The Decision for Peace

Interview of Sakonoe, Hitachane, a career government official, and Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Suzuki cabinet, from a report of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey.

Q. When was the Suzuki cabinet appointed?
A. April 7, 1945.

Q. Was it the expectation that this Cabinet would consider ways of making peace?
A. The Prime Minister, Mr. Suzuki, doubted the possibility of our continuing the war, so right after the Cabinet was formed he ordered me to examine the details of the Japanese fighting power and to advise whether it was sufficient to continue the war. I reached the conclusion at the end of April, rather the beginning of May, that Japan could not continue the war.

Q. What factors led you to this conclusion?
A. Our inability to manufacture airplanes, the amount of factory damage from bombing, ship losses and damage, the food situation, and the sentiment of the people. The official government propagandists always insisted on ultimate victory of Japan, but the people had doubt because at the time of the Okinawa battle the military said that they could defend Okinawa, but Okinawa fell. When the first B-29s came to Tokyo, Army fighter planes went up and tried to fight them, but as the raids continued, the number of defending fighter planes which rose was gradually less and less. The people saw this, and it gave them some idea of the fighting power of Japan. There were so many rumors that the fall crops were going to be destroyed by American farmers that they were very anxious about their food. I think it is an old Japanese proverb which says that an insect was inside the lion and the lion was killed by the insect. During the time Hoshina (Noshi) Hoshina headed the Cabinet Planning Board under one of Koyano's cabinets, and Tojo's Chief Cabinet Secretary, said so to some of my colleagues that he thought Sakonoe was the insect inside the lion. I think Mr. Suzuki was the lion. The Emperor liked Mr. Suzuki. He spoke with Mr. Suzuki and with the former Prime Ministers, for example, my father-in-law, [Adm. Konishi] Ichida, who are sort of older statesmen.

Q. Did the Emperor have access to the foreign rules?
A. I don't think so. Then also there were the members of the Imperial Household Ministry who were always against war.

Q. How did you go about finding out the sentiment of the people?
A. I listened to what they said, in the stores, on the streets, and so on. They did not know the number of airplanes we had, or the iron manufacturing capacity, but they could feel what the situation was. You can't stop them from feeling, you know.

Q. Did you have any organized method, like the Gallup system?
A. No, there was no organization. But I saw so many people every day. As many as 20 or 30 people came to see me every day. I knew well what the actual position was with regard to Japan's manufacturing capacity, because I was an officer of the Cabinet Planning Board at one time.

Q. How long?
A. 1941-42 and 1943-44, during part of the Tojo and part of the Koiso cabinets. When I was in the Tojo cabinet, I tried to break it up. You know, there is an old Japanese proverb which says that an insect was inside the lion and the lion was killed by the insect. Hoshina (Noshi) Hoshina, head of the Cabinet Planning Board under Koyano's cabinet, and Tojo's Chief Cabinet Secretary, said to some of my colleagues that he thought Sakonoe was the insect inside the lion.

Q. You were not happy working with Hoshina?
A. No, but I knew him very well. We were both in the Finance Ministry together before the Mutsuhito incident. I guess he wanted me in the Planning Board because he knew I had some skill in planning. I planned many things, but Tojo moved most of them, and especially I would not listen to anything about the sentiment of the people. I thought Tojo did not know how to stop the war. He knew how to start one, but not how to stop it. You know, when I was learning to drive a car in
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New York, the teacher told me that before I could learn to drive the car I must first learn how to stop it. Before Tojo the cabinet breakers were always Raising a question without any manner. They have played a particularly important role in Japanese history, and always have been connected with the military. Under Tojo, all the cabinet were urged to him because he was the military's man. Under Tojo they obeyed him.

Of course, I could not indulge in any propaganda against Tojo, because I was in the Cabinet, but I believe that Okada and I were the center of the opposition to Tojo. It took just 1 year to do it. You may wonder why Okada disliked Tojo as I shall tell you the story. Before the war Tojo gathered together all the central Prime Ministers and explained why he was going to start the war. Okada, [Adm. Mitsubishi] Yenai, and [Bosan Reijirō] Washinaga did not agree. Okada asked Tojo about the condition of Japan's merchant shipping. Tojo explained that we might lose 80,000 tons per month, and I don't remember the exact amount of new construction he mentioned, but it was by his calculations more than enough to make up for what was lost. Okada said his estimate was wrong. And the fact was that Okada was right. It was as he said. We lost less, well, maybe 300,000 or 400,000 tons per month. Our capacity for building was 500,000 tons per year, but we couldn't build that much because we never did have the materials. There were many, many shipyards which were idle during the war for this reason. So Okada says that Tojo is a liar. No, that is not the word, that he has no sense for estimating the facts.

