SOME ASPECTS OF THE PREPARATION OF PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S SPEECHES FOR THE 1948 CAMPAIGN.

by

Charles J. Murphy.

INTRODUCTION

It now appears to be generally agreed that President Truman's 1948 campaign is of great historical importance. Because of the opportunity which I had to follow the preparation of his campaign speeches and the knowledge which I have of the sources from which the material for the speeches came, it seems worthwhile that I should make some kind of record of my information on this subject.

I think it is accurate for me to say that I perhaps am more familiar with the sources from which the material for the speeches came, and the manner in which the speeches were prepared, than any other person. If this memorandum should turn out to be top-heavy, as it undoubtedly will, with references to myself—that can be accounted for by the fact that it will be an account
of that part of the work in which I participated and which, for that reason of course, is the part of the work I remember.

This memorandum is being dictated from memory, without notes, and consequently will have some considerable gaps in it and perhaps some inaccuracies. At some later time I hope to have an opportunity to revise it after going through such files as might be available containing different drafts of the speeches and notes relating thereto.

By way of background, some reference might be made to the manner in which Presidential speeches were ordinarily prepared during the period before the campaign began.

Speaking generally, the work for sometime past had been done by Clark Clifford, George Kluey, David Bell, and me. From time to time help was obtained from other sources. For example, when a speech was to be made on a subject which fell clearly within the jurisdiction of one of the Departments of the Government, it was customary to ask that Department to submit a draft and to help in revising the draft.

We also received considerable help, both in the form of research materials and drafts of speeches from the Research Division.
of the Democratic National Committee. This was a group of six
or eight young men, headed by William L. Hatt, Jr., and was
referred to usually as the Hatt group. This group was organized
in the late Spring of 1944 expressly to help with speeches and
speech materials during the campaign. Their particular responsibility
was to furnish some local background information and local color
for each stop where the President was to speak, and to furnish an
outline or draft of a speech for each stop other than the major
speeches.

To return to the subject of the major speeches before the
campaign, the four of us mentioned above worked together well and
with little or no friction. Each speech went through a number of
drafts, usually about seven. It is perhaps impossible to generalize
about the nature of the contribution which each of us made to these
drafts, but I had the impression that, by and large, Kehr and Hall
did more of the writing, and that Clifford and I did more of the
editing and criticizing.

Mention should be made of the fact that Leon Kehr's sister
was a never-failing source of drafts and materials for a speech on
almost any subject, and that we frequently called on him for help.
When our group had finished with a draft, it was submitted to the President who met with four or five of his staff, and from time to time other individuals, to go over the draft and make such changes as the President desired.

Under this process the preparation of a major speech was ordinarily regarded as about a week's work — although upon occasion it was done in a considerably shorter period than that.

It was apparent, therefore, that our production schedules had to be stepped up considerably to meet the requirements of the campaign.

This memorandum will relate chiefly to the major speeches, as they are the ones with which I was principally concerned. There will be references to some of the whistle-stop speeches with which I had something to do.

Some reference should be made to what the President once referred to as his 'non-political campaign trip' to the West Coast in June. This was in many respects a kind of shake-down cruise for the campaign trips which came later. On that trip there were five major speeches and, as I recall, about forty other speeches over a period
of two weeks. Before the trip was over the situation had developed so that it seemed to be generally accepted that it was my responsibility to provide the President with some material for use in his whistle-stop speeches. This material was ordinarily furnished in the form of a brief outline. Sometimes it was only a few rough pencil notes which I wrote early in the morning and handed to the President before most of the people on the trains had gotten up. In at least one case the material included a “prop” which the President displayed to the crowd. In this case it was a Bureau of Reclamation report on the Columbia River Basin which the President used at Pocatello, Idaho. This technique of displaying papers and reading from them was later developed very effectively during the campaign.

Incidentally, it was on this June trip that the expression “whistle-stop” came into use. It grew out of some critical statement made by Senator Taft to the effect that the President was going about to every whistle-stop in the country, abusing Congress. In the speech at Los Angeles, where he had been greeted by almost a million people on the streets, the President referred to Senator Taft’s statement and mentioned the number of the whistle-stops, including Los Angeles. From that time on, the term was frequently
used to designate the spot other than those where the President
was scheduled to make major speeches.

The Acceptance Speech at Philadelphia
JULY 16, 1864

The President's speech accepting the nomination at the
Democratic Convention in Philadelphia did a great deal to set the
tone of the whole campaign and should properly be regarded as the
opening campaign speech.

During the week before the President's nomination, I began
to be very much concerned about the preparation of the acceptance
speech. However, in view of the opposition to his nomination from
some quarters, and the doubts as to what might actually happen at
the Convention, it was a subject which I did not feel free to press.

On Saturday of that week I stayed at home and during the
course of that day and Sunday I wrote a draft of an acceptance
speech. While that draft was not used, it seemed to me that the
philosophy it stated was in substantial accord with the philosophy
which was developed in the course of the campaign and to me, at any
rate, it is of considerable interest on that account.
I had this draft typed on Monday morning and submitted
it to Elsey, Bell, and Clifford, severally. It got a very favorable
reaction from Bell, quite favorable from Elsey, and apparently a
favorable reaction from Clifford. This encouraged me to think that
we were then in a position to produce a speech, if necessary.

