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WASHINGTON, D. C., 27 April 1946

Effective until 27 October 1947 unless sooner rescinded or superseded

UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER IN THE POSTWAR ARMED FORCES

In order to achieve maximum utilization of the Negro manpower in the postwar period, the War Department has adopted the following policy:

Negro manpower in the postwar Army will be utilized on a broader professional scale than has been attempted heretofore. The development of Negro officers and specialists based on individuals merit and ability, to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded Army, will be accomplished through the medium of training, installations and organizations. Strength of Negro units with white units in composite organizations will be accepted policy.

IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized manpower of the Nation in the event of a national emergency the following will obtain:

1. The troop bases for the postwar Army will include Negro troops representative of the Negro civilian population of the total population of the U.S.

2. To meet the requirements of training and expansion, combat and service units will be organized and activated from the available Negro manpower. Employment will be in Negro regimental or group, separate battalions or squadrons, and separate companies, troops or battalions, which will conform in general to other units of the postwar Army. A proportionate number of these units will be organized as part of larger units. White officers assigned to Negro organizations will be commissioned in the Negro department. In addition, Negro manpower with special skills or qualifications will be employed as individuals in appropriate overseas and special units.

3. Additional officer supervision will be supplied to units which have a greater than normal percentage of personnel within the NAV classification of IV and V.

4. No more Class IV and V, 706 increase of officers.

5. No more Class IV and V, 706 increase of officers.

6. Increased officer personnel will be of campaign grade.

7. The planning, preparation, implementation, and revision of this policy will be carried out by the Assistant for Planning and Policy Coordination, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War Department General Staff.

8. Officers will be accepted in the Regular Army through the operation of the present integration policy without regard to race.

9. Regular Army officers, regardless of race, equal opportunity for advancement, promotion, and retention in all components of the Army will be continued.

10. Regular Reserve officers will be eligible for active duty training and service in accordance with any progress established for other officers of the component and status. All officer requirements for training of the Regular Reserve will be determined from the Regular Army and for replacement, regardless of race, will be procured in the existing man, from current sources; namely: Regular Reserve Officers, Reserve Officers, and Officers, etc., graduates of the United States Military Academy, or graduates of the United States Military Academy.

11. All enlisted and warrant officers of any race will be accorded the same prospective through appropriate installations to secure proper classification and assignment of individuals.

12. Surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department will include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel.

13. As a rule, Negro and white troops are assigned for duty, the War Department policies regarding race of recreational
facilities and membership in officers' clubs, messes or similar organizations as set forth in paragraph 19, AD 250-19, WD Memorandum 605-5, 14 June 1943, and MS letter, AD 250-19 (5 July 44) (2-9-44) 8 July 1944. Recreational Facilities, will be continued in effect.

11. Considering essential military factors, Negro units will be stationed in localities and communities where attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute an undue burden to the local civil authorities. NAACP, 1. Commanders of organizations, installations, and stations commanding Negro units, in presenting their reports, will also indicate the policy. National boards are authorized in the solution of purely local problems.

12. Commanders of all schools of the Army will ensure that all personnel under their command are thoroughly indoctrinated with the necessity for the unreserved acceptance of the provisions of the policy.

13. MS letter (AD 250-19 (5-9-44)10-4-44) 15 October 1944. War Department policy in regard to Negroes, in revised since the policy expressed therein has been amplified and superseded by the policy contained herewith.

14. The above stated policy is the direct result of the report made by a "Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Officers in the Post-War Period," convened 4 October 1945 by the direction of Secretary of War. The following approved Board Report is published for the information of all concerned :

REPORT OF BOARD OF OFFICERS
ON UTILIZATION OF NEGRO OFFICERS IN THE POST-WAR ARM

06 February 1946

I. PURPOSE

A. Statement of the Problem: The Board was directed in a memorandum dated 5 October 1945 to prepare a broad policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment, including the development of means required in the event of a national emergency.

The proposed policy and means will cover:

1. Broadening the professional base of Negro personnel in the Regular Army.
2. Organization of Negro units.
3. Implementation and revision of policies by a Staff Group.
4. Induction and training of Negro personnel.
5. Induction of all races throughout the service in the policy promulgated.

