committing to combat racial units with 85% of their strength in grades IV and V, the two lowest mental classifications;

(3) Army experience during the war with segregated hospitals, officer candidate schools, and the integration policies in Europe; (4) the advances in formal education and industrial skills made by Negroes since World War II; and (4) the Navy's experience with integration policy, since this represented "a clean break with prior Naval policy and experience," and a "more profound change than any that has been adopted by the Army."

Having read Gibson's name, Colonel Davidson Somers, who was assigned to the Assistant Secretary's office and who had worked with the Committee on Special Troop Policies, wrote to Mr. Mead on August 20 as follows:

"... It is pretty well recognized that in this field the Army has not found the right answer in terms of most efficient use of available manpower.

"I think two things are needed. The first is the designation of a first-class officer or group of officers of high rank with the special assignment of planning for the use of Negro troops. In the past, the subject has been rather unpopular and change has taken place as a result of yielding to pressures rather than on the basis of forward planning. The officers in G-1 and ASF assigned to deal with..."
the problem have had relatively low rank and have not, in my opinion, been particularly qualified for the job. Moreover, for them it was merely one duty among a number of others. The higher-ranking officials who have had to deal with the problem have not been able to give it the attention it deserves. Although Gibson has made a number of valuable contributions, he is not in a position to have any really strong influence on policies. No one person has had the responsibility, the authority, and the opportunity to do the job and as a result it has been neglected.

"I think that the present time would be appropriate for the designation of a really well-qualified officer or group of officers to study the subject.

Appointment of a representative civilian group, not all Negro, to advise the selected officer would also be desirable.

"However, I do not think that a mere study, even by a highly qualified officer would be sufficient. Some indication of direction from high Army levels is needed as a basis for the study and I think this requires a basic change in policy. I recommend that the basic Army policy be changed to call for eventual non-segregation and assignment of Negro troops solely on the basis of ability and that the designated officer be directed to plan on this basis.

"I recognize that this cannot be accomplished at once or a hundred per cent. So one can claim, in view of the table of ASCT scores shown on Page 3 of Gibson's memorandum that Negroes in general new made as good soldiers as whites in general. It is not necessary to rely on racial theories to explain the differences; lack of educational, occupational and social opportunities is a sufficient explanation. The fact remains, however, that if Negro troops are assigned on the basis of qualifications, many service units will have sixty or seventy per cent Negroes. These cases will present

1. The table referred to is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Negroes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade I</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade II</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade III</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade IV</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade V</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a special problem and, where the proportion of Negroes is as large as that, it will presumably be necessary to make the unit entirely Negro.

"This is the kind of problem with which the study can deal, given a basic direction. Inquiry can be made as to the areas in which non-segregation can be attempted first and the methods by which it can be introduced. In this framework, the study can make use of the available experience in non-segregation (Officer Candidate Schools, hospitals, integrated platoons in NCO, and the experience under the Navy's new policies) instead of merely generalizing, as in the past, on the disappointing and not very relevant experience with large segregated units.

"In the absence of any such basic direction, I am afraid the study would be as unfruitful as those that have been made in the past. If there is a basic change in the Army's policy, the practice can be allowed to evolve gradually on a trial and error basis.

"If the basic change in policy recommended above is adopted, we shall have a number of difficulties. There will be a certain amount of social friction. There will also be a considerable amount of professional Negro agitation, since it cannot be expected that Negroes, on a purely competitive basis, will initially not achieve as much rank or as many desirable positions as they do in the present segregation system. The table of AGOT scores seems sufficient evidence of this. However, I do not see any cause for alarm in these difficulties. We shall be on firm ground and will be able to defend our actions by relying on the unassailable position that we are using men in accordance with their abilities."

It was not only civilian officials in the War Department who were giving increasing attention to the utilization of Negroes in the postwar Army. Assistant Secretary McCoy had sent to General Marshall a copy of the study "Opinions About Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies of 7 Divisions" which had been prepared by the Research Branch of the
Information and Education Division, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. Referring to Mr. McCoy on August 26, General Marshall agreed that the results of the survey 'should not be released for publication at this time, since the conditions under which the platoons were organized and employed were most unusual.' However, General Marshall also agreed that 'the practicability of integrating Negro elements into white units should be followed up.'

Developments were now rapid. The replies of the theater commanders to the questionnaire sent out on May 28 by the Special Planning Division of Army Service Forces were due on September 1; and by October 1 the three forces were to have submitted to the Special Planning Division their conclusions and recommendations on postwar utilization of Negroes on the basis of the replies from the field. On September 17 — two weeks before the forces were to submit their recommendations — Assistant Secretary McCoy sent to Secretary Patterson the memorandum above mentioned from Colonel McEachern, Truman Gibson and General Marshall, together with a copy of the I & B report on Negro platoons in white companies. In a covering memo, Mr. McCoy said to Judge Patterson:
"I am sending you herewith some papers on the problem of post-war employment of Negro elements in the Army. This whole subject has to deal with rather soon and it is a matter in which I feel the Secretary of War must become involved."

Four days later, on September 21, General Hodes in the office of the Chief of Staff sent the following memo to General Hodge of the Army Ground Forces: have issued orders for General Gillies to report to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, for temporary duty. . . . It is my understanding that when he arrives he will be given the mission mentioned by Mr. McCoy and Judge Patterson, and that he (General Gillies) will decide the method and the personnel required to determine the post-war employment of Negro elements in the Army . . . ."

In accordance with verbal instructions from the Secretary of War, Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., and two other General officers, Major General Lewis A. Picket and Brigadier General Winslow C. Morse, met on October 1. Their name was Gillies. The recorder for the Board, without vote, was Brigadier General Alm D. Varnum. On October 4 the Gillies Board received instructions from the office of the
Chief of Staff, approved by Secretary Patterson, directing the preparation of "a policy for the use of the authorized Negro manpower potential during the post-war period including the complete development of the means required to derive the maximum efficiency from the full authorized manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency."

III

The first sitting of the Gillen Board lasted from October 4 to November 17 when it submitted a report to the Assistant Secretary of War, the three commands and O-1 and O-3 for review and comment. On January 4, 1946, the Board was recommended to consider the criticisms of its report, and to re-examine its recommendations in the light of the suggestions of the reviewing agencies. Finally on February 20, 1946, the Board issued its final report and recommendations as approved by General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of War.

In the course of its study, lasting nearly four months, the Gillen Board received testimony from 69 military and civilian witnesses.
including two chiefs of staff; theater commanders; general staff officers; theater, army and corps commanders; general and staff officers of Negro divisions; special agents from G-1 and G-2; prominent Negro leaders; officers and civilians from both military and civilian life; and those who had worked closely with the Assistant Secretary of War McIlroy on the Special Troop Policies Committee. In addition to the testimony of these witnesses, the Board examined the various studies of Negro manpower made between wars; and it had before it the voluminous reports from the field in response to the questionnaire from the Special Planning Division, though there is little evidence that the Board made much use of these reports.

The Gillen Board report was thus based on the most extensive inquiry ever made by the Army into the utilization of Negro manpower and its recommendations, which were substantially adopted by the Army, represent the first comprehensive and considered policy ever framed by the War Department for the employment and treatment of Negro troops. On February 26, 1946, the War Department released to the press the report of the Gillen Board, together with its recommendations. This
release for publication as a measure in itself of the changing attitude of the Army towards the Negro soldier, for no previous policy had ever been published.

At the very outset of its report the Millem Board made plain that two considerations had directed the course of its inquiry and formed the motivation of its recommendations. These were:

1. The Constitutional right of the Negro to enjoy the privileges and share the responsibilities of citizenship.

2. The obligation of the Army to make the most effective use of every individual in the military structure.

The first consideration the Board regarded as a prima facie truth which required no defense or elaboration. The second consideration it regarded as a prima facie military necessity which, so far as Negro manpower was concerned, had been too long neglected in Army policy and practice.

Two of the primary lessons of World War II, the Board wrote, were the limits and variable quality of the military manpower potential of the nation. "The principle of economy of forces clearly indicates, therefore, 1. The final report of the Board appears as Appendix. The differences in the first and final reports are not substantial and will be noticed later in this chapter.

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that every effort must be expended to utilize efficiently every qualified available individual in a position in the military structure for which he is best suited. It follows logically that we must always strive for improvement in the quality of the whole. The Negro, forming approximately 10% of the nation's population, becomes no small part of the manpower reservoir available for use in time of peace or in the event of a National Emergency. Therefore, those officers in the military establishment charged with the responsibility of procuring, training, and assigning manpower have a legal and moral obligation under the Constitution to take all steps necessary to prepare this manpower for the most effective employment in the country's defense.

Reviewing the Army's experience with Negro troops during World War II, the Board found that (1) Negro combat units that were required to close with the enemy to accomplish a prescribed mission performed with less proficiency; (2) generally Negro infantry units suffered relatively light losses; (3) in certain instances small infantry composite units, Negro Platoons in white companies, when able led were eminently
successful even though relatively heavy casualties were suffered (4) Negro soldiers, if given the opportunity, will satisfactorily execute combat duties in supporting type units, such as artillery; (5) Negro service type units, even in direct support of combat units, often demonstrated a high degree of proficiency.

Although the Gillen Board concluded that the Negro soldier "definitely contributed to the success attained by our military forces," it did not attempt to hide the fact that the performance of Negro units was uneven and the utilization of Negro soldiers by the Army revealed the lack of adequate planning and good judgment. The Board did not attempt to assign the blame for this state of affairs. It merely set down the facts which were uncontroversial.

The Army, reported the Board, had "encountered considerable difficulty in the proper placement of the 909,000 Negroes who volunteered or were drafted. Admittedly, part of this difficulty was attributable to the educational disadvantages suffered by the majority of the Negro population, which in turn were reflected in the Negro's capacity for leadership."
On the other hand, the Board thought that many of the disadvantages under which Negro units labored were the result, not of the Negro's environment and lack of opportunity, but of inadequate staff work by the Army itself. For example, the Board pointed out, "Although it was definitely known that the Negro manpower would amount to approximately 10% of the manpower available for war, plans were not prepared prior to World War II for mobilization and employment of major units of all arms. This resulted in some instances in a disproportionate allocation of lower bracket personnel to combat elements." There were other failures in forward planning. No provisions were made for the use of Negroes in supporting type combat units, and such units were formed only after public pressure by Negroes. Because there had been no initial plans for Negro combat units, there was a constant reorganization, regrouping, and shifting from one type of training to another, with consequent confusion and loss of morale among Negro elements. Some units did not have definite Tables of Organization and Equipment, and consequently nobody seemed very sure for what mission such units were organized. The
cumulative effect of this confusion and improvisation, the Board felt, was to create in the Negro mind a doubt whether the Army and any definite intention of using Negro soldiers in combat; and this sense of bewilderment and doubt impaired the Negro's usefulness and may have been reflected in his "sub-standard performance in combat." Although the Army strove to compensate for the educational disadvantages of the Negro by the extension of training periods, careful briefing, and careful staging into combat areas, it could not, by these belated wartime precautions, completely offset the lack of planning between wars.

A repetition of this experience could be prevented, in the Board's opinion, by forward planning, and by the development of a broader base of trained personnel, both officer and enlisted, than that which existed prior to World War II. The Army should make a start on this forward planning by realizing the advances which had been made by the Negro during the war in education, industry and government service. Of particular importance to the Army was the vast range of trades and skills which had been opened to the Negro. "Many Negroes," the Board noted,
"who, before the war, were laborers, are now craftsmen, capable in
many instances of competing with white men on an equal basis . . . .

This increase in industrial experience is an important factor when
considering manpower from the standpoint of national defense. These
three factors of education, craftsmanship, and governmental participa-
tion have enhanced the military value of the Negro. A broader selectivity
is now available than was heretofore possible, with a resultant
beneficial effect on military efficiency."

Therefore, the Board concluded, "a progressive policy for greater
utilization of the Negro manpower should be formulated and implemented.
Now. The new policies should be "progressively flexible," "envisage
the continued mental and physical improvement of all citizens," "be
implemented promptly," "be objective in nature." And finally, "they
must eliminate, at the earliest practicable moment, any special
consideration based on race. They should point towards the immediate
objective of an evaluation of the Negro on the basis of individual
merit and ability."
IV

Such was the over-all policy recommendation of the Gillen Board. In its immediate objective of broader utilization of Negro manpower it was more practical, and its ultimate objective of eliminating all considerations of race it was more enlightened, than any previous racial policy of the War Department. However, of the 18 specific recommendations which the Board proposed to affect this over-all policy, only six represented a significant advance toward the achievement of the immediate goal. And of these six, only one took a step in the direction of integration. These six recommendations were:

1. "That ... qualified individuals be utilized in noncrucial special and overhead units ..." (Recommendation II of Initial report.)

An overhead unit is a housekeeping detail at an Army post or installation. Since Negroes employed in overhead would be used as individuals, this recommendation represents the first break, so far as duty detail is concerned, with the traditional segregation policy.

1. For complete list of recommendations in the final Gillen Board report, see Appendix C. The final list reflects revisions made in the light of suggestions by reviewing agencies. Differences between Initial and final recommendations, where significant, are discussed in the text.
Negroes integrated in their work in overseas units would continue, however, to eat and sleep in segregated messes and barracks.

3. "That Negro units organized or mobilized for the post-war Army consist in general in other units of the post-war Army." (Recommendation 8 in initial report.)

The intent of this recommendation was to open a wider variety of units, consequently a larger selection of military occupations, to Negroes. However, as originally worded, the recommendation was confusing since it seemed to authorize the formation of Negroes in units up to divisional strength. Military experience in two world wars had indicated conclusively that utilization of Negroes in divisional units was not justified by combat performance, and almost all writers on the subject had advocated the abandonment of this policy. Therefore, in the final recommendations, the following clause was appended to the above recommendation: "...but the maximum strength of any units should not exceed that of an infantry regiment or comparable organization." The prescription against the formation of Negro units above regimental strength was a definite advance in the direction of better military utilization.
3. "That a staff group of selected officers whose background has included command or staffs be formed as an integral part of the S-2 or S-3 division of the staffs of the War Department and each major command of the Army to assist in the planning, promulgation, implementation and revision of policies affecting all racial authorities." (Recommendation 4 of initial report.)

This recommendation parallels one made by Colonel Saunders in a memorandum to Mr. Holley prior to the formation of the Gillen Board.

In the final recommendations, on the suggestion of S-3, the S-1 division was designated as the proper staff division to appoint such special groups of officers to handle racial policies. However, S-1 objected to the formation of special groups to deal with racial problems, on the ground that "we must soon reach the point where our general staff must be able to cope with such problems without the formation of ad hoc committees or groups." This recommendation of the Board was not accepted by the Army, as there is today no special staff group in S-1, either in the Department of the Army or in the major commands, delegated to make policy on the utilization of Negro troops.

4. "That re-enlistment be limited to regular Army soldiers who meet only the minimum standards." (Recommendation 5 in Initial report.)

