Secretary of Commerce Henry Vail said, speaking at a 200 dinner to honor the late President Roosevelt, April 12, 1946, spores of the "desperate efforts of a small military clique" to bring about war with Russia.

The Highberger Letter, a newsletter with good sources of information to rightist circles, circulated privately to businessmen pointed March 14, 1946 to "the trend of thinking within the military that now is the time to stop Russia, whereas at a later date we might not be able." It reported March 21 that "a stand has been taken by the U.S. which "means war, the risk of war."

John J. O’Neill, editor of the New York Herald Tribune, on March 24 wrote of "the actions...staged by the Washington military clique mostly through stenog and in and out of Congress." He said: "Every possible step toward making atomic energy available for human welfare applications has been completely and ruthlessly suppressed by the military clique. Every action that has been taken, including the present bill, is pointed in the direction of our enemies."

O’Neill continues: "is revealed fact of diplomacy buffoonery in being staged to provide apparent justification for a military general weapon any place in Canada as indicated that it is a laugh to all but the most gullible, and an insane situation that is being leveled with all the melodramatic panache available to the state departments....

In a recent set it is difficult to imagine anything more idiotic than diplomats threatening an atomic-energy war to monopolize the oil supply of one country when the proper development of atomic energy for welfare purposes will make all oil for power use an accidently as commodities as the coal pit....

The Washington columnist, Joseph and Stuart Klapper, in the New York Herald Tribune of March 16, under the headlines "RUSSIA'S PERSPECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY," wrote that the new line in American foreign policy, the so-called "anti-Russia" policy, is the direct result of the new weapons the U.S. has developed. They painted a terrifying picture of these weapons, and said American experts were inclined to suspect the Soviet High Command has not recognized the implications of the new weapons.

In a highly significant paragraph, the Klapper, who are known to have excellent sources among top American policy-makers, wrote: "Sooner or later, however, the existence of the new weapons will make it necessary to find out whether Russian policy can be radically changed."
In other words, if nuking the Bastards doesn't work, the "new" weapons must be used.

Another significant paragraph reports that some generals are worried by the fact that "the American Constitution virtually requires this country to accept a surprise attack before giving itself for war."

Some of the peace move and the home-front future so the worry is in the world is in a position to launch a surprise attack on the U.S., the statement suggests that some of the military are beginning to adjust at the 14th—the 14th being the American Constitution, which leaves the decision of war or peace up to elected civilian authorities and not to the military.

John D. Steel, in a broadcast March 13, 1946, interpreted the plan's dispatch to mean that this was in a position to use the atomic bomb as a surprise weapon without constitutional restraint. He described the "two-party" or "minority and majority," in the army, navy, civilian, and international circles, and said that it "demonstrates tremendous pressures" and by a "terrific leverage of votes and newspaper propaganda has made an ally of six months ago almost equal to an enemy."

These tremendous pressures, apparently bending toward an atomic war on the Soviet Union or the threat of one, were sufficiently serious for Walter Lippmann, New York Herald Tribune columnist, to warn publicly that such an attack could not succeed. Lippmann wrote just before his recent departure for Europe:

"An atomic bombing could destroy the Red Army; it could destroy only the industrial means of supplying it. The Russian defense to atomic attack is, therefore, self-contradictory: it is to overcome continental Europe with industry, and deny us to drop atomic bombs on Poland, Romania, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc. The more we threaten to demolish Russian cities, the more obvious it is that the Russian defense would be to nonsense themselves in Europe and cities which we could not denounce without massacring hundreds of thousands of our own friends."

Ira Pearson, in his column in the New York Daily Mirror, March 19, 1946, indicated that the military were waiting for some pretext to use the atom bomb on the Soviet Union. He wrote:

"The Russian situation was so tense just before Stalin started pulling his troops out of Iran that U.S. military men seriously discussed bombing Russian oil fields. If the Red Army started an aggressive move in Turkey, President Truman opposes using the atom bomb, but military strategists figured large-scale troop deployments, by inventing new tactics, could persuade the Red Army--"
If it is started to search against Turkey or the Balkanies."