The plan proposed is based upon the lessons of experience and revisions made in the use of all racial manpower in the event of another emergency striking every resource of the nation.

B. Plan of Investigation: The Board has concerned itself with an examination of past and present War Department policies, their effectiveness during the period between World Wars and in World War II, and the advisability of continuing these policies during the post-war period. In the course of its proceedings, the Board has obtained a free expression of the views of representative military and civilian leaders.

Essentially the problem has resolved itself into the following questions:

1. How shall Negro personnel be utilized in the Army in the event of another national emergency?
2. What basis of Negro personnel is necessary in the post-war Army in order to provide for rapid expansion in time of war?
3

3. What shall be the scope of the War Department General Staff and of subordinate commanders in implementing any policy adopted?
4. How shall authorized Negro personnel be selected, processed, treated and assigned?
5. Shall changes in policy be adopted and promulgated immediately?

II. REASONS UNDERLYING THE PROBLEM

A. GENERAL ASPECTS OF NEGRO MILITARY POTENTIAL

The United States of America has just successfully concluded a global war which strained her manpower, industry and material resources to the utmost. Every citizen of the democracy was called upon to exert the utmost effort as part of the National team. That every citizen did so, to the limit of his and her ability, is history.

The natural and artificial resources of any nation are dependent upon and reflect the vigor of her manpower. An intelligent patriotism is imperative, if the nation is to vindicate the past, maintain the present, and rise to its future destiny.

LESSONS GAINED FROM WARS II

Lessons of primary military interest gained from the experience of the last five years are:

That there is a limit to the amount of manpower available in the nation to form a modern military organization capable of prosecuting the major war.

That the manpower available, of itself, varies in quality.

The principle of service of all men clearly indicates, therefore, that every effort must be expanded to utilize efficiently every qualified available individual in a position in the military structure for which he is best suited. It follows logically that we must always strive for improvement in the quality of the whole.

THE NEGRO MILITARY POTENTIAL

The Negro constitutes approximately 10% of the civilian population of the country and thus becomes an integral part of the manpower reservoir available for use in time of peace or in the event of a National Emergency.

An impartial review and analysis of the progress made by the Negro citizens between World War I and World War II, particularly in the last five years, has led this Board to the conclusion that comprehensive study involving the Negro manpower of the nation in the military establishment is timely.

The Negro is a born free citizen enjoying the privileges conferred by citizenship under the Constitution. By the same token, he must defend the country in time of national peril. Testimony presented to this Board has indicated that the Negro is ready and eager to accept his full responsibility as a citizen.

It follows therefore:

That the Negro, desiring to accept his legal and moral responsibility as charged by the Constitution, should be given every opportunity and aid to prepare himself for effective military service in company with every other citizen who is called.

That those charged with the utilization of manpower in the military establishment have an equal legal and moral obligation under the Constitution to take all steps necessary to prepare the qualified manpower of the nation so that it will function efficiently and effectively under the stress of modern battle conditions.
ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES IN WORLD WAR II

During the national emergency just concluded, approximately 910,000 Negroes, including reservists and volunteers, were selected for use in the armed forces. These men were obtained from a reservoir of approximately 9,450,000 Negroes who registered for service. In the placement of the men who were accepted, the Negro encountered considerable difficulty. Leadership qualities had not been developed among the Negroes, due primarily to environment and lack of opportunity. These factors had also affected his development in the various skills and crafts.

CONCISE MEASURES

In the opinion of the Board, many of these difficulties can be overcome by forward planning, and by the development of a broader base of trained personnel, both officer and enlisted, than that which existed prior to World War II. This policy also insures a much larger proportion of the available Negro manpower than was done heretofore.

RESULTS OF THE WAR

So much would be complete that failed to evaluate the collateral education gained by every Negro men and women during the war years. The impact of thousands of belated lives and health standards; the increased financial resources, left a mental stamp which will persist and continue to become more articulate.

