CIRCULAR

No. 124

WASHINGTON, D. C., 27 April 1946

Effective until 27 October 1947 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER IN THE POSTWAR ARMED FORCES

To effect the maximum effective utilization of the authorized Negro manpower in the postwar period, the War Department has adopted the following policy:

Negro manpower in the armed forces will be utilized on a broader professional scale than has been obtained heretofore. The development of leaders and specialists based on individual merit and ability, to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded armed service will be accomplished through the training of installations and organizations. Recruitment of Negro units with white units in composite organizations will be accepted policy.

IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency the following will obtain:

1. The troop bands for the armed forces will include Negro troops approximately in the ratio of the Negro civilian population to the total population of the country.

2. To meet the requirements of training and expansion, combat and service units will be organized and activated from the available Negro manpower. Employment will be in Negro regiments or groups, separate battalions or squadrons, and separate companies, troops, or batteries, which will conform in general to other units of the armed forces. A proportionate number of these units will be organized as part of larger units. White officers assigned to Negro organizations will be placed on the basis of their qualifications and character irrespective of color.

3. Additional officer supervision will be supplied to units which have a greater than normal percentage of personnel within the NAACP classification of IV and V.

- 106 or more Class IV and V, 206 increase of officers.
- 106 or more Class IV and V, 206 increase of officers.

Increased officer personnel will be of competent grade.

4. The planning, preparation, implementation, and revision of this policy will be coordinated by the Assistant for Planning and Policy Coordination, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War Department General Staff.

5. Officers will be accepted in the Regular Army through the operation of the present integration policy without regard to race.

6. In the case of commissioned officers, regardless of race, equal opportunities for appointment, advancement, professional improvement, promotion, and retention in all components of the armed forces will be continued.

7. Negro Reserve officers will be eligible for active duty training and service in accordance with their respective commands for other officer of like component and status. All officer requirements for appointment of the Regular Reserve establishment as distinguished from the Regular Army and for replacement, regardless of race, will be processed in the existing manner from current sources; namely, ROTC, higher education, Reserve officers, Reserve officers, direct appointments, graduate studies, and the United States Military Academy.

8. All enlisted men whether volunteers or selections will be accorded the same processing through appropriate installations to ensure proper classification and assignment of individuals.

9. Surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department will include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the armed forces which could be filled by Negro military personnel.

10. A policy, Army and Air Force, that both Negro and white troops are assigned for duty in the War Department policies regarding use of recreational facilities.
facilities and membership in officers' clubs, messes or similar organisations as set forth in paragraph 39, AR 215-10, WD Memorandum 600-8, 16 June 1935, and WD letter, AR 501.3 (5 Jul 44) (38-4-48) 5 July 1944. Recreational Facilities will be continued in effect.

11. Considering essential military factors, Negro units will be stationed in localities and communities where attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute an undue burden to the local civilian authorities.

12. Commanders of organizations, installations, and stations controlling Negro personnel are authorized to develop and implement an enlightened racial policy.

13. Commanders of all branches of the Army will ensure that all personnel under their command are thoroughly indoctrinated with the necessity for the unrestrained acceptance of the policies of the policy.

14. WD letter (AR 501.3 (38-4-48)) 16 October 1945, War Department policy is carried in Negro units, is reaffirmed since the policy expressed therein has been amplified and supported by the policy emanated herewith.

15. The above stated policy is the direct result of the Report made by a "Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Officers in the Post-War Period," convened 4 October 1945 by the direction of Secretary of War. The following approved Board Report is published for the information of all concerned:

REPORT OF BOARD OF OFFICERS ON UTILIZATION OF NEGRO PERSONNEL IN THE POST-WAR ARMY

26 February 1945

I. PURPOSE

A. Statement of the Problem: The Board was directed in a memorandum dated 5 October 1945 to prepare a broad policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment, including the development of means required in the event of a national emergency.

The proposed policy and means will cover:

1. Broadening the professional base of Negro personnel in the Regular Army.
2. Organization of Negro units.
3. Implementation and revision of policies by a Staff Group.
4. Induction and training of Negro personnel.
5. Individuation of all ranks throughout the service in the policy promulgated.

The plan proposed is based upon the lessons of experience and wartime results attained in the use of all authorized manpower in the event of another emergency striking every resource of the nation.

