Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace, speaking at a ZAC dinner to honor the late President Roosevelt, April 10, 1946, spoke of the "desperate efforts of a small military clique" to bring about war with Russia.

The Kiplinger Letter, a newsletter with good sources of information to rightist circles, circulated privately to businessmen printed March 16, 1946 to "that brand of thinking within the military that are in the time to stop Russia, whereas at a later date we might not be able." It reported March 21 that a stand has been taken by the U.S. which "indicates that the risk of war." 

John J. O'Neill, associate editor of the New York Herald Tribune, on March 24 wrote of "the actions...wedged by the Washington military clique mostly through stonewalling and use of Congress." He said "Every possible step toward making atomic energy available for human welfare applications has been completely and ruthlessly suppressed by the military clique. Every action that has been taken, including the maternal bills, is pointed in the direction of war making." (Emphasis on war making)

O'Neill continues "a revealed list of diplomacy buffalo in being staged to provide apparent justification for a military spends weapons any more in Canada so innocently that it is unwise for all but the most gullible, and an iron situation that is being dealed with all the ultrasocially openly available to the state departments....

"As a scientist it is difficult to imagine anything more idiotic when diplomats threatening atomic energy was to monopolize the oil supply of one country when the proper development of atomic energy for welfare purposes will make it for power even as commodities as oil..."

The Washington Post, article by Joseph N. Stilwell, in the New York Herald Tribune of March 18, under the headline "MONUMENTS OF US VIGILANCE," wrote that the new line in American foreign policy, the so-called "nuclear.pojo policy," is the open result of the new weapons the U.S. has developed. They painted a terrifying picture of these weapons, and said American experts were unable to express the Soviet High Command has not recognized the implications of the new weapons.

In a highly significant paragraph, the Albany, who are known to have excellent sources among top American policy-makers, writes "Sooner or later, however, the existence of the new weapons will make it necessary to find out whether Soviet policy can be radically changed."
In other words, if nuclear bombs don’t work, the “meat” weapons must be used.

Another significant paragraph reports that some generals are worried by the fact that the American Constitution virtually requires this country to accept a surprise attack before giving itself for war.

Thus, at the present time and in the foreseeable future, an enemy in the world is in a position to launch a surprise attack on the U.S.A., the statement clearly suggests that some of the military are beginning to shift their attention at the 63rd—i.e., the British American Constitution, which leaves the decision of war or peace up to elected civilian authorities and not to the military.

Johnston Steel, in a broadcast March 10, 1946, interpreted the Alliance’s speech to mean that “we must be in a position to use the atomic bomb as a surprise weapon without constitutional restraint.” He described the “meat pack” as including “human elements, cultural and economic,” in the army, navy, finance, and international finance, and said that it was “diange tremendous pressures” and by a “frightful leverage of public and newspaper propaganda.” Larsen’s ally of six months ago almost spoke as enemy.

These pressures, apparently oriented toward an atomic war on the Soviet Union or the threat of one, were sufficiently serious for Walter Lippmann, New York Herald Tribune columnist, to warn publicly that such an attack could not succeed. Lippmann wrote just before his recent departure for Europe:

“An atomic bombardment could destroy the Red Army; it could destroy only the industrial means of supplying it. The Russian defense to atomic attack is, therefore, self-evident: it is to over-run continental Europe with industry, and deny us its purpose. It would lead on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Switzerland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The more we threaten to demolish Russian cities, the more obvious it is that the Russian defense would be to overcome themselves in Europe and cities which we should not demolish without massacring hundreds of thousands of our own friends.”

Drew Pearson, in his column in the New York Daily Mirror, March 20, 1946, indicated that the military were waiting for some pretext to use the atom bomb on the Soviet Union. He wrote:

“The Russian situation was so tense just before Stalin started pulling his troops out of Iran that U.S. military men seriously discussed bombing Russian oil fields—of the Red seeding an aggressive move in Turkey.”

President Truman opposes using the atom bomb, but military strategists figured long-term measures, by neutralizing Russian oil, could persuade the Red Army—
If it started to march against Turkey or the Caucasus.

The implication of the foregoing statements seems to be that the military now considers that it has a weapon it can and should be able to use without consulting the American people. According to a New York Times, Feb. 25, 1918, Drew Pearson has accused Admiral Leahy as a source "of leaks that are feeding the anti-Dirig case feeling that is sweeping the country by the greatest use of subcommittee. Pearson's... report on the wild scenes of Leahy to the millions of readers, who knew Pearson as a liberal-minded friend of America in the past, naturally asks Pearson how reason to change his mind, although he has simply changed his source. What strikes Leahy as aggression appears to minimize an appeal made by the country's last view of the lessons she has learned by her experience in World War II. The Pearson report, if reflecting the temper of Admiral Leahy and the military, appears to be also in the nature of a trial balloon.