This recommendation stemmed from the conclusion of the Gillen Board that "the high re-enlistment rate of professional privates in
Negro units has in the past denied entry into the service to much potential officer and non-commisioned officer material. Economy and efficiency require that men of low intelligence and education who have proved incapable of developing into specialists or leaders be eliminated from the service at termination of the first enlistment. Any policy implemented should include all races.

This conclusion and the consequent recommendation of the Board must be considered in connection with the Army's policy of restricting Negro strength to 10% of the over-all strength of the service. When the Negro strength exceeds 10%, the Army halts Negro-enlistments. However, it is also Army policy to accept re-enlistments regardless of the mental qualifications of the soldier.

The practical effect of these two policies, i.e., for long periods, to deprive the Army of the services of many better qualified Negroes seeking enlistment and to burden the Army with low-score men who will never rise above the rank of private, and whose usefulness to the peacetime Army, whose principal function is to serve as a training cadre for wartime expansion, is very limited.
The Board had found "from the evidence presented by the most experienced commanders . . . that the results obtained by all units are in direct proportion to the leadership demonstrated. The failures of Negro units have in almost every case been attributed to the lack of leadership qualities of junior officers and non-commissioned officers. Leadership, therefore, must be stressed and the development of all attributes which contribute to this and must be the prime objective of those responsible for the training of the post-war Army. It was this objective which the Board sought in the above recommendation. The Army did not accept the recommendation.

5. "That surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel." (Recommendation 19 in initial report.)

This recommendation is complimentary to that above, proposing that Negroes be used in overheard units on an individual basis. Both recommendations originated in the Board's conviction that the educational and industrial progress made by the Negro during the war opened the way for a wider utilization of Negroes than ever before. The Board
declared that "there are many places in the framework of the overhead units at Army installations where Negro personnel with special skills can be utilized to advantage as individuals," and enjoined the Army to conduct "period surveys . . . to determine such positions." Only by opening such positions to Negroes, the Board wrote in a study attached to its report, could the Army foster leadership, reward endeavor, maintain morale, and inculcate the competitive spirit among the better qualified Negro enlisted men and non-commissioned officers. The forced competition with whites "on an individual basis of merit," the Board insisted, would not only make the Army career more attractive to the superior Negro, but would provide the Army with "many types of specialists needed as an asset for rapid expansion of Army units in time of emergency." If such a program were adopted, the Army would not lose much of its investment as it had between the two world wars.

6. "That experimental grouping of Negro units with white units in composite organizations be continued in the post-war Army." (Recommendation II in initial report.)
The key word in this recommendation is "experimental." In a tab attached to the original report, the Board wrote:

"Experience has shown that one of the outstanding weaknesses of the Negro soldier has been his lack of ability to successfully close with the enemy. Experiments during World War II indicate that many of the Negro units perform satisfactorily when grouped or operated with white combat units. Examples are tank battalions, tank destroyer battalion groups, artillery units, motor transport companies operating as service units, signal communications units, chemical warfare units, and the experimental platoons . . . .

"The generally satisfactory results obtained from experimental groupings of Negro and white units and the formation of composite units in World War II is believed to be a step forward in the right direction for more efficient utilization of Negro manpower . . . .

"It would appear feasible at this time to include in a white regiment a Negro service company or perhaps a heavy weapons company without encountering unsurmountable difficulties . . . .

"It is believed feasible to carry this experimentation to the larger units in maneuvers. The Board is of the opinion that satisfactory results can be obtained by assigning an extra battalion to an infantry regiment, an Air Force squadron to an Air Force group, an artillery battalion to an artillery group, a combat engineer battalion or pontoon companies to a combat group and the like . . . ."

It was the belief of the Board that "through composite units it may be possible to build up a professional relationship between white and Negro personnel during peace-time which will prove advantageous in expanding the Army for war." (Italics added.) The Board warned, however, that such experimentation must not be carried so far as to risk "the disruption of civilian racial relationships."
When the original Board report was circulated to reviewing agencies, G-1, G-3 and Army Ground Forces had no objection to this recommendation. Army Ground Forces, in fact, stated its opinion that "although Negroes and other enlisted men should not be mixed in the same company or detachment under present conditions, companies or battalions composed of Negro enlisted men should be employed alongside other units in regimental or higher formations." Army Air Forces, however, felt because of the basic characteristics of the AAF, that this may prove impractical . . . principally because a group operates as an integral unit rather than as three or four separate squadrons. Personnel and equipment are often interchanged and common messes are often utilized by personnel of more than one squadron." Army Service Forces thought practicable that while such experimental groupings might be practical in combat organizations, mixed units would not be practicable in the smaller units—companies and battalions—which the Service Forces were divided for operational purposes.

In the final recommendations the word "experimental" was deleted.
It should be noted, however, that the Army, since the adoption of the Gillen Board policies, has in fact conducted experiments in the grouping of Negro and white units. Although the Gillen policy authorizes the formation of Negro regiments, actually there remains only one Negro regiment—stationed in Japan—in being. Generally the largest Negro unit is currently the battalion or a white regiment assigned to it, however. Most of the Negro battalions are not assigned to white regiments, they are attached to them. It is not yet common practice to attach Negro companies to white battalions—though there are some instances of such grouping—and the Negro platoon in a white company is the exception.

V.

On November 17, the initial report of the Gillen Board was sent to the Chief of Staff for circulation to the reviewing agencies. These were the General Staff Divisions G-1 (Personnel and Administration) and

1. The grouping of Negro and white units in composite organizations will be treated more fully in the following two chapters.
G-3 (Organization and Training): the three commands — Army Ground, Air
and Service Forces; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Mr.
McClay.

Except for the Board's proposal to create a special staff
planning group on Negro policies, G-3 endorsed the Board's recomman-
dations as "sound" and "logical," though it "regretted that the
recommendations...are not more specific."

G-3 likewise concurred in the "principles and general policies"
emphasized by the Board, but wanted the Board to be more specific —

the kinds of units in which experience had proven the Negro to
be more efficient, since it thought "recognition must be made of the
inaptitude and limited capacity of the Negro soldier." G-3 approved
the formation of a special planning group, but suggested it be placed
in G-3, as the division responsible for personnel policies. G-3 also
recommended that emphasis be placed on procuring additional Negro
officers through an expansion of the ROTC program in Negro colleges.

It opposed an arbitrary percentage of Negro officers, parallel to the
10 per cent quota for enlisted Negro
Army Ground Forces approved "in general" the conclusions and recommendations of the Board, but proposed "that a policy be formulated at once on the future utilization of Negroes in all the armed forces of the United States," and that War Department policy should be based on this common policy and implemented in accordance with the approved conclusions of the Gillen Board. Army Ground Forces also asked that the War Department, in formulating its final policy of Negro troops, give consideration to those conclusions upon which the AGF had insisted as a result of the study undertaken in response to the questionnaire of the Special Planning Division.

Army Ground Forces had several suggestions and criticisms of the report, although it concurred in the Board's over-all statement of policy. AGF had no objection to surveys to determine positions in which Negroes might be employed, but it warned against "any attempt to dictate such employment" by the War Department as a "serious infringement on

1 See page _____ for the full list of these conclusions.
command responsibility. The ASF insisted that "determination of positions which can be filled by Negro personnel should be made at the command echelon," and suggested that the recommended special staff groups would "provide adequate War Department supervision."

As stated previously, the ASF also opposed, General Orders: Forces, any experimental grouping of white and Negro units. Its most strenuous opposition was reserved, however, for the Dillon Board's proposal to continue the War Department policies on the use of recreational facilities, and membership in officers' clubs and messes. The ASF commented:

For the present and the foreseeable future, special intermingling of Negroes and whites is not feasible. It is forbidden by law in some parts of the country and is not practiced by the great majority of the people in the remainder of the country. For example, intermarriage is forbidden by law in a number of states. To require citizens, while in the Army, to conform to a pattern of social behavior different from what they would otherwise follow would be detrimental to the morale of white soldiers and would tend to defeat the effort to increase the opportunities and effectiveness of Negro soldiers. It would be a mistake for the Army to attempt to lead the nation in such a reform as social intermingling of the races . . . . Solution of the problem will require a common sense approach in each individual case which appears to be amply provided for by the latitude in solution of local

1. These policies were described in Chapter . . .
problems to be granted commanders under recommendation B 14.

Finally ASF suggested that implementation of the Gillen Board's recommendations should be deferred "until there is not a likelihood of interference with achieving satisfactory solution of the major problems now confronting the War Department such as reorganization, the single department, and universal military training." Alone of all the reviewing agencies, ASF opposed publishing the recommendations of the Gillen Board, arguing that "such a course of action would serve to put tools in the hands of racial agitators to the possible embarrassment of the War Department."

The Army Air Forces, like ASF, opposed both the experimental grouping of white and Negro units and the joint use of officers' clubs, theaters, post exchanges and recreational facilities. All were opposed: "much loyalty where such is contrary to civil practice in that community."

1. Apparently the ASF had no objection to the integration in Army hospitals and Officer Training Schools.
Aside from these two specific criticisms, the AAF confined itself to general observations on the problem, the substance of which was that the Army should not be "the testing ground for problems in race relationships," and that "the difficulties of the colored problem will be with us as long as any extensive race prejudice exists in the United States." The real solution to the problem, the Air Force thought, "lies in the overall education on this subject and will undoubtedly take generations to accomplish. In the meantime, it is believed that the War Department should use great care to march in the van of popular opinion, by that it should never be ahead of popular opinion on this subject; otherwise it will put itself in a position of stimulating racial disorders rather than overcoming them."

1. It is interesting to contrast the views here expressed with the policies adopted three years later by the Air Force — policies which are currently being implemented, and apparently without stimulating racial disorders. These policies are dealt with at length in Chapter ___.
Recommending to consider the suggestions and criticisms of the three commands and the general staff divisions, the Gilmor Board stood firm on all of its original recommendations which it deemed essential to its objective of "maximum efficiency in the use of all authorized manpower." It refused to accede to the proposal of Army Service Forces that individual commanders be permitted to conduct the survey of positions in which Negroes could be employed in overhead installations. Such delegation of responsibility, the Board held, "hazards lack of uniformity and makes results doubtful."

The Board did not agree that AAF and AAF could not use smaller Negro units in white organizations, declaring that World War II experience proved conclusively not only that racial units could be so grouped, but that such groupings had achieved "the best results."

On the subject of the professional low-score private, the Board went further than in its original report and stated its opinion that in the post-war professional Regular Army, "enlisted personnel . . .
should be carefully screened to eliminate more than a normal percentage
falling into ADP classifications IV and V and with permissible
personnel falling into classification V, held to a minimum.9

The Board was especially inflexible in opposing the recommendation
of ASW and AAF that the Army take a backward step and re-establish the
color line in officers' messes and in enlisted men's recreational
facilities. It replied:

The Board, in considering a policy with respect to
recreational facilities, officers' clubs, messes and
similar social organizations, has carefully analyzed
the lessons derived from World War II. ... During the
period of this conflict, over 2,400,000 Negroes were
called through the medium of the Selective Service. A
maximum number of over 200,000 actually served under
the colors. This large segment of the population con-
tributed materially to the success obtained by our
military forces. ... The Negro enjoyed the privileges
of citizenship and, in turn, willingly paid the premium
by accepting service. In many instances, this payment
was assiated through the medium of the supreme sacrifice.
During the course of the war years, certain instructions
were found necessary and promulgated. Most important,
from a racial point of view, were Army Regulations 210-10,
dated 20 December 1942 and War Department Memorandum
600-41, dated 14 June 1942. In these regulations the
War Department announced a policy directed at lessening
and ameliorating racial discrimination. This policy has
been in effect over a period of years. With the non-con-
currence to the retention of the Board's Recommendation 18,
the Board cannot agree. It is the considered opinion
that the Board's recommendation should not be disapproved.
To do so would render the War Department's position
untenable. The Board, in its report, has visualized and
evaluated the progress made by the Negro race in all
lines of endeavor during the war years. If the provisions
of this recommendation are not approved, the effect on this
mover component will lessen its military value ... .
The Gillam Board had clearly seen that military efficiency required a broader utilization of Negro troops. Its recommendations for increased diversification of Negro units, for limiting Negro units to regimental strength, for surveys of positions in which Negroes could be employed, for denying re-enlistment to the low-score professional private—all these had pointed the way toward a wider and more effective utilization. Furthermore, the Board, by advocating the grouping of white and Negro units and the employment of individual Negroes in overhead installations, had made a beginning on the problem of segregation.

Nevertheless, the Board had apparently mistook these basic premises which had always underlain the Army's racial policy and practice; or, if it had questioned them, it had not clearly indicated its conclusions. Thus, the Board prefaced its conclusions and recommendations on the continuance—at least for a long time—of the segregated unit as a fundamental racial principle; and it
apparently did not inquire whether segregation, in and by itself, was
not a primary factor in the inefficiency and combat ineffectiveness
which, according to the reports of field commanders, had formed so
large a part of the record of Negro units, and which the Board had
set itself to correct. Likewise, the Board took for granted that
the Army would set a quota on its Negro strength proportionate to
the Negro civilian population, without asking whether such a quota
system did not, in effect, deprive the Army of the better qualified
Negroses who, the Board insisted, must form the training cadre of
the peace-time Regular Army. The failures of Negro combat units,
the Board agreed, could be largely attributed to the inferior
quality and poor leadership of their company-grade and non-commissioned
officers. Yet the Board seemingly did not perceive that segregated
units could not furnish the training competitive climate
which is
necessary to develop first-rate officer material, and that so long
as Negroes competed only against themselves for positions
in peacetime, the inferior Negro officer would be jealously feared,
or advertised, or advertised as
The inferior Negro officer benefitted by the limitations
of opportunity which segregation imposed.
While the military reviewers had confined their criticisms of the Gillee report largely to matters of organisation, training and assignment, it was to the basic premises that the civilians in the War Department secretariat directed their attention. The Board's analysis of the problem, these civilians felt, was excellent; but they were far from clear about the Board's thinking on the fundamental issues. Assistant Secretary McCoy, who had been instrumental in creating the Board, wrote to Secretary Patterson on November 24:

I do not want to leave without giving you my comments on the Gillee Board report on Negro manpower.

The members of the Board have performed a real service. Their report is a great advance over previous studies. It is objective and constructive and, unlike many earlier papers, realistically states the problem in terms of making the most efficient use of available manpower.

I agree with the objectives stated by the Board and particularly like the discussion of past policies and the statement at bottom of page 8 as to what future policies should be.
experiment and development is excellent. I hope it will represent the attitude of the Army on all matters in the post-war period.

I have two principal criticisms which I think I should bring to your attention.

In regard to the basic issues of segregation, I understand the main proposals to be as follows:

a. for officers, complete equality without regard to race, and abandonment of all forms of segregation.

b. for enlisted men, progressive experiments with mixed and segregated units looking to eventual assignment on the basis of ability alone.

