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No. 124
WASHINGTON, D. C., 27 April 1946

Effectived until 27 October 1947 unless sooner rescinded or superseded.

UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER IN THE POSTWAR ARMY POLICY

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized Negro manpower in the postwar period, the War Department has adopted the following policy:

1. Negro manpower in the peace Army will be utilized on a broader professional scale than has been attempted heretofore. The development of leaders and specialists based on individual merit and ability, to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded war Army will be accomplished through the medium of installations and organizations. Uniformity of Negro units with white units in composite organizations will be accepted policy.

IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized manpower of the Nation in the event of a national emergency the following will obtain:

4. The troop bands for the wartime Army will include Negro troops approximately in the 1 to 20 ratio of the Negro civilian population to the total population of the Nation.

5. To meet the requirements of training and expansion, combat and service units will be organized and activated from the available Negro manpower. Employment will be in Negro regiments or groups, separate battalions or squadrons, and separate companies, troops or batteries, which will conform in general to other units of the peace Army. A proportionate number of these units will be organized as part of larger units. White officers assigned to Negro organizations will be given the opportunity to share in the progress and advancement. In addition, Negro manpower with special skills or qualifications will be employed as individuals in appropriate overwatch and special units.

6. Additional officer supervision will be supplied to units which have a greater than normal percentage of personnel within the MCAT classification of IV and V.

7. 105 or more Class IV and V; 25% increase of officers.

8. 105 or more Class IV and V; 75% increase of officers.

Decreased officer personnel will be of comparably higher grade.

9. The planning, procurement, implementation, and revision of this policy will be coordinated by the Assistant for Planning and Policy Coordination, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department General Staff.

10. Officers will be accepted in the Regular Army through the operation of the present integration policy without regard to race.

11. Opportunities for promotion, including promotion in rank, regardless of race, equal opportunities for appointment, advancement, professional improvement, promotion, and retention in all components of the Army will be continued.

12. Negro Reserve officers will be eligible for active duty training and service in accordance with any progress established for other officers of the same component and status. All officers required for expansion of the Regular establishment as distinguished from the Regular Army and for replacement, regardless of race, will be procured in the existing manner from current sources; namely, West Point cadets, officers Reserve Corps, direct appointments, graduates of the Reserve Officer candidate programs, and graduates of the United States Military Academy.

13. All enlisted men and women volunteers or selections will be accorded the same processing through appropriate installations to ensure proper classification and assignment of individuals.

14. Surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department will include recommendations covering the positions to each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel.

15. At ports, camps, and stations where both Negro and white troops are assigned for duty, the War Department policies regarding use of recreational
facilities and membership in officers' clubs, messes or similar organisations as set forth in paragraph 19, MS 220-10, MS Memorandum 660-3, 14 June 1943, and MS Letter, MS 503.3 (5 July 44) (6-8-4-8) 6 July 1944, Recreational Facilities, will be continued in effect.

11. Considering essential military factors, Negro units will be stationed in localities and communities where attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute undue burden to the local civilian community. The Committee recommends to the War Department that the following recommendations be included in the Army's Negro policy:

12. The use of Negro personnel in the Army will be based on the necessity for the use of Negro personnel in the national interest, as determined by the War Department. The War Department will be responsible for the planning and execution of such policy. This Committee recommends that the War Department be given the authority to establish and control such policy. The War Department shall be responsible for the planning and execution of such policy and shall be responsible for the financing of such policy. The War Department shall be responsible for the planning and execution of such policy. The War Department shall be responsible for the planning and execution of such policy.

13. The War Department policy is designed to provide for the use of Negro personnel in the national interest, as determined by the War Department. The War Department shall be responsible for the planning and execution of such policy. The War Department shall be responsible for the planning and execution of such policy. The War Department shall be responsible for the planning and execution of such policy.