The Pearson report quoted above refers to the "casinos" of the situation and used the term "Iroquois crisis".

William L. Shirer in the New York Herald Tribune, April 14, 1918, summarized some of the evidence that this "crisis" was an Anglo-American fabrication and pointed to the real meeting of the Iranian affair. He said "A month ago there appeared in the press two dispatches whose significance in shedding light on the struggle between the Anglo-American powers and Russia in the Security Council can only now be appreciated. One was from Washington the other surprisingly enough, none from Berlin.

"From Washington on March 16 the brothers knew Washington correspondents, reported that 'many American policy makers there is only one reason why ultimatum war is not expected.' The reason was, they said, that to stop the Russians we would precipitate 'the most wicked kind of crisis.'"

On the same day, March 16, the British representative sent a cable to the Foreign Office in London from a correspondent from Berlin: "...the Russian armies received confirmation of the report of the German ultimatum. This is a clear indication of the fact that Germany is willing to accept the conditions of the Council of the Four Powers. The Russian government, however, has not yet decided whether to accept these conditions or not."

"Cautious diplomat," he added on March 16, "believes that this crisis (the flare-up over Iran) may have been deliberately raised to force the British government to crystallize public opinion and strengthen the
American lead in disarming about to be resumed at the meeting of the United Nations organization.

"According to these observers," Mr. Dulles went on, "the momentum of pro-Gerol steak feeling worked up during the war to support the Grand alliance had continued too heavily after the semblance. This made it difficult for the administration to carry out the stiffer diplomatic policy required now. For this reason, these observers believe, a campaign was worked up to attain a better psychological balance of public opinion to permit the Government to adopt a harder line."

"Is a campaign was worked up then to make the American people less pro-Gerol steak? A violent kind of crisis was deliberately planned to stop the Grand alliance..."

"There seems to be no doubt that when James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, was last in Moscow he made every effort to be accommodating to the Soviets. A man to whom compromisers come naturally, both because of his nature and his long experience in Congress, he believed compromises with a new Soviet, which was flexing its great muscles after the victory, was both possible and desirable. And he made some compromises in Moscow.

"Whether they were good or bad only time will show. But the fact is that when he returned to Washington he suddenly found himself in a most uncomfortable situation. From the White House down, the new line was getting through with the Democrats and stop them. He was assuredly taking too hard from all sides for having 'given in' to the demands in Moscow. I do not think it is inaccurate to say that he was given to know unless he immediately adopted a 'firm line,' he would be replaced by someone else who would..."

"...It soon became obvious that some sort of crisis was in the making. The announcement the night of March 15 by the State Department that Soviet troops in Iran were moving west toward Turkey and Iraq still remains something of a mystery to this day. Could the oldest Washington correspondent remember when the State Department had ever before called them in at 8 p.m. to give them news of the movement of foreign troops in a far away land? And it done so when Hitler's troops marched into the Rhineland? Into Austria? Into Czechoslovakia?"

"And whatever happened to these 'heads! Soviet column disembarked in some headlines across the front pages of our newspapers? The State Department never said...no more word was ever forthcoming from the department about the progress of the 3rd troops. Did they move back? Did they get lost in the snowdrifts? No one was told. But the frightening headlines had
achieved a purpose."

On December 20, 1946, the Acheson brothers could write in an analysis of the Truman administration that "matters of foreign policy to be sure are left wholly to Mr. Byrnes", but this was not long to be the case.

Subsequent events support Acheson's thesis that upon Byrnes's return from Moscow, where he had reached agreement with the Russians on several vital points, he received an ultimatum from Atlee L. Lacy and the President that he pursue the get-tough-with-China policy or get out.

Early in March the Washington columnist Carl Sandburg, the newspaperman closest to Atlee Lacy, reported that Byrnes might resign to be replaced by General Marshall. The press was full of attacks on Byrnes. He was painted as following a line of "Russification" towards the USSR. Typical was the statement of the influential Right Wing Letter that the "State Department is not good. Byrnes is not qualified. Stories that Byrnes may be replaced by a stronger, tougher man... have substantiated doubts deriving from the White House".