On these fundamental issues, the report does not speak with the complete clarity that is necessary in this field. I do not think this is intentional, although I believe it results from a conscious avoidance of the word "segregation." The report correctly emphasizes the need for strict enforcement of policies, but our experience in this field has shown that we cannot get enforcement of policies that permit of any possibility of discrimination. If the report means that Negro officers are to command white officers and men, it should say so flatly. If it means that we are to try segregated units, as well as mixed units consisting of Negro and white detachments, it should say so. If, in either case, it does not mean those things, that should be put beyond doubt. There are a number of places in the report that require bluntness in this respect.

My second objection is to the reference to a quote for Negroes. This occurs in Part II (Recommendations) at page 15 in the phrases "within proportions corresponding to those in the civilian population" and "that the overall proportion not to exceed the ratio that existed in World War II."

In the first place, these two provisions are inconsistent, since the proportion of Negroes in the Army during the war did not equal the proportion in the civilian population. But the important objection is that these provisions are inconsistent with the basic premise of the report.
that we should make the most efficient use of available manpower. If some future battle of the Bulge creates a decisive need for replacements and only Negroes are available, we will surely not turn them down on the ground that we have a full quota. Even if the quota is intended as a floor, not a ceiling, it is still objectionable. It tends to lower standards, as we learned in this war. I do not see any place for a quota in a policy that looks to utilization of Negroes on the basis of ability.

Nevertheless these points, I think this is a fine achievement for the start of your administration of this field.

Judge Patterson sent Mr. McCloy's memorandum to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Staff, referring to the Gillen Board, with a note:

The attached comments by Mr. McCloy on the Gillen Board report should be considered by the Chief of Staff, along with the foregoing comments of G-1 and G-3.

Mr. McCloy, as you know, gave considerable attention to the matter of racial relations in the Army. His views are entitled to a great deal of weight.

The Board evidently was of the opinion that it had spoken "with the complete clarity that is necessary" on the issue of progressive experiments with segregated units of enlisted men, and the issue of abandonment of all forms of segregation for officers, since in its replies to the suggestions of the reviewing agencies, it made no reference whatever to the questions raised by Mr. McCloy. The
of the Board on these matters it can be only deduced from the fact that it did not object to the conditions laid down by the Operations Division (6-1) for its concurrence in the Gillen report. 

"That Negro enlisted personnel be assigned to Negro units.

That no Negro officer be given command of white troops."

And in reply to a comment by Army Ground Forces on the officering of Negro units, the Board said: "Negro units should eventually be commanded by Negro officers," and added, "No need exists for the assignment of Negro commanders to units composed of white troops."

The Board did, however, comment on Mr. McCoy's criticism of the inconsistent quota system as inconsistent with the basic objective of military efficiency. It said: "By unanimous opinion, the ratio of Negro to white troops should be the same as in the civilian population. This is necessary both for intelligent planning and for the need to establish a troop basis for implementation of policy. Why this exact ratio was necessary for "intelligent planning," the Board did not say, nor did it respond to his criticism that the quota system was incompatible with "a policy that admits to integration of the forces on the basis of ability."
Mr. Truman K. Gibson, the civilian aide to the Secretary of War, agreed with Mr. McCloy's reading of the Board's intent on segregation.

Moreover, he was confident in his own mind that the Board's intent and his interpretation were identical. He asked only that the Board word its intent in unequivocal language. Gibson wrote to Judge Patterson:

"I agree in general with the two criticisms that Mr. McCloy expressed relative to (a) the necessity for a clear statement on the basic issue of segregation and (b) the denial of the equal basis for determining the extent of the inclusion of Negroes in the Army in the future.

Mr. McCloy's statement supporting these two points of criticism was brief and requires elaboration. While the statement of the two main proposals of the Board is correct, they do not constitute the ultimate aim recommended by the Board. They are rather two methods that must be utilized in reaching them. The Board intended and so stated that Negro officers should be used freely and outside the limits of the restrictive policy of rigid segregation. As for enlisted men, the several references to mixed units show without question that the Board did not feel that the present policy of segregation should be continued.

The recommendations implementing these two proposals were not made to assuage the feelings of Negroes. They were not even intended to primarily benefit Negroes. They were included for the purpose of carrying out the actual objective which the Board set out, namely that of making the best possible utilization of a manpower potential that has been greatly abused by the Army in the past. In making use of this reservoir that contains 10% of the nation's population, the Board recommended that Negro enlisted men (a) be utilized in segregated "type" units, (b) be utilized in mixed units and, (c) be utilized as specialists on a basis of individual ability and capacity. Further it was recommended that Negro officers be utilized without regard to "ceiling and in the same" manner as other officers. The long range objective

1. Gibson here refers to Recommendation D of the original report — "that all officers of the under's class be accorded the same rights, privileges and opportunities for advancement." In the final report, the word "same" was changed to "equal."
proposed by the Board is that a policy be ultimately evolved that will permit the utilization of all personnel on the basis of individual ability alone. This means, of course, a completely integrated Army.

It is not urged that the ultimate objective be reached in one step. Instead a reasonable and practical approach is suggested within the limits of a policy that will not require the segregation of officers and enlisted personnel by race. The Board was at the outset confronted with alternative choices. The numbers could (a) have followed the present pattern of segregation, (b) could have jumped to the other extreme and required a policy of complete integration, or (c) could permit a progressive and planned integration with particular regard to making the best possible use of individual officers and soldiers of ability. The last named course was the one adopted. The Board did not suggest that Negro officers immediately and in large numbers be placed in field units in command of white troops and white officers. It did suggest a course that would permit the utilization of Judge Advocates and medical officers and other specialists in a manner not prohibited by Army policy. In arriving at its recommendation concerning the use of officers, the Board frankly faced the possibility that at a future time, Negro officers would command white officers and white troops. However, this situation is not one that will immediately confront the Army in the event the Gillen Board Report is accepted. That is one of the details that would be worked out by the staff group that is proposed. The possibility that Negro officers will command white officers and enlisted men at a future date should not operate to prevent the removal of restrictions that have prevented a proper utilization of Negroes in the past.

The view of the Board on the basic issue of segregation is not revolutionary. The objective of complete integration is discussed in future terms. The immediate procedures recommended by the Board are gradual in nature. Yet, the recommendation that the policy of segregation be abandoned is contrary to all of the thinking that has gone into the preparation of mobilization plans in the last twenty-five years. For years the Army has said "the policy of segregation has been found sound." The Board found this to be untrue. But, since so
many people believe that segregation is necessary—it is vital that any deviation from this policy be clearly and explicitly stated.

In view of the foregoing, I therefore respectfully urge:

1. That the report of the Gillen Board be accepted.

2. That a clear and explicit policy be prepared on the basis of the discussion, recommendations, and conclusions of the Gillen Board and that this policy be publicized as soon as possible. It should be particularly explicit on the basic issue of segregation in the following respects:

   (1) It should state unequivocally that the present Army policies requiring segregation are no longer binding.

   (2) It should state clearly that the eventual goal is the elimination of segregation.

   (3) It should state that any intermediate steps taken to achieve this goal should be defined as clearly as to permit of no misinterpretation.

3. That the staff group as recommended by the Gillen Board be organized and that the Civilian Aide to the Secretary be appointed to its membership.

Having considered all of the comments of the reviewing agencies, the Gillen Board on January 26 submitted a supplemental report containing conclusions and recommendations of which were slightly revised. On February 26, this final report was approved by the Chief of Staff, the Secretary, and the War Department, and on March 2, 1945, it was returned to the War Department. The report contains an appendix—a clearing statement of objectives.

This week a letter, dated April 5th, was submitted by the War Department apparently in response to the recommendations of the Civilian Secretary policy review of the previous to the Secretary's action, and an appendix was appended.

It is not evident in response to the recommendations of Assistant Secretary, and I believe, it is a clarifying.
Objective: The Board visualises at this time only two objectives:

The Initial Objective: The utilization of the proportionate ratio of the manpower made available to the military establishment during the peace period. The manpower potential to be organized and trained as indicated by present recommendations.

The Ultimate Objective: Effective use of all manpower made available to the military establishment in the event of a major mobilization at some unknown date against an undetermined aggressor. The manpower to be utilized in the event of another major war, in the Army without regard to antecedent or race.

When, and if such a contingency arises, the manpower of the nation should be utilized in the best interests of the national security.

The Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this time, intermediate objectives. Between the first and ultimate objectives, timely planning may be interjected and adjustments made in accordance with conditions which may obtain at this undetermined date.

The clarifying statement, then, appeared to say that Negroes, in a ratio corresponding to their civilian population, would be used for the present in segregated units; that in event of war they would be employed in integrated units if this met the best interests of national security. What steps should be taken toward integration? segregated, possible, present in preparation for integration in an unforeseen war, the Board was not prepared to say.

On September 12, 1940, the Schieffelin Board report was released to the
Following the publication of the Gillen Board report, G-1
(Personnel and Administration Division) prepared the draft of a
new directive on Negro manpower, translating the recommendations of
the Gillen Board into War Department policy, and circulated the draft
to the three commands for consent.

Detailed in this policy draft were the basic assumptions of the
Gillen Board, i.e., that Negroes would be generally employed in
"separate" units and that Negro strength would constitute 10 per cent
of the Army's total troop basis.

Of the six principal recommendations of the Gillen Board which
were discussed in detail earlier in this chapter, the draft directive
adopted four virtually without change. These were qualified
Negroes be used in appropriate overhend installations on an individual

1. The final form of this directive, War Department Circular 124, 1946,
is reproduced in Appendix __.

2. The word "separate" was deleted by War Department Circular 32, 1947,
though the policy of the segregated unit was unchanged.
basis; (2) that Negro units conform in general to white units; (3) that regular surveys be conducted of the positions which could be filled by Negro personnel; (4) that "groupings of Negro units with white units in composite organizations will be accepted policy."

Two of the Board's recommendations, however — the formation of a special staff group in G-1 to promulgate Negro troop policy and the denial of re-enlistment to the low-score professional private — were not effectively translated. G-1 decentralized the creation of a proposed working group but located it in the Welfare Branch — a relatively unimportant branch of the Personnel Division. The proposed policy of re-enlistment merely echoed the existing War Department regulations and in no way excluded the re-enlistment of the professional private. In the final draft of the new directive, the reference to re-enlistment was omitted altogether, and the responsibility for Negro troop policy was placed in the hands of the Assistant for Planning and Policy Coordination.

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

1. "Late", by War Department Circular 50, 1947, the Director of Personnel and Administration (G-1) was made responsible.
In an attempt to allocate total Negro manpower by type units, the draft directive proposed the following initial distribution:

- Infantry, cavalry, bomber, fighter and tank units: ~40%
- Artillery, air reconnaissance, troop carrier and combat engineer units: ~35%
- Medical, quartermaster, ordnance, aircraft maintenance, transportation, signal, chemical, finance, weather, other engineer and overhead units: ~25%

The Air Force objected to this distribution, and in the final directive no attempt was made to designate the division of Negro troops by type units.

For the most part the comments of the Ground and Service Forces on the draft directive were directed to phrasing; only the Air Force continued to protest upon the fundamental principles of the policy.

The Air Force wrote:

The principle that the Negro race should be given greater understanding and improved treatment is conceded by that the Negro race is a large potential source of manpower is undisputed. However, it is believed that the proposed approach to the utilization of this manpower is faulty. Never in history has an Army selected its man-
power on the basis of a proportionate share of the population, be that selection on the basis of color or creed. The basis for selection which has been used by all armies in peacetime is that of professional ability. Selection on any other basis would be wasteful and inefficient because artificial requirements would have to be established to absorb the individuals. These requirements could not be established on the basis of professional ability or intelligence. The organization of the post-war Army, like the organization of America's industrial organizations, should have efficiency as its goal. Racial minorities should neither be discriminated against nor pampered.

This statement of principle was unexceptionable. However, the implications of this principle were not carried over into the detailed criticisms which the Air Force made of the new policy directive.

Specifically, the Air Force found that it could not concur in the recommendations for the grouping of white and Negro units, the mixing of white and Negro personnel in the same unit, and the tentative allocation of Negroes to type units. On the other hand, the Air Force acted consistently with the principle of military efficiency in demanding the abolition of the quota system and opposing the proposed survey of positions which could be filled by Negroes on the ground that a qualified Negro should be permitted to fill any position.
On April 27, 1946, the new policy on the utilization of Negro manpower was finally promulgated as War Department Circular 124.

Concurrently, the old policy embodied in War Department letter of October 15, 1940, was rescinded. On the same day, Circular 124 was released to the press.

VIII

The limitations of the Gillen Board report are obvious. Although its mission was to prepare a policy and program for the most efficient utilization of the nation’s available manpower, it never radically questioned the validity of the Army’s traditional policy assumptions that Negro troops must be segregated, held to a quota and segregated. Nor questioned whether these preconceived principles operated against the morale and the effectiveness of Negro soldiers. Furthermore, although the Gillen Board was charged with the preparation of a "complete development of the means required" for securing the maximum efficient use of Negro manpower, it never examined thoroughly into
the rules, regulations and procedures of the various general staff
most effective employment of Negro
divisions which inhibited the responsibility

troops.

Nevertheless, the Gillen Board report marks a milestone in the
Army's Negro troop policy. As the very outset of its
Gillen Board pointed out to the Army the lesson which American
industry had written during the war and which the Army could
never again afford to ignore — that the Negro, given the opportunity
to learn, could perform tasks as varied and as skilled as those
performed by white men. As a result of this lesson, the Gillen Board
report is unmarred by the preconception which disfigured
almost every War Department study on the Negro between wars — that
the Negro is inherently inferior.

On May 8, 1946, the War Department dispatched to the three commands
the following letter:

SUBJECT: Utilization of Negro manpower in postwar Army

TO: Commanding Generals:
  * Army Ground Forces
  * Army Air Forces
  * Army Service Forces
1. The War Department has adopted a comprehensive policy with respect
to utilization of Negro manpower in the postwar Army, as announced in
WD Circular 124, 1945.

2. While implementation of this policy will necessarily be progressive
over a period of time, it is desired that it be initiated without delay.
In this connection particular attention is directed to paragraphs 2, 3,
8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the above mentioned circular.

3. Of special interest is the approved 'Report of Board of Officers
on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army,' reproduced
in Circular 124 in order that all officers and enlisted men, both white
and Negro, may be informed of the background which led to formulation
of the stated policy.

4. The War Department relies upon the whole-hearted acceptance and
support of this policy by commanders at all echelons. Upon their tact,
resourcefulness, and judgment will depend, in large measure, the
success of this policy.

MY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR

EDWARD F. MUSCELL
Major General
The Adjutant General
Chapter __

THE GILLEN POLICY APPLIED

I.

Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and Lt. Col. Davidson Bonner, in his assistant, had warned that, on the basis of past experience, the Army would enforce a new racial policy only if that policy supplied a clear directive for forward planning, and if this planning were made the responsibility of special staff officers of sufficient rank to make their views prevail.