B. Plan of Investigation: The Board has concerned itself with an examination of past and present War Department policies, their effectiveness during the period between World Wars and in World War II, and the advisability of modifying these policies during the post-war period. In the course of its proceedings, the Board has obtained a free expression of the views of representative military and civilian leaders.

Essentially the problem has resolved itself into the following questions:

1. How shall Negro personnel be utilized in the Army in the event of another national emergency?
2. What basis of Negro personnel is necessary in the post-war Army in order to provide for rapid expansion in time of war?
3. What shall be the auge of the War Department General Staff and end of authorized commanders in implementing any policy adopted?
4. How shall authorized Negro personnel be selected, processed, trained and assigned?
5. Shall changes in policy be adopted and promulgated immediately?

II. FAITH BASED ON THE PROBLEM

A. GENERAL ASPECTS OF NEGRO MILITARY POTENTIAL

The United States of America has just successfully concluded a global war which strained her manpower, industry and material resources to the utmost. Every citizen of the democracy was called upon to meet the utmost effort as part of the National team. That every citizen did so, to the limit of his or her ability, is history.

The natural and artificial resources of any nation are dependent upon and reflect the vigor of her manpower. An intelligent patriotism is imperative, if the nation is to vindicate the past, maintain the present, and rise to its future destiny.

LESSON GAINED FROM TWO WARS

Lessons of primary military interest gained from the experience of the last five years are:

That there is a limit to the amount of manpower available in the nation to form a modern military organization capable of prosecuting the major war.

That the manpower available, of itself, varies in quality.

The principle of equality of training clearly indicates, therefore, that every effort must be expanded to utilize efficiently every qualified available individual in a position in the military structure for which he is best suited. It follows logically that we must always strive for improvement in the quality of the whole.

THE NEGRO MILITARY POTENTIAL

The Negro constitutes approximately 12% of the civilian population of the country and thus becomes as small part of the manpower reserves available for use in time of peace or in the event of a National Emergency.

An impartial review and analysis of the progress made by the Negro citizen between World War I and World War II, particularly in the last five years, has led this Board to the conclusion that comprehensive study involving the Negro manpower of the nation in the military establishment is timely.

The Negro is a born free citizen enjoying the privileges conferred by citizenship under the Constitution. By the same token, he must defend his country in time of national peril. Testimony presented to this Board has indicated that the Negro is ready and eager to accept his full responsibility as a citizen.

It follows therefore:

That the Negro, desiring to accept his legal and moral responsibility as charged by the Constitution, should be given every opportunity and aid to prepare himself for effective military service in company with every other citizen who is called.

That those charged with the utilization of manpower in the military establishment have an equal legal and moral obligation under the Constitution to take all steps necessary to prepare the qualified manpower of the nation so that it will function efficiently and effectively under the stress of modern battle conditions.
ASSIGNMENT DIFFICULTIES IN WORLD WAR II

During the national emergency just concluded, approximately 919,000 Negroes, including reserves and volunteers, were selected for war in the army. These men were obtained from a reservoir of approximately 2,459,000 Negroes who registered for service. In the placement of the men who were accepted, the Army encountered considerable difficulty. Leadership qualities had not been developed among the Negroes, due primarily to environment and lack of opportunity. These factors had also affected his development in the various skills and crafts.

CONJECTURE MEANS

In the opinion of the Board, many of these difficulties can be overcome by forward planning, and by the development of a broader base of trained personnel, both officer and enlisted, than that which existed prior to World War II. This change also embraces a much larger proportion of the available Negro manpower than was done hereafter.

EFFECTS OF THE WAR

No study would be complete that failed to evaluate the collateral education gained by every Negro man and woman during the war years. The imprints of tens of thousands of better living and health conditions, plus the increased financial resources, have left a mental stamp which will persist and continue to become more articulate.

During the last few years, many of the concepts pertaining to the Negro have shown changing trends. They are pointing toward a more complete acceptance of the Negro in all the diversified fields of endeavor. This trend has been noticeable to a greater extent in the Northern and Western sections of the country. The Negro to a greater extent has been accepted in industry, and in administrative and scientific fields, both as individuals and groups, with good results. This acceptance has resulted in better wages which automatically raised his standard of living. It also has resulted in better opportunities which have been afforded the Negro to expand his knowledge of the trade and skills. The latter have a ready market in the intricacies of a modern military machine.

Many Negroes who, before the war, were laborers, are now craftsmen, capable in many instances of competing with the white man on an equal basis. This change in the industrial status has, further, allowed the Negro to give his children more and better education. In many colleges and universities of the North and West, the Negro student is accepted solely on the basis of his individual merit and ability. This rise in the technical and cultural level of the Negro has, in turn, given him a more articulate voice in government.