The implication of the foregoing statements seems to be that the military now considers that it has a weapon it can and should be able to use without consulting the American people. According to Blair, below in the Feb. 26, 1946, Drew Pearson has accused Admiral Leahy of concealing facts about the anti-Communist feeling that is sweeping the country by the dis

Pearson says, in a letter to the New York Herald Tribune, April 16, 1946, summarized some of the evidence that the crisis in Iran was a Anglo-American fabrication and pointed to the real meaning of the Iranian affair. He said:

"About a month ago there appeared in the press two dispatches whose significance in shedding light on the struggle between the Anglo-American powers and Russia in the Security Council was only now appreciated. One was from Washington; the other curiously enough, came from Berlin."

"From Washington, on March 11, the brothers Aide, two of the boys Pearson Washington correspondents, reported that 'many American policy makers believe there is only one reason why ultimate war is not expected.' The reason was, they said, that to stop the Russians we would precipitate 'the most violent kind of crisis.'"

"For the Aide, received confirmation six days later, on March 17, from a German source. Told us to the east of a long dispatch from Berlin by Col. Dohrander of the New York Times' about a reduction in the size of the Red Army in occupation in Germany were two interesting paragraphs about a totally different subject. They were especially interesting if one keeps in mind that correspondent Dohrander undoubtedly enjoyed the confidence of German diplomats in the German capital."

"Certain diplomats," he added on March 17, "believe that this crisis (the flare-up over Iran) may have been deliberately raised upon by the American government to crystallize public opinion and strengthen the
Americans tend in disbelieving about to be resumed at the meeting of the United Nations organization. It according to these observers, Mr. Dulles went on, "the momentum of pro-Castro feeling worked up during the war to support the Grand Alliance had continued too hastily after the victories. This made it difficult for the Administration to carry out its more diplomatic policy required now. For this reason, these observers believe, a campaign was worked up to maintain a better psychological balance of public opinion to permit the Government to adopt a harder line."

"In a campaign was worked up then to make the American people less pro-Russian? A violent kind of crisis was deliberately planned to stop the Cubans..."

"There came to be no doubt that when James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, was last in power, he made every effort to accommodate to the Cubans. A man to whom compromise came naturally, both because of his nature and his long experience in Congress, he believed compromise with a new Cuba, which was flexing its arms muscles after the victory, was both possible and desirable. And he made some compromises in Havana..."

"Whether they were good or bad only time will show. But the fact is that when he returned to Washington he suddenly found himself in a most uncomfortable situation. From the White House down, the new line was getting gnawing at the objectives and stop them. He was severely taken to task from all sides for having 'giving in' to the Communists in Havana. I do not think it is inaccurate to say that he was given to know that unless he immediately adopted a firm line, he would be replaced by some one else who would..."

"...It soon became obvious that some sort of crisis was in the making. The announcement on the night of March 15 by the State Department that Soviet troops in Iran were moving west toward Turkey and Iraq still remains something of a mystery to this day. Could the oldest Washington correspondent remember when the State Department had ever before called them in at 5 p.m. to give them news of the movement of foreign troops in a far away land? And it done so when Hitler's troops marched into the Rhineland? Into Austria? Into Czechoslovakia?"

"And whatever happened to these 'theory' Soviet columns embossed in some headlines across the front page of our newspapers? The State Department never said...no were word was ever forthcoming from the department about the progress of the Red troops. Did they ever reach? Did they get lost in the mountains? No were never told. But the frightening headlines had
achieved a purpose."

On December 30, 1964, the Alup brothers could write in an analysis of the Nixon administration that "matters of foreign policy to be sure are left untried to Mr. Sorensen, but this was not long to be the case."

Subsequent events support Mr. Sorensen's thesis that upon Sorensen's return from Havana, where he had secured an agreement with the Cubans on several vital points, he received an ultimatum from Adlai Stevenson and the President that he pursue the get-tough-with-China policy or get out.

Early in March the Washington columnist Earl Wilson, the newspaperman closest to Adlai Stevenson, reported that Sorensen might resign to be replaced by General MacArthur. The press was full of stories on Sorensen. He was painted as following a line of "Mahanism" towards the U.S.S.R.

