ATTACHED IS SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE
LAST SEVEN MONTHS OF THE WALLACE-TAYLOR
CAMPAIGN FOR RELEASE IN MORNING PAPERS,
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1948.
HENRY A. WALLACE
THE LAST SEVEN MONTHS OF HIS PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

(Please credit Americans for Democratic Action in using this analysis of the final phase of the Wallace campaign.)

AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION
PUBLIC SERVICE FOUNDATION
1740 K Street, N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.
This is primarily an attempt to highlight the major developments of the Progressive Party campaign. While the record cited here is necessarily incomplete, we believe that the presentation of additional evidence would merely sustain our contentions and conclusions.

A similar analysis of the first three months of the Wallace-Dyler campaign was issued by Americans for Democratic Action last April.
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In the first three months of his campaign Wallace's travels and speeches were not widely reported. While there was evidence that Communists had initiated the Third Party and captured key posts in it, there was little public debate on the issue — partly because election day was a long way off.

When in late April, President Philip Murray of the CIO went before the Textile Workers Convention and delivered a scathing attack on the Wallace movement, the press and the public took notice. Murray said he had "found out a great deal more" about the Third Party since the CIO Board refused to endorse it. He stated:

"I charge in this mighty convention that the Communist Party is directly responsible for the organization of a Third Party in the United States. It was inaugurated at a Communist Party meeting in the City of New York in October of 1947."

Murray removed from the realm of speculation any hope that the majority in the CIO would support Wallace.

Wallace's campaign manager, C. A. Baldwin, countered with the statement that Murray's charge was "false and nonsensical."

But the evidence mounted.

Alfred Friendlich in a copyrighted piece in the "WASHINGTON POST" on May 2 filled in the details of the Murray charge. The article is appended to this document.

On May 14, Louis Hollander, President of the New York State CIO Council and vice-president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers told his union that three union leaders — Michael Quill, vice-president, N. Y. CIO Council, Ruth Young of the US and Irving Petenis, vice-president of the Fur Workers, dropped opposition to the Third Party "in order from the international political cartel" after the CIO endorsed the Marshall Plan.

News of these frontal attacks was received at the Wallace HQ simultaneously with reports of internal party differences over the extent of communist influence.
When Wallace arrived in Denver, Colorado on May 31 he found his followers
seriously split on the eve of their State Convention. In a bitter all-night fight
the extremists won control and the state wing of the Party lost its most influential
leader, Charles A. Groves, who served previously as Chairman of the Wallace forces.
He declined to continue in the post. By the time the convention opened (with only
200 of the expected 2,400 delegates on hand) Wallace had lost his personal plan for
a state party with a "broad base."

In the wake of damaging allegations and political drawbacks, Wallace was forced
to acknowledge the existence of the communists. It could hardly be said that he
showed any preoccupation with problems created by their presence in his organization.

He had repeatedly insisted in response to questions, that he knew no communists
and very little about communism. He has never publicly altered his position. New-
paper reporters who have accompanied Wallace on his travels have admitted their be-
wildement at Wallace's persistent profession of ignorance. Commenting on this
James A. Wechsler writing in the Wisconsin PROGRESSIVE, declared:

"Surely a man who has taken so many dogmatic stands on issues in-
volving world communism without his previous when he boasts—in
another paragraph—that he doesn't know what he is talking about,
which is exactly what Wallace has done on repeated occasions dur-
ing his long campaign."

In the middle of May on the West Coast when asked about his attitude toward
communism he replied he knew little about it; that his "first orientation" came
from some pamphlets given him a year ago by Richardoyer, a left-wing writer.

On May 31 at Seattle Wallace declared:

"If the Communists want to work, they must do it on my taxes.
If the Communists are working for peace, God bless them.
If they are working for the overthrow of the Government by force,
they know I'm against them."

Despite his admissions of ignorance Wallace has occasionally made categorical
statements on Communist policies. He recently declared that the Communist Party
"has long ago abandoned the idea of overthrowing the Government by force and
violence."
He at one time informed questioners that he had not read the Canadian Spy report; that he "assumed" the sentences imposed on the defendants were fair because they undoubtedly tried to get all the information they could.

On another occasion, he dismissed as unimportant the question of whether Lee Pressman was a Communist on grounds that Pressman did not play an important role in the Third Party. When told by reporters that there had been a public announcement that Pressman was slated to serve as Secretary of the convention Platform Committee, Wallace said that was news to him.

As he entered New England following the GOP convention, Wallace found many of his substantial non-Communist supporters deeply troubled. A Burlington, Vermont bank president withdrew as a Wallace elector because of the persistent stories of Communist control.

At Berlin, New Hampshire the Third Party candidate stated:

"I'm not going to say anything in the nature of red-baiting but I must say this: If the Communists would run a ticket of their own this year, we might lose 10,000 votes, but we would gain 3,000,000. I know if the Communists really wanted to help us, they would run their own ticket this year and let us get those extra votes."

Reporters with Wallace noted "the gravity and sober intensity of the candidate's statements on the poisoning effects of Communist efforts on his behalf."

(Howard Norton, BURLINGTON SUN, June 28.)

There may have been a marked increase in his sobriety and intensity, but Wallace was simply repeating what he had said as early as 1947 when in late December he declared in Milwaukee:

"I will keep my eye on the ball and not be distracted by red horror. I hope they (the Communists) will have a heart and not come out with any resolutions for me."

As the Progressive Party candidate continued to evade the issue of communist support, his state organizations found their non-CP members deserting in droves. By late summer the dwindling Progressive forces in the Rocky Mountain area were in the control of a small clique of communists and devout fellow travelers.
The situation in Colorado had grown considerably worse. The withdrawal of
Graham from Party affairs was followed by the resignations of two other top
officials in July. They were Albert S. Fisher and Wendell Beaven. Following the
National Convention at Philadelphia, Bill Berkowitz, Chairman of the Colorado dele-
gation, and Colorado finance chairman, resigned, with the statement:
"I believe in a Third Party movement but I don't believe in Com-
munism and I didn't like the thought that Wallace didn't repre-
sent the Communists."

Simultaneously, six Party officials pulled out in New Mexico with a de-
nunciation of the Party's attitude toward Communism and Soviet Russia. They said Party
leaders had refused to modify the platform which demonstrated a refusal to treat
objectively the policies of Soviet Russia.

Four days later, on August 4 three leaders in Santa Fe resigned.

In Nevada only 49 people registered as Progressive Party members.

When the New York Progressives called a convention September 11, ten delegates
showed up at the session.

But these developments served merely to drive Wallace closer to the Communist
and fellow-traveling wing of his constituency.

The day after the Attorney General had listed the American C redu Congress as a
"communist" group, Wallace addressed a Congress meeting in Chicago on September 26.
George Parnall, executive secretary, free an hand after arrest as an alien sub-
versive, appeared with Wallace on the platform. Wallace said he was "proud to
address the Congress which he said the Attorney General had "condemned."

Wallace continues to encourage the support of Communists on the theory that
they work just as much as he does. He continues simultaneously to deny that he
has any personal or political intimacy with them. These disclaimers are politely
reproduced by the DAILY WORKER which frequently takes pains to protect that Mr.
Wallace has far from achieved the "socialist" goals of the WP. In a typical
"criticism" the WORKER recently stated:
"We expect to see Wallace defend the Socialist program as the working class philosophy of the Communist movement... Wallace as is right, has clearly and repeatedly stated what should be obvious to everyone but a frontal reactionary... he does not support this working class socialist goal."

The Communist Party Convention, met in early August. William Z. Foster, Party Chief, charged:

"They are known liars who charge that the Communist Party is trying to dominate the new party or to claim the credit for its formation. We Communists have many points of difference with it...."

But the CP Convention, as was expected, declared its support of Wallace and Taylor. Foster explained:

"Wallace and Taylor will rally hosts of workers, Negroes, farmers, veterans, women, youth, intellectuals, and other patriotic Americans who are determined that our people shall not be besmirched for the profit and glory of Wall Street."