Q: You said a few minutes ago that it took just a year to accomplish your project against Tojo. I wonder if you would give us the story of what happened in that year?

A: First we tried to [Marquis Keiki] Kido (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) because he could nominate the Prime Minister. Of course, the Emperor formally nominated him, but it was Kido who actually did it. And we went to Tojo, and it would be best for him to resign. Tojo decided to accept his cabinet because Mr. Kishi [Prime Minister of Commerce and Industry] and [Mano] Shigemitsu came over to our side. This was just before the Kōrensō campaign. Tojo asked Yenai to be Minister without portfolio. Okada asked a meeting of the former Prime Ministers, and they decided that Yenai should not enter the Tojo government, so Tojo was compelled to resign. General Abe accepted his invitation, but Tojo could not stand up against the solid opposition of the former Prime Ministers.

Okada tried to get them to build a Cabinet of peace-minded people, and the Army fought against it. Katō was an old soldier, but outside of the government he had been very critical of Tojo, so we expected that Katō might do something, but he was not strong enough to fight the military. I think it was a pity that Katō ever came in as Prime Minister.

Then Suzuki was appointed. His decision meant a change in the tendency of operation of the government. The Emperor for the first time could express his own opinions, I think. Many of the lower officials in the government, like me, had had official conferences in which we might say something like, "How can we continue the war without itself?" Next day the Kōrensō would come to my office and say, "We hear that at a meeting last night you expressed doubt of final victory." All were afraid of the Kōrensō.

Well I came to the conclusions I have told you about before, and Suzuki decided I was right. He went to the Emperor and came back a short while later. He said to me that we must not make any steps toward peace. This was in the middle of May. So we asked Hiranuma, Kōshi [former Prime Minister] to speak with the Russian Ambassador [Joseph Alex. Andreieff] Malkin in private conversation. He did so on several occasions, sounding out the Russian attitude toward interfering with America. In the beginning it looked as if we might be successful, but the talks never reached a successful conclusion. In May Germany collapsed, as you know, and after that the War Minister [Gen. Kōzō Matsukata] asked the Cabinet for a conference in the presence of the Emperor to decide the fundamental principle of the war—whether to continue it or not. Of course, we [laughing] had had many rehearsals of that meeting.

The military insisted upon continuing, but I and others had different ideas, although we couldn't actually advocate the stopping of the war because the MPs were still around. I drafted the memorandum for the conference, and I started it with the statement that we should try to accomplish the war and keep the Emperor's reign intact and keep the home land. Of course, the military read it and said it accomplished its meaning that the war should be continued, but it was followed by the detail which I had collected for my report to Mr. Suzuki. The whole thing was presented at the conference in the presence of the Emperor. Those attending were
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the Prime Minister, the war Minister, the Navy Minister (Yasuaki), the Army Chief of Staff (Gen. Yoshibori Umezu), the Chief of the Naval General Staff (Admiral Isoroku Toyoda), and the Foreign Minister (Shigenori Togo). Each expressed his own opinion, but none expressed his real feelings. But if you read the details of my memorandum, it is clear that the war had to stop. The Emperor himself read the report as well as the others. This was on the ninth of June. At that time the Emperor told nothing.

On the 25th of June the Emperor, by his own will, called a meeting of the Prime Minister and the others I just mentioned who were in the meeting of June 8th. (At this point S. explained that the Cabinet had to present a written request for permission to hold a conference in the presence of the Emperor, but the Emperor could call me at his own initiative at any time, although he rarely did so.) The Emperor told them that the conclusion in the memorandum presented in the conference of June 9th seemed to be very paradoxical. He knew the real meaning of the conclusion. He said, "I think it is necessary for us to have a plan to close the war at once as well as one to defend the home islands." (S. explained that at that time the Army was making much of the plan to destroy the American forces when they landed on the home islands.)

As a result of this new statement by the Emperor, Suzuki decided to stop the war. After the meeting, when Mr. Suzuki came back, he said to me, "Today the Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say but was afraid to say."

Q. What was the reaction of the military to this decision?

A. No one understood and approved the idea. The War Minister, Anami, also approved, but he could not express his real feelings of the generals around him and the fear of retribution.