14. MS Letter (32-4) (3-8-4) (6-8-4) (6-8-4) 16 October 1943, War Department policy in regard to Negroes, is recommended since the policy expressed therein has been amplified and superseded by the policies enumerated herewith.

15. The proposed policy is the direct result of the report made by a "Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Officers in the Post-War Period," convened 4 October 1945 by the direction of Secretary of War. The following approved Board report is published for the information of all concerned:

REPORT OF BOARD OF OFFICERS
ON UTILIZATION OF NEGRO PERSONNEL IN THE POST-WAR ARMY

26 February 1945

I. PURPOSE

A. Statement of the Problem: The Board was directed in a memorandum dated 5 October 1945 to prepare a broad policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment, including the development of means required in the event of a national emergency.

The proposed policy and means will cover:

1. Broadening the professional bases of Negro personnel in the regular Army.
2. Organization of Negro units.
3. Implementation and revision of policies by a Staff Group.
4. Induction and training of Negro personnel.
5. Induction of all ranks throughout the service in the policy proclaimed.

The plan proposed is based upon the lessons of experience and an estimate made of the full extent of the development and use of all available manpower in the event of another national emergency.

B. Plan of Investigation: The Board has completed its work with an examination of the policies and present War Department policies, their effectiveness during the period between World Wars and in World War II, and the advisability of implementing these policies during the post-war period. The Board has obtained a free expression of the views of a representative military and civilian leaders.

Essential to the problem has resolved itself into the following questions:

1. How shall Negro personnel be utilized in the Army in the event of another national emergency?
2. What basis of Negro personnel is necessary in the post-war Army in order to provide for rapid expansion in time of war?
3

3. What shall be the scope of the War Department General Staff and of subordinate commanders in implementing any policy adopted?
4. How shall qualified Negro personnel be selected, processed, trained and assigned?
5. Shall changes in policy be adopted and promulgated immediately?

II. FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. GENERAL ASPECTS OF NEGRO MILITARY POTENTIAL

The United States of America has just successfully concluded a great war which strained her manpower, industry and material resources to the utmost. Every citizen of the democracy was called upon to exert the utmost effort as part of the National team. That every citizen did so, to the limit of his or her ability, is history.

The natural and artificial resources of any nation are dependent upon and reflect the vigor of her manpower. An intelligent patriotism is imperative if the nation is to vindicate the past, maintain the present, and rise to its future destiny.

LESSONS GAINED FROM WORLD WAR II

Lessons of primary military interest gained from the experience of the last five years are:

1. That there is a limit to the amount of manpower available to the nation to form a modern military organization capable of prosecuting the major war.
2. That the manpower available, of itself, varies in quality.
3. That the principle of service of forces clearly indicates that every effort must be expanded to utilize efficiently every qualified available individual in a position in the military structure for which he is best suited. It follows logically that we must always strive for improvement in the quality of the whole.

THE NEGRO MILITARY POTENTIAL

The Negro constitutes approximately 10% of the civilian population of the country and thus becomes an integral part of the manpower reservoir available for our forces or in the event of a National Emergency.

An impartial review and analysis of the progress made by the Negro citizens between World War I and World War II, particularly in the last five years, has led to the conclusion that comprehensive study involving the Negro manpower of the nation in the military establishment is timely.

The Negro is a born free citizen enjoying the privileges conferred by citizenship under the Constitution. By the same token, he must defend the country in time of national peril. Testimony presented to this Board has indicated that the Negro is ready and eager to accept his full responsibility as a citizen.

It follows therefore:

1. That the Negro, desirous of accepting his legal and moral responsibility as charged by the Constitution, should be given every opportunity and aid to prepare himself for effective military service in company with every other citizen who is called.
2. That those charged with the utilization of manpower in the military establishment have an equal legal and moral obligation under the Constitution to take all steps necessary to prepare the qualified manpower of the nation so that it will function efficiently and effectively under the stress of modern battle conditions.
ADJUSTMENTS TO AID WORLD WAR II

During the national emergency just concluded, approximately 90,000 Negros, including reserve and volunteers, were selected for service in the armed forces. These men were obtained from a reservoir of approximately 9,453,000 Negros who registered for service. In the placement of the men who were accepted, the Negro encountered considerable difficulty. Leadership qualities had not been developed among the Negroes, due primarily to environment and lack of opportunity. These factors had also affected his development in the various skills and crafts.