RELATIVE EDUCATIONAL DATA

The Negro's increasing capability for participation in society and government is evident from consideration of the data below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Attainment</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Negroes of U.S.</th>
<th>Other Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War I</td>
<td>War II</td>
<td>War II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 8 years</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 4 years High School</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 or more years College</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Ratio of Negroes who came from North of Mason-Dixon Line:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World War I</th>
<th>World War II</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
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<p>| | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>50</td>
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</table>

Increases in Industrial Experience

The great expansion of industry during the war gave the Negro greater opportunity to gain industrial experience than ever before. The War Munitions Board reports that Negro participation in defense industries increased from 3% in 1940 to 8.9% in 1944, over 200%. This increase in industrial experience is an important factor when considering manpower from the standpoint of national defense.

PLANNING OPPORTUNITY POST WAR YEARS

These three factors of education, craftsman ship, and governmental participation have enhanced the military value of the Negro. A broader selectivity in manpower available than ever before is possible, with a resultant beneficial effect on military efficiency.

STATE AND NATURE OF POLICY

While the lessons learned from the service of the Negro in the war have not been fully realized in our minds, and while the people as a whole are still incompletely educated, it is the considered opinion of the Board that a progressive policy for greater utilization of the Negro manpower be formulated and implemented now, if the nation is to establish its military structure on the experiences of the past. The nation should not fail to use the assets developed through a closer relationship of the races during the years of war.

The policies prepared by the War Department should be progressively flexible. They should evolve the continued mental and physical improvement of all citizen. They should be implemented as an integral part of the national program by all agencies. They must ultimately approach the ultimate objective of an evaluation of the Negro on the basis of individual merit and ability. They should point towards a long-range objective which stimulates, over a period of time, a still greater utilization of this manpower potential in the military service of the nation.

NECESSARY ACTION

Dramatic leadership in implementing the program is imperative. All ranks must be imbued with the necessity for a straightforward, unprejudiced attitude towards the maintenance and preservation of a forward-thinking policy.

SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF COMBAT PERFORMANCE—WORLD WAR II

1. General

A careful analysis of the combat service performed by the Negro in World War II indicates clearly that:

The participation of the Negro in World War II was in many instances
creditable, and definitely contributed to the success attained by our
military forces.
No analysis would be complete, however, that fails to evaluate the disad-
vantages under which the Negro entered the conflict and which militated
against his success.

2. Disadvantages Faced by the Negro

The records and testimony indicate that:

(a) Although it was definitely known that the Negro manpower would
amount to approximately 10% of the manpower available for war, plans
were not prepared prior to World War II for utilization and employment of
major units of all arms. This resulted in some instances in a disproport-
tionate allocation of fewer trained personnel to combat elements.

(b) Likewise, no provisions were made initially for utilizing the Negro
manpower in supporting type combat units. These eventually emerged as
all categories. This latter condition apparently resulted from the pressure
initiated by the Negroes themselves.

(c) The initial lack of plans for the organization and utilization of the
wide variety of combat units was reflected in frequent reorganiza-
tion, renumbering, and shifting from one type of training to another. For
example, some engineers and artillery were thus affected.

(d) However, the shortage was not reflected in a lack of personnel, as
was indicated without
definite T., G., and R. and without a general prescription as to the
missions for which organized. This was an expedient to offset the lack
of plans when manpower was suddenly made available to large numbers.

(e) The above factors, when added to the inevitable lack of information as
to ultimate time and place of assignment and mission to be assigned the
various units, was undoubtedly confusing to the Negro unit and may have
become a contributing cause for some of the reported failures in combat.

(f) Official reports on Negro units do not reflect many factors which
may have been contributing causes of the sub-standard performance in
combat.

An over-all far-reaching factor which affected adversely the efficiency of
combat units of all types was the shortage of trained subordinate leaders. This
shortage stemmed directly from instruction for which the Army was only partially
at fault. Environment and lack of administrative and educational advantages in
peaceful days greatly handicapped the Negro in the performance of his wartime
duties.

3. Advantages Faced by the Negro

Likewise in estimating the combat record of performance, careful scrutiny
must be given to the advantages which accrued to the Negro from the Negro
man-
power and the resultant benefits derived therefrom. Consideration must be given
to the facts that:

(i) First-class equipment and matériel, and ample quantities for training
purposes, were made available.