* * * * * *

When the Third Party assembled in July for its national convention at Philadelphia, the burden of proof to clear the party of charges of CP domination was clearly on Wallace.

The evidence was heavily weighed against the Party. The leading characters chosen to carry the show were closely allied with the left-wing of the labor movement or were long-standing CP "fronters". Vita Garmentino headed the Rules Committee. Albert Fitzgerald, President of the CP, was convention chairman. While Rexford G. Tugwell headed the 74-man platform committee, Joe Freeman was secretary. This committee was the obvious and logical place for the concentration of Wallace's most orthodox CP followers. The formulation of a Party platform was a matter of great concern to the Communists.

Interest centered on the platform committee hearings for several days prior to the opening of the convention. Tugwell had asked a wide variety of organizations, including the CIO, AFL and AAA to testify. AAA officials believed that the issue of European aid, atomic energy and other matters of foreign policy should be raised with the Third Party. It seemed apparent that the AAA, in present-
lag such testimony, could not ignore the fact that CP domination of the Third Party was undoubtedly the chief obstacle to its endorsement of the ADA foreign policy planks.

As is generally known, when James Leck, Executive Secretary of ADA, was finally permitted to testify, Tagwell, enjoining the Committee from questioning the witness, dismissed Leck and in a sharp attack on ADA characterized the testimony as "innocent."

Tagwell, in an impromptu press conference told reporters that while he had made speeches in support of the Marshall Plan, he did not regard it as of any "importance" in the Third Party's platform.

This was only one of Tagwell's many capitulations to the more rugged and purposeful men around Wallace.

A second test of Tagwell's personal principles came in the closed committee sessions on the issue of Puerto Rican Independence.

As Governor of Puerto Rico, Tagwell had steadfastly maintained that the abrupt granting of Independence would be a sharp economic blow to the Island. He favored "taking it into the Union."

In "The Stricken Land," the autobiography of his governorship, Tagwell stated the problem:

"I had begun to think, it will be seen, that American liberals had a duty not to try to put Puerto Rico out of the Union by way of granting independence...futility can masquerade under one name as well as another; here it was hidden under the familiar shibboleth of freedom."

As Governor, Tagwell adroitly felt the hostility of the Communists to liberal progress and their contempt for the democratic system. As criticized Luis Muñoz Marín, Puerto Rican progressive political leader, for what Tagwell viewed as collaboration with the CP:
"...he (Marini) came to extend a dangerous tolerance to the Communist, forgetting that they had no direct interest in Puerto Rico but were only using independence as a means of creating trouble for another 'capitalist' nation,...he was taken in by the pseudo revolutionary rhetoric, and so the (Communists) went on undermining him and encouraging the independentistas in their efforts to get control of the Party."

At that time Tagwell demonstrated his awareness of the danger and futility of liberal collaboration with the Communists; he saw clearly that they were "using" independence as a battle-cry against the U. S. and as "a means of causing trouble."

"It is obvious," he wrote, "that the Communists were getting ready for the day when the party line of international communism would diverge from politics of the United States."

Whatever his private doubts, Tagwell made no public protest when the Wallace Platform insisted that "the people of Puerto Rico have the right to independence."

He told friends that, as in the case of the Marshall Plan, the matter should not be made an issue.

Tagwell unquestionably argued these and other questions in secret committee sessions where his presence was conspicuous.

It was obvious that if he had fought the issues publicly, the Party would have cracked wide open because of the large number of Communists firmly entrenched in key positions.

Tagwell took cognizance of this in telling the convention,

"As an old campaigner, I would like to remind you of the value of solidarity and the danger of contention."

As was inevitable, the voice of democracy then grew increasingly feeble,

He and a few others vainly drafted a platform provision urging the U. S. and Russia to assume joint responsibility for ending the war crisis. There were floor demands to strengthen it. Then a Vermont delegate sought to add the assurance that "It is not our intention to give blanket endorsement to the foreign policy of any nation," the convention ingenuously cried down. Tagwell agreed that the amendment was unnecessary. The Vermont was effectively allowed.
Throughout the main convention sessions, Fitzgerald, Harnamott, Freemen, and a few others kept the delegates under iron-clad control from the rostrum.

Only once was this smooth-functioning machine caught off guard. The incident concerned an esoteric shift in the party line; it was unfortunately not precipitated by any deep disagreement on foreign policy.

The early draft of the platform, most of which was written long in advance of the convention, carried a declaration upholding the Kosovarian pursuit of a "unified homeland." This traditional CP pluck for the Kosovarians had, since its earlier insertion in the platform, taken on new meaning. The Kosovarians were lining up behind Tito and adoption of the plank would have put the convention squarely on the side of Tito against the Cominform. The provision had, therefore, been cruelly stripped from copies given the delegates.

A curious delegate from Minnesota rose and questioned the discrepancy. A hasty conference was held on the stage and Louis Adamic was elected to step up and "clarify" the reasons for the last-minute deletion of the Kosovarian provision. He might well have spoken in his native Yugoslav tongue, as the "clarification" was almost totally incomprehensible. But his speech stopped further objections.

The completed platform followed faithfully the Communist Party line and contained no provision which conflicted with the Soviet position on foreign policy.

This fact has been challenged by L. C. Thackray of the NEW YORK POST, who, in an editorial exchange with Mrs. Thackray with whom he shares the title of co-publisher and co-editor of the paper, disputed her assertion that the platform "owed" to the CP line. On August 29 Thackray wrote:

"I challenge my colleague's statement that the Progressive Party "owed to the Communist Party line." The Platform, for example, calls for limitation of armaments and a pooling of atomic energy control on an international basis with the right of international inspection, a provision exactly contrary to the Soviet position and to the Communist Party position." (Mr. Thackray'sitalics.)
The fact is, however, that the Soviet Government and its former UN representative, Mr. Gromyko, have insisted that the USSR pursue inspection. The proposal submitted to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, June 11, 1947, by the Soviet representative carried a specific provision for "periodic" inspection by the proposed international control commission, and provided further for the carrying out of "special investigations in cases where suspicion of violations of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons arises."

The United States, the UK, France, and China found the proposal unacceptable on grounds that any diversion of atomic materials from peaceful uses to war weapons could not be detected by periodic inspections or by special investigations where there is "suspicion" of violation. These nations reported that the Soviet proposals "do not provide any effective means of controlling declared activities or detecting clandestine ones" and that the Commission "has less chance than ever of finding evidence of violation of the convention in such countries as restrict the free movement of foreigners within their territories."

The Soviet Union also demanded the prohibition and destruction of atomic weapons before the conclusion of an international agreement to enforce the prohibition and prevent misuse of atomic materials. It has now modified this demand.

The merits of the long UN debate over the inspection issue are not particularly relevant here.

It is perfectly obvious, however, that the Wallace convention, in upholding "the right of international inspection" put the issue in such broad terms that it could not possibly offend either the Soviet or the American Communists.

In virtually imposing a set of party rules (against some scattered protests), Fitzgerald and Harriman revealed the convention into speedy acceptance of a formula giving a small minority virtual control of party affairs.

The National Committee was authorized to make decisions even if no majority quorum is physically in attendance.
Heavily populated states (where the Communists are concentrated) were given far larger representation than smaller ones.

Resistance to these and other provisions by Maryland delegates was quickly overcome.

As the convention drew to a close, a Founding Convention of Young Progressives for Wallace was formed. The large number of young people at the main convention simplified the establishment of the youth wing.

While Students for Democratic Action — SSA's student division — declined long in advance to participate in the proceedings, Stephen Miller, SSA organizer, attended as an observer. His report is appended to this document.

The saga of the convention has been widely reported. Allowing for inevitable differences in newspaper reports, one conclusion is inescapable: There is no longer any reason to hope that a liberal resurgence can be affected within the Progressive Party as it is now constituted.

The Party chairman is Elmer Benson, left-wing SEE leader of Minnesota. Albert Fitzgerald and Paul Robeson are co-chairmen. Clark Forsman is treasurer. Mrs. Edith Gilbert, Alvin Jones, Jerry O'Connor and Fred Stover were named vice-chairmen.