Byrnes, however, had been supported by Luce who had written in Newsweek: "I am for Byrnes. He's a good man. He is the right man for the job. We need a man who is not afraid to stand up to the Russians. Byrnes is that man."

The Acheson brothers reported that those attacks upon Byrnes stemmed from Lacy's office. They wrote that whereas Stettinius had been amenable to Lacy's influence, Byrnes had not. Lacy, in February 16, broke his habit of not talking to the press to denounce the New York Herald Tribune. The President also denied the rift. Following these denials, however, there came a drastic shortening in Byrnes' policy, indicating that Byrnes must have decided to give in to the ultimatum to "get tough". Instead of postponing the Far East question (what only Forrest G. V. Swett could describe as "sagging" world peace) for a mere two weeks, he named the scene of an international crisis.

His "bold" stand, which widened the rift between the US and the USSR, caused Arthur Krock to write in the New York Times on April 7 that Byrnes had achieved "in a few weeks in Washington... the same change he had in his own heart when he first came". "On April 9 the Achesons reported that Byrnes had "converted" his staff to the "get tough"'s policy of the President.

On April 14, AP correspondent John H. Whitehead reported from Washington that "officials describe Secretary of State Byrnes as willing to risk the worst split to single-mindedly pursue unity even to preclude the Paris meeting to failure—rather than go anything like all the way to meet Russian demands".
These who heard Winston Churchill call for an alliance of Christian peoples at Fulton, Mo., might have recalled that on June 1, 1945, at Mount Vernon, Ga., Admiral Leahy spoke in similar vein declaring that permanent peace could be achieved only if "civilized Christian peoples should at the end of this war enter into a solemn agreement to join forces at once in war against any nation that may in the future violate the sovereignty or the territory of any nation."

The influence Admiral Leahy exercises on American policy is known to most informed newspapermen but not to the American public. Here is the testimony of some reputable correspondents:

Margaret Channing in the New York Post, March 9, 1946: "Of all the men in Truman's daily asserted inner circle, no one has more influence, and at the same time is less known to the public than Admiral Leahy...The President has come to lean heavily on this counselor. There is no doubt that he has recently played an important part in persuading the President of the need to take a firmer stand towards the Soviet."

LelandThomas, in the New York Post, March 23, 1946: "There are impressive indications that Mr. Truman pays particular attention on questions of international politics to the advice of Admiral Leahy..."

Steve described Leahy as "mysterious, the least known of Washington officials." He adds: "It can be a dangerous precedent for a lesser military man to act behind the scenes as a key adviser to the President on foreign policy. Certainly it is not in the American tradition."

William F. Buckley in the New York Post, March 13, 1946, said: "One that Truman has succeeded in procuring is a host of international politics to him, Leahy has branched out to become an adviser on world politics as well as on military and naval matters. His chief complaint against Byrnes is understood to be that the latter has not been 'firm' enough in dealing with Soviet Russia."

Leahy, President Roosevelt's Ambassador to Vichy, was a firm partisans of Marshal Pétain, and is a declared enemy of all the progressive movements of Europe which he labelled "Umberto's" pure and simple. Roosevelt's early attitude in French policy, his endorsement of the French administration and the Vichy government, seem to have been largely due to Leahy.

Leahy's influence on Truman is infinitely greater than on Roosevelt. Truman—who has frequently confessed his lack of knowledge of world affairs and whose general orientation is revealed in his statement on the occasion of the
feel attack on the USSR in 1941 that we should help the Soviets if the Nazis were winning and the Nazis if the Soviets were winning, in the plan hope that they would destroy each other, — is letting Ledyard make policy.

On March 11, 1946, CBS correspondent Malcolm Hille reported from Washington: "Lend-Lease was a virtual control over foreign policy. Now that international affairs are getting direct treatment from the White House. Increasingly, international decisions are being made in which the State Department is 'omitted,' after the fact. Truman has become, in fact, his own Secretary of State, perhaps to an even greater degree than was Roosevelt. This means that Ledyard, a military man, is exercising greater control over foreign policy than is the civilian Secretary." On March 29, Bert Andrews reported in the New York Daily Tribune that the policy Ledyard was pursuing about Iran had been determined in consultation with the military.

**ROLE OF ARMED SERVICES**

It is not only Ledyard's control over the military that the military are seeing as a "virtual control" over American foreign policy.