Typical was the column of the influential Chicago Tribune that the "State Department is not good. Sorensen is not qualified. Stories that Sorensen may be replaced by a stronger, tougher man... have substance despite denials from the White House."

The Alup brothers reported that these attacks upon Sorensen came from Ledyard's office. They write that whereas Sorensen had been accessible to Ledyard, Sorensen had not been. Ledyard, on March 19, broke his habit of not talking to the press by making a report to both Anderson of the New York Herald Tribune, "the President also denied the rift. Following these denials, however, there came a drastic break in Sorensen's policy, indicating that Sorensen must have decided to give in to the ultimatum to "get tough". Instead of postponing the Chinese question (which only Khrushchev could describe as endangering world peace) for a mere two weeks, he named the time of an international crisis.

His "duff" stand, which widened the rift between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., caused Arthur Krock to write in the New York Times on April 7 that Sorensen had achieved "a new stature in Washington...He has shown he can do it!". On April 9 the Alupes reported that Sorensen had won a "new type of support--disillusionment!"

On April 11, AP correspondent John W. Rightower reported from Washington that, "officials inside the State Department and the President's office were willing to risk the worst split in Anglo-American relations ever seen in an era of good-neighbor policy."
Those who heard Winston Churchill call for an alliance of Christian peoples at Fulton, Mo., might have recalled that on June 4, 1945, at Mont Valera, near Admiral Loebk's spa in similar vein declaring that permanent peace could be achieved only if "civilized Christian peoples should at the end of this war enter into a solemn agreement to join forces at once in war against any nation that may in the future violate the sovereignty or the territory of any nation".

The influence of Admiral Loebky's expressed an American policy is known to most informed newspapers but not to the American public. Here is the testimony of some reputable correspondents:

Margaret Childe, in the New York Post, March 8, 1946: "Of all the men in Truman's innermost circle, no one has more influence, and at the same time is less known to the public than Admiral Loebky. The President has been so loyal to him in this respect. There is no doubt that he has recently played an important part in persuading the President of the need to take a firm stand towards the Soviet Union."

Lauren Lowry, in the New York Post, March 28, 1946: "There are impressive indications that Mr. Truman pays particular attention to questions of international politics to the advice of Admiral Loebky."

Morse described Loebky as "mysterious, the least known of Washington officials." He added: "It was a danger to the political man to stand behind the scene as a key adviser to the President on foreign policy. Certainly it is not in the American tradition."

William Rafler and Charles Van Devanter in the New York Post, March 18, 1946, said: "Now that Truman has succeeded to the Presidency and a host of international politics have to him, Loebky has branched out to become an adviser on world politics as well as on military and naval matters. His chief complaint against FDR is understood to be that the latter has not been firm enough in dealing with Soviet Russia."

Loebky, President Roosevelt's Ambassador to Vichy, was a firm partisans of Marshal Pétain, and in a declared enemy of all the progressive movements of Europe which he labeled 'Socialist.' pure and simple. Roosevelt's early attitude in French politics, his underestimation of the French underpinnings and the Serres movement, can be traced in large part to Loebky.

Loebky's influence on Truman is fundamentally greater than on Roosevelt. Truman—who has frequently confessed his lack of knowledge of world affairs and whose general orientation is revealed in his statement on the occasion of the
The article discusses the role of the military in American foreign policy. It mentions that the military, through Admiral Leahy, has become a significant player in foreign policy decision-making. Leahy is described as having direct access to the President and advising on major foreign policy issues. The article highlights the influence of the military on foreign policy, particularly in the context of the Second World War. The military's role is seen as crucial in the decision-making process, with Leahy acting as a key advisor to the President. The article also touches on the significance of the President's daily news summaries, which Leahy often influenced, and the importance of the military's presence in the White House, observing the military's direct involvement in foreign policy affairs. The focus remains on the military's growing influence and its impact on American foreign policy.
that is representation be increased to six. Even so the representatives of the service departments remain in the majority.

The Slope, noting Truman's "increased interest" in foreign affairs, said that the creation of Reeves staff indicated that the President will intervene to a greater extent in foreign policy and reported his intervention to oppose the State Department's proposed recognition of Bulgaria and Romania.