During the last few years, many of the concepts pertaining to the Negro have shown dramatic trends. They are pointing toward a more complete acceptance of the Negro in all the diversified fields of endeavor. This trend has been noticeable to a greater extent in the Northern and Western sections of the country. The Negro to a greater extent has been accepted in industry, and its administrative and scientific fields, both as individuals and groups, with good results. This acceptance has resulted in better wages which automatically raised his standard of living. Also, the Negro has now been given opportunities which have been afforded the Negro to expand his knowledge of the trades and skills. The latter have a ready market in the industries of a modern military machine.

Many Negroes who, before the war, were laborers, are now craftsmen, capable in many instances of competing with the white man on an equal basis. This change in the industrial status has further, allowed the Negro to give his children more and better education. In many colleges and universities of the North and South, the Negro student is accepted solely on the basis of his individual merit and ability. This rise in the technical and cultural level of the Negro has, in turn, given him a more articulate voice in government.

RELATIVE EDUCATIONAL STATUS

The Negroes' increasing capability for participation in society and government is evident from consideration of the facts below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth in Educational Attainment</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Negroes of</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War I</td>
<td>War II</td>
<td>War I</td>
<td>War II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 year - 8 years Grade School</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 year - 4 years High School</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 or more years College</td>
<td>few</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Date of Negro Migration from the South

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratio of Negroes who came from North of Mason-Dixon Line:</th>
<th>World War I</th>
<th>World War II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Increases in Negro Participation in Government**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent of all persons employed by Federal Government in Washington who were Negroes</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Per cent of Negroes whose jobs were substantial | 95  | 50  |

**Increases in Industrial Experience**

The great expansion of industry during the war gave the Negro greater opportunity to gain industrial experience he had never before. The War Manpower Board reports that Negro participation in defense industries increased from 3% in 1940 to 8.3% in 1944, or over 3 times. This increase in industrial experience is an important factor when considering manpower from the standpoint of national defense.

**PLANNING APPROPRIATE FUTURE UTILIZATION**

These three factors of education, craftsmanship, and governmental participation have assured the military value of the Negro. A broader selectivity is now available than was heretofore possible, with a resultant beneficial effect on military efficiency.

**NOTE ON NATURE OF POLICY**

While the lessons learned from the service of the Negro in the war just concluded are still fresh in our minds, while the people as a whole are still militarily minded, it is the considered opinion of the Board that a progressive policy for greater utilization of the Negro manpower be formulated and implemented now. It is to establish its military structure on the experience of the past. The nation should not fail to use the assets developed through a closer relationship of the races during the years of war.

The policies prepared by the War Department should be progressively flexible. They should exhibit the continued mental and physical improvement of the Negro through all ages. They must adjust, at the earliest practicable moment, any spatial service policy to the immediately objective of an evaluation of the Negro in the basis of individual merit and ability. They should point towards a long-range objective which recognizes, over a period of time, a still greater utilization of this manpower potential in the military service of the nation.

**RECOMMENDED ACTION**

Immediate leadership in implementing the program is imperative. All minds must be aligned with the necessity for a straightforward, uncompromising attitude towards the ultimate elimination and preservation of a fair and equal policy.

3. **SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF COMBAT PERFORMANCE—WORLD WAR II**

1. **General**

A careful analysis of the combat service performed by the Negro in World War II indicates clearly that:

The participation of the Negro in World War II was in many instances
creditable, and definitely contributed to the success attained by our military forces.
No analysis would be complete, however, that fails to evaluate the disadvantages under which the Negro entered the conflict and which militated against his success.

2. Disadvantages Faced by the Negro

The records and testimony indicate that:

(i) Although it was definitely known that the Negro manpower would amount to approximately 10% of the manpower available for war, plans were not prepared prior to World War II for utilization and employment of Negro units of all arms. This resulted in some instances in a disproportionate allocation of lower trained personnel to combat elements.

(ii) Likewise, no provisions were made initially for utilizing the Negro manpower in supporting types combat units. These eventually enhanced all categories. This latter condition apparently resulted from the pressure initiated by the Negro themselves.

(iii) The initial lack of plans for the organization and utilization of the wide variety of combat units was reflected in frequent reorganization, reorganization, and shifting from one type of training to another. For example, some engineers and artillery were thus affected.