After that the government decided to send Prince Konoe to Russia and asked Russia if he would be present. The Russians said that they could not decide on the matter unless they received from the Japanese government an expression of in more detail of the purpose of the Prince's mission. We sent a cable to Ambassador (Nestorov) Gogol in Moscow to explain the mission, as follows:

1. To make an improvement in relations between Russia and Japan (this in view of the recent denunciation of the Neutrality Pact).
2. To ask the USSR to intervene with the United States in order to stop the war.

The Russian answer was that Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for the conference at Potsdam, so an answer to the Japanese request could not be given until they returned. We wanted an answer before the conference, but we just couldn't have it, so there was nothing to do but wait.

Suzuki and I felt quite dejected about the Russian attitude toward our proposal. Then on June 26th came the Potsdam Declaration. Suzuki, Togo, and I talked together, and we felt that this declaration must be accepted as the final terms of peace (surrender), whether we liked it or not. Still the military side of the government said that the terms of the proclamation were "too dishonorable."

On the 29th of August, early in the morning, about 2 o'clock, the bell rang beside my bed. (My own house was bombed in April and I moved to my official residence. That was bombed in May, so I moved my bed into my office, and I stayed there 24 hours a day. In the morning when I got dressed, I would put on my hat and walk through the building, return to my office and hang up my hat. That I called coming to the office. At night I would again put on my hat and walk through the building the same way. That was coming home from the office.) When the bell rang beside my bed, it was Anami telling me that President Truman had announced that the atomic bombs had been used at Hiroshima. I already knew that the Hiroshima damage had been very severe and that it had been caused by just one airplane. Everyone said that America had used a new bomb, but they didn't think it was an atomic bomb because many scientists had told us that no country could finish the atomic bomb for use in the war.

The military said that it was probably a 6-ton bomb bursting in the air. They made their calculations, but found that a 6-ton bomb could not do that much damage. They suggested that it might be a 100-ton bomb. After the announcement we sent some scientists to Hiroshima, and they reported that it was a real atomic bomb.

*Asked in relation, why the military permitted the attack in Russia, if it were bombs in accordance of the Potsdam Declaration, Schafer replied: "The War Minister (Anami) knew of our regulations, but he never told my military staff. For that I blame Mr. Anami. And that is why he committed suicide." He continued: "On the outside and officially he pretended that we were maintaining the war, but inside himself he had made his decision that it must be brought to a stop. He alone could have broken the treaty without anyone. It shows his character that he didn't, despite what he knew of our regulations. Yosihiko Umezu, shows, expressed his idea that the war should be stopped, and that is one way of being a brave man. Mr. Anami saved another..."*
When this news came in on the morning of the 7th, I called the Prime Minister on the phone and reported the announcement. Everyone in the government and even in the military knew that if the announcement were true, no country could carry on a war. Without the atomic bomb it would be impossible for any country to defend itself against a nation which had the weapon.

The chance had come to end the war. It was not necessary to blame the military, the manufacturing people, or anyone else; just the atomic bomb. It was a great rescue. Someone said that the atomic bomb was the Ramses to save Japan.

Q: How long do you think the war would have continued if the atomic bomb had not been used?

A: We had already asked the Russians to intercede, and we could expect that they would eventually give us some answer. If it had been unfavorable, there was just one way to bring peace and that was to broadcast directly to the United States. But it would have been hard to find a good chance to do so. I think you can understand. Suzuki tried to find a chance to stop the war and the atomic bomb gave him that chance.

I asked the Cabinet Board of Information to put all the information about the atomic bomb in the newspapers and on the radio, in order to tell the people just how feared it was. But the General Staff Information Office stopped it. They tried hard to emphasize that the people need not fear the atomic bomb if they were in shelters. I had much struggling with the Chief of Military Information. All the Cabinet Board of Information was finally allowed to say was that the atomic bomb had been used at Hiroshima. This item appeared in the morning papers on August 8. Of course, all the intellectuals knew the meaning of the announcement, because there had been so many stories about atomic power. I wanted all the people to understand the meaning of the bomb, but it took a full day just to get the bare announcement released.

On the morning of August 7, Suzuki and Togo (Foreign Minister) conferred and reported the news to the Emperor. They also gave their opinion that this was the chance to accept the Potsdam Declaration. Still the War Minister could not make up his mind; publicly, openly.

Early on the morning of August 9 the bell beside my bed rang again, and Densho reported that Russia had declared war on us. I previously had a

4 Meaning that without it the war would have continued until Japan was no more.
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two military assistants, the War Minister saw what was meant, and it gave him his chance. On the surface this was a negligible event, but it really is not.
The conference lasted for 3 hours. I walked in two or three times, and each time everyone was very deep in his chair, and they said nothing. The atmosphere was very gloomy and very cold. Afterwards the Prime Minister came out and told me that two opinions had been expressed and no agreement had been reached.