While Benford S. Tugwell was a vice-chairman in the earlier Wallace-for-President Committee, he took a quiet walk following the Philadelphia convention. His absence was not brought to public attention for some weeks.

On August 10, Tugwell admitted in a telephone interview with reporters:

"I am an enemy member of the Progressive Party."

He said there had been a "big row at Philadelphia", adding that "if the wrong people get control, old-fashioned progressives" would not feel at home in the Wallace movement. Asked if he meant the Communists, Tugwell replied:

"If certainly don't know whether they are Communists but they certainly act like them."

A few days later, Wallace took cognizance of the Tugwell statement. Then questioned about it at Louisville, the Progressive Party candidate stated:
"The Progressive Party is not controlled by Communists nor was its convention or program dictated by them, I am not a Communist and never expect to be one."

He was then asked whether he believed the Communists seek the violent overthrow of the U. S. Government. Wallace made this startling rejoinder:

"I don't know what the story is. There is probably as much variation among Communists as among Democrats and Republicans and certainly the Communists are not as violent as Rhinos Jefferson was."

He then pledged that when elected president, neither Communists nor fascists "will control my policies or me."

Taggert insisted that these statements by Wallace made his own "happy." In fact, it is now rumored that he will again reverse his position and stump for Wallace, but so far he has made no perceptible move in that direction.
As the campaign headed into the fall, Wallace became somewhat more extravagant in his criticisms of American foreign policy. He took the broad view that "the Truman-Dulles-Vandenberg-Dewey policies permitted to come to full fruition will destroy completely the civilization of the last 2,000 years."

He made no distinctions between the men or their political parties and carefully skirted any detailed discussion of international issues. He held that it is "fruitless to seek solutions for specific problems without establishing an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence." He repeatedly claimed that "mutual confidence"—and the peace of the world—was contingent on his election to the presidency:

"If I were president, there would be no crisis in Berlin...We would have found agreement long before now with the Soviet government."

In accepting the nomination for the presidency by the Progressive Party, Wallace made one of the most astounding proposals of his campaign:

He declared:

"...we gave up Berlin politically and we can't lose anything by giving it up militarily in a search for peace."

He explained that the U.S. had lost its "prestige" by establishing the "Western Sector."

Wallace's counsel to the U.S. Government has consistently been one of retreat and withdrawal in the face of Soviet aggression and expansion. He has followed faithfully the major fluctuations of Russian foreign policy. But his counsel to retreat from Berlin cannot be dismissed merely as another pro-Soviet cliché. It was, in effect, a blunt betrayal of the free men of Europe. It meant the height of the Berlin crisis when German democratic leaders in that city were once again rallying their exhausted forces against the threat of dictatorship.

Meanwhile, the beleaguered presidential aspirant grows increasingly bitter toward independent liberal-labor forces in America who overwhelmingly reject the theory that one form of totalitarianism is less repugnant than another.

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There were some who believed that Wallace, following his exchange with Stalin, received rough treatment from the U. S. State Department. The exchange unquestionably struck a new note of informality in diplomatic relations.

Wallace has always cherished the belief that if other statesmen would retire from the scene and give him and Stalin a little privacy, they could work out a quick formula for lasting peace. As a matter of fact, Wallace has repeatedly proclaimed that "if I were running for president of the world, this campaign would be a snap."

While Wallace and Stalin expressed a mutual desire for peace in the preamble to their respective letters, a careful examination of the Stalin missive discloses that he totally ignored at least two of the six "definite decisive" steps which Wallace wrote must be taken to end the "cold war."

The first major point which Stalin disregarded was the free movement of citizens, students and newspapermen between and within the two countries. A second Wallace condition was resumption of a free exchange of scientific information and scientific material between the two nations.

If Stalin has accepted these as part of his formula for world peace, it would certainly have marked a radical shift in Soviet policy. But he chose to ignore them.

The other points made by both were couched in general terms; all of them had been the subject of tortured months of debate in the councils of the United Nations.

Wallace apparently overlooked the significant omission in Stalin's reply. The Progressive Party candidate hailed the letter from Moscow as proof that Stalin "is truly prepared to discuss issues on their merits and is genuinely interested in finding a way for the two great powers to live at peace." Wallace asked that the press treat his own letter "objectively." But it could hardly be said that he applied the same test to his treatment of the Stalin letter.

While the Wallace-Stalin letters may have been unique in the annals of American foreign policy, they created only a mild and brief sensation.
The exchange, however, resolved one uncertainty. It settled the debate over the withdrawal of Wallace from the campaign. There had been broad hints in the press that, under certain circumstances, he would give up the battle before November.

Following receipt of Stalin's letter, Wallace said that even if it meant the end of the Third Party, he was prepared to confer with the Soviet premier. But when it became apparent that the U.S. Government would not sponsor any such Moscow mission, Wallace hastily assured his people that "the new party is going through all the way."


In April the Gallup Poll showed that nearly half (47%) of the people who favored the Wallace candidacy were supporting the Marshall Plan. Wallace dismissed this with the comment that "these people (his constituents) obviously didn't have all the facts.

But the "facts" as disclosed by Wallace, appear to have cost him additional votes. His brusque dismissal of the Greek-Czechoslovakian crisis as an anti-Soviet plot conceived in Wall Street sounded quite incredible to most Americans. Liberals came to regard his preachings as an invitation to betray the non-communist left in Europe and elsewhere in the world. Events in Europe — culminating in the bitter Berlin clash — made his position more untenable than ever. As most citizens tended to believe that their country was at least partially right, Wallace's contention that it was entirely wrong, left him increasingly exposed to the charge that he was a tool of the Communists.

Wallace honestly denies this and challenges such statements as lies. He insists that "the policies we propose require no relinquishment of any American public interest or principle."

Meanwhile, the traveling troubadour who shares honors with Wallace on the national Progressive ticket has been playing to remarkably small audiences across the country.
Glen Taylor's views of the world are far simpler than Wall St.'s. He falls more into the category of an old-fashioned (and sometimes reactionary) isolationist. He is against the European program because it will create a host of bureaucrats and put Europe "on a permanent solvency.

Taylor's distinction between peaceful and belligerent communists is sound. Wallace doctrine, but in shading the CP into "pinkos" and "fascists" he has reduced the Wallace theory to a somewhat comic level. The "pinkos" Taylor says, are welcome in the Progressive Party ranks. But he predicts that the "red" Communists who advocate force and violence "will support Dewey because the best way to get a revolution is to have another Hoover depression."

Except for a few formal functions such as the Progressive Party convention, Taylor is apparently not permitted to travel with the First company. He has toured around mostly by himself and only his more sensational remarks ever make the newspapers.

He achieved his greatest fame in defying the Alabama Jim Crow laws. But he quickly sank back to oblivion only to emerge when his more shocking crudities catch the attention of the press.

In a recent outburst at Madison, Wisconsin, he charged that:

"Commies are running our American government, so why should Russia make peace with them?"

He added:

"That if I was a Russian at the Moscow conference, I wouldn't agree to anything."

While this was a faithful echo of the Wallace line, Taylor's choice of words must have pleased even the most lusty chieftains in the Wallace camp.
The defections from the Wallace camp — both numerically and qualitatively — would have spelled personal defeat for anyone but the resourceful general of Idaho’s Army.

The meager tale of how large segments of the Progressive Party split away on the communist issue has been related elsewhere in this document.

But a few other facts are worth recording.

By mid-summer Wallace clung to a few left-wing unions and some scattered locals to substantiate his claim that “American workers are flocking to the Progressive Party.”

By mid-September there were indications that even the left-wing union leaders were finding it increasingly difficult to hold the membership in line until election day.

Amusing evidence of Wallace’s declining strength among organized workers was provided by the United Electrical Workers at its September convention which failed to endorse the Progressive Party or its candidates. The UE is the largest American union generally considered under Communist control. Its president, Albert Fitzgerald, is co-chairman of the Progressive Party and chairman of the National Labor Committee for Wallace. There was every reason to believe that the convention could be stampeded for Wallace following rejection, by 4 to 1, of a motion to follow CIO policy and endorse Truman.