Unfortunately the Gillem Board had refrained from indicating the intermediate steps which should be taken to achieve its ultimate objectives, and the Army refused to adopt the Board's recommendations for a staff group to direct planning. Instead, the Army added the implementation of WD Circular 124 to the other responsibilities of G-1, the General Staff Division for Personnel, which was soon to be renamed the Division of Personnel and Administration.

Fortunately, however, the Director of the Division of Personnel and Administration at this time was Major General William S. Paul, an
officer who was not only sympathetic to the idea of the idea of broadened opportunity

for Negroes but who was an expert in personnel management and was

aware of the inefficient use which the Army had made of its Negro manpower in the past. And in Colonel George H. Evans and Major Jerome F.

Lieblein, General Paul had junior officers with very precise ideas of

how, within the limitations imposed by segregation and the social

practices, the policies of the Gillman Board could be put into

practice. Whether the Army would accept these ideas was, of course,

in doubt.

The heart of the Gillman Board policy — as General Paul, Colonel

Evans and Major Lieblein knew — was the provision for gradual

expansion of Negro combat and service units until they approximated

the diversification of white units, and (2) the provision for sending

qualified Negroes in camp overhead, or housekeeping, installations

on an individual basis.

So long as Negroes were limited in assignment to relatively few

virtually

type units, and so long as Negroes were excluded from some of the
Therefore, if the Army were to make full use of potential Negro skills, new type units must be opened to Negro enlistment. Unless the Army

But in as much as the Negro strength was set at ten per cent of Army

there was, despite the promise of the Gillen Board policy, a limit

number to the variety of Negro units which could be trained, quite apart

from the fact that there would be difficulty in finding sufficient

Negroes with all the skills required by a wide variety of tactical

units. It was just here that the overhead unit was designed to play

qualified

its part, offering an opportunity to the individual Negro

whose skill was not needed in a Negro unit and not wanted in a white

unit.

Obviously this double-barreled program of creating new Negro

units and opening up overhead employment could not be affected all

at once or without planning. The number of combat and service units

is limited by Army appropriations. If new Negro units were to

be organized, some white units would have to be converted. Before
additional Negro units could be activated, the Negro element in the Army
would have to be screened in order to determine how many Negroes had
the necessary skill and training required by these units, and how
many Negroes had the potential skills which could be trained in Army
School courses. In the same way, there would have to be a survey of
the jobs in overhead installations to determine what positions could
be immediately filled by trained Negroes already within the Army and
what jobs could be progressively opened up as Negroes received further
school training. And the whole program, of course, would come to nothing
unless all the technical and administrative services, which traditionally
had not used Negroes or had used them only in menial capacities,
abandoned their racial policy and agreed to use the school-trained
Negroes in their newly acquired occupational specialties.

The implementation of the Miles Board policy would necessarily
and be slow, but six months after the promulgation of Circular 334, the
Division of Personnel and Administration decided it was time to make
a start.
On November 16, 1946, the Division of Personnel and Administration, in a memorandum to the Director of Organization and Training Division (formerly G-3), the commanding generals of Army Ground and Air Forces, and the chiefs of Ordnance and Chemical Corps, declared that "experience in the utilization of Negro military manpower indicates little, if any, constructive progress toward the development of this category of personnel to the point where their employment may be considered effective or economical." Therefore, A Division proposed that "a controlled utilization program" be undertaken immediately, involving a broader use of Negroes both in units and as individuals in overhead installations.

With respect to use of Negroes in overhead, described that "fully qualified Negro personnel will be assigned to duty in overhead installations in numbers not less than a ratio of one to ten," and that "this personnel will displace white personnel in equal numbers except that waiver will be permitted for a period..."
necessary to provide on-the-job training or, in case the Negro
is fully qualified, on-the-job orientation."

The assignment of Negroes to overhead would be "accomplished
at all posts, camps and installations where there is a substantial
Negro population, and at other overhead installations requiring
performance in high type skills for which qualified Negro individuals
may be available or trainable in the Army area." Furthermore,
directed that "where fully trained personnel are not available for
assignment to overhead positions, individuals who are mentally
qualified and whose aptitudes indicate that they may be readily trained
for such assignment will be assigned to appropriate schools for
training and, upon successful completion of which, assigned to
designated overhead positions." Then listed 66 Military
Occupational Specialties required in most overhead installations
which were to be used in duty assignments of qualified Negroes. Many
positions were signal, medical
of these disarmament discrimination or finance MOS from which
Negroes had been previously excluded.
In addition to this program of overhead utilization, also proposed that selected Table of Organization units, both combat and service, be designated as Negro experimental units. The units to be so designated were:

1. In the Army Ground Forces one Field Artillery Motorized 155 mm Howitzer; one Infantry Battalion; and one Tank Company.

2. In the Chemical Corps one Chemical Mortar Company.

3. In the Ordnance one Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company.

These Negro units were to experimental only with respect to the controlled selection and distribution of abilities and skills; the controlled selection and assignment of officers and training cadre; the endeavor to maintain high morale and to develop the learning ability of the enlisted personnel.

Monthly reports were to be made on these units as they progressed through their training, and at the end of six months the units were to be measured against corresponding white units. From this experiment
Alleged to get "factual indication of the extent and scope of the possible assignment fields in which Negroes of varying amount of learning ability may be profitably employed and the minimal limitations under which their training or assignment could be considered ineffective."

It is instructive to note the response of the addressees to this plan. The Army Ground Forces approved in principle but wished the program postponed for six months, Army Air Forces objected to the whole program on the grounds that "not only selection, but career development should be based upon consideration of the qualifications of personnel as individuals without artificially applied factors of discrimination either for or against an individual because of his race."

It is felt that in the case of Negro personnel, special consideration in station assignment only should be given on the basis of social acceptability in the civilian community, but that forcing or retarding the military development of personnel on the basis of color is debilitating and detrimental to the organization as a whole." In the opinion of the Air Force, the experience gained from such experimental...
units would be invalid because comparison would be made between Negroes and Negro units that had been accorded "the utmost in special consideration regarding selection and training" and "white individuals and units that are the product of routine procedures."

The Division of Organization and Training opposed the program on the grounds that repeated studies had been made in the past, and that the bottleneck of Negro utilization was not primarily one of training but "the application of sound common sense and leadership by local commanders." In particular, O and objected to the overhead assignment of Negroes in a ratio of one to ten, and suggested that the use of Negroes in overhead be left to local commanders so as not to "jeopardize the good discipline and effectiveness of troop units."

The Chief of Ordnance and Chief of Chemical Corps both concurred in the plan but said that, inasmuch as they did not have the Negroes available for the designated units, the required personnel would have to be authorized if the units were to be organized.
Because of the opposition of Army Ground Forces and the Division

The director of Plans A Division, of Organization and Training, General Paul, decided to postpone that

part of the plan calling for the creation of experimental Negro units

and to concentrate on broader utilization of Negroes in overhead

positions.

Thereupon, the Division of Personnel and Administration prepared

a new plan, limited to the expansion of overhead positions for


Rodes, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, on January 10, 1947.

To begin with, P and A Division drew up a list of 119 Military

Occupational Specialties which were most commonly needed in overhead

installations. The main concentration of these MOS was signal, ordnance,

transportation, medical and finance MOS, since these departments had

always been the most most inflexible in their exclusion of Negroes,

especially in skilled jobs.

Upon the basis of this list of MOS, the plan called for a survey of

overhead in those MOS

as recommended by the commanding generals of the AAP, the AGF, the Armies
in the Zone of Interior and Overseas, and the Chief of Technical and
Administrative Services. This survey was to determine:

1. The number of MOS from the list of 113 to which Negroes
   might be assigned.

2. The number of Negroes who could be used in each such MOS.

3. The number of Negroes, in II and Overseas commands, already
   qualified by school training in the listed MOS and available
   for immediate assignment to overhead positions.

4. The number of Negroes in II commands only qualified for
   school training in the listed MOS.

Upon receipt of these reports from commanders, the War Department
would then:

1. Direct commanders to assign to overhead immediately those
   Negroes already qualified by school training.

2. Direct that all specialist schools be available for Negroes.

3. Increase the school quotas for Negroes, both in the courses
   open to recruits upon completion of basic training and in
   the courses for enlisted men already assigned to units.

Negroes who were detached from their units and sent to school would,
upon completion of their courses, be returned to their units and assigned.
to overhead. Negroes from the replacement stream—that is, recruits who had completed basic training—would, upon completion of school courses, be earmarked for overhead utilization when they were assigned to units.

The Negroes thus assigned to overhead would be interspersed on the job with whites performing the same duties. However, for billets and mess they were to be formed into separate detachments or attached to already existing Negro detachments. The whites who would be displaced under this plan would be retained long enough to give the Negroes on-the-job instruction and then be reassigned.

General Hodde, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, immediately objected to this plan on the grounds that (1) the timing was bad, since continuing demobilization necessitated frequent adjustments in overhead installations; (2) during the training period for Negroes, there would have to be two men for every position to be filled by a Negro; (3) the directive was too detailed and centralized power in Washington.
Replying to these objections by Hodes, General Paul stated that

1. Since the flow of manpower was now to domestic rather than overseas installations, the small shift of men contemplated under the program would cause no dislocation and would provide II commanders with trained men to run their parts. (2) School training inevitably required the temporary absence of men from their units, and since commanders were always complaining about the lack of trained Negro manpower, they undoubtedly be willing to put up with temporary inconvenience in order to have their men school-trained; (3) the Gilles Board policy had been in effect for nine months with no material implementation by field commanders, and "if any results are to be accomplished a specific directive must be issued." In conclusion, General Paul reminded General Hodes that WD Circular 154 changed the Personnel and Administration Division with the implementation of the Gilles policy, and that policy expressly directed the use of Negroes in overhead.

General Hodes still refused to approve the directive prepared by P and A Division, and insisted that no plan be set in motion until a survey was taken in all commands to find out whether commanders were
complying with WD Circular 124. On February 4, 1947, therefore, General
Nokes directed General Paul to notify all commanders that the Secretary
of War was "concerned over certain indicated failures to implement the
provisions of War Department Circular 124, 1946, especially that part
which pertains to the utilization of Negro personnel in overhead
installations." All commanders were directed to report to the Adjutant
General by April 15th:

1. Action taken to effect greater utilization of Negro
   personnel at overhead installations.
2. Action taken to implement other provisions of the Circular.
3. Plans for further implementation of the provisions of the
   Circular during the year 1947.
4. Measures in effect to provide school training to Negro
   personnel for particular jobs in overhead installations.
5. Recommendations for the further implementation of WD
   Circular 124, which should be effected by the War Department.

These orders were dispatched on March 5 to all commanders in the
Si and Overseas and to the Chiefs of Technical and Administrative
Services. In the letter to commanders the Adjutant General directed
that their reports "should itemize all NAS's of major importance involving
Negro personnel" in the overhead installations.
The results of this survey are revealing. Actually, the total of Negroes employed in overhead was larger than might have been expected.

Of a total of 104,355 men in overhead in all commands, 13,928 were 1. Negroes, or 13.38 per cent.

Compliance with Circular 126 on overhead utilization of Negroes varied widely from command to command. For example, in the European Command, 5,186 Negroes were employed in overhead out of a total of 11,460, or 45.5 per cent. In the Mediterranean Theater, on the other hand, only four Negroes were used in overhead out of a total of 2,756.

At Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming, 480 Negroes of a total of 688 were used in overhead — 71 per cent. The Corps of Engineers, however, employed only 22 Negroes out of 1,058 men in overhead — 2.1 per cent.

The total figures on utilization of Negroes in overhead do not, however, tell the whole story. These totals were arrived through the

1. These totals do not include General McArthur's command, which submitted no figures on overhead. The Far East Command reported it would assign Negroes to overhead "at such time as positions requiring special skills become vacant in overhead units and Negro personnel qualified to fill such positions are available and can be spared from their present assignments. At the present time the services of Negroes possessing special skills are required in the Negro T&L units now activated. Effective 1 July 45 it is planned to incorporate about 490 Negroes in the bulk overhead units in Japan. These Negroes will be utilized along with whites (about 1,700) in logistical operations."
concentration of Negroes in such overhead positions as cook, baker, truck driver, general clerk and duty soldier (unskilled laborer).

For example, of the 879 Negroes in the overhead of the Third Army, 897 were employed as cook, military policeman, duty ECO, duty soldier and truck driver.

In the overhead of the same Third Army, however, there were 29 white finance clerks and no Negroes; 27 white motion picture projectionists and no Negroes; 476 white writers and no Negroes. Throughout all commands the use of Negroes in overhead in signal, ordnance, transportation, medical and finance NOS was minimal.

In fact, some commands and some departments flatly refused to use Negroes in overhead positions, notwithstanding Army policy as expressed in WD Circular 124. For example, the Office of the Chief of Finance said, "It is considered impractical to have negro overhead assigned to these [field] activities and none are utilized." The Alaska Department said it would be inconsistent with the "best utilization" of personnel to detach Negroes from NOS units and assign them to overhead. The Mediterranean Theater stated that "the project of assigning
Negro enlisted men to duty in overhead installations in this theater
has been handicapped by the shortage of skilled technicians and competent
non-commissioned officers in Negro units. The Chief of Transportation
reported that "continuous progressive action is being exerted to
screen qualified Negro personnel to encourage them to attend various
schools to develop fully their capabilities," but admitted that
that almost all railway MOS were closed to Negroes. The Army Medical
Center in Washington stated candidly that "other than through extensive recruiting procedures, no
action has been taken to implement the provision of WD Circular
194, 1946, for the "sic" Area Service Unit." The Signal Corps reported
that "personnel allotments to operating units have been revised to in-
clude a quota of Negro personnel and requisitions placed for the
required MOS's," but did not specify what the required MOS were, nor
date that virtually all skilled MOS in the Signal Corps were
closed to Negroes. The Ordnance Department declared that "all technical
courses at the Ordnance School are open to qualified Negro personnel
possessing the necessary prerequisites to such instruction" — a state-
In reporting on the measures taken to provide school training to Negroes in preparation for jobs in overhead installations, the commanding generals, almost without exception, stated that Negroes were granted equal opportunity with whites to attend Army schools. "Specialist school attendance is available to the Negro soldiers as well as to whites," wrote the commander of the Second Army. The commander of the Third Army said, "No differentiation between Negro and white personnel is made in overall plans to provide specialist training for particular jobs in overhead installations; likewise attendance at Service schools is impartial." The Commander of the Fourth Army declared that "all Negro personnel will be given equal opportunity for specialist training in available courses."

Undoubtedly these commanders believed they were expressing a fact, and were probably unaware that the situation with respect to school training for Negroes was precisely the opposite from what they reported it to be.

Actually more than half of all Army Schools had no quotas for Negro soldiers, and were thus effectively closed to Negroes regardless of their qualifications.

