



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

August 2, 1948

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402
State Dept. Guidelines, June 12, 1979

By NLT: ALC NARS, Date 11-13-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS

PALESTINE Bernadotte has informed Macdonald, our Consul General in Jerusalem, that he is very disappointed and discouraged with the lack of support from the United Nations and particularly the US in providing him with the necessary personnel and equipment and that he is not prepared to continue in his task under such conditions. Macdonald says that it is perfectly true that Bernadotte cannot accomplish his task with the small force he now has, that the situation is steadily deteriorating, making it more difficult and probably impossible to demilitarize Jerusalem. Macdonald feels that the resignation of Bernadotte at this time would preclude any possibility of the United Nations finding a solution to the Palestine problem and that the US would be blamed by both sides for the consequences. Bernadotte has requested a Marine unit of 85 men to guard demilitarized areas in Jerusalem for 60 to 90 days when he hopes an international force can have been recruited. Macdonald states that our proposal that Jewish-Arab police force be recruited is impracticable due to the deeply rooted hatred on both sides. Bevin has instructed British representatives in Transjordan to emphasize to Bernadotte the necessity of setting up machinery as soon as possible to handle truce violations.

BERLIN Ambassador Smith and the British and French representatives will be received by Stalin at 9:00 P.M. today, Moscow time. Molotov told Smith in his preliminary interview that he hoped Smith would understand that the measures taken in Berlin were necessitated by the action of the western powers following the London conference with respect to currency and the implementation of the decisions of the conference.

We have informed Douglas that we are firmly convinced that, in the event the conversations in Moscow fail, the Berlin question should be referred to the Security Council; Douglas states that he believes the British will agree to this approach. As the Soviet veto would bar any formal Security Council action, we believe that the form of our approach to the Council becomes largely a matter of adopting a course which will enable the largest number of favorable votes to be cast. We have prepared a preliminary draft of a note to be sent to the Soviets in the event of the failure of the talks in which we state that the Soviet action constitutes a grave encroachment on the military position of the US and that, if the blockade is not promptly lifted, we shall have no choice but to request the Security Council to take the matter under consideration as a threat to the peace.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~