 Wallace appeared at the opening convention session and in a fiery oration asked for outright support from all labor groups. But no proposal to endorse him was ever placed before the convention.

While a rank-and-file revolt probably would not have occurred on the single issue of endorsing Wallace, passage of a pro-Wallace resolution would have meant a clean break between the UE and majority of the CIO national board. The ultimate effect of such a break would inevitably split the membership and make it difficult for the CIO to control its vast, big-tradion-union stronghold.
The Progressive Party, meanwhile, had lost the support of another key labor leader — A. F. Whitney, president of the powerful Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. He was vice-chairman of the Progressive Citizens of America which formally launched the Wallace campaign. Whitney has subsequently joined Americans for Democratic Action and endorsed President Truman.

Since no left-of-center group in recent years has won any substantial support among farmers, there is no special significance in Wallace's weakness in rural areas, despite the fact that both he and his campaign manager, C. J. Bookin, were long identified with Federal agricultural programs. But it is worth pointing out that James G. Patton, president of the National Farmers Union (the leading liberal farm organization) who was long an intimate of Wallace, has remained strictly aloof from the Progressive Party movement.

Aubrey Williams, another long-time friend and New Deal colleague, publicly challenged Wallace to return to the Democratic Party. But his plea provoked from Wallace this bitter retort:

"Tell me when you get your belly full of beans, Aubrey, and we shall go out and kill the fattened calf."

The defection of Benford D. Page, of the National Farmers Union, has been cited elsewhere in connection with the report on the Progressive Party convention.

Dr. Frank Kingdon, a co-chairman of the defunct PCC, would have no part in building the Wallace movement when it became a Third Party. J. Raymond Volck, Gene Kelly and Bartley Crum, all members of the PCC board, also went out when the Third Party was launched.

Crum, publisher of the NEW YORK SUN (formerly PM), has repudiated Wallace and personally endorsed the candidacy of President Truman. When the SUN also declared for Truman, Wallace was left without the support of a single metropolitan daily newspaper in the country, with the exception of the DAILY Worker.

While T. G. Thackrey, co-publisher of the NEW YORK POST personally favors Wallace and supports his candidacy in signed editorials, Mrs. Thackrey, who shares
the title of publisher and editor has taken an opposite view in the editorial pages of the paper.

Neither the NEW REPUBLIC nor the NATION, the two leading liberal weeklies, support Wallace. The NEW REPUBLIC, of which Wallace was editor in the early phases of his campaign, has now endorsed President Truman. The Wisconsin PROGRESSIVE, founded by Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., condemning attempts of Wallace strategists "to claim common ancestry," asserts that the Wallace party "nullifies the word 'progressive' and damages the prospects for building a genuine progressive party."
ESCAPE TO THE SOUTH

Following the Progressive Party convention while Wallace was suffering the un-
pleasant political consequences of his Communist alliance, he went South.

In the initial stages of the trip, it looked as though the mere presence of the
Progressive Party candidate might provoke a small-scale civil war. In North Carolina
where he took his worst pelting and heckling, the police provided him little pro-
tection. But throughout some dangerous and turbulent skirmishes, Wallace showed re-
markable restraint and occasional humour.

There were unquestionably some persons in his entourage who welcomed riot and
disorder. Clark Foreman, treasurer of the Progressive Party and chairman of the
Southern Conference for Human Welfare, was quoted directly by Seabold Joyce, Jr. in
the Washington STAR:

"If we'd had the same kind of quiet reaction here (in Greensboro,
N. C.), as we had in Virginia earlier in the day, then I wouldn't
have liked it at all. This is what we wanted."

At Salem, N. C., where boots and jeers filled the ball park during a Wallace
rally, police chief John M. Gold rushed into the stands and warned the crowds:

"Don't you fools see what you're doing. It's the Communists
themselves who are getting you to pull this stuff. I'll prove
it to you. Do you know who started this 'down with Wallace
chant'? It was a Communist named John Hunt."

Gold pointed to Hunt, publicity director of a local of the left-wing CIO Food
and Tobacco Workers, who, according to newspaper reports "stood grinning and fidget-
ing."

Despite these incidents there is no evidence that the demonstrations were pro-
voked by either Communists or other Wallace supporters. According to impartial
observers, the violence sprang from native hatred of a man who stubbornly and
courageously defied some old Southern customs.

The details of the Southern excursion have been widely reported. As during
other brief campaign interludes, Wallace emerged as a tolerant and thoughtful
figure preaching the brotherhood of man. Throughout his talks, he singled damm-
tions of American foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia with confused bits of philosophy and biblical quotations.

At Norfolk, Va., he told a hostile audience:

"We must learn from Jesus and Jefferson. The military strategists can give us no answer to the problems of the atomic age."

On another occasion, as he allowed his way out of an angry crowd, he shouted:

"As Jesus said to his disciples, 'If at any town they won't listen to you willingly, then shake the dust from your feet and go elsewhere.'"

Wallace toured the South as a law-abiding citizen. His refusal to address Jim Crow meetings was carried out in accordance with local laws and ordinances. For instance, in Alabama where speakers were roped off from the rest of the crowd on the Courthouse steps, Wallace simply refused to appear.

This proved an effective challenge to authorities and as Wallace moved into the deep South — through Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee and Arkansas — he was given greater protection. Ordinarily, non-segregated audiences were permitted to hear him even in Boss Crump's town of Memphis.

Meanwhile, Wallace continued to assail President Truman on grounds that his civil rights program is mere "lip service."

Wallace himself has been challenged on the same grounds by such distinguished leaders as Walter White, of the NAACP. Following Wallace's Southern trip, White wrote in the New York HERALD TRIBUNE:

"...the record of performance of the Progressive party's candidate, at a time when he had power to execute changes precisely as other Cabinet officers and officials like Lewis, Tolles and Steele were doing so, is such as to cause one to look with skepticism upon his present speeches."

Lester Granger of the National Urban League in questioning Wallace's record on the race question characterized him as "an eloquent protestor and accomplished denouncer."

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In his escape to the South Wallace made a visible effort to bring the conversation around to the non-controversial topic of Jim Crow. Liberals applauded his precedent-shattering journey and denounced the attacks on his person and liberties. But the most violent scenes of the Dixie drama could not obscure Wallace's and surrender to the Communist machine at Philadelphia. The extra political dividends paid out by the bell-ringing Dixiecrats clearly failed to cover the cost of that fatal capitulation.

Wallace himself, on returning North, briskly resumed the role of the embittered spokesman of Soviet interests.
RECAST TO REALITY

In an abrupt and baffling maneuver, Wallace's campaign managers pulled out
Progressive Party candidates in a majority of key congressional races just a month
before election.

This retreat to reality was quite repugnant to Mr. Wallace. In an obvious
attempt to assuage the shock, his hard-boiled strategist resorted to some fantas-
tic rationales for their conduct. Left-wingers in the areas affected by the with-
drawals were clearly prepared for the shift in the line; a stream of local communiques
suddenly appeared into the pages of the NEW YORKER. But the sudden move was a tacit
admission that Wallace's popularity had declined sharply in a great many states.

The official announcement of the shift came from S. B. ("Beastie") Baldwin, Pro-
gressive Party campaign manager, generally regarded as a highly congenial fellow in
the extreme left-wing of the Wallace camp.

While Wallace was stumping through Texas, Baldwin held a Washington press con-
ference and revealed that the Party was "withdrawing" some thirteen congressional
candidates. These included Progressive opponents of such distinguished liberals as
Helen Schrager Douglas and Chet Holifield, whom the Wallace forces in California were
plagued to defeat despite nation-wide protests by liberal and labor groups.