The whole subject of Army Schools will be treated at length in the next chapter.
Some indication of the importance which commanders in the field attached to WD Circular 124 may be gained from a perusal of the "plans" and "recommendations" which they submitted for further implementation of the Gillem Board policy. Although a few commanders asked for an increase in school quotas for Negro enlisted men, the vast majority reported that they were complying with the Gillem policy and had no plans or recommendations for further implementation. The Alaskan Department suggested that a team of officers be sent to the field to instruct commanders how to implement WD Circular 124; another commander proposed the establishment of a central school for training Negroes in certain skills including leadership; a third general recommended orientation programs for Negroes "to inculc[he] in them the realization that their opportunities in the Army are equal to those of other races." Officers proposed training as cooks, clerk-typists, fiscal clerks and medical technicians; a study of NRE in which Negroes may be best utilised; a course for white officers in the command of Negro troops. The most constructive suggestion was made by the European Command—that Negroes assigned to overseas command should have the same ASCT (Intelligence) spread as white personnel.
In the end, nothing came of the survey which General Nokes had
ordered, and the plan developed by General Paul for wider utilization of
Negroes in overhead was shelved.

V

In the spring of 1947 the Personnel and Administration Division was
engaged in drawing up plans for a revolutionary change in the Army's
system of personnel management for enlisted men. What the P and A Division
had in mind was the division of Army jobs into career fields -- infantry,
artillery, mechanized cavalry, food service, etc. -- and the designation within
career fields of job ladders by which the enlisted man could progress,
through a series of school courses and examinations, from rung to rung
in his specialty. The object of this so-called Career Guidance Program
would be to discovery the maximum potential
of each individual and to the needs of the individual soldier, the most
egalitarian system of promotion.

The Personnel and Administration Division was concerned how the
Negro enlisted man would be fitted into this program so that the Negro
would enjoy the benefits of the program and the army could get the most
Because there was not the same diversity of Negro units as white and therefore not the same spread of jobs, Negroes had clustered in a relatively small number of MOS. This meant that Negro soldiers would not have as many career fields open to them. Furthermore, many school courses were a prerequisite of OGT 90 for admission, and since 70% of Negro personnel were below OGT 90 as compared to 20% white below OGT 90, many Negroes currently in the Army would have difficulty progressing up the career ladders.

In June, 1947, F and A Division requested the Adjutant General to send Mr. Roy Davenport, a personnel expert, into the field to make a study of the utilization of Negroes and to submit a report on how the Career Guidance Program might affect the Negro soldier.

Davenport submitted his report in the following August. Among his principal findings were the following:

1. There were heavy concentrations of Negroes in certain MOS and types of duty, which would effectively bar the full participation of Negroes in the career program since it is presumes that experience qualifications will be mandatory for advancement.
3. School quotas for Negroes were limited to relatively few courses, only 26 out of 87 entry courses being open to Negroes. In the courses open to Negroes, quotas were often inadequate. As a result, some qualified Negroes were denied the opportunity for schooling, and many Negroes were sent to schools for which they were not best qualified.

4. There was considerable evidence of mal-assignment of Negroes.

Davenport's recommendations were:

1. All Army School courses be open regardless of race, and larger quotas/for Negroes. This was necessary if the Army were to have the necessary specialists in Negro T/O units, and if Negro representation in overhead were to be balanced in accordance with WD Circular 224.
2. In order that Negroes might benefit by the Career Guidance Program, selective recruiting of Negroes should be continued. A report of AGCT distribution of all personnel, both white and Negro, would provide a basis for determining the number of Negro personnel to be recruited in order to remove the GCT differential between white and Negro troops. Active recruitment should be directed at Negro high schools to secure recruits in higher GCT categories.

3. Standards for school courses should not be set higher than warranted by the content of the courses and work for which the student is being prepared.

4. The use of Negroes should be broadened in order to open more career ladders to them.

VI

Upon receiving Davenport's report, the Personnel and Administration Division agreed that his findings on mal-utilization of Negro troops and non-observance of the Gillem policy were accurate.

It also agreed that his recommendations were sound. But with all the good will in the world to correct this situation, the P and A Division was caught in a vicious circle, and knew it.
Davenport had recommended that the Army broaden the list of occupational specialties open to Negroes; make all school courses available to qualified men regardless of race; increase the Negro quotas for such courses; and specially procure Negro recruits of higher mental caliber to insure that there would be Negroes capable of absorbing school training and making their way up the career ladders.

But how, asked Personnel and Administration, would one increase the jobs open to Negroes unless new Negro units were formed or white units converted to Negro, so that the jobs actually exist for Negroes? How school quotas to be increased for Negroes unless the actual jobs were there to justify the school training? "Negro school quotas cannot be increased," P and A wrote to the Adjutant General, "until requirements justify this training. Increased requirements cannot appear until utilization of Negroes is currently broadened in a greater number of fields." Army Ground Forces and the Division of Organization and Training, the staff division responsible for the creation of units — had already refused concurrence in P and A's plan for additional Negro units. General
Hodes had stalled the plan for a general increase in Negroes in
overhead. Clearly a new approach was needed. Major Liebling in P and
A Division and Mr. Davenport in the Adjutant General's office went to
work.

The new "plan of attack" which evolved was three-pronged.

First, there should be a study, field by field and area by area, of as
many Army jobs in order to determine what positions could be
already trained, and what positions could be
filled by Negroes.

Filled only after an intensive program of training. When this were
known, then the problem of Negro utilization should be attacked
piece-meal, one career field after another.

Secondly, the P and A Division would ask the Division of Organ-
isation and Training to convert some white units to Negro, in order
that there would be requirements to justify the training.

Finally, P and A would undertake a special procurement to supply
the necessary men for the converted units.

To conduct the preliminary studies on which this concerted
program was to be based, P and A Division suggested that the Adjutant
General assign a qualified Negro officer to the Personnel
Research and Procedures Branch within his office. It would be the duty
of this Negro officer to provide the P and A Division "with appropriate
studies, area by area, field by field" of which the Adjutant General
recommended "specific measures to be immediately taken to broaden
Negro utilization." These recommendations would detail specifically
the implementing steps to be taken on such matters as increasing
particular school Negro quotas, properly selecting Negro students, and
properly assigning the trained Negro personnel upon completion of
schooling."

This was the most ambitious and far-reaching plan which had
yet been proposed, and though its approach was gradual, it gave
promise of solid accomplishment, both in expanded opportunities
for Negroes and in more efficient utilization of manpower by the
Army. General Pershing immediately endorsed the plan and in a lengthy
message to Mr. James C. Evans, Acting Civilian Aide to the Secretary of
the Army, he explained the program in some detail —
You have referred (General Paul wrote) . . . . to the three
inter-related problems inherent in expanding Negro utiliza-
tion-placing, training (including school training), and
specialized procurement. An advance in any one of these
areas without a corresponding advance in the others will not
produce satisfactory overall results. We must first chart
out the areas of expanded placement before we can plan on
an increase in school quotas for school training or before
we can justifiably embark on any specialized procurement
program to produce Negro enlisted men capable of absorbing
more technical school training and performing more
technical duties . . . . You will recognize that, while
any plan must address itself to these three problems,
the first and most important question is the expansion of the
overhead skills and the types of units in which Negro personal
will be placed . . . .

I am convinced . . . . that the problem of further implementa-
tion to WD Cir 124, as far as utilization is concerned, has now
reached a stage where our efforts must be concentrated on
increasing utilization in specific areas until in each such
area adequate Negro utilization has been obtained under the
policies of WD Cir 124. It is at this juncture all the more
important to tackling this problem of expanding Negro utiliza-
tion specifically area by area as our career guidance program
emerges into its final organization of military jobs into
fixed career fields and job progression ladders within these
fields.

As the career guidance program developed on the planning
boards, I was also concerned with ensuring that sufficient
consideration was given to the problem of Negro utilization
in this program. With this in mind I requested Major Davis
of this Division and Mr. Davenport, Personnel Research Branch,
IN, to survey the situation and after a country-wide inspection
trip, to give us their recommendations on this subject. Their
report crystallized the thinking of this Division on the
necessity for specific fields of field implementation of
WD Cir 124 and for the closest coordination of this piece-meal
implementation with the career guidance program. It also
convinced me that in order to secure these specific implementa-
tion advances field by field, it would be necessary to rely
upon studies in each individual field on the problem of
Negro utilization in both overhead installations and WD
units.
With regard to utilisation in overhead installations, it is contemplated that, field by field, the studies referred to above will match the jobs within each field presently held by Negroes against the total numbers of personnel performing these jobs. Based upon this analysis these studies will then indicate the specific jobs in which Negro personnel must be introduced or their present use expanded. The studies must then provide the specific procurements, school training, and assignment plans to accomplish the introduction or expansion of properly selected and school-trained Negroes into the jobs within the field under study to the extent warranted by DD Cir 158 and under the policies of that directive.

With regard to the expansion of Negro utilisation within T/1/OE units, studies will also be made comparing the units on the present and those on the future mobilisation troop basis in which Negro utilisation is indicated. These studies will also match the units in which Negroes are presently assigned against those in which they have not as yet obtained assignment. These studies will make further reference to the level of skills required in these units in which Negro personnel are not yet utilised and to obtaining an appropriate spread of combat units in which Negroes have not yet been introduced. These studies will thus earmark the types of units in which Negro personnel must be immediately introduced or in which their utilisation must be expanded to secure for future mobilisation appropriate Negro utilisation in units with higher skill levels and with a greater combat spread. When the T/1/OE unit program for Negro utilisation has been thus developed, this Division is prepared to urge upon Organisation and Training Division the necessary conversion of appropriate T/1/OE units to Negro utilisation on the present and future mobilisation troop basis. This Division will at the same time undertake the necessary specialised procurement to staff such converted units with competent personnel.
General was not willing to delay action on the new program, however, until studies had been completed. Concurrently with his approval of the plan prepared by Major Liebich, he persuaded the Organization and Training Division, as a kind of trial run for the new program, to convert 19 units from white to Negro personnel. Seven of these units were combat, five were combat support, and seven were service. The designated units were:

### I. White divisional units to be designated as Negro units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Battalions &amp; Companies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82d Airborne Division</td>
<td>360th AAB Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>920th Field Artillery Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Armored Division</td>
<td>14th Field Artillery Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Infantry Division</td>
<td>5th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12th Field Artillery Battalion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### II. White non-divisional units to be designated as Negro units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>288 Ordnance Evacuation Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520 Engineer Pontoon Bridge Troopway Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78 Engineer Construction Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239 Engineer Pontoon Bridge Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>588 Engineer Troopway Bridge Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420 Medical Evacuation Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Field Artillery Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102 Quartermaster Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>428 Amphibious Tractor Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230 Quartermaster Salvage Collecting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Tank Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>661 Tank Ambulance Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>804 Motor Transport Service Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To man these converted units, the P and A Division in late December, 1947, launched a three-month special procurement drive for 6,318 Negroes, over and above the normal monthly procurement of Negroes. Eligible for enlistment in these converted units were men with prior military service who had completed high school or had been awarded the Bronze Star, Army Commendation Medal, or decoration for valor and could attain a score of 19 or higher on the standard Army test; and all others who could attain a score of 17 or better on the same test. Physical standards varied with the units, the highest being for service with the parachute infantry.

The conversion of these 19 units did not greatly expand the range of military occupational specialties open to Negroes, since Negroes had already been serving in several units. The conversion did, however, increase the number of combat and combat support units to which Negroes could be assigned, and thereby increased the total of skilled NCE available to Negroes and offered correspondingly new opportunities for school training.

Seizing the opportunity which was offered by the conversion of units to request larger school quotas for Negroes, the P and A Division decided to try to recover some of the ground lost when General Bedell had rejected its plan for wider employment of Negroes in overseas. Thereupon, P and A
Division directed the Adjutant General's office to:

1. Break out the school-trained MDS found in the listing of T/O units recently converted from white to Negro, and recommend such increases in school quotas for each school-trained MDS as were necessary to insure that the skilled positions in the converted units were filled.

2. Examine the world-wide army strength report to determine in what school-trained MDS the Negro element of authorized strength, and recommend increases in quotas to meet deficiencies which could not be met by existing school quotas.

3. Submit immediate recommendations for increase in Negro quotas for the following school-trained MDS: calligrapher, central office technician, installer-remover, automatic telephone system, teletype mechanic, dental laboratory technician, medical equipment maintenance technician, x-ray technician, medical laboratory technician, pharmacy technician, and medical personnel.

It should be noted that most of the MDS listed in (3) above are signal and medical MDS. General Paul insisted also that a directive making mandatory be sent to all major commands, the use of the Negro personnel that was to be trained as a result of the increase in school quotas.

The officer assigned by the Adjutant General to recommend the additional school quotas for Negroes requested by P & A Division, was Major James D. Fowler, a Negro best known with an excellent war record.
Major Fowler had been selected as the Negro officer to conduct the

studies upon the basis of which the P and A Division was to implement

its field by field program of increased Negro utilization. That was his

first job under the new assignment.

As a result of the break-out of school-trained NOS found in the 19

newly converted units, Major Fowler recommended that of the 6,318 men

who were to be specially procured, 3,134 should be trained in 37 courses

of instruction. This would necessitate an increase of Negro spaces in these
courses -- or a weekly increase in attendance of 47.

As a result of his examination of the world-wide strength report
to determine the increase in school quotas required to meet deficiencies,

Major Fowler recommended an increase of 172 spaces, or an increase
weekly of 77.

After examining the so-called tables of distribution for over 200

installations, Major Fowler recommended that school quotas for

the 11 NOS listed in (5) above be increased by 39, or a weekly increase of

of 18. Prior to Fowler's recommendation, there had been no quota at all

for Negroes in these 11 NOS.
The increases recommended by Major Fowler were carried out. As a result of this three-fold program to increase Negro school quotas, Negro attendance in Army courses jumped from five to 33.7 per cent of the total enrollment; and the number of Army courses open to Negroes rose from 30% to 95% of all Army courses.

VIII

The conversion of 29 units from white to Negro in December, 1947; the special procurement of 6,000 Negroes to man these units in the summer of 1948; the increases in Negro school quotas during the same period — these accomplishments mark the high point in the Army’s implementation of the Gillen Board policy. In fact, they represent the only really significant advances which the Army made toward the Gillen Board objective of maximum efficient utilization of Negro manpower.

However, the three-pronged attack which had planned by General Paul, Major Lieblitch and Mr. Davenport was never carried through. The field by field studies were not been completed. No more units were converted from white to Negro, and an
a consequence the spread of combat units and the range of military occupations were never expanded as had been planned. No further requests were made for increases in school quotas. Those increases recommended by Major Fowler were short-lived in effect because as soon as the requirements of the converted units had been met, Negro school quotas were reduced to a level sufficient to meet the standing replacement needs of Negro units. The F and A Division had informed Major Fowler that, following the submission of recommendations for school increases in the fields of military police, signal and medical, he would be asked to make further studies "with a view to increasing other school quotas based upon the conversion of OBE positions from white to Negro." But these studies were never requested, and further increases in school quotas for Negroes for overhead positions were never asked for.