(ii) Favorable training areas and aids were placed at the disposal of
Negro units, and particularly in combat units; several training
periods were extended to insure adequately trained units.

(iii) Experienced white commanders were assigned to direct training and to
lead the major elements into action.

(iv) The combat units were carefully briefed into the theater of opera-
tions and all elements of command were briefed individually prior to
entry into action.

(v) Deorganization and reorganizing were practiced with the objective of
enhancing the chances of success of the units involved.
b. Reactions of Pace

Certain facts were deduced from a careful check of the records and the
testimony of commanders, observers and participants in the war just terminated,
and arrived at after weighing the advantages and disadvantages previously
outlined.

These are:

(1) There is substantial evidence to indicate that the least proficient
performance has been derived from combat units which were required to
bear with the enemy to accomplish a prearranged mission.

(2) In general, relatively slight losses were experienced by Negro
infantry units.

(3) There was ample evidence to show that in certain instances small
infantry composite units, Negro platoons in white companies when shilly
led were essentially successful even though relatively heavy casualties were
suffered.

(4) The Board likewise was convinced from evidence that the Negro sol-

dier will execute in satisfactory manner, combat duties in a supporting

type unit; for example, an artillery battalion.

(5) The evidence clearly indicated that the largest use of Negro manpower
was in the service type units, and that in this field they demonstrated
their highest degree of efficiency.

The Board recommends that the maximum emphasis be placed directly in support of combat units, being to all intents and
purposes a part of them. Many of these elements performed most creditably.

5. Summary

From the evidence presented by the most experienced commanders, the Board
cannot fail to conclude that the results obtained by all units are in direct propor-
tion to the leadership demonstrated. The failures of Negro units here in al-
mast every case have been attributed to the lack of leadership qualities of junior
officers and non-commissioned officers. Leadership, therefore, must be stressed
and the development of all attributes which contribute to this end must be the
prime objective of those responsible for the training of the present Army. In
addition, the most benefit will be derived from the broader scope of activities
which have been open to the Negro during five years of war.

A corollary to this first objective is clearly defined, for it leads di-
rectly toward the second objective.

Infantry must be made more effective. Then the quality of the close com-
bat elements composed either wholly or in part from the Negro component is raised
to the level desired and expected, the Army of this nation will be immensely
improved.

In implementing the recommended program, all types of Negro units
should be included in the present Army. These units should eventually be offered by
Negro officers and non-commissioned officers to fill leadership positions in non-
Negro units, especially infantry units, to which the Negro has demonstrated the least
degree of efficiency. The training of these units should stress initiative and
command ability on the part of the Negro soldier in order to improve his charac-
ter and skill. In general, it should tend to assume responsibility, raise his morale, and
better prepare him to assume the duties of a combat soldier.

After weighing the evidence carefully and objectively, it seems evident
that certain essentials action can and must be taken. By so doing, the War Depart-
ment will enhance the military value of this potential and thereby increase the
efficiency of the armed forces of the nation.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Having considered the factual and other official materials made available by
the War Department and the oral testimony of over 60 military and civilian wit-

nesses, this Board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:

1. A comparison of the Selective Service Records in two were indicates that the Negro manpower which may be expected to become available to the Army in case of another national emergency will no doubt exceed that of World War II.

2. Considering the advances made by the Negro civilian during the period between World War I and World War II and the increase in numbers available for military service, it is concluded that adequate plans were not prepared for the ultimate utilization of this manpower.

3. The advancement of the Negro in education, skills and crafts and resultant economic betterment definitely indicate that if prompt and adequate steps are taken at this time, a greater and more efficient use can be realized from this manpower in the military establishment of the future.

4. In the light of past experiences, it is believed that many of the difficulties and risks of the conflict encountered in the placement of the Negro manpower during the Selective Service period of World War II could have been eliminated had War Department policies been fully implemented.

5. The experiences gained in the utilization of the Negro manpower in the past can be used to the definite conclusion that if remedial action is taken by the War Department at this time, many of the apparent deficiencies of the Negro soldier can be eliminated and more efficient results derived from this manpower in the future.

6. Many of the deficiencies of leadership attributed to the Negro soldier in the past can be eliminated by creating in the Negro Army, for purposes of comparison, a broader Negro base of both officers and enlisted men to assist in the training of the present day Army to provide officers and leaders to meet more efficiently the requirements of the Army in the event of a national emergency.