A statistical accounting of the total number of "withdrawals" was shrouded in
double-talk. Baldwin said they included thirteen candidates distributed through
California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts and Connecticut. But the Wallace
forces have used the effective threat of opposition against so many liberals that the
technical matter of fitting against them had become somewhat academic. Outstanding
candidates like Robert K. Humphrey have waged primary fights against Progressive
opponents and launched final campaigns in the shadow of Progressive opposition.

Baldwin's press conference disclosures were packed with such remarkable observ-
ations set

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"In 12 districts the Democratic candidates could not possibly win without the Progressive Party's official or unofficial support which they are receiving."

The Progressive Party is either not opposing or is endorsing Democrats in 26 districts.

"Outright endorsement of Democrats would be much greater if it were not for the pressure and threat of withdrawal of financial support exerted on many Democrats if they accepted our endorsement."

Or (as in the case of the 15 "withdrawals")

"Many Democrats who had shown signs of yielding to the pressure have now turned to a much more constructive Liberal Party. . . . These Democratic Party candidates are also members of the Progressive Party Line."

The latter statement was on the whole Baldwin distortions.

Take the case of Helen Douglas, who for six months has been trying to campaign under the constant threat of Progressive reprisals.

Despite all kinds of pressure from Baldwin and Wallace, Helen Douglas refused to accept a place on the Progressive ticket in the California primaries.

Wallace retaliated by putting up his own candidate and taking him on a personally conducted tour of the Douglas district last spring. Wallace rationalized that Mrs. Douglas showed signs of becoming a "war-senger."

Mrs. Douglas won the Democratic nomination. She failed to get the GOP nomination under California's unique cross-filing system. So three candidates, including Sidney Moore, the Wallace Progressive, entered the final election race.

Recently the debate broke out again and the Progressives started edging toward Mrs. Douglas.

On September 21 Baldwin told a group of New York businessmen, in the presence of newspaper reporters, that the Progressive Party planned to support Helen Douglas in California and Chester Bowles for governor in Connecticut.
Wallace mounted the platform and unhesitatingly rebuked his campaign manager asking:

"Beast, what are you doing to our party, anyway?"

The New York TIMES gave the story front page billing under the headline

"WALLACE CONTRADICTS HIS MANAGER IN PUBLIC ON RACING MINORITIES"

But a week later, on Thursday, September 30, the DAILY WORKER disclosed in an exclusive dispatch that the California Progressives had endorsed Mrs. Douglas.

"Mrs. Douglas," the WORKER stated, "has made it clear that she will emphasize the necessity for price controls, a federal financed program of low-cost housing and slum clearance, and vigorous enforcement of the rights of all minorities."

Mrs. Douglas shot back:

"I did not seek the endorsement of the Third Party and I do not desire it. I strongly support the Marshall Plan and believe that the present Russian attitude is a threat to world peace."

She added:

"I feel just as strongly about the Marshall Plan as I did when they desired to oppose it. The only reason they chose Atlantic is because they knew they were in trouble and now they can do CLAIRE CREDIT if I will, they act like the drowning man throwing a life preserver to the lifeguard."

This was a neat and effective thrust at the DAILY WORKER falsification which implied that Mrs. Douglas agreed to refrain from discussing such unpleasant issues as the Marshall Plan.

The CP interpretation of the Douglas endorsement appeared the same day Baldwin held his Washington press conference.

"Beastie" solemnly quoted the WORKER line:

"The withdrawals", he said, "represent no change in policy. We have always been ready to form a united front with progressive candidates."

Chet Hallfield against whom the Progressive Party had entered an opponent in both the primary and election races, tossed back the olive branch to Baldwin with
the blunt retort:

"I do not seek, nor do I accept any so-called endorsement by the Third Party, whose candidates cannot now be legally removed from the November ballot."

Mr. Chase Going Woodruffe, congressional candidate in Connecticut, also said

"No thanks."

In the case of Robert Humphrey, Baldwin disclosed that there would be no third party opposition because the Progressives 'did not want to contribute to Hall's victory.'

But a couple of days later Minnesota Progressive Party officials further "clarified" the matter in the pages of the DAILY WORKER:

"In filing no Progressive Party candidate, yet withholding endorse-
ment of Humphrey, we are in effect, saying what we said before the primaries — that Joe Hall can be beaten only by presenting a clear-
cut alternative program to bi-partisan reaction. This Humphrey is not doing.

"Under these circumstances the Progressive Party cannot assume
responsibility for the candidacy and program of Humphrey, nor does
it on the other hand restrain individuals and groups who support
our program from voting for Humphrey if they see reasons for doing
so."

This notable example of left-wing gibberish was quite meaningful, however. It
said, in effect, that Progressive Party officials didn't want their members to vote
for him even though there would be no Progressive Party candidate in the field.

Baldwin admitted that about 105 Progressives are still entered in Congressional
races. Moreover, many of those chosen to stay are opposing outstanding liberals.

Baldwin admitted the Party would keep its eye on against Henry Jackson in
Washington. Jackson has a fine record and is the only Democratic member of the
House in the entire Northwest.
Baldwin said the Party is still "negotiating" the possible withdrawal of one of its
candidates against Franke Knowner, another Democratic liberal House member from
California.
While in Connecticut the Progressive Party withdrew its opposition to Mrs.
Woodhouse, its candidates stayed in three other districts where liberal Democrats
seem House seats.
There seems to be only one plausible explanation for these amazing inconsist-
cences.

The Progressive Party belatedly recognized that in fighting distinguished
liberals it had seriously damaged Wallace, and the chance to roll up any significant
national vote against American foreign policy.
In California, for instance, it is now estimated that Wallace dropped from a
possible 700,000 votes to a probable 400,000 in the six-month period his Party
sought Mrs. Douglas and the other Democratic liberals.

Baldwin insisted that the Progressive candidates will be held in line against
Paul Douglas and Adai Stevenson in Illinois. This threat would only be effective
if the courts restore Wallace, Taylor and the state-wide Progressive candidates to
a place on the ballot. Meanwhile, the Progressives will conduct a write-in campaign
which will indirectly aid the notorious GOP reactionary Senator, "Curly" Brooks.

Joseph and Stewart Alsop, in their syndicated column "Letter of Note" have re-
vealed that the Progressives tried twice to make deals with John Arvey, Democratic
leader in Chicago and Cook County. The Alsop column confirmed rumors that

* Illinois Progressives early in the campaign threatened to run a
  Senate candidate against Paul Douglas unless Arvey kept Douglas
  off the ticket.

* Illinois Progressives went to Arvey with an offer to pull out
  their congressional candidates in Cook County if Arvey
  would get Wallace put back on the Illinois ballot.

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Army obviously rejected both proposals.

Wallace's own observations on Progressive opposition to liberal nominees have been confused and contradictory.

In addressing the US convention late in August, he hotly denied charges "of pro- Truman labor leaders that the Progressive Party is importing the chances of liberal candidates for election."

He added:

"This is a monstrous lie...most easily refuted by looking at the records."

As has been reported earlier, Wallace took issue publicly with Baldwin when the latter hinted that the third party would support Mrs. Douglas and Noakes.

When news stories on the Baldwin press conference hit the streets, Wallace called together the press on the other side of the continent to clear up a few things.

While he didn't contradict Baldwin's revealing revelations, Wallace, arriving in Los Angeles, said he wanted to emphasize that the Party was merely "supporting" and "endorsing" Mrs. Douglas et al.

This important distinction had obviously escaped Baldwin who had been careless in using the terms interchangeably.

Wallace didn't define the difference. But it appears that an outright endorsement might have implied Progressive Party approval of such matters as the Marshall Plan to which Mrs. Douglas is firmly committed.

Meanwhile, although the Progressives still insist on opposing liberal Democratic nominees in a large number of districts, observers agree that with the possible exception of Vito Marcantonio in New York, the Party will not elect a single one of its own congressional candidates. The 125 Progressives running for the House are scattered over 33 states while senatorial candidates are still entered in 11 states.
An August poll by Dr. Gallup showed that the combined minority party congressional candidates would poll less than one per cent of the vote. At that time Gallup forecast that Wallace would get 5 per cent of the national vote, although the same poll subsequently showed Wallace would poll only 2½ per cent.