CONSTRUCTIVE MEASURES

In the opinion of the Board, many of these difficulties can be overcome by forward planning and by the development of a broader base of trained personnel, both officer and enlisted, than that which existed prior to World War II. This increase should enable a much larger proportion of the available Negro manpower than was done heretofore.

RESULTS OF THE WAR

No study would be complete that failed to evaluate the collateral education gained by every Negro man and woman during the war years. The imprints of know-how of living and leadership skills, plus the increased financial resources, left a mental stamp which will persist and continue to become more articulate.

During the last few years, many of the concepts pertaining to the Negro have shown changing trends. They are pointing toward a more complete acceptance of the Negro in all the diversified fields of endeavor. This trend has been noticeable in a greater extent in the Northern and Western sections of the country. The Negro to a greater extent has been accepted in industry, and in administrative and scientific fields, both as individuals and groups, with good results. This acceptance has resulted in better wages which automatically raised his standard of living and opened new avenues for education. Many educational opportunities which have been afforded the Negro to expand his knowledge of the trades and skills. The latter have a ready market in the intricacies of a modern military machine.

Many Negroes who, before the war, were laborers, are now craftsmen, capable in many instances of competing with the white man on an equal basis. This change in the industrial status has, further, allowed the Negro to give his children more and better education. In many colleges and universities of the North and West, the Negro student is accepted solely on the basis of his individual merit and ability. This rise in the technical and cultural level of the Negro has, in turn, given him a more articulate voice in government.

RELATIVE EDUCATIONAL STATUS

The Negro's increasing capability for participation in society and government is evident from consideration of the facts below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Negroes</th>
<th>Other Whites</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>War I</td>
<td>War II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whites</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
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<td>world</td>
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<tr>
<td>states</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>world</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 8 years grade school</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 4 years high school</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 or more years of college</td>
<td>few</td>
<td>45%</td>
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</table>
Ratios of Negroes from the North

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World War I</th>
<th>World War II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Negroes who came from North of Mason-Dixon Line</td>
<td>1 to 5</td>
<td>1 to 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in Negro Participation in Government</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of all persons employed by Federal Government in Washington who were Negroes</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of Negroes whose jobs were essential</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Increases in Industrial Experience**

The great expansion of industry during the war gave the Negro greater opportunity to gain industrial experience than ever before. The War Munitions Board reports that Negro participation in defense industries increased from 3% in 1918 to 5.2% in 1919, since 1936. This increase in industrial experience is an important factor when considering manpower from the standpoint of national defense.

**PLANNING APPREHENSIONS FORWARD UTILIZATION**

These three factors of education, craftsmanship, and governmental participation have enhanced the military value of the Negro. A broader selectivity is now available than was heretofore possible, with a resultant beneficial effect on military efficiency.

**STATUS AND NATURE OF POLICY**

While the lessons learned from the service of the Negro in the war have been concluded here and are still fresh in our minds, the world is a whole is still military-minded. It is the considered opinion of this Board that a progressive policy for greater utilization of the Negro manpower be formulated and implemented now, when the nation is to establish its military structure on the experiences of the past. The nation should not fail to use the assets developed through a closer relationship of the races during the years of war.

The policies prepared by the War Department should be progressively flexible. They should maintain the continued mental and physical improvement of all citizens. They should be implemented mentally and physically by all citizens. They must, alike, at the earliest practicable moment, any special policies that would restrict the natural movement of the Negro on the basis of individual merit and ability. They should be translated towards a long-range objective which recognizes, over a period of time, a still greater utilization of this manpower potential in the military service of the nation.