(iv) The manpower shortage was further augmented with the inevitable T. of D. and R. and without a general preservation as to the missions for which organized. This was an expediently to offset the lack of plans when manpower was suddenly made available to large numbers.

(v) The above factors, when added to the defective lack of information as to ultimate time and place of assignment and mission to be assigned the various units, was undoubtedly confusing to the Negro soldier and may have become a contributing cause for some of the reported failures in combat.

(vi) Official reports on Negro units do not reflect many factors which may have been contributing causes of the sub-standard performance in combat.

An over-all far-reaching factor which affected adversely the efficiency of combat units of all types was the shortage of trained subordinate leaders. This shortage resulted directly from limitations for which the Army was only partially at fault. Inexperience and lack of administrative and educational advantages in preparatory days greatly handicapped the Negro in the performance of his wartime duties.

3. Advantages Acquired to the Negro

Likewise in estimating the combat record of performance, careful scrutiny must be given to the advantages which accrued to the units from the Negro manpower and the resultant benefits derived therefrom. Consideration must be given to the facts that:

(i) First-class equipment and matériel, and ample quantities for training purposes, were made available.

(ii) Favorable training areas and aids were placed at the disposal of Negro commanders, especially in combat units. Second training periods were extended to insure adequately trained units.

(iii) Experienced white commanders were assigned to direct training and to lead the major elements into action.

(iv) The combat units were carefully engaged into the theater of operations and all studies of command were briefed meticulously prior to entry into action.

(v) Reorganization and retraining were practiced with the objective of enhancing the chances of success of the units involved.
b. Reductions of Force

Certain facts were deduced from a careful check of the records and the testimony of commanders, observers, and participants in the war just terminated, and arrived at after weighing the advantages and disadvantages previously outlined.

These are:

(I) There is substantial evidence to indicate that the least proficient performance has been derived from combat units which were required to

(II) In general, relatively slight losses were experienced by Negro

(III) There was ample evidence to show that in certain instances small

(IV) The Board likewise was convinced from evidence that the Negro sol-

(V) The Board likewise was convinced from evidence that the Negro sol-

5. Summary

From the evidence presented by the most experienced commanders, the Board

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A corollary to this first objective is clearly defined, for it leads di-

Infantry must be made more effective. When the quality of the close com-

In implementing the recommended program, all types of Negro units should

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After weighing the evidence carefully and objectively, it seems evident

III. CONCLUSIONS

Having considered the factual and other official materials made available by

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ness, this Board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:

1. A comparison of the Selective Service Records in two war indicates that the Negro manpower which may be expected to become available to the Army in case of another national emergency will no doubt exceed that of World War II.

2. Considering the advances made by the Negro civilian during the period between World War I and World War II and the increase in numbers available for military service, it is concluded that adequate plans were not prepared for the ultimate utilization of this manpower.

3. The advancement of the Negro in education, skills and crafts and resultant economic betterment definitely indicate that if prompt and adequate steps are taken at this time, a greater and more efficient use can be realized from this manpower in the military establishment of the future.

4. In the light of past experiences, it is believed that many of the difficulties and much of the confusion encountered in the placement of the Negro manpower during the Selective Service period of World War II could have been eliminated had War Department policies been fully implemented.

5. The experiences gained in the utilization of the Negro manpower in two major wars tend to the definite conclusion that if remedial action is taken by the War Department at this time, many of the apparent deficiencies of the Negro soldier can be eliminated and more efficient results derived from this manpower in the future.

6. Many of the deficiencies of leadership attributed to the Negro soldier in the past can be eliminated by creating in the Negro army, for purposes of operation, a broader Negro base of both officers and enlisted men to assist in the training of the present army and to provide current and leaders to meet more efficiently the requirements of the Army in the event of a national emergency.

7. Creation of a broader Negro base in the present Army logically includes organization of appropriate elements of our female component.

8. To insure understanding and a basis for planning purposes there must be established a ratio of Negro to white manpower in the present Army. This ratio, for the present, should be that which exists in the civil population.

