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By NLT-HL RRS, Date 11-13-80

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SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS

CHINA We are instructing Ambassador Stuart that we have no intention of again offering our good offices as mediator in China and that the US must not give any indication of support or encouragement for a Chinese coalition government including the Communists. At the same time Stuart should avoid indicating overt US opposition to a compromise settlement, since this might imply US support and encouragement of the present civil war.

KOREA Our political adviser in Seoul points out that, since the whole chain of events now taking place in our relations with Korea is based on a General Assembly resolution, we might lose all that we have gained if we initiate the withdrawal of troops, with publicity, before the General Assembly has again considered the Korea problem and reached some decision on it.

PALESTINE We are advising our Embassy in London that we feel the US and UK should avoid any action which appears contrary to the UN resolution on Palestine but should rather work for improvements in the partition decision, secured through Arab-Jewish negotiations, which will make it more acceptable to both parties. We concur in the British view that political or economic union between the Arab and Jewish states in Palestine is unrealistic and impractical. We continue to believe that Jerusalem should not be placed under the sole authority of either side and that some degree of UN responsibility is still essential, perhaps through a condominium including the Jewish and Arab states. We would favor having the UN Mediator lay down a frontier between the two states which could only be changed through the United Nations.

GERMANY Ambassador Smith reports that while yesterday's sessions with Molotov began in a cooler atmosphere than before, Molotov did not as on previous occasions reject our position in Berlin, nor did he assert that quadripartite control in Germany had lapsed. His conversation seemed to be generally exploratory, and as the discussions progressed he grew more reasonable. At one point Smith felt that Molotov was prepared to accept the western position, but he finally stated that he would refer the question to his government and report back later.