**REQUIRED ACTION**

Immediate leadership in implementing the program is imperative. All hands must be agreed on the necessity for a straightforward, unprejudiced attitude towards the maintenance and preservation of a forward-thinking policy.

3. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF COMBAT PERFORMANCE—WORLD WAR II

1. General

A careful analysis of the combat service performed by the Negro in World War II indicates the following:

The participation of the Negro in World War II was in many instances
2. Disadvantages Inherent in the Negro

The records and testimony indicate that:

(a) Although it was definitely known that the Negro manpower would amount to approximately 10% of the manpower available for war, plans were not prepared prior to World War II for utilization and employment of major units of all arms. This resulted in some instances in a disproportionate allocation of lower bracket personnel to combat elements.

(b) Likewise, no provisions were made initially for utilizing the Negro manpower in supporting type combat units. These eventually enhanced all categories. This latter condition apparently resulted from the pressure initiated by the Negroes themselves.

(c) The initial lack of plans for the organization and utilization of the wide variety of combat units was reflected in frequent reorganization, reorganizing, and shifting from one type of training to another. For example, some engineers and artillery units were affected.

(d) The personnel mix, as noted previously, was segregated without definite T. of O. and R. and without a general prescription as to the missions for which organized. This was an expediency to offset the lack of plans when manpower was suddenly made available to large numbers.

(e) The above factors, when added to the defective lack of information as to ultimate time and place of assignment and mission to be assigned the various units, was undoubtedly confusing to the Negro alms and may have become a contributing cause for some of the reported failures in combat.

(f) Official reports on Negro units do not reflect many factors which may have been contributing causes of the sub-standard performance in combat.

An over-all far-reaching factor which affected adversely the efficiency of combat units of all types was the shortage of trained subordinate leaders. This shortage stemmed directly from limitations for which the Army was only partially at fault. Environment and lack of administrative and educational advantages in previous years greatly handicapped the Negro in the performance of his wartime duties.

3. Advantages Inherent in the Negro

Likewise, in estimating the combat record of performance, careful scrutiny must be given to the advantages which accrued to the units from the Negro manpower and from the resultant benefits derived therefrom. Consideration must be given to the facts that:

(a) First-class equipment and matériel, and ample munitions for training purposes, were made available.

(b) Favorable training areas and aids were placed at the disposal of Negro units. This, especially in combat units, assured training periods extended to ensure adequately trained units.

(c) Experienced white commanders were assigned to direct training and to lead the major elements into action.

(d) Combat units were carefully inserted into the theater of operations and all principles of command were briefed meticulously prior to entry into action.

(e) Decentralization and reorganization were practiced with the objective of enhancing the chances of success of the units involved.
b. Reductions of Force

Certain facts were derived from a careful check of the records and the testimony of commanders, observers and participants in the war just terminated, and arrived at after weighing the advantages and disadvantages previously outlined.

These are:

1. There is substantial evidence to indicate that the least proficient performance has been derived from combat units which were required to
   move with the enemy to accomplish a preordained mission.
2. In general, relatively slight losses were experienced by Negro
   infantry units.
3. There was ample evidence to show that in certain instances small
   infantry composite units, Negro platoons in white companies when skilfully
   led were constantly successful even though relatively heavy casualties
   were suffered.
4. The Board likewise was convinced from evidence that the Negro sol-
   dier will execute in satisfactory manner, combat duties in a supporting
   role until for example, an artillery battalion.
5. The Board unanimously indicated that the largest use of Negro manpower
   was in the service type units, and that in these field it demonstrated
   their highest degree of proficiency. Their greatest contribution was made
   directly in support of combat units, being to all intents and pur-
   poses a part of them. Many of these elements performed most creditably.