INFILTRATION OF MILITARY INTO DIPLOMATIC CORPS

Several of the most important posts in the diplomatic service today are held by military men, all of them good friends of Admiral Leahy.

As President went to China, General Marshall held the key position in areas of the world where Soviet and American interests most meet other facing.

Gen. Walter Bedell Smith — by special legislation — is permitted to retain his military status while serving as U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. In Frankfurt, on his way to Moscow, Gen. Smith was quoted as saying there "was a great feeling of doubt" among the American people as to "what the Russians want and what the Russian motives are".

Vice Admiral Allen G. Kirk is the recently appointed Ambassador to Belgium and Minister to Luxembourg.

A major General has been introduced into the State Department with the appointment of Maj. Gen. John E. Ehrlich as Assistant Secretary of State.

MILITARY SUPER-CABINET

The military gained a vast strategic foothold when President Truman announced the appointment of a council of "old hands" made up of five generals and five admirals, including Leahy. This "council" received most attention in the nation's press, although its appointment is unprecedented move in a democracy in possession.

Each military majority has been common in the governments of king and emperors, but are completely contrary to American tradition and practice. One wonders what Clemenceau, who thought war too important a matter to be left to the generals, would think of the increasing power the American generals are wielding in the press. In the New York Times quoted above, it is interesting that Biddle predicted that such a council would be set up and said it "would be charged with significant duties in the foreign policy field".

SIXTH RENDEZVOUS

As long as President Roosevelt held the reins of command, the Three heart was assured.
He was dead two weeks when the first session of the United Nations opened at San Francisco, April 25, 1945. There the first split among the Big Three became visible when the U.S., and Great Britain insisted—over the opposition of the Soviet Union—onincluding Danish Occupation into the peace organization of the victorious powers.

As hostilities drew to a close in Europe, the rift between Moscow and the west widened when, under British pressure, we broke a pledge made at Potsdam with respect to the occupation of Germany. As Ralph Ingersoll reports in POS SESSIONS: "We had agreed at Yalta to turn over the Russian sphere in Germany as soon as hostilities were over. Instead, on Churchill’s personal persuasion, we refined a Baker at the Russians across the line for months before we went back to our territory with all the grace of a grudging giver." The British grew more as the U.S. embarked on a policy of a double standard in war affairs, whereby the Soviets did in Europe was our business, while what we did in Asia was none of theirs.

The conference of Big Four foreign ministers in London, which followed after the San Francisco meeting, produced an absolute deadlock.

On Thanksgiving Day, 1945, Secretary of State, Byrnes decided, on his own initiative, to break the deadlock. He suggested a conference of Big Three foreign ministers in Moscow, only a few days after President Truman had declared that there would be no more such gatherings.

The Russians accepted his proposal at once. Great Britain was reluctant, but could not very well publicly oppose an attempt to reconstitute Big Three unity.

Foreign minister Byrnes had accepted him.

The Moscow Conference was a success; there Byrnes at that time followed a closely-concealed of great-power policy, seeking concessions to the Russians where American interests are not at stake and winning concessions from the Russians in China where American interests are considered strong. In both areas—

the Russians as well as China—the former status quo of the British Empire, it is true, suffered.

The Moscow Conference opened on December 19, 1945. Three days later, when London must have been informed that strategy Mr. Byrnes was following in Moscow, the first British announcement was announced in the form of the most ignorant news.

On December 26, from London, the New York Times reported on its front page that Winston Churchill would soon arrive in the U.S. to speak a "Bacon," in Florida.

Churchill’s "Bacon," as events ultimately proved, was timed to try toDevelop an American-Russian understanding and to attempt to steer American policy to a

alignment with Britain against Russia.

Meanwhile, in the U.S., itself groups were fomenting their nations because of
the atom bomb. The stockpiles of the bomb were growing. The American president was loudly predicting America's determination to increase still further its already supreme military power, and secretly biding his time to kill his hostilities to the Soviet Union. Successfully maneuvering for greater control of the domestic scene was American big business which is strongly opposed to the Soviet Union on a class basis. A continual anti-Soviet hysteria was being fomented by big business' control of the press and radio, and by other groups such as the National Catholic Welfare Conference, called by the bishops, and by the Federation of Churches, the Yadenberg Republicans former isolationists, and the British government itself.