1. To accept the Potosan Declaration unconditionally, with the understanding that the Potosan Proclamation did not include the requirement that the Emperor's legal position be altered.

2. To accept the Potosan Declaration with the following conditions: First, that the Allied forces would not occupy the home islands, except the small islands off the coast; second, that the Japanese military and naval forces abroad would be withdrawn by the Japanese government and disarmed and demobilized; third, all war crimes should be punished by the Japanese government.

Suzuki said that he, Yonai, and Togo were in favor of the first opinion; that Amami, Umezu (Army Chief of Staff), and Togo (Chief of Naval General Staff) favored the second opinion.

Then I said, "Let me have the Cabinet conference." He agreed and I arranged for it at 1 p.m. Sixteen ministers were in attendance. They were gathered about a big round table. As Chief Secretary, I sat at a small secretarial desk on one side. When the meeting opened, Togo (Foreign Minister) explained the details of the former Cabinet meeting. About nine ministers agreed with the first opinion (unconditional acceptance of Potosan Proclamation), four with the second opinion (conditional acceptance), and three were on the fence. (These took such positions on the three conditions in the second opinion were too many, that two were enough, that the Prime Minister should take the decision and the rest should follow.) The Cabinet meeting continued until 8 p.m. with one hour out for dinner. Toward the end I wrote a note to Suzuki suggesting that he had better declare an internment. This he shortly announced.
The Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, and I then met in the Prime Minister's room, and I told Suzuki that it was apparent that the Cabinet conference was unable to reach a decision. I asked him what he thought we should do. Then he said, "How about this? Go to the Emperor, report the conferences in detail, and get the Emperor's own decision." I said that it would be better to have an inner Cabinet meeting in the Emperor's presence and let all the members express personally their own views. Suzuki agreed, and I proceeded to make the arrangements.

To hold a cabinet meeting in the presence of the Emperor, it is necessary to prepare a document stating the purpose of the meeting, over the signatures of the Prime Minister, the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff. I wrote this document and got the signatures. It was taken to the Emperor and he agreed to the meeting.
The conference with the Emperor was held at 11:30 p.m. (the Cabinet meeting was still in session.) I read the text of the Potosan Declaration. It was very hard to do because the words of the declaration are very hard; the contents were not cheerful things to read in the presence of the Emperor. Then the Foreign Minister expressed his opinion, and the other ministers, all of them, expressed theirs, in the morning conference. About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 10th, the Prime Minister stood up and made the following announcement: "We have discussed this question for a long time and everyone has expressed his own opinion sincerely without any conclusion being reached. The situation is urgent, so any delay in coming to a decision should not be tolerated. I am therefore prepared to ask the Emperor his own wish and to decide the conference's conclusion on that basis. His wish should settle the time, and the government should follow it."

(At this point Sakurada explained very casually that this was a very delicate and unusual procedure, that under the Constitution the Emperor cannot decide anything by himself, that there is no constitutional procedure for the Emperor to express his wishes in matters of policy, and that the Emperor must always follow the government's advice.)

Suzuki stepped two or three steps away from the Emperor and asked him to express his own opinion. The Emperor just bowed toward and told Suzuki to go back to his seat. The Emperor then started to express his own opinion. "I agree with the first opinion as expressed by the Foreign Minister. I think I should tell the reason why I have held to so thinking about the world situation and the internal Japanese situation, he continued the war must go on, but the destruction of the whole nation. My ancestors and myself have always wished to put forward the nation's welfare and international peace in our prime concern. To continue the war..."
now means that cruelty and bloodshed will still continue in the world and that the Japanese nation will suffer severe damage. So to stop the war on this occasion is the only way to save the nation from destruction and to preserve peace in the world. Looking back at what our military headquarters have done, it is apparent that their performance has fallen far short of the plans expressed. I don’t think this discrepancy can be corrected in the future. But when I think of the ordinary citizens abroad and of those who died or were wounded in battle, about those who have lost their property or lives by bombing in the home land, when I think of all these sacrifices, I cannot help but feel sad. (Zakihara said that the Emperor used very heated emotional words in this part of the statement, and because of them the members of the Cabinet cried openly.)

I decided that this war should be stopped, however, in spite of this sentiment and for more important considerations.