5. Summary

From the evidence presented by the most experienced commanders, the Board
cannot fail to conclude that the results obtained by all units are in direct propor-
tion to the leadership demonstrated. The failure of Negro units here in al-
most every case has been attributed to the lack of leadership qualities of junior
officers and non-commissioned officers. Leadership, therefore, must be stressed
and the development of all attributes which contribute to this end must be the
prime objective of those responsible for the training of the present Army. In
this respect, most benefit will be derived from the broader scope of activities
which have been opened to the Negro during five years of war.

A corollary to this first objective is clearly defined, for it leads di-
rectly toward the second objective:

Infantry must be made more effective. Then the quality of the close
combat element is composed either wholly or in part from the Negro component is relied
on to the level desired and expected, the Army of this nation will be immediately
improved.

In implementing the recommended program, all types of Negro units should
be included in the present Army. These units should eventually be offered by Negro
soldiers in the various branches of the armed forces, other than combat units.
In this respect, the Negro units, especially infantry units, in which the Negro has demonstrated
the least degree of efficiency, should be utilized to obtain the necessary initiative and
command ability on the part of the Negro soldier in order to improve his charac-
ter and skill. In general, the Board believes that is essential that Negro units
be trained to assume responsibility, make his moves, and

After weighing the evidence carefully and objectively, it seems evident
that certain essential actions can and must be taken. By so doing, the War Depart-
ment will enhance the military value of this potential and greatly increase the
efficiency of the armed forces of the nation.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Having considered the factual and other official materials made available by
the War Department and the oral testimony of over 60 military and civilian wit-

neesee, this Board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:

1. A comparison of the Selective Service Records in two areas indicates that the Negro manpower which may be expected to become available to the Army in case of another national emergency will no doubt exceed that of World War II.

2. Considering the advances made by the Negro civilian during the period between World War I and World War II and the increase in numbers available for military service, it is concluded that adequate plans were not prepared for the ultimate utilization of this manpower.

3. The advancement of the Negro in education, skills and crafts and resultant economic betterment definitely indicate that if prompt and adequate steps are taken at this time, a greater and more efficient use can be realized from this manpower in the military establishment of the future.

4. In the light of past experiences, it is believed that many of the difficulties and much of the confusion encountered in the placement of the Negro manpower during the Selective Service period of World War II could have been eliminated had War Department policies been fully implemented.

5. The experiences gained in the utilization of the Negro manpower in two major areas lead to the definite conclusion that if remedial action is taken by the War Department at this time, many of the apparent deficiencies of the Negro soldier can be eliminated and more efficient results derived from this manpower in the future.

6. Many of the deficiencies of leadership attributed to the Negro soldier in the past can be eliminated by creating in the Negro Army, for purposes of expansion, a broader Negro base of both officers and enlisted men to assist in the training of the Negro Army and to provide cadre and leaders to meet more efficiently the requirements of the Army in the event of a national emergency.

7. Creation of a broader Negro base in the present Army logically includes organization of appropriate elements of the female component.

8. To insure understanding and a basis for planning purposes there must be established a ratio of Negro to white manpower in the present Army. This ratio, for the present, should be that which exists in the civil population.

In World War II some type of Negro units demonstrated greater proficiency than others. In general, service units have performed in a more satisfactory manner than combat units. Likewise, some units have consistently better combat records than others. In organizing or activating Negro units to create a broader base in the present Army, it is concluded that combat units be stressed.

9. For efficient results, the implementation and progressive development of a general policy in preparation for full utilization of Negro manpower in a national emergency will require the closest cooperation and coordination with the War Department, between the War Department and field commanders, and between local commanders and local civil officials.

10. Creation of a War Department General Staff Group of selected officers, experienced in command, who can devote their time to problems involving minority racial elements in the military establishment is necessary to insure adequate and continuous coordination and cooperation in implementing policy. Creation for the same purpose of a similar group on the staff of each major command is necessary.