Meanwhile Britain had returned to London to be unprofitably attacked from all sides.


Churchill conferred with President Roosevelt and went down to Florida to see the British-American Express. Eventually he traveled with Churchill for almost 24 hours to sit on the platform at Wellesley College, at Fulton, Mo., to hear the British chancellor deliver an American-American Declaration of Association for Europe, as the Expresser Letter phrased it, "an American-American alliance against Russia."

Despite subsequent denials there is persistent belief that Churchill's speech was discussed in detail with Trumam and his chief advisors. In the light of this belief, Trumam's presence on the platform at Fulton meant just what it seemed to mean—approval of the Churchill proposal.

Margaret Chase in the New York Post, March 2, writes: "The President on the text of the Churchill's Fulton, Missouri speech before it was delivered.

The two men discussed in considerable detail the history-making address."

The Expresser Letter (March 2) reported that 'Churchill's proposal of an Anglo-American Alliance (against Russia) was presented to Trumam by Churchill during his visit here last month, and was subsequently discussed with the President and MacArthur. All agreed, not necessarily the alliance, but of the public proposal of its. This was driven home by Trumam's appearance on the platform with Churchill.'

Margaret Chase wrote in an Oli dispatch from Washington: "The most successful expression yet of the military viewpoint in our relations with other countries came with the Churchill speech in Missouri. Trumam's introduction of Churchill is being widely accepted as endorsement. Circumspect class to Admiral Leahy have been openly glowful about this development."

It is evident that Churchill's speech and President Trumam's widely credited endorsement of it had as their purpose to turn public opinion if not to execute it.

The Expresser Letter accused (March 4) "The Churchill speech is merely one
of a series of provocations by U.S. and Britain against Russia. They are now working up to a climax but the climax is not yet. Even the stiff U.S. note to Russia on Iran this week is not the real climax but only the forewarning. Events will come alternately from U.S. and Britain and from others in SE.

The trial balloon to test public opinion collapsed on this first flight. Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister finally dispatched Churchill’s speech—just as Truman did. But it was only after public opinion had reacted violently against the speech that both of them declared they had had nothing to do with the talk of a “private citizen.”

Syrians, as developments following his return from Moscow indicate, had understood he had to join the Kremlin easy or quit. He stayed. It was Syria who followed up the failure of the Churchill speech with the Iranian “crisis.” The “Iranian crisis” was designed to accomplish what Churchill had failed to do—to re-orient the American people against the Soviet Union so that Churchill’s Anglo-American “frontal association” could be realized.

As early as March 5, the Apo brothers revealed just how this first lesson of “political education” was to be managed when they reported that American policy makers had accepted the inevitability of a break with the Soviet Union and were determined that, when the break came, “the major issue will be the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the United Nations.” The March 16 Fijlinger Letter revealed a similar thought, predicting a break with Russia “by all or most actions” backed by the UN.

So the Iranian crisis was staged. Events were to prove that the Soviet Union had been seeking, and finally obtained, a friendly agreement with Iran—an agreement which with or without the presence of Soviet troops was far more advantageous for Iran than any that “small action” had ever made with other foreign powers, including Britain and the U.S. This is made incumbent clear by I.D. 3000 in Mr. The break with the Soviet Union did not materialize. But to a large measure the “crisis” served the purpose for which it had been apparently designed. A dispatch from London by C.J. Bulger for the New York Times, April 17, 1945 said of the coming Paris conference:

“there is a good deal of preliminary bluff—street on both sides. But what is more important in the pre-conference line-up is the vastly altered status of public opinion in the Western democracies which is bound to strengthen the hand of the Syrumea team... There are many diplomats who believe this change was deliberately engineered by some effective maneuvering by the Administration in Washington. The momentum of the pro-Jewish feeling, carefully juggled and built up during the war—which carried on through Potsdam and Sanrese Conferences—has been halted and replaced.”
Sen. Claude Pepper in a major foreign policy speech in the Senate March 20, 1948, called on the U.S. to "demonstrably possess every atomic bomb we have and smash every facility we possess which is capable of producing only destructive forms of atomic energy."