The blame for this failure to carry out the plan of the F and A Division under General Paul must be shared. The historical

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1. By March, 1943, the Negro school spaces had declined to 85 out of a total of 162, or 5.2% as contrasted to the 13.7% following Fowler's recommendations. The number of replacement stream courses open to Negroes had dropped from 40% of all courses offered to 15.6%.
records section reveal no consistent enthusiasm for, and very often
active opposition to, any positive measures for implementing the policies
of the Gillen Board. This is particularly true of the Army Ground Forces
and the General Staff Division of Organization and Training. Nevertheless, a
measure of the responsibility for the failure to carry through on the
field by field approach proposed by P and A Division must be borne by 72.
Major Fowler. Even if it is conceded that he did not get very active
support and encouragement, the fact remains that he had a clear, detailed
and broad directive to make the necessary studies on which were to hinge
future recommendations to the P and A Division. Major Fowler did not make
these studies. His only completed study was of the distribution of NCS
among Negro troops, and his only positive recommendation was for a 10
per cent Negro representation in every NCS. This was obviously impractical
because, in many of the most technical NCS, qualified Negroes were not
available in a ratio of 10 per cent.
So far this chapter has dealt only with the principal recommendations of the Gillen Board regarding the employment of Negro type units, occupational specialties and overhead employment. What of some of the other recommendations?

1. The Gillen Board recommended and the Secretary of War stated that "surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department will include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro personnel." No such recommendations have been made.

2. The Gillen Board recommended that reenlistment be limited to Regular Army soldiers who meet only the minimal standards. The Army did not accept this recommendation, but it has taken steps in this direction.

In the Army's own ranks, the Army advised commanders that they could discharge all men with a GCT score of 18 and below who had proven themselves "unfit" for military training or who...
2. With the objective of eliminating the "professional private," the Gilleen Board had recommended that "re-enlistment be denied to Regular Army soldiers who meet only the minimum standards." The Army did not accept this recommendation. Nevertheless, in the past three years it has taken measures -- intermittently and for limited periods -- to eliminate personnel that lowered standards.

In April, 1946, concurrently with the adoption of the Gilleen policy, the Army refused to re-enlist men with a mental score below 60 GCT 70. The only exceptions were men who had been decorated for valor and prior service personnel with a GCT of 65 who were recommended for re-enlistment by their commanders.

In August, 1946, the Army decided not only to shut off the enlistment of low-score men, but also to screen out of the service those who had proven themselves incapable of absorbing further military training. This order permitted command, under authority of Army Regulation 615-39 defining "ineptness," to eliminate those men with a minimum of six months service, who are incapable of serving in the
Army in a desirable manner after reasonable attempts have been made to utilize their capabilities. . . . Such personnel are normally individuals who lack the mental qualifications necessary to become suitable soldiers (generally personnel whose AQT score is below 70) or those who, because of repeated commission of minor offenses requiring disciplinary action, cannot be economically utilized.

It is difficult to estimate with any certainty just how many men were eliminated from the service as a result of this order, but the European Command reported that it expected to dispose of 15,000 low score and unsuitable men out of its total complement of 43,000 by the application of AR 615-39. Several commands reported that this order materially improved the quality of their Negro elements by opening up vacancies to better qualified Negroes.

In April, 1947, the Army renewed the above order with some modifications. Commanders were permitted to separate men after three months service under the provisions of AR 615-39, but they were no longer required to eliminate men solely on the basis of low mental score, and were required to base separations on inability
to absorb profitably further training and repeated disciplinary instructions.

This order was rescinded in October, 1948, and no further action in this

September, direction was taken until 1949, when the Army announced that
By September, 1945, the Army announced that reenlistment would not
be granted to men who at the completion of their first enlistment had not
made the rank of corporal, if married, or private first class, if single.

Two other steps which the Army has taken, affecting the quality of
Negro troops only, was the special procurement of 6,000 men for the
converted units in the first three months of 1945, and the selective
recruitment from October, 1946, through July, 1947, when the enlistment
standard for Negroes was set at 50, while remaining at 40 for whites. Though
this latter device was discriminatory, it did have the effect of raising
somewhat the intelligence level of the Negro enlistees and reducing the
differential in IQ spread between white and Negro personnel.

3. The Gillen Board had recommended a special staff group in Washington
and in the various commands to handle the planning and implementation of
Negro policy. The failure of the General Staff to accept this recommendation
was undoubtedly responsible in part for the limited success of the Gillen Board
policy. Although four officers of the rank of major or colonel worked
gave this task only what
hard at plans to implement the Gillen policy, they
time they could spare from their other duties, and none of them had

enough authority to give real weight to their views. If the Negro soldier
had been regarded as an individual in the Army, there would be no need for a
special staff group to formulate Negro policy. But so long as the Army
was divided into white and Negro elements, the Negro’s welfare required
the full time attention of a staff group of sympathetic, highly placed
officers.

4. The Gillen Board recommended and the Army agreed that Negro units
should exceed regimental size. This policy has been adhered to. There is
the common pattern now in the Negro
previously but one Negro regiment, and
battalion assigned, or more usually attached,
white battalions, and it is the exception to find a Negro platoon in a white
company.

The declared policy of the Army is for ‘groupings of Negro units
with white units in composite organizations.’ The Gillen Board said, further,
that ‘experiments and other experiences of World War II indicate clearly
that the most successful employment of Negro units occurred when they
were employed as units closely associated with white units on similar tasks, and a greater degree of success was obtained when small Negro organizations were so employed."

It was not entirely clear whether William Board intended the statement quoted above to mean that the Negro units should become progressively part of the stubborn resistance in charge which those who would reform had tried to maintain. Astute commanders of units in this area, who had been assigned to white units and were close to the black units, believed that Board intended to declare a "clear-cut" policy. The Negro units were to be part of the "company" policy. The incident is a clear example of the tension and competition that existed between black and white units.

On April 29, 1914, Assistant Secretary of War Howard Petersen proposed that Negro units in the division be organized into large, white units. He suggested that the division of Negro and white units be "company" policy. The formation of mixed units in the Negro units would suggest the "clear-cut" policy. These large units or Negro units into white companies, a combination which is not in accordance with the policy, as expressed in Circular 115."
In May, 1947, CCR Circular 35, <i>par. 23</i>, General Eisenhower deleted the sentence: "Employment will be in Negro regiments or groups, separate battalions or squadrons, and separate companies, troops or batteries."

The deletion of the word "separate" would mean that Negro units could be assigned as organic parts of larger white organizations, rather than merely attached to them.

Organization and Training Division protested vehemently. Because, argued O and T, the WD Circular said that "a proportionate number of Negro units will be organized as part of larger units," this plainly "not the plain meaning of the statement."

"It was understood the ST divisionary ST should be not separately attached, and that they should be attached to white units." Furthermore, O and T added, "our implementation of the Negro problem has not progressed to the degree where we can accept this step, we have already progressed beyond that which is acceptable in many states and we still have a considerable latitude in the present policy without further liberalizing it from the Negro viewpoint."
Army Ground Forces were equally

This headquarters feels that the separate Negro units should retain their identity. When used they should be used to replace similar units of a white outfit and be integrated in that manner rather than lose their identity by becoming an organic part of a mixed regiment or battalion. Removal of the word 'separate' ... would permit the indiscriminate organization of small Negro units within larger T/O units. It is believed that this would be contrary to the spirit of the Gillem Board Report and the present regulations. Such organization might be detrimental to the solution of the Negro manpower problem."

General Eisenhower ordered "separate" deleted.

X

The limited progress which the Army has made in Negro utilization since the adoption of the Gillem policy is not attributable solely
to lack of effort or the absence of good will. The unreasonable 
To that 
the objective of the Gillen Board policy was unsustainable within the framework 
in which it was forced to operate. The objective of the Gillen Board was 
to secure the maximum efficient utilization of manpower. The 
framework in which this objective was to be sought was — except 
overhead assignments — rigid segregation of the races.

The Gillen Board declared that the Negro enlisted man must be used in 
assignments only on a basis of selection. Negro enlistees must be assigned to units according to their abilities and without 
regard to race, which means that eventually the Negro units must be dissolved.

The Gillen Board adopted the first alternative. But obviously it is 
impossible to have the same spread of combat and service units formed from 
the 30 per cent Negro element as is formed from the 90 per cent white.

There is a very definite limit to the number of white units which can be 
converted to Negro. — with the best will in the world. That limit is
set by military appropriations, by the 10 per cent Negro strength of the Army, and the availability of skilled Negroes to fill the range of positions required in the tables of organization. And if there is a limit to the number of Negro units which can be formed, there is correspondingly a limit to the kinds of jobs and the opportunities for schooling available.

Recognizing this inequality, the Army sought to temper the injustice, while retaining segregation, by increasing the number of Negroes in overhead. While this was commendable in itself, it did not open the full range of MOS to Negroes, and it did not meet the injunction of the Gilder Board that Negroes must be trained and used indiscriminately.

Possible range of contact was in order to assume an essential part-time training center which could become the basis for expansion in units of equal opportunity. Setting aside preconceived equality of treatment and opportunity, the Negro is entitled as an American citizen, and taking the narrow and pragmatic view of military efficiency, the Army will not get the maximum use out of its Negro soldier until he is trained and assigned according to his ability, until he is allowed to exploit his talents in free competition with whites and permitted to reach his natural level in an unsegregated Army.
Although the Gillen Board set as its ultimate objective, in event of major war, the utilization of all manpower without regard to race, the Army has seriously contemplated the integration of whites and Negroes in the same unit.

In the fall of 1942, Secretary of the Army Royall proposed to the General Staff the creation of an experimental unit of at least the size of a regimental combat team, with an engineer battalion and the station complement of a post large enough to accommodate these troops.

It was Royall's idea that Negro enlisted men should form 20 per cent of the troop list and that they should be used in all types of positions. Negro officers should be used in the same ratio as their numbers in the service, and, of course, should be in command of the mixed troops. There would be volunteers for this experiment, but individuals assigned to the units could request reassignment if they objected to serving under integrated conditions.
This experiment was contingent, however, upon the Navy and the Air Force conducting parallel experiments. Royall suggested that the Navy experiment should include a carrier, or a cruiser, plus a division of small craft and one shore station "where the social problems of individuals and families would have to be solved." For the Air Force he proposed at least a group of combatant aircraft, including both bombers and fighters, and the requisite air base facilities. As in the Army experiment, Negroes would form 10 per cent of the contingents.

The object of this experiment, Royall wrote to Secretary of Defense Forrestal, was to provide a study of --

"(a) The Command Factor. That is, the efficiency of mixed units of all types under both white and Negro commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

"(b) The social problems involved, particularly with reference to the common use of living and recreational facilities by individuals and families of both races.

"(c) Individual achievement by both Negroes and whites in mixed units.

"(d) Morale and disciplinary factors.

"(e) Unit spirit."
The General Staff did not view this experiment favorably, insisting that "it did not prove anything on the subject." Secretary Royall did not agree with his staff, however, and General Bradley thereupon ordered that plans should be drawn up for the experiment, the General Staff finally decided that the designated unit should be a regiment of the Third Division, due to be activated early in February, 1944, at Camp Gage, Kentucky. In addition to the 10 per cent Negro enlisted personnel, there were to be 10 Negro officers, but none above the rank of major. At the end of a year, the regimental commander was to submit a report.

Although plans were laid for the orientation of officers in this unit and March 1, 1944, as the date for the commencement of unit operation, the experiment was finally abandoned. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force would agree to conduct comparable experiments, nor did they see any reason why they should. The Navy had, however, operation for three years a policy of complete integration -- on the job, in messes and sleeping quarters -- general service ratings. And the Air Force was about to launch its own program for dissolving the majority of its segregated units.
On July 26, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981, in which he declared it to be the policy of the President "that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin."

By the same executive order the President created a committee of seven members within the National Military Establishment to be known as the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, and empowered that committee "to examine into the rules, procedures and practices of the armed services in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order."
The new policy on equality of treatment and opportunity, the President ordered, was to be "put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale."

The President's Committee was named on September 15, and held its first meeting on January 11, 1945.

From the outset the members of the Committee were agreed that the results of their inquiry were likely to be slim if they merely pointed out inequalities and attempted to exercise them by appeals to religious, moral and political principles. The religious, moral and political case against inequality of treatment had been stated over and over again. What was needed now was to show, not what inequality of treatment and opportunity did to these who suffered from it, but what it did to the armed services that suffered and practised this inequality.

The armed services did not pretend that inequality was morally justifiable. They defended it on the grounds of expediency and military efficiency. What the Committee had to determine was whether inequality of treatment and opportunity actually
the personnel practices and procedures of the services, not only to discover
which of those practices and procedures made for unequal treatment and
opportunity, but to determine the extent of those unequal practices upon
utilization of service by Negroes.

The Army's

II

The Committee began its inquiry by delving into the historical
records of Negro utilization. The record revealed conclusively that
Army had written the record—whatever reasons could be adduced in
support of the Army's Negro policies and practices, efficient utilization
was not among them. High Army witnesses testifying before the
Committee though they continued to advocate the policies of the past,
agreed that in the past those policies had not produced satisfactory results.
The creation of the Gilles Board to reexamine those policies was
sufficient evidence that the Army itself was not satisfied with the
results it had obtained from

Gilles Board report and the supporting studies on which it based its

Recommendations:

1. The Committee in its hearings has viewed Negro units as
   service units and judged experience of the units on that
   basis; whereas, it should consider experience in terms of
   personnel opportunity.
The Committee found the analysis of the Gillee Board sound enough.

As far as it went, but seemed merely to show that the heart of the issue was the question of whether it was economically sound from the Negro manpower standpoint. It was evident that the Army had made the best use of its potential.

The range of skilled jobs performed by Negroes in defense industry during the war, but the Gillee Board, while recommending that Negroes be used in the same spread of jobs as whites, never considered how that was to be achieved without breaking the pattern of segregation.

Nor did it ever come to grips with the question of whether segregation itself did not, by its very nature, affect the morale of the Negro soldier and thereby lower his efficiency, regardless of the level of skill in which he was employed.

But matters might have been considered in view of the Board's recommendation of the goals, namely, the ultimate objective of Negroes in overhead -- by which concrete steps except for use of Negroes in overhead -- by which the goal was to be attained.
The deficiencies of the Gillen Board's recommendations became immediately apparent when the Committee dug into the record -- dealt with in the preceding chapter -- of the Army's implementation of AD Circular 124. Qualified Negroes were denied school training because they were excluded from a whole range of military jobs. They were excluded from these military jobs because the tables of organization of Negro units did not require these positions. And so the Army allowed actual Negro skills to wither and failed to develop potential skills.