7. Creation of a broader Negro base in the present Army logically includes organization of appropriate elements of any female component.

8. To insure understanding and a basis for planning purposes there must be established a ratio of Negro to white manpower in the present Army. This ratio, for the present, should be that which exists in the civil population.

In World War II some types of Negro units demonstrated greater proficiency than others. In general, service units have performed in a more satisfactory manner than combat units. Likewise, some units have consistently better combat records than others. In organizing or activating Negro units to create a broader base in the present Army, it is essential that combat units be stressed.

9. For efficient results, the implementation and progressive development of a general policy in preparation for full utilization of Negro manpower in a national emergency will require the closest cooperation and coordination with the War Department, between the War Department and field commanders, and between local commanders and local civil officials.

10. Creation of a War Department General Staff Group of selected officers, experienced in camp, who can devote their time to problems involving minority racial elements in the military establishment is necessary to insure adequate and continuous coordination and cooperation in implementing policy. Creation for the same purpose of a similar group on the staff of each major command is necessary.

11. The War Department policy established for the administration and utilization of minority groups in the present Army should be carefully coordinated with policies of the various services.

12. Testimony before this Board has indicated that units composed largely of personnel classified in the two lowest grades on the A.G.O.T. scale require more
officer supervision in training and in the field than units composed of personnel of normal distribution. It is concluded, therefore, that employment of officers to units including abnormal proportions of personnel in Grades IV and V on the ASCOT scale is necessary when time is the critical factor, as it will be under war conditions or under a system of universal military training. This procedure is not necessary in the Regular Army in peacetime.

14. The training advantages afforded by a favorable climate or terrain conditions should be evaluated against the factors of unfavorable climate attitudes with the resultant effect on both training and morale. Troop locations should be selected after a consideration of those operating factors. The report being given in all cases to the fact that small cities or communities are incapable of absorbing large numbers of military personnel regardless of race. Improvements to this principle may be necessary in the event of universal military training, for general efficiency of the military establishment, or to the interests of national security.

15. Regardless of source or procurement and of racial antecedents all officers of all components of the Army should be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement as prescribed by law and regulation; and all officers should be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion, and retention in all components of the Army.

16. The sources of potential officer material can be increased and fostered through the creation of a more comprehensive ROTC and an Army leadership school program.

17. Processing of all personnel entering the Army, whether volunteers or recruits, through receiving and training centers promote and maintain the efficiency of the Army and will assure proper assignment of individuals.

18. The high enrollment rate of professional privates in Negro units has in the past caused entry into the service to such potential officer and non-officer personnel who are academically or physically unqualified for professional and technical education and assignments who have proven incapable of developing into specialists or leaders to be eliminated from the service at minimum of the first enlistment. Any policy implemented should include all races.

19. There are many places in the framework of the combat units at camp installations where Negro personnel with special skills can be utilized to advantage. Periodic surveys of the installations are necessary to determine such positions.

20. Important and other arguments of World War II indicate clearly that the most successful employment of Negro units occurred when they were employed as units closely associated with white units of similar tempo, and a greater degree of success was observed when small Negro organizations were used alone.

21. Experience, education and tenure on the part of all personnel of the Army will serve to modify many of the difficulties inherent in a mixed or composite unit.

22. Present War Department policies pertaining to the administration of educational, recreational and housing facilities and of Officers' clubs at posts, camps and stations where racial similarity elements are located are considered adequate for the present and should be continued in effect.

23. The adoption and promulgation without delay of a broad, comprehensive and progressive policy for the utilization of Negro manpower in the combat Army will eliminate the Negro's inferiority, alleviate some of the frustrations, improve morale, and facilitate the development of individual ability and leadership.

24. The adoption and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment will not in itself achieve the desired result,
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Steps must be taken concurrently to inform and indoctrinate all ranks of the military establishment concerning the importance of the national security of the successful accomplishment of the program.

24. The approval and promulgation of a constructive and progressive policy involving the utilization of this manpower potential should be affected without delay. When possible, the service component should capitalize on and benefit from the lessons learned in the school of war.

25. Existing laws, regulations and official publications should be examined for determination of any conflict with the proposed policy concerning a greater utilization of Negro manpower.

26. Publication of the approved policy by the War Department will facilitate an understanding attitude irrespective as to the race of the nation is concerned and it is believed that a progressive program aimed directly at the objective of more effective manpower utilization is being implemented.