11. The War Department policy announced for the administration and utilization of minority groups in the present Army should be carefully coordinated with policies of the other services.

12. Testimony before this Board has indicated that units composed largely of personnel classified in the two lowest grades on the A.G.O.T. scale require more
officer supervision in training and in the field, these units composed of personnel of normal distribution. It is concluded, therefore, that assignment of officers to units including abnormal proportions of personnel in Grades JY and K on the L.O.C.T. scale is unnecessary when time is the critical factor, as it will be under war conditions or under a system of universal military training. This procedure is not necessary in the Regular Army in peacetime.

15. The training advantages accruing from a favorable climate or terrain conditions should be evaluated against the factor of unfavorable climate or terrain with the resultant effect on both training and service. Troop locations should be selected after a consideration of these opposing factors, the report being given in all cases to the fact that small armies committees are incapable of absorbing large numbers of military personnel regardless of race. Exceptions to this principle may be necessary in the event of universal military training, for general efficiency of the military establishment, or in the interest of national security.

16. Regardless of source or procurement and of racial heritage, all officers of all components of the Army should be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement as prescribed by law and regulation; and all officers should be required to meet the same standards for appointment, promotion, and retention in all components of the Army.

17. The sources of potential officer material can be increased and fostered through the adoption of a more comprehensive ROTC and an Army leadership school program.

18. Processing of all personnel entering the army, whether volunteers or reservists, through reception and training centers prepared and maintained the efficiency of the Army and will insure proper assignment of individuals.

19. The high enrollment rate of professional private in Negro units has in the past delayed entry into the service to such potential officer and non-commissioned officer material that the selection of leaders was difficult. This situation is accentuated by the necessity of training leaders who have proven incapable of developing into specialists in leadership from the service at breakdown of the first enlisted. Any policy implemented should initiate all those.

20. There are many phases in the framework of the career units as army installations where Negro personnel with special skills can be utilized to advantage. Periodic surveys of the installations are necessary to determine such positions.

21. Important and other experiences of World War II indicates clearly that the most successful employment of Negro units occurred when they were employed as units closely associated with white units in similar tasks, and a greater degree of success was obtained when small Negro organizations were as employed.

22. Experience, education and training are by the present and should be continued in effect.

23. The adoption and promulgation without delay of a broad, comprehensive and progressive policy for the utilization of Negro manpower in the service Army will eliminate the Negro's inferiority, eliminate some of the frustrations, improve morale, and facilitate the development of individual ability and leadership.

24. The adoption and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the Army will not in itself achieve the desired result.
Stages must be taken concurrently to inform and indoctrinate all ranks of the military establishment concerning the importance of the national security of the successful accomplishment of the program.

26. The approval and promulgation of a constructive and progressive policy involving the utilization of this manpower potential should be effected without delay, to ensure that the necessary measures are taken to capitalize on and benefit from the lessons learned in the school of war.

26. Existing laws, regulations and official publishations should be examined for determination of any conflict with the proposed policy concerning a greater utilization of Negro manpower.

27. Publication of the approved policy by the War Department will facilitate an understanding attitude inside as the press of the nation is concerned and thereby indicate that a progressive program aimed directly at the objective of more effective manpower utilization is being implemented.

IV. Recommendations

A. Policy

In order that authorized Negro manpower may be utilized with maximum efficiency during the present period, this Board recommends that the War Department adopt, promulgate and implement the following policy:

To utilize the Negro manpower in the present Army in a broader professional field than has hitherto been the case; through the medium of installations and organizations, to facilitate the development of leaders and specialists to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded war Army.

B. Implementation of Policy

In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized manpower of the service in the event of a national emergency, it is further recommended:

1. That combat and service units be organized and activated from the Negro manpower available in the present Army to meet the requirements of training and expansion and in addition qualified individuals be utilized in appropriate special and service units.

2. That the proportion of Negro to white manpower as exists in the civil population be the accepted ratio for creating a loyal base in the present Army.