The Daily brothers reported in the Daily Tribune, March 1, 1946, "Policy is based on fact, and the man who selects and preparers the facts for the highest authority cannot avoid making policy. In the light of these recent actions, it is particularly interesting that four Admiral Halsey, director of the new National Intelligence Agency, now has the task of preparing the President's daily summary of the world's situation. Halsey, who is a former Secretary of State, is the President's personal choice for the directorship of the CIA, and he is regarded as possessing a major potential influence on American foreign policy. The daily summary which is the only paper on the subject of the world situation that Halsey reads every day (underlining mine) is drafted by Halsey's staff of young officers, selected equally from the ground, air and naval forces and six men seconded from the State Department. Halsey takes the summary to the White House every afternoon after lunch and generally presents it personally to the President."

The Daily brothers report that the "significance of the novel plan adopted by the President should not be underestimated. The obvious meaning in view of the cooperation of the Secretary of State's staff is that the opinion of the service departments on the world situation will be more regularly, if less directly, transmitted to the President. The importance of the larger scale given the War and Navy Departments was recognized by the State Department which originally had only three men attached to its staff and limited..."
that in representation be increased to six. Even so the representatives of the service departments remain in the majority."

The Senate, noting Truman's "increased interest" in foreign affairs, said that the creation of even staff indicated that the President will intervene to a greater extent in foreign policy and reported his intervention to oversee the State Department's proposed recognition of Bulgaria and Romania.

INFILTRATION OF MILITARY INTO DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Several of the most important posts in the diplomatic service today are held by military men, all of whom are old friends of Admiral Leahy.

As Presidential envoy to China, General MacArthur holds the key position in an area of the world where Soviet and American interests meet each other face to face.

Gen. Walter Bedell Smith - by special legislation - is permitted to retain his military status while serving as U.S. ambassador to Moscow. In Franklin, on his way to Moscow, Gen. Smith was quoted as saying that "as a great feeling of doubt" among the American people as to "what the Russians want and what the Russian motives are."

Vice Admiral Alee C. Kirk is the recently appointed ambassador to Belgium and Minister to Luxembourg.

A major change has been introduced into the State Department with the appointment of Maj. Gen. John H. Eilendorf as assistant secretary of state.

MILITARY SUB-CABINET

The military gained a most strategic foothold when President Truman announced the appointment of a council of "old men" made up of five generals and five admirals, including Leahy. This "council" received most attention in the nation's press, although its appointment is an unprecedented move in a democracy in peacetime. Such military councils have been common in the governments of king and emperors, but are completely contrary to American tradition and practice. One wonders what Clemenceau, who thought war the most important matter to be left to the generals, would think of the increasing power the American generals are vesting in the press. In the CNA dispatch quoted above, it is interesting that Hitler predicted that such a council would be set up and said it "would be charged with significant duties in the foreign policy field.

SISER ROOSEVELT

As long as President Roosevelt held the reins of government, Big Three unity was assured.
He was dead two weeks when the first session of the United Nations opened at San Francisco, April 25, 1945. There the first split among the Big Three became visible when the U.S. and Great Britain insisted—over the opposition of the Soviet Union—on establishing Panfilov's regiment into the peace organization of the victorious powers.

As hostilities drew to a close in Europe, the rift between Russia and the west widened when, under British pressure, we broke a pledge made at Yalta with respect to the occupation of Germany. As Ralph L. Ingersoll reports in MINUTES: "We had agreed at Yalta to turn over the Russian sphere in Germany as soon as hostilities were over. Instead, on Churchill's personal persuasion, we relented a sleeper at the Russians across the line for months before we went back to our territory with all the grace of a grudging giver." The broad map view as the U.S. embarked on a policy of a double standard in world affairs, whereby the United States in Europe was our business, while what we did in Asia was none of theirs.

The conference of Big Four foreign ministers in London, which followed after the San Francisco meeting, produced an absolute deadlock.

On Thanksgiving Day, 1945, Secretary of State, Byrnes decided, on his own initiative, to break the deadlock. He suggested a conference of Big Three foreign ministers in Moscow, only a few days after President Truman had declared that there would be no more such gatherings.

The Russians accepted his proposal at once. Great Britain was reluctant, but could not very well publicly oppose an attempt to reconstitute Big Three unity.

Foreign Minister Brejnev accepted too.

The Moscow Conference opened on December 29, 1945. Three days later, when London first news had been informed that strategy Mr. Byrnes was following in Moscow, the first British announcement was announced in the form of the most opportune news.

On December 30, from London, the New York Times reported on its front page that Winston Churchill would soon arrive in the U.S. to speak a "ounselion" in Florida.