9. In World War II some types of Negro units demonstrated greater proficiency than others. In general, service units have performed in a more satisfactory manner than combat units. Likewise, some units have consistently better combat records than others. In organizing or activating Negro units to create a broader base in the present Army, it is essential that combat units be stressed.

10. For efficient results, the implementation and progressive development of a general policy in preparation for full utilization of Negro manpower in a national emergency will require the closest cooperation and coordination with the War Department, between the War Department and field commanders, and between local commanders and local civil authorities.

11. Creation of a War Department General Staff Group of selected officers, experienced in command, who can devote their time to problems involving minority racial elements in the military establishment is necessary to insure adequate and continuous coordination and cooperation in implementing policy. Creation for the same purpose of a similar group on the staff of each major command is necessary.

12. The War Department policy established for the administration and utilization of minority groups in the present Army should be carefully coordinated with policies of the other services.

13. Testimony before this Board has indicated that units composed largely of personnel classified in the two lowest grades on the A.G.O.T. scale require more
officer supervision in training and in the field than units composed of personnel of normal distribution. (It is concluded, therefore, that assignment of officers to units including abnormal proportions of personnel in Grades IV and V on the A.O.C., scale is necessary when time is the critical factor, as it will be under war conditions or under a system of universal military training. This procedure is not necessary in the Regular Army in peacetime.)

14. The training advantages accruing from a favorable climate or terrain conditions should be weighed against the factors of unfavorable climate or terrain with the resultant effect on both training and service. Troop locations should be selected after a consideration of those opposing factors. The report being given in all cases to the fact that small strike committees are incapable of absorbing large numbers of military personnel regardless of race. Emphasis to this principle may be necessary to the event of universal military training, for general efficiency of the military establishment, or to the interest of national security.

15. Regardless of source or procurement and of rental authorities, all officers of all components of the Army should be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement as prescribed by law and regulation; and all officers should be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion, and retention in all components of the Army.

16. The sources of potential officer material can be extended and fostered through the medium of a more comprehensive ROTC and an Army leadership school program.

17. Processing of all personnel entering the Army, whether volunteers or reenlistments, through recruiting and training centers provides and maintains the efficiency of the Army and will insure proper assignment of individuals.

18. The high recruitment rate of professional private in Negro units has in the past delayed entry into the service in such potential officer and non-commissioned officer material as has been available. This has caused a shortage of qualified and alert personnel to deploy to the front in the first sentence. Any policy implemented should include all races.

19. There are many places in the framework of the various units at army installations where Negro personnel with special skills can be utilized to advantage. Periodic surveys of the installations are necessary to determine such positions.

20. Important and other experiences of World War II indicates clearly that the most successful employment of Negro units occurred when they were employed as units closely associated with white units in similar tasks, and a greater degree of success was achieved when small Negro organizations were employed.

21. Experience, education and training of personnel of the Army will serve to rectify many of the difficulties inherent in a mixed or composite unit.

22. Present War Department policies pertaining to the administration of educational, recreational and housing facilities and of officers' clubs at posts, camps and stations where racial disparity elements are located are considered adequate for the present and should be maintained in effect.

23. The adoption and promulgation without delay of a broad, comprehensive and progressive policy for the utilization of Negro manpower in the various Army will eliminate the Negro's但是, eliminate some of the frustrations, improve morale, and facilitate the development of individual ability and leadership.

24. The adoption and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment will not in itself achieve the desired result.
Steps must be taken concurrently to inform and indoctrinate all ranks of the military establishment concerning the importance of national security of the successful accomplishment of the program.

26. The approval and promulgation of a constructive and progressive policy involving the utilization of this manpower potential should be effected without delay. Such a policy, if properly carried out, can bring about a greater utilization of Negro manpower.

27. Publicity of the approved policy by the War Department will facilitate an understanding attitude among the press of the nation in general and thereby indicate that a progressive program aimed directly at the objective of more effective manpower utilization is being implemented.