There are two kinds of Army School courses. First, there are those courses for men who are detached from their regular units to receive further training in their assigned skill. Upon completion of training, these men are returned back to their regular units. Secondly, there are the school courses for recruits who have just finished their basic training or prior service men who have reenlisted.
It is difficult to get a racial breakdown of students who are detached for
schooling because allotments are made to major commanders who sublot their
quotes to posts within their command. The local commanders make the selection
for schools according to their needs within their commands, and it would
be necessary to check up on every post, camp and station to determine the
racial breakdown.

However, the quotas and the training divisions for students are determined in Washington, and are broken down into white and
Negro quotas. The school input quotas published March 21, 1949, listed 106 courses available to whites.

Only 21 of these courses -- or .1976% -- were available to Negroes. The spaces for whites
in these 106 courses were 99.79; the spaces allotted Negroes were 22 -- or 4.4 per cent.

That is, Negroes were excluded from approximately 96 per cent of Army School
courses. (See reproduction of school input chart on opposite page.)

Although the figures are not available, the same situation obtains
with respect to the courses for detached service students, since commanders
recommend school spaces only to meet the needs of their units. As the Negro
units do not have the same spread of MOS, their educational allotments were
limited.
It is difficult to get a racial breakdown of students who are detached for
schooling because allotments are made to major commanders who sublet their
quotas to posts within their command. The local commanders make the selection
of those within their allotment. The result is that there are some schools that
are underutilized, and it would be necessary to check up on every post, camp,
and station to determine the racial breakdown.

However, the quotas are the training divisions for replacement training
students are determined in Washington, and are broken down into white and
Negro quotas. The school input quoted published March 21, 1949, listed 106
courses available to whites. Only 21 of these
were Negro quotas. The listed spaces for whites
in these 106 were 171; the spaces allotted Negroes were 62 -- or 44 per cent.
That is, Negroes were excluded from approximately 80 per cent of Army school
courses. (See reproduction of school input chart on opposite page.)

Although the figures are not available, the same situation obtains
with respect to the courses for detached service students, since commanders
recommend school spaces only to meet the needs of their units. As the Negro
units do not have the same spread of Negroes, they do not require an
equivalent
not require the same range of school training, and therefore the men
are not eligible for attendance at the majority of courses.

officers at several installations visited by the Committee, the officers
insisted the Committee was mistaken,
asserting that Negroes
had the same opportunity to attend all courses as did whites. When it was
pointed out that Negroes could barely attend courses if there were no Negro
quotas, the officers replied that, of course, the Army did not train men
unless there were vacancies to be filled; and if there were no vacancies
in Negro units, obviously there were no Negro quotas. But, they
maintained, there was no discrimination involved, since whites also were
subject to the same conditions. There was no discrimination mean.

in limiting Negro school courses
and personnel,
due to the replacement needs of the Negro units, the Army was
Negro equality of treatment and opportunity, however, civilian personnel
advised by the Personnel and Administration Division, who testified
before the Committee, were quite aware of the discrimination practiced
by the Army in setting its school quotas.
2. **Military Occupational Specialties**

As of August, 1949, the Army had 590 active** in 196 of these

MOS, there were no Negro authorizations at all. This is a pity a fair

comparison, however, since many of these MOS had white authorizations

In 196 of these there were

of only two, three or four men. Among the 144 MOS in which

there were authorizations for 10 or more whites and no authorization for Negroes,

there were 245 MOS in which there was authorization for 10 or more

whites and authorization for 10 or less Negroes.

In 91 MOS there was authorization for 10 or less Negroes but

an authorization for 100 or more whites.

There were only two MOS in which there was a greater authorization

for Negroes than whites. These were munitions handler and decontaminating

equipment operator.

What makes this situation remarkable is the fact in

a great many of the MOS for which there were Negro authorization, the

Army was seriously under its white strength. A glance at the Army
strength report for February, 1949 (which is out of date and does not

In those days military security involved giving some idea of the cost to

the Army was itself to develop the Negro potentialities of its

Negro citizens. For example, in that month the Army was asked—here is

the table for that month in 10 MOS:

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Perhaps a single Negro case history will serve to dramatize

better than any page of statistics how the Army's racial policy

deprievs the qualified Negro of equal opportunity and deprives the

service of needed military skills.

James Mason, Negro — the name is fictional, the case is from

Army records — was a youth interested in radio who hopes to
find in an Army career the opportunity to follow his ambition. On June 27, 1947, Mason went to an Army recruiting station and was told that if he enlisted for three years he could choose the branch of service in which he wished to serve. Mason asked whether he would be sent to the Signal Corps School at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey and particularly whether, since he had been studying radio since 1942, he would get the opportunity to take the course in Radio Repairman Fixed Station. He was assured that, if qualified, he could take that course. Mason enlisted.

In July Mason reported to Fort Dix for basic training, upon the completion of which he was assigned to the field unit to help train new recruits. There he remained for a year, when he was transferred to Fort Riley, Kansas, where he was assigned to an Army Service Unit, performing menial duties. On September 16, 1948, after 16 months in the Army, during which he had progressed one step toward Fort Monmouth and one step toward Fort Monmouth and the radio course, Pvt. Mason wrote to the Chief Signal Officer in Washington, D.C. enclosing:

[Signature]
Maj. Gen. Spencer B. Atkin
Chief Signal Officer
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I am writing you in request for some information. I am a Negro. I enlisted for three years of service from 1947. I was told that if I enlisted for three years, I could choose the branch of service that I wanted to serve in. Well, I enlisted in the Signal Corps. Every time I try to go to Radio Repair School, I am turned down. I have been studying since 1946, and I am still studying, but still I can't get the branch of service that I enlisted for.

Sure, it is on my record that I am a Signal Corps man, but that is not helping me to get where I can do my part.

Now that you know why I am writing you, can you please tell me how I can go about getting into the Radio Repair School at Fort Monmouth, N.J.

As you know, such as this will turn men against the Army. If the Army is going to lie to the men that are now coming in, I can't blame them for not trying to advance. The quota of Negroes is not filled. Can't be, because there are some Negroes returning from Monmouth.

I was going to reenlist, but I am not now, because I cannot get the school that I was promised. If I get that, I might stay in, but as long as the Army lies to me about Signal School, that makes me hate that I ever agreed to serve my country, and it makes me want to get out.

Since I am only an enlisted man, you probably won't answer my letter, but PLEASE do, and tell me how I can get my branch of service. . . .
he directed the Adjutant General—to provide there are no military
objections and Private Hessen has the necessary prerequisites—to
issue orders transferring him to the Signal School, Fort Hamenouth.
By 15 September Hessen had special orders to report at Hamenouth, and
on October 28, Hessen received at Hamenouth a letter from the office of
the Chief Signal Officer:

Dear Private Hessen:

Your letter of 15 September 1948 addressed to the
Chief Signal Officer was by his direction made the basis
of administrative action which has resulted in your
present assignment to the Signal School for a course of
instruction in radio subjects.

With this attainment of your objective it is
hoped that your morale will greatly improve and that you
will apply yourself diligently to the course of study to
which you have been assigned.

The Chief Signal Officer has directed me to convey
to you his earnest hope that you will successfully conclude
your course of instruction and that on your future
assignments, you will reflect the value of new military
training and acquired technical knowledge.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Major E. H. Bolinger

U.S. Signal Corps

22nd Infantry Regiment

Chief Signal Officers Division
However, Pvt. Mason had not obtained his objective. His objective was school training for MOS 649, Radio Repairman Fixed Station. There was no Negro quota for this course. There was a quota only for MOS 649, Radio Repairman. Nevertheless, Mason diligently applied himself to the course he could get into; and on December 23, he wrote to the Chief Signal Officer, thanking him for getting the transfer, and concluding: "I like my new assignment and I only hope that you will be as pleased with my work as I am in doing it."

Mason did well in his studies, and as he approached the end of course 649, he hoped that he would be allowed to pursue course 649. He was informed, however, that 649, which had been closed to Negroes since October 1, 1946, still had no Negro quota. He thereupon wrote again to the office of the Chief Signal Officer on March 21, 1949, saying:

'I am presently pursuing the 648 Course and have received excellent marks through the course and have rated as a superior student. I have also enrolled in a correspondence course at my own expense and am studying diligently to become a qualified technician with large broadcasting equipment.'
At the time I enlisted the 649 Course was available to men and I met the necessary initial qualifications and had been promised enrollment in this course. I have no personal objection to the fact that Fort Eif officials used me as cadre for training other students, but the time I lost on this training job when I should have been enrolled in the 649 Course is now operating to defeat my enrollment in the 649 Course. I believe it is unfair that I should have lost the opportunity of pursuing the 649 Course solely because of the fact that I apparently possessed the type of caliber required for training recruits.

I feel that under the circumstances an exception should be made in my case and a quota provided which will allow me to be enrolled in the 649 Course upon my completion of the 649 Course in the near future.

28 March, 1949

Private
Company F, Signal Training Regiment
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

Dear Private ________:

Major Holmgren has been transferred to another station and your letter of 21 March 1949 has been referred to me for reply.

At the present time there are no colored Signal units in which your services could be utilized as an NCC 649. Therefore, no quotas are allotted for colored enlisted men in a pipeline status to pursue this course.
Upon completion of your present course of instruction, you will be assigned to a unit as MOS 649. If, at that time, the unit to which you are assigned can effectively utilize your services as an MOS 649, you can be sent to school for further training on a detached service basis.

It is regrettable that situations such as these occur, but since you have attained part of your objective in receiving radio repair training, it is hoped that you will continue to pursue your course with great diligence and that you will always perform your duties to the best of your ability.

No opening in a Negro unit, therefore no MOS, therefore no school training. There is the vicious circle which segregation perpetuates. While it continues, the use of manpower by the Army is inefficient. There is no way to break this circle except with the opening wedge of integration.

The most ironic comment on Private Mason's bitter experience is that of the man who said, "I have an 80 average for elements of radio and one of my white friends had 78 and got the 649 Course. . . . My skin is brown, true, but as a citizen of the United States, and a member of the U. S. Army, I think I am entitled"
to any training I am qualified for."

There seemed to be no answer to that.

V.

What the Army records in the Pentagon disclosed about utilization was amply confirmed by
Committee and by reports submitted by commanders in response to Committee
questionnaires. There is no room here to set down in full the data on overhead utilization for two
supplied by these reports. Figures on overhead utilization for two large Army posts may well serve to illustrate the committee's findings.

In the 2324th Army Service Unit, forming the
...
Armored Division at Knox, there were 1200 whites and only 26 Negroes, or 2\% per cent of the total. At Fort Meade, on the other hand, there 199 Negroes in the overhead complement and 616 whites, or 24 per cent Negroes. But at both Knox and Meade, the same pattern reappeared as had been disclosed in the survey taken in 1947, that is, Negroes in overhead tended to be concentrated in a relatively few MOS, and there was a whole range of MOS without any Negro representation at all.

For example, in the 2128th ASD unit at Knox, cooks, food service apprentices, MP's, firemen, duty soldiers (laborers), firefighters and truck drivers accounted for 109 Negro positions out of the total of 164. There were no Negroes in ordnance, finance, signal, four sections; only 20 Negroes serving with Signal — a lineman, electrician and duty soldier; only one Negro with Transportation as truck driver. In the 3rd Armored Division almost all the Negro overhead were bandmen and clerk typists. For example, of 1177 bandmen, 1124 were Negroes.
The Committee did not confine its attention to the questions of job distribution, schooling, and assignment. It also began to look into the 10 per cent quota limitation put upon Negro strength.

In the meantime, the Army defended the 10 per cent racial quota system on the ground that it reflected approximately the ratio of Negroes in the civilian population. This rationalization was hardly acceptable, since, as the Committee pointed out to Army representatives, no quota system was ever applied to any other race, creed, color or national denomination.

The Army could make a much better case on the grounds of military efficiency, because it is undeniable true that a far larger percentage of Negroes fall into the lower AGT categories than do whites. But unfortunately the Army's defense of the racial quota on the grounds of efficiency ran foul of the Army's re-enlistment policy.

When the racial quota became the Army shuns original enlistments of Negroes until the Negro element again falls below
10 percent. But while the Army refuses original Negro enlistments, it
continues to re-enlist Negroes—even if their GAT score is below the
original enlistment standard for first enlistments. Thus, there
develops the anomalous situation that the Army refuses to enlist a
Negro, while the quota is filled, even if he has a GAT of 240, but
will continue to re-enlist a Negro with a GAT of 70, and sometimes
bellow—90. This hardly contributes to military efficiency, as General
Gillen pointed out in 1945.

The Army shut off Negro enlistments beginning in April, 1949,
then until mid-November. From May through September
and did not resume Negro enlistments until September 1949.

365 Negroes were taken into the Army—evidently through errors of
recruiting stations, since they had no Negro quotas. During that same
period the Army re-enlisted 3,448 Negroes, of whom 41 per cent
had a GAT score below 80—the original enlistment standard during those
months.

Here, then, were the areas of unequal opportunity and discrimination—
jobs, schooling, assignment and quota. These were also precisely the
areas where the Army failed to make maximum efficient use of its
military manpower. The argument of efficiency, the Committee could
plainly not accept in justification of the Army's racial policy and practice.

It was not sufficient, however, to discover and point out where the areas of inequality and inefficiency lay. The Committee must go further, as it had been explained by the President to the President-elect and as it had been required by the President's Executive Order. Indicate what procedures should be adopted to eliminate inequality and unequal treatment and opportunity.

VII

On April 6, 1969, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson sent to the three service secretaries a memorandum in which he declared that "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin" was the policy of the National Military Establishment. (1)

In order to achieve "uniform application" of this general policy, Secretary Johnson mandated supplemental policies to guide the services. These were that (1) "All personnel will be considered on the basis of individual merit and ability and must qualify according to the basis of individual merit and ability and must qualify according to the"
prescribed standards for enlistment, attendance at schools, promotion, assignment to specific duties, etc.; (2) "all individuals, regardless of race, will be accorded equal opportunity for appointment, advancement, professional improvement, promotion and retention in their respective components of the National Military Establishment"; (3) while "some units may continue to be manned with Negro personnel," it was not required that all Negroes would necessarily be assigned to Negro units," and "qualified Negro personnel shall be assigned to fill any type of position vacancy in organizations or overhead installations without regard to race."

Secretary Johnson directed each service "to examine its present practices and determine what forward steps can and should be made in the light of this policy and in view of Executive Order 9981." The services were ordered to report not later than Sept. 1949, stating their detailed implementation of the above policy, and submit to such supplemental policies "as may be determined by each Service to meet its own specific needs."
On April 31, Secretary Royall replied to the April 6 memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. With respect to Secretary Johnson's general policy statement, the Department of the Army has reviewed its practices and procedures and is of the opinion that they are sound in the light of actual experience, and are in accord with the policies of the National Military Establishment and with Executive Order 9981.