Churchill's "ounselion," as events ultimately proved, was timed to try to thorn a American-Japanese understanding and to attempt to steer American policy to an alignment with Britain against Russia.

Meanwhile, In the U.S. itself groups were fanning their flames because of
the atom bomb. The stockpiles of the bomb were growing. The American president was loudly proclaiming America's determination to increase still further its already awesome nuclear power, and secretly biding his time to use his hostility to the Soviet Union. Subsequently reassuring the world about domestic affairs was a reassuring reassurance that the United States big business was being threatened by big business' control of the press and radio, and by other groups such as the National Catholic Welfare Conference, called Bibles and Bagels, a faction in the Federation of Churches, the Van Heusen Republicans, former isolationists, and the British government itself.

Meanwhile, Europe had returned from Moscow to be uncharacteristically attacked from all sides.

Winston Churchill arrived in the U.S. on January 19, 1941.

Churchill conferred with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman went down to Florida to see the British Prime Minister. Eventually, the two leaders travelled with Churchill for almost 24 hours to sit on the platform at Westminster College, at Fulton, Mo., to hear the British premier suggest an Anglo-American "virtual association" or, as the Kiplinger Letter phrased it, "an Anglo-American alliance against Russia.

Despite subsequent denials there is persistent belief that Churchill's speech was discussed in detail with Truman and by later White House. In the light of this belief, Truman's presence on the platform at Fulton meant that it seemed to mean—approval of the Churchill proposal.

Marquis Childs in the New York Post, March 5, wrote: "The President went over the text of Winston Churchill's Fulton, Missouri speech before it was delivered. The two men discussed in considerable detail the history-making address."

The Kiplinger Letter (March 5) reported that 'Churchill's proposal of an Anglo-American Alliance (against Russia) was presented to Truman by Churchill during his visit here last month, and was subsequently discussed with Spence and Wechs. It is approved, not necessarily the alliance, but of the public proposal of it. This was driven home by Truman's appearance on the platform with Churchill.'

Marquis Childs wrote in an O.J. dispatch from Washington: "The most successful expression yet of the military viewpoint in our relations with other countries came with the Churchill speech in Missouri. Truman's introduction of Churchill is receiving widespread endorsement. Circles close to Admiral Leahy have been openly glowful about this development."

It is evident that Churchill's wartime speech and President Truman's widely credited endorsement of it had as their purpose to boost public opinion if not to serve his.

The Kiplinger Letter declared (March 5): "The Churchill speech is surely me
of a series of pronouncements by U.S. and British against Russia. They are now working up to a climax but the climax is not yet. Even the stiff U.S. note to Russia on Iran this week is not the real climax but only the forerunner. Events still come alternately from U.S. and Britain and from others in S.W.

The trial balloon to test public opinion collapsed on this first flight. Clement Attlee, British Prime Minister finally dismissed Churchill's speech—just as Iran did. But it was only after public opinion had reacted violently against the speech that both of them declared that they had had nothing to do with the talk of a "private citizen."

Syrie, as developments following his return from Moscow indicate, had understood he had to join the wall easy or quit. So stayed. It was Syrie who followed up the failure of the Churchill speech with the Iranian "crisis". The "Iranian crisis" was designed to accomplish what Churchill had failed to do—to re-orient the American people against the Soviet Union so that Churchill's Anglo-American "federal association" could be realized.

As early as March 8, the able brothers revealed just how this first lesson of "political education" was to be managed when they reported that American policy makers had accepted the eventuality of a break with the Soviet Union and were determined that, when that break came, "the major issue will be the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the United Nations". The March 18 "Fitzhugh Letter" revealed a similar thought, predicting a break with Russia "by all or most actions" backed by the U.N.

So the Iranian crisis was staged. Events were to prove that the Soviet Union had been sought, and finally obtained, a friendly agreement with Iran— an agreement which with or without the presence of Soviet troops was far more advantageous for Iran than any that "small action" had ever made with other foreign powers, including Britain and the U.S. This is made indubitably clear by F.D. '36 in M. The break with the Soviet Union did not materialise. But to a large measure the "crisis" served the purpose for which it had been apparently designed. A dispatch from London by C.S. Holbrooke in the New York Times, April 17, 1946 said of the coming Paris conference:

"there is a good deal of preliminary bluff-retreat on both sides. But what is more important in the pre-conference line-up is the vastly altered status of public opinion in the Western democracies which is bound to strengthen the hand of the Syræbion team...There are many diplomats who believe this change was deliberately engineered by some effective maneuvering by the Administration in Washington. The momentum of the pro-Soviet feeling, carelessly engendered and built up during the war—which carried on through Potsdam and Moscow Conferences—has been halted and reversed."
Sen. Claude Pepper in a major foreign policy speech in the Senate March 30, 1948, called on the U.S. to "destroy every atomic bomb we have and smash every facility we possess which is capable of producing only destructive forms of atomic energy. Of course, we should have stopped the whole atomic bomb production process on U.S. soil. Our failure to do so has not only precipitated a coup and ill will, and many of the acts of provocation are being committed in the world, but a dangerous atomic bomb race among the major powers is already on the way." 