IV. Recommendations

A. Policy

In order that authorized Negro manpower may be utilized with maximum efficiency during the peacetime period, this Board recommends that the War Department adopt, promulgate and implement the following policy:

To utilize the Negro manpower in the peacetime period so as to be ready for rapid deployment and utilization in an expedited war effort, the War Department should undertake the following broad policies:

1. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

2. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

3. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

4. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

5. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

6. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

7. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

8. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

9. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

10. That Negro units be organized in accordance with the same policies that apply to white units.

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized manpower of the Nation, a plan for the establishment of a Negro unit is further recommended.

1. That units of Negro manpower be organized and utilized to meet the requirements of the need for the utilization of Negro manpower in the United States Army.

2. That Negro units be organized and utilized to meet the requirements of the need for the utilization of Negro manpower in the United States Army.

3. That Negro units be organized and utilized to meet the requirements of the need for the utilization of Negro manpower in the United States Army.

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10. That Negro units be organized and utilized to meet the requirements of the need for the utilization of Negro manpower in the United States Army.
that all officers, regardless of race, be required to meet the same standard for appointment.

6. That all officers, regardless of race, be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement; and be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion and retention in all components of the Army.

7. That Negro officers meet requirements for promotion of the regular establishment and for replacements be procured from the following sources:
   (a) Reserve officers, including ROTC graduates, who shall be eligible for active duty training and service in accordance with any program established for officers of like component and status.
   (b) Candidates from the ranks.
   (c) Graduates of the United States Military Academy.
   (d) Other sources utilized by the Army.

8. That all enlisted men, whether volunteers or selectees, be recruited through reception and training centers, or other installations of a similar nature to ensure proper classification and assignment of individuals.

9. That reenlistment be denied to Regular Army soldiers who meet only the minimum standards.

10. That surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel.

11. That groupings of Negro units with white units in composite organizations be continued in the postwar Army as a policy.

12. That principles that Negro units of the postwar Army be stationed in localities where community attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute an undue burden on the local civilian population be adopted; exceptions to this principle to be premised on the basis of military necessity and in the interest of national security.

13. That at posts, camps and stations where both Negro and white soldiers are assigned for duty, the War Department policies regarding use of recreational facilities and membership in officers' clubs, messes or similar social organizations be continued in effect.

14. That commanders of organizations, installations and stations containing Negro personnel be fully cognizant of their responsibilities to the execution of the overall War Department policy; and conversely that they be permitted maximum latitude in the solution of purely local problems.

15. That the War Department, concurrently with promulgation of the approved policy, take steps to insure the indistinctive and indistinguishable color of all races throughout the service as to the necessity for an unreserved acceptance of the provisions of the policy.

16. That approval and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the postwar Army be accomplished with the least practicable delay.

17. That upon approval of this policy steps be initiated within the War Department to amend or repeal such laws and official publications as are in conflict therewith.
18. That the recommended policy as approved by the War Department, with reference to the utilization of the Negro manpower in the future may be

/Alvin C. Gillum, Jr./
Alvin C. Gillum, Jr.
Chairman
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army

/Alton E. Fish/
Alton E. Fish
Maj. Gen., U. S. Army
Member

/William H. Moore/
William H. Moore
Brg. Gen., U. S. Army
Member

/A. B. M. Varner/
A. B. M. Varner
Brg. Gen., U. S. Army
Recorder, without vote

APPENDIX
The Board of Officers, in a supplementary memorandum, approved the following
statement with regard to the objectives of its report:

Objectives: The Board visualizes at this time only two objectives:

The Initial Objectives: The utilization of the proportionate ratio of the
manpower made available to the military establishment during the peace period,
the manpower potential to be developed and tested as indicated by pertinent
recommendations.

The Ultimate Objectives: The effective use of all manpower made available to
the military establishment in the event of a major mobilization at some unknown
date against an undetermined aggressor. The manpower to be utilized in the
event of another major war, in the army without regard to assignments or rank.

Also, and if such a contingency arises, the manpower of the nation should be
utilized in the best interests of the national security.

The Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this time, inter-
mEDIATE OBJECTIVES, BETWEEN THE FIRST AND ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES, timely placing any
important and uncompleted goals in accordance with conditions which may arise
in the period from this date to the time of actual war.

(As of 20 Apr 42)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:

Donald F. Whittle
Chief of Staff

The Adjutant General

Chief of Staff

Chief of Staff