IV. Recommendations

A. Policy

In order that authorized Negro manpower may be utilized with maximum efficiency during the present period, this Board recommends that the War Department adopt, promulgate, and implement the following policy:

To utilize Negro manpower in the present Army on a broader professional basis than has obtained heretofore, and through the means of installations and organizations, to facilitate the development of leaders and specialists to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded war Army.

B. Implementation of Policy

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized manpower of the Nation in the event of a national emergency, it is further recommended:

1. That combat and service units be organized and activated from the Negro manpower available in the present Army to meet the requirements of training and operation and in addition qualified individuals be utilized in appropriate special and overtasked units.

2. The proportion of Negro to white manpower as exists in the civil population be the accepted ratio for creating a troop basis in the present Army.

3. That Negro units organized or activated for the present Army conform in general to either units of the present Army but the minimum strength of type units should not exceed that of an infantry regiment or comparable organization.

4. That the present pattern of ROTC units be preserved and an additional officer qualification program be included. The above units be organized and each major component of the Army to meet the planning, procurement, implementation and revision of policies affecting all racial minorities.

5. That there be accepted into the regular Army a specified number of qualified Negro officers who officers initially selected for appointment in the regular establishment to those from units with experience in World War II.
that all officers, regardless of race, be required to meet the same standard for appointment.

6. That all officers, regardless of race, be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement; and be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion and retention in all components of the Army.

7. That Negro officers be granted requirements of the regular establishment and for replacements be procured from the following sources:
   (a) Reserve officers, including ROTC graduates, who shall be eligible for active duty training and service in accordance with any progress established for officers of like component and status.
   (b) Candidates from the ranks.
   (c) Graduates of the United States Military Academy.
   (d) Other sources utilized by the Army.

8. That all enlisted men, whether volunteers or selectees, be rotated through reception and training centers, or other installations of a similar nature to insure proper classification and assignment of individuals.

9. That reenlistment be denied to Regular Army soldiers who meet only the minimum standards.

10. That surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel.

11. That groupings of Negro units with white units in composite organizations be continued in the present Army as a policy.

12. That the principle that Negro units of the present Army be stationed in localities where community attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute an undue burden to the local civilian population be adopted; exceptions to this principle to be premised on the basis of military necessity as in the interest of national security.

13. That at posts, camps and stations where both Negro and white soldiers are assigned for duty, the War Department Policies regarding use of recreational facilities and membership in officers' clubs, messes or similar social organizations be continued in effect.

14. That commanders of organizations, installations and stations containing Negro personnel be fully cognizant of their responsibilities in the execution of the overall War Department policy; and conversely that they be permitted maximum latitude in the solution of purely local problems.

15. That the War Department, concurrently with promulgation of the approved policy, take steps to insure the indistinguishability of all units throughout the service as to the necessity for an unreserved acceptance of the provisions of the policy.

16. That approval and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the present Army be accomplished with the least practicable delay.

17. That upon approval of this policy steps be initiated within the War Department to amend or rescind such laws and official publications as are in conflict therewith.
18. That the recommended policy as approved by the War Department, with reference to the utilization of the Negro manpower in the pursuit may be interpreted and made public.

/ / Alonzo C. Gillem, Jr.

/ / Lewis H. Fish

Lt. Gen., U. S. Army

Maj. Gen., U. S. Army

Chairman

Member

/ / William C. Moree

/ / Al A. Varnum

Wm. C. Moree

Col. D. R. White

Brig. Gen., U. S. Army

Maj. Gen., U. S. Army

Member

Recorder, without vote

APPENDIX

The Board of Officers, in a supplementary memorandum, approved the following statement with respect to the objectives of its Report:

OBJECTIVES: The Board visualizes at this time only two objectives:

The Initial Objective: The utilization of the proportionate ratio of the manpower made available to the military establishment during the peace period, the manpower potential to be developed and tested as indicated by pertinent recommendations.

The Ultimate Objective: The effective use of all manpower made available to the military establishment in the event of a major mobilization at some unknown date against an undetermined aggressor. The manpower to be utilized in the event of another major war, in the army without regard to assignments or races.

And, if such a contingency arises, the manpower of the nation should be utilized in the best interests of the national security.

The Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this time, intermediate objectives. Between the first and ultimate objective, there may be interrelated and advantageous steps to be made in accordance with conditions which may develop.

(As signed 25 Apr 45)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Chief of Staff

The Adjutant General