Mr. Suzuki then said, “The Imperial decision has been expressed. This should be the conclusion of the conference.” It then was about 3 a.m. on August 10.

We went back to the Cabinet offices and reconvened the Cabinet meeting. The Prime Minister reported the Emperor’s decision. All the members agreed to it and signed the document (advising the Emperor that the Potsdam Declaration should be accepted unconditionally). I forget to say that the conference in the presence of the Emperor was attended by (Baron Kitazawa) Hiranuma, President of the Privy Council. This he did at the Emperor’s special request. A Privy Council resolution is essential for the ratification of the international agreement, such as the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, but there was not time to assemble the full Privy Council. They are old men, living all over the country, and it would have taken a considerable period to assemble them all for a formal session. To save time, I advised the Prime Minister that this should be omitted. So Mr. Suzuki asked the Emperor to call Baron Hiranuma into the meeting. Hiranuma agreed with the first opinion (unconditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration), and his agreement was sufficient to consolidate acceptance by the Privy Council.

The cable of acceptance was sent early, about 7 o’clock, on the morning of the 11th through the Swedish and Swiss Governments. About 9:00 on the 12th we received a broadcast from San Francisco giving us your government’s answer, but we did not receive the official written document through the neutral countries until about 10:00 on the morning of the 11th.

There was little difference between the broadcast version and the official text. We studied the former the whole day on the 12th, the unofficial document. On the afternoon of the 13th, San Francisco broadcasted that the Japanese reply was very late and stated that in a result it might be necessary to bomb Tokyo. (Meanwhile we had heard from a prisoner of war, A B-29 pilot, that your government planned to use the atomic bomb on Tokyo on the 15th.) I was very much worried. So I asked Doi to broadcast that the Japanese government had not yet received the official reply of the American Government. This broadcast was stopped by the military on the grounds that they were afraid the military forces abroad would pick it up, guess that something was going on, and the effects on morale would be serious. The military refused to permit Doi to send anything. I was very afraid of the possibility that the atomic bomb would be used against us again. So on my own responsibility I told Doi to make the broadcast despite the military.

That was about 5 p.m. Fifteen minutes later San Francisco said that they could understand why the Japanese reply was late. Immediately thereafter several high officials of the military came to me and asked me why I had told Doi to issue this broadcast. They had been to the Doi’s official and had been told that I had ordered the broadcast despite the military objections and would take complete responsibility. This conversation was repeated several times with the military officials, but nothing came of it, and no harm was
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done to me. You see, the military were very hard to catch the Emperor's decision to accept the
Potsdam Declaration unconditionally.
The official answer of your government was re-
ceived on the morning of the 18th, as you know.
We had a Cabinet meeting beginning at 1 p.m.
The discussion was confined entirely to the part
which said that the ultimate form of the Japanese
Government should be decided by the Japanese
people themselves. Some said that this meant ac-
ceptance of our proposal, while others said that it
was a refusal.
It is difficult to explain the second opinion, that
this was a refusal of our offer. (Sakuraba passed
at this point, reflecting.) I forget to say earlier
that in our talks with the United States, which I
drafted myself, I had stated that the "legal position"
of the Emperor should not be altered. Himona,
President of the Privy Council, who is a very theo-
retical nationalist, believed that the "prerogatives"
of the Emperor were derived from the Constitu-
tion, so that the position of the Emperor is not a
legal but a natural one. He, therefore, insisted
that the word "prerogatives" be substituted for
"legal position." That was all we meant by the
statement anyhow, but I was over-ruled.
About 10 ministers held the opinion that the
American offer was acceptable, that the Japanese
people could decide the ultimate form of the
government. Three believed that it was unacceptable
because the Emperor's position should not be de-
dependent upon the people. Again no conclusion
for the conference was reached, and we declared an
intemission about 8 p.m.
I thought that another conference in the pres-
ence of the Emperor would be necessary, but I saw
that was too good to be possible when the mem-
bers of the military staff came to see me and said,
"You need a trick of some kind to get the Imperial
decision."? They thought I had arranged
and staged everything. Nevertheless I asked the
military chiefs of staff to sign a request for a sec-
ond conference in the presence of the Em-
peror. They refused. They did not want the
Emperor's decision to be apparent.
(All this was going on while the Cabinet session
was in intermission, so you can see, these inter-
missions are a very convenient thing.) I wanted
to do something. The military had closed one path to a
decision. I was very tired, and I thought it would
be a good thing if we all got some sleep that night.
But San Francisco was still broadcasting, and I was
afraid of that atomic bomb. I suggested to Sunaki
that the cabinet meeting should be postponed until
morning and that I would talk with the military
people that night. I said I would talk with them,
but I had no idea how I would get through them.
The two chiefs of staff had a talk with the For-