With respect to the supplemental policies advocated by the Secretary of Defense, the Army replied:

1. "Under Department of the Army policy all personnel are considered on the basis of individual merit and ability. Common standards for enlistment, promotion, attendance at schools, assignment to specific duties, etc., are prescribed."

2. "... Negro officer and enlisted personnel are given equal opportunity for advancement and professional improvement through attendance at schools."

3. "Some units are and will continue to be manned with Negro personnel. All Negroes are not now assigned to Negro units. Qualified Negroes are assigned to fill any type of position vacancy in organizations (from company to regiment) and in overhead installations."

The Secretary of the Army concluded by saying that the Department of the Army policy affords adequate flexibility in the utilization of Negro manpower without supplement at this time."
The Army's description of its policies and practices did not accurately reflect the situation as recorded in the Army's files.

And as observed in Army installations and by May 11, the Secretary of Defense made a reply, in which he noted:

"The lack of any response to the request made in my memorandum of 5 April that you prepare and submit by 1 May a detailed plan for such additional forward steps as can and should be made."

Secretary Johnson continued:

I have looked into the matter of equality of treatment and opportunity for individuals serving in the Department of the Army. I am pleased to note that the progress made by the Army in this field over the past few years has been praiseworthy. I feel, however, that much remains to be done and that the rate of progress toward the objectives of the Executive Order must be accelerated.

With that in mind, please re-examine the current situation in your Department and submit to me by 20 May specific additional actions which you now propose to take.

VIII

At this juncture the Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board, an organization of the defense level created by former Secretary of Defense Forrestal to coordinate the personnel policies of all three services, approached the President's Committee and suggested that
it might be helpful to the Army and Navy (whose reply to the April
6 memorandum had also been rejected as unsatisfactory) if the Committee
were to indicate informally to these two services the steps which, in
its opinion, should be taken to bring their policies into line with
those announced by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Informally

(1) The President's Committee agreed to do this, and thereupon
submitted to the Army a suggested four-point program. This program
provided for:

1. The opening of all military occupational specialties
   to qualified personnel solely on the basis of qualification and without regard to race.

2. The abolition of all race quotas for Army schools and the assignment of all individuals to school courses
   open to recruits and non-drafted service personnel — solely on the basis of qualification and the Army's need, and without
   regard to race.

3. The assignment of all new students upon completion of their
   school courses, on the basis of qualification and Army need, and without regard to race and without limitation to racial units.

4. The abolishment of all enlistment standards
   for all three services and, coincidentally with this
   move, the abolition of the racial quota.
The Secretary of the Army sent his second reply to the Secretary of Defense on May 26. A lengthy document, it was devoted principally to a defense of the Gillie Board policy and to a resume of achievements under that policy. In the course of this defense and resume, the Army stated that:

1. "By reserving a proportionate number of spaces in the troop basis (including all grades and type jobs) for Negro personnel, the Department of the Army insures that the Negro will have an equal opportunity with the white to train for, and attain to, the position of responsibility, he may be called upon to fill in event of mobilization."

2. "There are no Army schools from which Negro officers and enlisted men are barred solely because of color."

3. "There are Negroes in every career field so far introduced and in process of formulation."

4. "Negroes are assigned to overhead installation jobs without regard to race and work alongside others performing this type of duty."

5. "Each service has inherent problems peculiar to its method of combat. In shipboard, an individual serves in a small group in one compartment and goes where the ship goes. The combat soldier, on the other hand, works as part of a large group in the open. Whatever his hopes and fears, he must move forward, he must keep up, all voluntarily. The soldier on the battlefield deserves to have, and must have, utmost confidence in his fellow soldiers. They must eat together, sleep together, and all too frequently die together. There can be no friction in their everyday living that might bring failure in battle. A chain is as strong as its weakest link, and this is true of the Army unit on the battlefield. These factors are of tremendous influence on Army organization, doctrine and assignment procedures."
7. "Among the direct competition of the better-educated white soldier, the average Negro soldier would find it difficult to rise above the level of service tasks. The present system of segregated units guarantees that Negro soldiers will be given the opportunity to develop leadership, unhindered and unfastened by overshadowing competition they are not equipped to meet."

8. "...there is a growing concern among many senior officers of the Army that we are weakening to a dangerous degree the combat efficiency of our Army. These officers are familiar with the combat performance of Negro troops during war and feel that we have already gone too far in inserting colored organizations in white combat units."
5. The conclusion reached was that soldiers must have more confidence in their fellow soldiers than sailors in their shipmates. It was also noted that the Army's policy of the past was not a defense of segregation on the ground of personal preference of the service. The Army's consistent policy of non-segregation in general ratings and the frictions which it never developed were the main reasons for its abandonment.

6. The Army had a problem while it took men at 80% of the services. The problem was not to accept a 10% Negro. The Army's contention that the abandonment of the racial quota would result in an Army 80% or 90% Negro, however, segregated units gave the Negro the opportunity to compete with a Negro which he would be denied.

7. The Army committed the Army to sending men into battle under inferior officers and thereby jeopardizing battle success. Furthermore, the Committee said, the aim of the President and the Secretary of Defense was equality of opportunity, not preferential treatment. If, when offered equal opportunity, Negroes suffer a loss in the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, that may be regrettable, but it is hardly discriminatory. The Negro should be made to meet the competition of whites. Only in this way could the Army secure maximum military efficiency.

8. The fear of Negro officers over the promotion of Negro units in white comradery did not occur with the experience of World War II, upon the basis of which the Gillen Board had concluded that the best utilization of Negro troops was secured when they were used in small units in white command as an integral part of larger white units.
In this second reply to the Secretary of Defense, the Army stated that

"Circular 124...will be amended to assure continued progress by

providing utilization of the Negro soldier on the broadest possible

professional scale." The only specific steps which the Army proposed, however,

in support of this general promise were (1) the opening of all occupational

specialties to Negroes; (2) the creation of additional Negro units; (3)

an increase in Negro school quotas; and (4) eventual segregation at the

company, rather than the battalion, level.

The Army did not agree to modify its policies of segregation or the

quota system, nor did it propose to abolish the racial school quotas.

On June 7, the Secretary of Defense for the second time rejected the

Army's reply to his April 6 directive, saying in a memorandum:

I have reviewed your comprehensive memorandum of 24 May concerning

equality of treatment and opportunity in the Department of the

Army and have noted with pleasure the significant progress made

by the Army in this field in the last few years. I also note

with pleasure the measures you propose in order to broaden still

further the professional bases for the utilization of Negro

manpower. I have read with understanding and sympathy the

Army's contention that its current policies and practices are in

accord with Executive Order 9981 and my supplemental policy

statement of 6 April 1948. I fully realize the grave problem

presented by this question, and that it is of greater magnitude

in the Army than in either the Navy or the Air Force. Nevertheless

I am forced to the conclusion that your proposals in reply to

my second memorandum on this subject still fail to meet the

basic intent of Executive Order 9981 and my memorandum of 6 April.
Accordingly, I am asking you to restate your position and your
Proposals, and at the same time to consider very carefully
the informal suggestions of the Fapy Committee which, I
understand, have been made available to you. I would be
pleased to have your reconsideration of this matter
submitted to me by 20 June.

IX

The deadline which had been set by Secretary Johnson was twice extended
at the joint request of the Army and the President's Committee in order to
provide time for parties to meet and discuss the problem. In the middle of
July the Army presented to the Committee an "Outline Plan for Utilization of
Negro Manpower to Provide Further Equality of Opportunity." The plan was
predicated on the retention of segregation and the 10 per cent quota system.

Within this framework the Army proposed to:

1.abolish all Negro quotas for school training.
2. Establish "on a fixed plan basis a suitable number of
   positions in each occupational career field for Negroes," be
   revised from time to time on the basis of experience.
3. Convert some Negro service units to combat units to

   - release manpower reserves for the Negroes
   - who would obtain more technical MOS as the result of (2).

4. Accelerate Negro employment in overhead

...
5. Administer the promotion system of the career guidance program on an equal merit basis against a single standard.

6. Conduct special enlistment program to secure Negro personnel to fill the expanded range of MOS opened to Negroes.

7. Convene a special board of army officers as recommended by the Gillies report to review the Army's Negro policy periodically.

This plan will be immediately recognized as a slight variant of the three-point plan which had been proposed by General Paul and Major Liebich in late 1947 as a placebo expansion of MOS, the creation of new Negro units requiring higher skills, and special procurement of better educated Negroes. Byproducts of this plan would be the extension of school courses and increased utilization in overhead.

The criticisms which were valid against the old plan were equally valid against its successor. The substance of the Committee's criticism was this:

1. Severe assignment of Negroes restricted to racial units and overhead, MOS and school courses could never be fully opened up to qualified personnel.

2. The Army was actually proposing the extension of the quota system to the new career guidance program. The Committee did not ask that a certain percentage of Negroes be assigned positions in each career field by allotted to Negroes. It asked only that all else be treated equally.
Ar might well be that very few Negroes were available to
perform a type of work that the Committee had identified as
suitable for Negroes. In the Committee's view, there was nothing
wrong with a concentration of Negroes in the laundry if
that is where their capabilities assigned them.

What was wrong was the assignment of a potential typewriter
operator to the laundry because the quota of Negroes
was too low. That the Committee sought was equal
opportunity for individuals, not a quota of opportunity for a
race.

The forced displacement of whites by Negroes in overhead
work was clearly an act of discrimination against whites. The Negro should get equal
not preferential treatment.

4. The promotion system of the career guidance program was
already administered on a single standard, but
a Negro who had scored high in a Negro unit or overheard
and if a vacancy were not available
in a racial unit or overheard, he, too,
did not climb the career ladder.

5. The Committee had no objection to special procurement, but it
thought the best way to get highly qualified Negroes was
to offer them equal opportunity to compete with whites.

Along with the evaluation of the Army's proposals, the President's
formally submitted for the first time its recommendations for
Committee (1)

Army action. In only two respects did these differ substantially from
the earlier recommendations.
First, the Committee recommended that so long as there were racial 
units in the Army, all enlisted men in the four lowest grades should be 
allowed, upon his own request and with the approval of his commanding officer, 
to remain in a unit composed of personnel of his own race.

Secondly, the Committee concurred that the Army had three valid points 
with respect to the quota: (1) the Army could not maintain its efficiency 
without a considerable proportion of men below the IQ or with a mental score GCT 80 and below; 
(2) the percentage of Negroes below GCT 80 far exceeded the percentage of 
whites below 80; (3) therefore, if the racial quotas were abandoned, it 
gave an advantage to the low score Negro, and an advantage that worked to the 
detriment of the Army, irrespective of questions of race.

Therefore, the Committee recommended to the Army that it substitute 
quota systems on the basis of the General Classification Test, as the

With respect to original enlistments, the Committee proposed 
quota systems. Based on their experience, they recommended that the Army 
that the Army not enlist a higher percentage of men in each month in 
that category than the normal distribution of men in that category as 
revealed by the Army's experience with the GCT in World War II.

1. The Army's IQ Test was scored on a scale of 100 to 200, with a score of 100 corresponding to a 50 percentile.
For example, while the Army enlisting men at GCT 80, the lowest category would be the upper third -- GCT 80-90 -- of Grade IV which covers the range from 60 to 90. Therefore, the Army should limit its original enlistments each month -- white and Negro -- to 13.4 per cent of its total monthly allotment, as the percentage of men falling between GCT 80-90 because 13.4 per cent of the men falling on the basis of World War II experience, that experience is adjusted
an enlistment standard of 80.

With respect to re-enlistments, the Committee proposed that (1) a man in GCT Grade IV (60-80), completing his first term of enlistment and scoring below 80 in aptitude area I test, should not be allowed to re-enlist; (2) a man with more than one term of enlistment, scoring below 80 in the same test, should not be allowed to re-enlist except upon waiver by the Adjutant General.

(1) Charts showing the GCT distribution of white and Negro enlisted men during World War II and in the peacetime Army as of March 31, 1949, are found in Appendices and.
During the next two months little progress was made in discussions with the Army. The Army steadily maintained, without advancing any figures to support its contention, that even if the Committee's GCT quota plan were substituted for the racial quota, there was a likelihood that Negro enlistments would run 36-40 per cent of total enlistments. The Army also refused to meet the Committee on the question of assignment of school-trained men to Negro units and to abolish the Negro school quotas. By taking these two steps and by expanding the utilization of Negroes in overhead, the Army insisted that no individual who qualified for an occupational specialty would be denied the opportunity to follow it. But the Army would not specifically agree that Negroes should not be assigned in assignment to Negro units and overhead.

The Committee steadily maintained that equality could be achieved only by the creation of a wide variety of Negro units or by integration.
It could not agree to the formation of more Negro units. Nor could it ask the Army to break up its present segregated units, for this would create immense organizational and administrative difficulties. The gradual introduction of qualified Negroes into white units, with those occupational specialties in which the Army was currently under strength, offered the Army a gradual and manageable solution to the problem of integration, which the other two services were in the process of solving.

Finally, in late September, the Army informed the Committee it was sending its proposals to the Secretary of Defense. The Committee asked the Army, in forwarding its plan, to keep open the question of the quota, merely stating that it was under further discussion.

On September 18, Secretary of Defense announced that the Army's program...to give greater assurance of equality of treatment and opportunity to all Army personnel without regard to race or color...As the Army had agreed, the new plan met the Committee's...
recommendations on opening up all military and school courses. The question of the
racial quota was left in abeyance. On the crucial issue of assignment, the
Secretary of the Army said:

This program does not mean that existing Negro units will be
broken up or that Negro personnel of these units will be scattered
throughout the Army. It does mean that qualified Negroes,
including members of these existing units, will have the
opportunity to learn those skills previously unavailable to
them. Hereafter, Negroes who acquire skills will be assigned to
positions where their specialties may be utilized in the manner
most useful to the Army.

Only Negroes may be selected for certain military
occupational specialties to which they are best suited. Under
these circumstances, Negroes may be assigned to positions
which, in the past, have been closed to them.

Under the Army's new program, Military Occupational Specialties
will be open to all qualified personnel. No individual who qualifies
for a Military Occupational Specialty will be denied the
opportunity to fill it because of race or color. This will
place greater significance and provide further implementation to
the Army's policy and practice of using qualified persons without
regard to race in filling the operating or so-called overhead,
positions at Army installations.

On October 23, it sent out a clarification of
[redacted]...
This interpretation absolutely precluded the assignment of any Negro personnel to a white unit. Furthermore, it never limited the assignment of Negroes in overseas to "Negro spaces."

When this message was brought to the attention of Secretary Gray, he immediately issued a statement, declaring that he had recently announced policy. This policy guarantees that qualified Negro soldiers will be given the equal opportunity with other qualified soldiers to practice their specialties if vacancies exist for those specialties. In clarification of the question of assignment of Negroes to white units, the Secretary said it was anticipated that as a result of the announced policy qualified Negro specialists would be assigned to some white units, but that Negro no existing units would be broken up for their personnel scattered throughout the Army.

Meanwhile, the Committee had indicated to the President....