Beyond today, whose Friday night tells us atomic energy over a nationwide network were won the status of an authority, declared on a broadcast, Jan. 12, 1948. "We are already the strongest military nation. We do not need the atom bomb to pull our weight in the world. We continue to manufacture it. We continue to manufacture it under a secrecy which must be called sinister because of the stress put on secrecy in this country and the effect it has on our international relations."

The struggle for control of atomic energy and for the decisive voice in determining the uses to which it will be put reflects the basic struggle in the tub, today, between the seniors and the juniors. The latter have one preliminary estimate in the legislation prepared by the McMahon Committee for domestic control of atomic energy, since the bid by the military for outright and complete control was defeated.

But the legislation proposed for international as well as domestic control contains no provision for the U.S. to discontinue manufacture of atomic bombs or to get rid of those we have. In fact, the introduction to the McMahon-Coburn bill insists on continued manufacture of the bomb, while the body of the report is silent on this question. And the McMahon bill calls for the continued production of atomic weapons "to such extent as the President may annually determine."

Thus, these proposals for control fall to touch the core of the problem—the bombs themselves.

The McMahon-Coburn report said Raymond Davis in a broadcast April 6, 1948, "It is not enough to outlaw our exclusive possession of the atomic bomb and the manifest intention of using it in event of war if this international control is not achieved."

"We suppose," Davis continued, "as the atomic world is a nation committed to the most brutal means of asserting our at the same time that we are trying to build up a world organization to curb our own brutality and that of any other country... There is no justification for our continued manufacture of the atomic bombs."

I. F. Stone, writing in The Nation April 13, 1948, underlines the great weakness of the McMahon-Coburn report: "We are asking other nations to hand over control of their atomic deposits well in advance of our heading over the secret of the
atomic bomb to the new international authority."

On the question of domestic control, any thoughtful citizen can perceive that the power to use the amount and nature of atomic weapons in the last analysis is the discretion of the President is an safeguard at all against military control. This is especially clear when the President appoints a super-intend of generals and admirals to serve as counsel on matters of foreign policy under the aegis of national defense, as President Truman did recently.

The American constitution provides that the people, through their elected representatives, control the size, purposes and uses of the armed forces. The atom bombs are as much a branch of the armed forces as the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, but the American people do not know how many bombs are being made, or where they are, nor for what purpose they are being manufactured. Nor do any of the proposals for control at present under discussion entertain that they should.

So nation can have it both ways. Either we destroy the bomb and the facilities for making them and proceed to a neutralization of atomic energy and a peaceful solution of domestic and international problems, or we continue to make the bombs and thus deliver to the military a weapon of unprecedented power to terror against other peoples and ourselves.

Many unthinking people believe that we must keep a stockpile of atom and continue production as a measure of national defense. There could be no greater fallacy. If we keep the bombs and continue to manufacture them, we absolutely ensure that other nations will sooner or later—and since techniques constantly improve it will doubtless be sooner—build their own atomic bombs. At best we will have won only the greatest insecurity.

Since this is true, and the people who advocate continued production of the bombs realize this, we automatically commit ourselves to ever-increasing militarization and a greater and greater occupation of the country for war. And, at the same time, we open the way for those who control the bomb to lead us into a so-called "preventive war".

The atom bombs by their very existence are impelling this nation to war and fascism.

That this is so becomes apparent when we trace the effect that the stock-piling of the bombs has already had in shaping American world policy, and the direction in which this policy is heading. Without recourse to "inside information" and without reference to earnings made privately by important government persons—although these are available—this assumption we believe demonstrates on the basis of material published by reliable and reputable correspondents that the military clique which controls the atom bomb has now won virtual control of American foreign policy, and that it is now steering that policy along exactly those lines proposed by William Marshall at Fulton, Missouri, and decisively repudiated by the American people.

# # #