Gallup concluded in his August forecast that the third party movement was "a much less important factor in the congressional races than in the presidential race."

While this may be generally true, interference by Progressives in many districts will materially affect the outcome of local races. In addition to instances already cited, there are many other places where Progressives will inevitably cut down the vote of liberal Democrats. For instance, in Brooklyn, New York Progressive candidate Leo Freedman is opposing Abraham Walter, Democratic liberal House incumbent. In Washington the Progressives have put up a candidate against Hugh Mitchell, a liberal ex-L. S. senator now running for the House. The same story holds in Wisconsin where Dan Hoan, the ex-Socialist mayor of Milwaukee, is handicapped in his effort to beat reactionary GOP Rep. Alvin O'Monski because of Progressive Party interference. Hoan is the Democratic nominee.

It is possible that the third party will take out candidates in some of these areas before the campaign is over. But in the light of recent developments, it would be reckless to predict the future course of the Progressive Party line.
WHERE ARE THE VOTES

On only one occasion has Henry Wallace declared that he confidently expects victory in '48. As he disembarked from the train early in the morning to enter the new Party's convention hall at Philadelphia, he made the cryptic forecast "We are going to win."

A candidate, on the eve of his nomination for the presidency, could hardly be expected to say less.

But in most of his predictions, Wallace, while forecasting a "tremendous hidden vote" this year, has not predicted his followers' victory until 1952 or even in 1964. Throughout one of the longest presidential campaigns in American history, he and his campaign managers have emphasized that the relative size of the '48 vote will determine the success or failure of the Progressive Party. They claim privately that 4,000,000 ballots for Wallace and Taylor would constitute a decisive victory for the Party. But there is no surface evidence to show that the national ticket will get much more than half that number.

The "hidden vote" on which Wallace relies has embarrassed some professional forecasters in the last decade and a half. A hazardous business now has been further complicated by the fact that many people are unquestionably afraid to admit they will vote for Wallace. They may be reluctant to admit it even to Dr. Gallup.

In June 1947, when the third party was in the discussion stage and six months before Wallace's formal announcement, a nation-wide poll by Dr. Gallup showed that 13 percent of all voters would support a new party under Wallace's leadership.

But in Dr. Gallup's first testing after the Wallace announcement, published on January 20th, Wallace was given only 7 percent of the total vote.

A June poll showed that he had dropped to 5 percent in a Dewey-Truman-Wallace contest. At that time, Gallup estimated (on the basis of a 98,000,000 total vote,) a Wallace vote of 3,500,000, if the Progressive Party succeeded in getting on the ballot in all the states.
But the Gallup poll published on July 31st dropped Wallace to 4 percent of the total vote, and to 2 1/2 percent on September 24. Gallup's survey of 11 states (to be followed by forecasts in other states), shows Wallace polling 14 percent of the New York vote. It gives him only 3 percent in six other states; 4 percent in Minnesota and 6 percent in California.

In his final presidential analysis of September 9, Eino Roep in his FOREIGN poll gave Wallace only 2.6 percent.

A United Press survey made in mid-September estimates that Wallace will poll less than 2,000,000 votes. It was based on the assumption that Wallace would be on the ballot in 35 states, including Illinois. Subsequently, he was ruled off the Illinois ballot. While most observers agree that Wallace will get on the ballot in a maximum of 35 states, C. P. Baldwin, his campaign manager, predicted in a Washington press conference, September 25, that the Wallace-Byler ticket will be certified in 44 states, Baldwin admitted, however, that as of that time, certifications had been made in only 30 states.

Roep contends that campaigns are largely ritualistic and he is so certain of a Dewey victory (harking 'political coalitions'), that he has given up further presidential surveys for the duration of the campaign. He says that a shift of 1 or 2 percent in the relative strength of Dewey or Truman is of no consequence.

Roep's forecasts carry considerable weight because in the last three presidential elections, he has erred by approximately 1 percent in predicting the size of the popular vote for the major party candidates.

But in the case of a minority candidate such as Wallace whose chief aim is to roll up a substantial popular vote, the campaign itself is significant even though the candidate is not regarded as a serious entry in the presidential contest. The shift, one way or the other, of even 1 or 2 percent, represents an enormous fluctuation in his total vote. For instance, if Wallace were to poll 8 percent of all ballots cast, an increase of only 1 percent would, in effect, increase his total vote by 30 percent.

* * * * * 

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There is ample evidence to show that Wallace was not personally equipped to embark on one of the longest presidential campaigns in American history. He has occasionally demonstrated considerable talent as a persuasive and impassioned speaker, but most of his public recitations are monotone and uninspired.

The Communists are chiefly responsible for the decline of the Wallace venture. But the house count indicates that a great many people simply refused to sit through the second show; in cities where he drew big crowds six months ago, Wallace's box office appeal has now hit a noticeable slump.

In Chicago last April he drew 20,000 paying customers with another 3,000 turned away. In September 15,000 showed up to hear him and only 14,808 paid entrance fees to the stadium. In Buffalo on his second trip, Wallace drew less than half the number of listeners he attracted to previous rallies. The crowds that turned out to hear him in such widely separated cities as Los Angeles and Baltimore were also much smaller than those which paid to hear Wallace when he made earlier appearances in those communities.

As election day neared, Wallace blamed his growing unpopularity on the liberal and labor groups which rejected his party as Communist-inspired and Communist-controlled.

Wallace obviously hoped that the nomination of President Truman would set the signals for a mass influx of those groups to his camp. But when they failed to appear, he lashed out with rare ferocity at Philip Murray and the liberals who endorsed Truman. At the same time, Wallace acknowledged that they would be missed in November and expressed the wishful hope that everybody could yet get together for a post-election reunion.

"I can't help feeling," he said, "that their chief governing motive is to keep Henry Wallace, I'm still holding the door open for them. I used to say they'd come along after Truman was nominated. But they didn't come flocking the way I hoped. I just can't say that they won't make statements or extreme that it will be impossible for us to get together after the election."

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CONCLUSIONS

Henry A. Wallace launched his crusade for peace and abundance under doubtful auspices and under incredibly unfavorable circumstances. Although subsequent developments compounded the difficulties in establishing a third party, Wallace should have been able to force many of the events which later led to his political decline.

By the time the formation of the Third party was announced, major liberal and labor organizations had assembled in America for Democratic Action. It was certainly apparent that they would not sponsor or support a political party which encouraged Communist participation.

On the domestic front Wallace's promise of "abundance" was not particularly appealing as long as the nation enjoyed a relatively high degree of prosperity. Housing shortages, exorbitant prices and the fear that a bust was just around the corner, caused considerable suffering and disquiet. But, after all, even Mr. Wallace's goal of 60,000,000 jobs had been reached.

Nevertheless, President Truman — especially in the last six months of the campaign — had proved an intrepid defender of the common man and waged a valiant fight against a hostile and reactionary Congress. The Progressive Party's policy (modified a few weeks before election) of opposing liberal congressional candidates substantially decreased Wallace's own popularity.

The principle domestic issues of the campaign have now been well established. The Democratic Convention, in a highly dramatic and significant session, adopted the most liberal platform ever approved by a major party. The critical issue of civil rights was settled in favor of Northern liberals and the Southern wing of the Democratic Party suffered a stunning defeat.

As a result of the adoption of this plank, Wallace's appeal to Negroes and other minorities was robbed of much of its effectiveness. President Truman subsequently issued executive orders curbing discrimination in Government employment and the armed services. Although the orders were criticized sharply by Wallace, they
Truman increased support and prompted A. Philip Randolph, leader of the Committee against Segregation in the Armed Services, to drop his campaign against Negro registration under the Draft Act.

Truman's forthright and persistent attacks on the Thomas and Ferguson Committees of the House and Senate and his ardent defense of individual liberties also deprived Wallace of an important issue.