ger Minster all that night. They wanted him to
put the question to the American government again,
to get the answer more exactly. The Foreign
Minister told them that that would mean curtailing
the slim string of communication between the two
countries, so he would not agree. They pressed
him all night. I stayed with them until 2 a.m.
The Foreign Minister insisted that we had been
able to establish a very delicate relation with the
American Government, that to ask the question
again would be construed as a refusal, which would
result in the destruction of communications be-
tween the two governments.

Early on the 19th the Prime Minister came to the
office about 6 a.m. I said, "Did you sleep well?"
He said, "Yes, did you?" I said, "One half hour."
At 2 a.m. I had asked Sunaki, completely on my
own responsibility, to broadcast that the Japanese
Government had almost decided to accept the reply
of the American Government. The military people
were very angry with Sunaki, and they (Sunaki)
reminded me to explain that I had ordered it.
But that is a minor point.
Sunaki told me, "What shall we do now?" I
suggested that he go to the Imperial Palace and ask
the Emperor to call a conference of the Cabinet, the
two chiefs of staff and Himona in the Emperor's
presence. The Emperor can do that at any time,
although the government cannot request such a
meeting without the signatures of the chiefs of staff
on the request document. Mr. Sunaki went to
the Palace and returned about 10 o'clock. Im-
mediately after the return, a telephone call came
from the Imperial Household Ministry summoning
all three people to a conference. All were in
formal clothes, but with the permission of the Im-
perial Household Ministry, we all went as we were.
The 16 Cabinet Ministers, the 2 chiefs of staff,
Barron Himona, the directors of the Bureau of
Military and Naval Affairs, and I were present at
the conference. Mr. Sunaki announced that the
Emperor had called us to discuss the matter of the
American reply in his presence, so that everyone
who had an opinion should express it freely. Anson
(War Minister), Gen. Umezu (Chief of Staff), and
Adm. Toyoda (Naval Chief of Staff) expressed the
opinion that the American message was insufficient,
so that we had better ask them again for a more
concrete answer or, if that were impossible, to
phases on a raid, but I soon discovered it was an attack by 50 or 60 Japanese soldiers. I immediately left the building by an underground passage, and went to the Metropolitan Police Headquarters. The machine-gun fire lasted only 2 or 3 minutes, they entered the building and, finding no one of any importance around, tried to set fire to it. They left in about 30 minutes and went to the private residence of Mr. Suzuki, which they burned to the ground. Just 5 minutes before they arrived, I had called the Prime Minister, told him of the attack on the Cabinet offices, and suggested that he should go out at once, as it seemed likely that they would go next to his private residence.

At the Metropolitan Police Station, I found that the Imperial Household Ministry had been occupied by a military force who were trying to get the record of the Emperor's broadcast and destroy it before it could be put on the air. They did not succeed in looting it. (Gen. Shimizu's) Tanaka (Commander of the Eastern District Army, Tokyo) spoke to the leaders of the group, trying to persuade them to vacate the premises, and he finally succeeded about 7 o'clock in the morning.

At noon on the 13th of August, the broadcast of the Emperor's speech to the people was made.

Q: I understand that the attack on the Cabinet offices did not come completely as a surprise to you?

A: Informed people suspected that something was going on as early as the 12th or 13th. Posters were put up in the Ginza and elsewhere saying people to kill "the Degeneration of Japan, Suzuki, Sakurada, Yosui, Oshida, Togo, and Hirose". Hinana's name was left off all of the posters and leaflets. The poster said they were put up by "Rancho" who were connected with the military.

Then on the 15th, all the military airplanes came out. They had not gone up to attack the B-29's for a long time, but they all came out then, hundreds of them, and spread leaflets saying, "We will continue the war" and "The Imperial Receipt is a forgery."

For one month, I lived with two policemen at all times, and at the recommendation of the police I changed my sleeping place every night. It was not so bad, but the tire problem was difficult, as it is mentioned, and moving all the time I could not get proper rations for me and my two bodyguards.

This was the second time I had had machine gun turned on me, the first being the February 151 incident, when I was secretary to my father-in-law, Oshida, the Prime Minister. Then I was not a marked man, as they were after the Prime Minister himself. This was the second time, when they were really after me. I may not be so lucky the third time.

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