Of course, we should have stopped the whole atomic bomb production process on N.I. (Nagasaki and Hiroshima) and all, and many of the acts of aggression are being committed in the world, but a decisive atomic bomb race among the major powers is already on the way."

Beyond today, whose Friday eight nights on atomic energy over a national scale network have won him the status of an authority, declared in a broadcast, Jan. 18, 1948: "We are already the strongest military nation. We do not need the atom bomb to pull our weight in the world. But we continue to manufacture it, and we manufacture it under a secrecy which must be called sinister because of the stress put on secrecy in this country and the effect it has on international relations."

The struggle for control of atomic energy and for the decisive voice in determining the ease to which it will be put reflects the basic struggle in the U.S. today between the arms race and the peacemakers. The latter have been a persistent incentive in the legislation prepared by the McMahon Committee for domestic control of atomic energy, since the bid by the military for outright and complete control was defeated.

But the legislation proposed for international as well as domestic control contains a provision that the provisions for the U.S. to discontinuamente developing and producing atomic bombs or to get rid of those we have. In fact, the introduction to the McMahon-Symphol report insists on continued manufacture of the bomb, while the body of the report is silent on this question. And the McMahon bill calls for the continued production of atomic weapons "in such amounts as the President may annually determine."

Thus, these proposals for control fall to touch the core of the problem—the bombs themselves.

The McMahon-Symphol report, said Raymond Plank in a broadcast April 6, 1948, "is not enough to outweigh our exclusive possession of the atomic bomb and the manifest intention of using it in event of war if this international control is not achieved."

"We oppose," Plank continued, "as the atomic world as a nation committed to the most brutal means of wages war at the same time that we are trying to build up a world organization to curb our own brutality and that of any other country."

There is no justification for our continued manufacture of the atomic bombs.

J.F. Jones, writing in The Nation April 13, 1948, underlines the great weakness of the McMahon-Symphol report: "we are asking other nations to hand over control of their uranium deposits with no assurance of our handing over the secret of the
atomic bomb to the new international authority."

On the question of domestic control, any thoughtful citizen can perceive that the amount and nature of atomic weapons in the hands available to the discretion of the President is an safeguard to all against military control. This is especially clear when the President appoints a super-secret of generals and admirals to serve as council on questions of foreign policy under the cloak of national defense, as President Truman did recently.

The American constitution provides that the people, through their elected representatives, control the size, purposes and uses of the armed forces. The atom bombs are as much a branch of the armed forces as the Army, the Navy, the Air Force. But the American people do not know how many bombs are being made, or where they are, nor for what purpose they are being manufactured. Nor do any of the proposals for control at present under discussion entitle them that they should.

No nation can have it both ways. Either we destroy the bombs and the facilities for making them and proceed to a peaceful utilization of atomic energy and a peaceful solution of domestic and international problems, or we continue to make the bombs and thus deliver to the military a weapon of unprecedented power to turn against other peoples and ourselves.

Many unthinking people believe that we must keep a storepile of atoms and continue production as a measure of national defense. There could be no greater fallacy. If we keep the bombs and continue to manufacture them, we absolutely insure that other nations will sooner or later—and since techniques constantly improve it will doubtless be sooner—build their own atomic bombs. At best we will have won only the greatest insecurity.

Since this is true, and the people who advocate continued production of the bombs realize this, we automatically commit ourselves to ever-increasing militarization and a greater and greater organization of the country for war. And, at the same time, we open the way for those who control the bomb to lead us into a so-called "preventive war".

The atom bombs by their very existence are impelling this nation to war and fascism.

That this is so becomes apparent when we trace the effect that the stockpiling of the bombs has already had in shaping American world policy, and the direction in which this policy is heading. Without recourse to "inside information" and without reference to warnings made privately by important government persons—although these are available—this phenomenon we believe demonstrates on the basis of material published by reliable and reputable correspondents that the military clique which controls the atom bomb has now won virtual control of American foreign policy, and that it is now steering that policy along exactly those lines proposed by Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, and decisively repudiated by the American people. # # #