In the area of foreign affairs, Wallace might have achieved considerable effectiveness as an independent critic if he had severed his ties with the Communists. A great many people are unquestionably deeply apprehensive about the state of the world and the prospects for continued peace. But they can find little solace in Wallace's ardent defense of Soviet policies which he repeatedly couples with a "know-nothing" stand on Communist operations.

A succession of world events commencing with the formation of the Soviet Cominform, and the Russian coup in Czechoslovakia, finally climaxing by the crisis in Berlin, evacuated a large number of Wallace's followers to the peril of blind pro-Soviet partisanship. Just as the Russians failed to win the allegiance of the democratic forces in Berlin, so Wallace has persistently antagonized independent American liberals whose support was essential to the success of his third party.

As matters now stand it seems more likely that the Democratic movement will have a greater effect on forcing a future political realignment in the United States than the Wallace Party. But neither movement appears to present any major threat to the immediate survival of the traditional two-party system.

Anything can happen in the tense closing weeks of a national campaign and it is conceivable that a bad fumble in the handling of foreign relations could materially increase the Wallace vote. If, for example, the United States should initiate or support any friendly alliance with the Franco dictatorship in Spain, Wallace and the Communists would not aiscend political profit. But barring such a catastrophe there is no surer evidence to justify Wallace's claim that his success is insured by the existence of a vast "hidden vote."
Report by Steve Jailer of Students For Democratic Action

On The Founding Convention Of
The Young Progressives Of America

The opening session of the founding convention met on the evening of Sunday, July 25. It opened with an invocation and the singing of the first ten verses of the Star Spangled Banner. Then the lights went out in the hall and an orator's voice addressed the audience for five minutes about the need for a new youth movement. Then, a spotlight focused on a girl who stepped to the stage to read the official call to the Convention.

As she finished, the lights in the auditorium went on, and a man took the stage to ask for nominations for chairman of this opening session. He recognized someone already stationed at the microphone on the floor, who nominated Christine Walker. The chair asked for additional nominations, and after a brief silence broken only by the rustling of a few people in the back of the hall who apparently could not reach a microphone, said, "I'm going to close nominations." Over a few scattered moans Miss Walker was elected chairman of the session, and opened before the delegates, she was the girl who had previously read the call to the convention.

Miss Walker introduced Seymour "Smiley" Linsiedel, the Chairman of the Resolutions (Arrangements) Committee for the convention. Linsiedel proceeded with his report to the group. The first item was the name of the organization, and the name Young Progressives of America was adopted. Next on the agenda was the adoption of the rules of the convention. These were read very rapidly — once — and adopted without discussion.

One of the rules provided that no resolutions could be introduced from the floor, but had to be presented in writing to the Resolutions Committee by midnight. It was then about 9 p.m. The personnel of the Resolutions Committee had not yet been made public. The committee was scheduled to meet at the end of the general session at Convention Hall — seven miles away. The present session was expected to last until shortly before midnight.

Next came the approval of the Convention working committees. Linsiedel presented the proposed membership of the committees. Certain (unusual) industrial states were to have three members per committee, other states to have two. Members of the calling group to the convention were to have the preempted right to serve on committees without prequalifying the quota of their states. Mr. Linsiedel moved the adoption of his own report.

The chair recognized a delegate from Minnesota. He explained that the liberals had already "given in once" when, apparently by pre-arrangement, no objection was made to the rule adopted by the convention providing for majority election of officers on an individual rather than on a state delegation basis — a provision which favored the larger delegations from the industrial states. He protested against the excessive weight given the industrial states, as he concluded, the Minnesota delegation stood up to explain his. The chair called on Linsiedel, Linsiedel reviewed the facts and held that "the Resolutions Committee has gone over this question thoroughly. We have over 1000 people registered and there are about 90 delegates on each committee, so that under changes now would be very unmanageable."

next
The chair recognized a youth from New York. He identified himself as a member of the Anti-agers for Wallace, a group that had demonstrated their zeal and enthusiasm during the election in New York's 20th Congressional District of Leo Love. He protested that no anti-agers were on any of the working committees. His statement was followed by considerable general applause.

At this point, approximately forty people were clamoring for the floor. A voice shouted in the hubbub, "I call the question." The chair quickly announced that the question had been called. There was a chorus of points of order and information. A young man from Massachusetts requested that he be told whom the state caucuses were held that selected the representatives from the state on the various committees. It seemed to him, he said, that as a delegate from Massachusetts, he had never been consulted, and he wanted to know whether Massachusetts could withdraw the delegation already selected for committees in favor of new, more desirable, personnel.

The chair again began to speak into the general uproar that followed his statement. His voice was inaudible. The chair announced that the report of the Committee had passed. All hands were raised on the floor. One group began to chant "rollcall, rollcall," while another shouted "No war Wallace. We want Wallace." The lights were turned out. An official voice began to read the resolution for Senator Taylor. Suddenly lights went on, revealing Senator Taylor on stage. About twenty people were ejected from the meeting by the ushers.

Senator Taylor spoke very briefly, and then demonstrated his political versatility by accompanying himself on the guitar while he sang a baritone song purporting the popular "Ballad of Guppi." The baritone verse was about a man who was swimming with a naked woman and, after an encounter with her husband, lost his teeth on the Isle of Guppi.

The evening session concluded after the remarks by Henry Wallace and songs by Paul Robeson, baritone.

About two hours behind schedule, at 1:30 p.m., the following day, the convention gathered for the final session. Previous speeches by several delegates indicated that there was no general resentment against the conduct of the session the previous evening, although a few disgruntled souls were in evidence. Mr. Lovefield proposed the agenda for the evening. After discussion, he also proposed that Mr. Jones and Miss Burning serve as co-chairmen of the session, and the convention approved them with utter cheerfulness.

Mr. Jones took the chair. He reviewed the convention rules and announced that in view of last night's occurrences it should be made clear that a call for the question was only a call for a vote on whether to cut off debate. A speaker from the floor protested that, as had happened the night before, delegations and observers were sitting together. On order from the chair, they separated. Mr. Striebel presented the report of the Credentials Committee. The chair then suspended the agenda.
to permit the convention to hear Congressman Imesnor, who was about to depart for Washington. Although the Credentials Committee had seated almost 3000 delegates and observers, a count of the convention showed a maximum attendance during the entire session of not over 5000.

At the conclusion of Mr. Imesnor's remarks, Mr. Walter Wallace, chairman of the Committee on Organization, read through the report of his group, and then submitted his report in sections for discussion. A question was raised from the floor questioning the independence of the organization as proclaimed in the preamble. The chair ruled it out of order. Another speaker formally moved that the Young Progressives be the official youth organization of the Progressive Party. The question was called, a speaker objected to cutting off the discussion. Miss Valor (who had succeeded Mr. Jones as chairman) recognized one man in the resulting flurry who asked whether the organization could declare itself the official youth organization of the Third Party. Quickly Mr. Wallace replied that it could not. The motion was withdrawn.

Consideration of the membership section of the report was interrupted when a point of personal privilege was raised, stating that one of the sergeants-at-arms had deeply offended a Puerto Rican delegate by telling this Spanish-speaking individual in blustery English that he could not sit with the Brooklyn delegation. The convention voted an apology to the Puerto Rican, who resumed his place with Breckinridge.

Longer discussion ensued about technical details of membership. When the membership section passed by a voice vote, a proposal was made from the floor that all votes be by a show of hands, "because some people have louder voices than others". The motion was defeated by a voice vote.

A proposal was heard from the floor that the rules of organization be adopted in toto without further argument. The floor was reconvened, and all debate on all of these matters should be suspended till first convention some time in 1946 when all rules will have been tried out. After some argument, during which the chair spoke strongly for the in toto adoption, it passed by hand vote in the judgment of the chair after a voice vote proved indecisive.

At 3:30 p.m., the convention adjourned into executive session for ten minutes. While in caucus, delegates were to hear some special information from their chairman and arrangements were to be made concerning action by the delegation to pressure Congress on certain issues. In this division into three groups, the New York caucus took almost half — and at least 40 percent — of the delegates into the balcony. The great majority of the remaining 60 percent surprised the Illinois and California groups.