3. That Negro units organized or activated for the present Army conform in general to other units of the present Army but the maximum strength of type units should not exceed that of an infantry regiment or comparable organization.

4. That in the event of universal military training in peacetime additional officer supervision is applied to units which have a greater than normal percentage of personnel falling into A.D.C.R. classifications IV and V.

5. That a staff group of selected officers whose background has included command be formed within the G-1 Division of the Army to assist in the planning, implementation, implementation, and training of policies affecting all racial minorities.

6. That there be accepted into the regular Army an unspecified number of qualified Negro officers after officers similarly selected for appointment in the regular establishment be those from units with experience in World War II.
that all officers, regardless of race, be required to meet the same standard for appointment.

6. That all officers, regardless of race, be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement; and be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion and retention in all components of the Army.

7. That Negro officers meet requirements for exaction of the regular establishment and for replacements be procured from the following sources:

(a) Reserve officers, including ROTC graduates, who shall be eligible for active duty training and service in accordance with any progress established for officers of like component and status.
(b) Candidates from the ranks.
(c) Graduates of the United States Military Academy.
(d) Other sources utilized by the Army.

8. That all enlisted men, whether volunteers or selectees, be rotated through reception and training centers, or other installations of a similar nature to insure proper classification and assignment of individuals.

9. That reenlistment be denied to Negro Army soldiers who meet only the minimum standards.

10. That surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel.

11. That groupings of Negro units with white units in composite organizations be continued in the postwar Army as a policy.

12. The principle that Negro units of the postwar Army be stationed in localities where community attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute an undue burden to the local civilian population be adopted; exceptions to this principle to be presented on the basis of military necessity and in the interest of national security.

13. That at posts, camps and stations where both Negro and white soldiers are assigned for duty, the War Department policies regarding use of recreational facilities and membership in officers’ clubs, messes or similar social organizations be continued in effect.

14. That commanders of organizations, installations and stations containing Negro personnel be fully cognizant of their responsibilities in the execution of the overall War Department policy; and conversely that they be permitted maximum latitude in the solution of purely local problems.

15. That the War Department, concurrently with promulgation of the approved policy, take steps to insure the distribution of all ranks throughout the service as to the necessity for an unreserved acceptance of the provisions of the policy.

16. That approval and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the postwar Army be accomplished with the least practicable delay.

17. That upon approval of this policy steps be initiated within the War Department to amend or rescind such laws and official publications as are in conflict therewith.
10. That the proposed policy as approved by the War Department, with reference to the utilization of the Negro manpower in the future may be considered and made public.

/s/ Allen C. Gillepsie, Jr.
/s/ Lewis B. Fish
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Maj. Gen., U. S. Army
Chairman
Member

/s/ Winfield S. Morde
/s/ A. B. Weidick
Brig. Gen., U. S. Army
Brig. Gen., U. S. Army
Member
Recorder, without vote

APPENDIX

The Board of Officers, in a supplementary memorandum, approved the following statement with respect to the objectives of its Report:

"Objectives: The Board visualizes at this time only two objectives:

1. The Initial Objective: The utilization of the proportionate ratio of the manpower made available to the military establishment during the present period, the manpower potential to be deployed and tested as indicated by pertinent recommendations.

2. The Ultimate objective: The effective use of all manpower made available to the military establishment in the event of a major mobilization at some unknown date against an undetermined aggressor. The manpower to be utilized, in the event of another major war, in the Army without regard to assignments or races.

"Here, and if such a contingency arises, the manpower of the nation should be utilized in the best interests of the national security.

The Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this time, intermediate objectives, between the first and ultimate objectives, that may prove either desirable and advantageous or in accord with conditions which may obtain at the time of their occurrence."

[NOTE: 20 Apr 41]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

OFFICIAL:
HERBERT C. WILKIN
Assistant Secretary
The Adjutant General

[signature]

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Chief of Staff