The session took slightly longer than the scheduled ten minutes — one hour and a half.

Finally the convention reconvened, and Mr. Linfield explained that of the National Council's thirty-one vice-chairmanships, ten were to go to trade union representatives, 8 to farm representatives, 8 to Southern representatives (one of these was to be a Negro, three to be minority representatives), 2 to students (one of whom was to be a teacher, one to be a minority representative), 1 to an athlete, and 1 to a representative of the arts and sciences, and 6 to religious representatives.
The convention proceeded to approve the nominations of the nominations committee. Among the officers selected in this manner were no additional nominations or dissent from the floor — namely, James and Miss Walker to be co-chairmen and Seymour Linfield to be Executive Director. The first delegations began to leave.

By the time the platform was to be presented for consideration, the convention was faced with the choice of leaving Convention Hall or paying an hourly fee of almost $2000.00. It was voted to give the National Council power to act as representative of the convention as far as unfinished business was concerned. The convention adjourned rapidly, without having adopted a platform.
"The Communist Party, as a means of blocking the Marshall Plan, decided last October to back a third party headed by Henry A. Wallace, long before the former Vice President himself announced his candidacy.

"The strategy, adopted in October, 1947, by the Party's Central Committee, was to force the U.S. to reverse its position, taken the week before, endorsing the European Recovery Program.

"In this way, it was hoped there would be created a large and powerful labor pressure group against the pending foreign aid program.

"Considerations of Russian foreign policy were the almost exclusive reasons moving the Communists to fund the third party and pick Wallace as its candidate.

"The two primary goals were defeating the Marshall Plan and winning a Communist victory in the Italian elections.

"The Central Committee of the American Communist Party ordered labor's endorsement of Wallace to be secured even if that resulted in "splitting the U.S. right down the middle".

"The points presented above are the highlights of the carefully planned scheme, which culminated in Wallace's formal acceptance of the role of candidate last December 29.

"But there is nothing to suggest that Wallace was a party to, or had direct knowledge of, the Communists' inception and creation of this third party.

"There is now an indication — not first, but nevertheless of possible significance — that the Communist Party having used Wallace and having failed in its objectives — is now thinking of new strategy involving the Channeling of Wallace. This indication will be discussed later.

"The Communists' support of the Wallace campaign and their key roles in it have been, of course, obvious for many months. But it was not until last week that a competent authority stated firmly that the Communists were 'directly responsible' for fashioning the third party movement.

"The speaker was Philip Murray, CIO president, addressing the Teamsters' chapter at Atlantic City, N.J., on Wednesday. He said the decision was made at a Communist Party meeting in New York City last October. He gave no further details.

"The WASHINGTON POST is now able to supply a number of those details, with some omissions, more..."
"Its information is mainly from persons who participated directly in the series of meetings where the plans and decisions were made. In addition, there is confirming information from individuals close to the actual participants, who have been told by them what happened.

Story Begins With CIO Foreplay

The chronology

The CIO national convention was held in Boston last year, beginning on October 15. Two days later it heard a speech by Secretary of State Marshall. The convention concluded its sessions with a vigorous endorsement of the Marshall Plan.

It reflected on increasing President Truman's re-election, but it did not lay any foundations, nor even provide an opening for support of a third party movement.

The ERG resolution and the cold shoulder to a third party were distressing in the extreme to the Communist Party.

CIO Comrades Pursued

Accordingly, the CIO convention action was a body blow. Party leaders immediately summoned a meeting of the top Communist leaders and organizers among CIO union officials. The meeting was held within a few days of the convention's close, when union leaders were still in the area.

There was a long discussion of how to put pressure on the unions and on Congress to defeat passage of the ERG.

At this meeting, the organization of a third party was not discussed in concrete terms, but delegates from Illinois and California noted that they would move to organize third-party campaigns in their States.

Quill Suggests Wallace

Wallace was mentioned as a possible candidate by Samuel J. Quill, president of the Transport Workers Union, who — only in the last month — has now broken with the Communists.

In general terms there was a discussion of how to get the CIO to reverse its convention stand and to accept the idea of denying Mr. Truman and helping a third party get under way.

Very soon after this meeting — still in October — there was a meeting in New York of the General Committee of the Communist Party. This is the party organ which frames all high policy decisions.
"It consists of William Z. Foster, national chairman of the party; Eugene Debs, the executive secretary; John Williamson, chief labor official of the party; and several CIO union officials.

December 15 Meeting Described

"The Central Committee decided to create a third party and to obtain Wallace as its candidate.

"The best evidence of what transpired at that meeting were the descriptions given to THE WASHINGTON POST of a subsequent gathering at which the official orders were handed out.

"It took place about December 15. Those in attendance were the Communism-minded leaders of unions in the New York area.

"Some 25 persons were present. There were one to three representatives of every CIO union in New York except the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.

"Party Chairman Foster was not present, but Debs, generally considered the best brains of the organization, was there.

"The most active figure, however, was Robert Thompson, Communist Party chairman for New York State.

Thompson Announces New Party

"He opened the meeting with a long speech, saying that it had been decided to create a third party, with Wallace as its head.

"Therefore, he continued, the Communist Party asked all union leaders to get busy preparing petitions for its candidacy, as well as literature to be distributed immediately Wallace's formal announcement of acceptance was made. This was anticipated correctly, as it turned out — some time during the next couple of weeks.

"CIO unions, Thompson said, should be ready to follow the announcement with an immediate endorsement of Wallace.

"Quill, Thompson spoke out in what now seems to have been the beginning of his breakaway from the party.

Quill Attacks Decision

(Quill has denied that he has ever been a card-carrying member of the party, but he has never denied that he was high in its councils.)

"Red Mike" — or, more properly, "Red Mike" — accused to know who had made such a decision.

"The Central Committee, said Thompson, more
Quill attacked it bitterly. He said the Central Committee could not tell him or his union that they had to go for Wallace, and that it had no right to do so. He said he would not go along and that the proposed action might split the CIO.

Pleaded Squeeze on Murray

"The Commies in the CIO and the labor unions which they could influence must pressure for an endorsement of Wallace," Thompson replied. "Even if it splits the CIO right down the middle."

"The hell with you and your Central Committee," Quill said. "He told Thompson to relay his remarks to 'that crookpet' Foster.

Despite his opposition, the meeting continued on the original line.

The strategy was made clear: The pressure to be created, it was explained, would be such that Philip Murray could not hold out against it. He would be forced to get a reversal of the convention stand. To save the CIO and his position in it, he would have to endorse Wallace and denounce the IBEW.

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Must Stop CIO Right Trend

Thompson said the Commies and the Unions and locals they led should not be wishy-washy about supporting Wallace.

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Already Thompson continued, the Communist Parties in France and Italy were making their decision and there would be revelations in both countries within two weeks.

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Wallace's Reliability Questioned

The meeting, it may be noted, took place at about the end of the serious Communist strikes in France and Italy.

"At the New York meeting, the talk went on into an hour's discussion on the question of whether Wallace was reliable."

"His recent shifts were recalled, as well as an occasion a year or so ago when, at a Eastern Square Garden rally, he had made disparaging remarks about the Commies. The question was: would he turn against the Commies again, or would he stay in line?"

F.H. Dashiell's account has two accounts, not necessarily inconsistent, on how this question was resolved.}

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"According to one, it was admitted that Wallace was not an adhesively consistent, was might be desired, but that he could be held as long as the Communists surrounded him and varied on him. The answer was to the effect that, 'To the extent that we can circle him, to that extent he'll stick.'

Communists Faced by Events

"According to a second account, it was decided that it did not make much difference if Wallace finally turned against them. The argument was that Wallace was to be used as a tool or lever for Communist foreign policy. The immediate goal was the defeat of the Marshall Plan and a Communist victory in the Italian elections.

"The Communist plans fell for short of expectations.

"The CIO reaction was not as hoped. The pressure was less — not enough to bother Murray seriously. The discount from the CIO coordination policy was much less than was anticipated. Only fractions of a few unions fell into the Communist Party line."