However, it developed that the President had asked Sam
Roosevelt to prepare a draft of an acceptance speech for him, and
Roosevelt showed up with his draft on Monday. It then became apparent
that the President expected Roosevelt to work with Clifford and his
group on the speech. However, there was no definition of functions
and we were all at a loss as to who was to take the lead, and who
was to do what. During the course of the discussions which followed,
in a somewhat confused manner that I cannot now recall, it was
finally decided that the President should speak from an outlines
rather than a prepared text. This meant that neither Roosevelt's
draft nor my draft was to be used. Finally, on the day before the
President was to go to Philadelphia, Roosevelt, Clifford and I met
in the Cabinet Room in the morning for the purpose of working on
the outline. It was still not clear as to whether Roosevelt or Clifford was supposed to take the burden of going ahead. It should be understood that the relations between Roosevelt and Clifford and all the rest of us were at that time and at all times since then of the very friendly sort and best.

We went through that morning without getting much done and finally broke up for lunch. I got back from lunch before the others and thought that the job of writing something could no longer be delayed. So I began to write an outline. The form of the outline was to follow generally that used by the President in his Los Angeles speech in June, and the subject matter to be covered had been generally agreed upon in earlier discussions with the President.

I had made some progress when the others came back from lunch -- and when they resumed their discussions I kept writing the outline. Eventually Roosevelt inquired as to what I was doing and I showed him what I had written up until that point. As well as I recall, I had reached about eight points at that time. He was favorably impressed and passed the outline across the table to Clifford who seemed to think it was all right — and they agreed to have it typed in that form.
From then on I completed the outline -- with no writing
the first draft, with suggestions from time to time from the other
two, and my copy being passed to them for changes and corrections.
This work went on rather rapidly and without much discussion. It
was agreed that the peroration should be set out in full so that it
might be read by the President. The peroration was taken from
Roosevelt's draft and was not fundamentally changed afterward.

Then the first draft of the outline was typed, we got Elsey
and Bell and put them in the Fish Room to work on it.

Late that afternoon we gave the President a draft of the
outline. I cannot now remember whether it was the first draft or
whether it had by that time been revised. At any rate, we continued
to work on it during the evening and, although it was shortened up
considerably and a good many changes made, I believe there was no
change from the fundamental structure of the first draft.

The following day we met again with the President and gave
him the revised outline in its then current form, and went over that
with him in detail, making such changes as he determined.
On the trip to Philadelphia, I sat with the President in the lounge of his car while the rest of the crowd ate dinner.
The President and I went over the outline to see if there were any particulars which he wished to discuss, but he seemed to be satisfied with it at that point.

We did agree on one slight modification because of something we had heard on the radio about the course of events at the Convention while we were on the train.

Then the President delivered his speech at Philadelphia. He followed the outline closely and, of course, added many things that were not in the outline. Afterward we compared the outline with the speech as it was delivered and counted the words in the speech that were actually in the outline. My recollection is that the President actually read from two-thirds to three-quarters of the outline and, approaching it from the other way, that the part of the outline he read constituted about one-half of what he said in his speech. In preparing the outline we had not expected him to actually read so much of it, although it had been intentionally prepared so that he could read from it if he wished.
Sometime prior to Labor Day, Clifford asked John Gibson, Assistant Secretary of Labor, to come over and talk about the Labor Day speeches. At that conference Gibson told us right much about the nature of the meetings and the crowds the President would address. He also made a number of suggestions as to the subjects upon which the President might speak, and agreed to prepare a draft for the Detroit speech and some notes to be used in preparing the other talks for that day.

In discussions with the President he had indicated that he thought the speeches should be made from notes or outlines in the same manner as the acceptance speech at Philadelphia. On the basis of the materials we received from John Gibson we undertook to prepare outlines for this purpose, devoting our principal attention to the Detroit speech which was to be nationally broadcast and the major speech of the day.

My recollection is that I prepared the first part of the outline for the Detroit speech, then Bell and I revised it together for the second draft, that Clifford and Elsey then took it over and
revised it once or twice. While they were working on the Detroit outline, I went ahead with work on outlines for Grand Rapids, Lansing, Pontiac, and Flint.

In the meantime, David Noyes and Albert E. (Bob) Carr had appeared at the White House, and the President had informed us that they were doing some special work for him and that he didn’t want anybody’s nose to get out of joint on that account. Two or three days before Labor Day, we met in the Cabinet Room with the President. Noyes and Carr were present in addition to the regular group. As I recall, we went over the Detroit outline in some detail and I told what was in the outlines for Grand Rapids and Lansing, and what I had in mind for Pontiac and Flint.

We met again the following day and at that time the President had a draft which he himself had prepared during the night for Detroit. The first part of it was based on the outline we had prepared. Some parts of it apparently came from material which had been given directly to him by the Secretary of Labor, and most of it was based upon a draft which he had received from Noyes and Carr.
When the President read this draft to the group, there was general agreement that it was a good speech. Some questions were raised about parts of it. The President had to leave for an hour or so to meet Margaret at the train, and instructed us to work on the draft and compose our differences, if any, while he was gone.

We did this, and the final form of the draft was settled shortly after the President returned.

By this time the speech was in text rather than outline form, except for the introduction. For the most part, I think it was based on the writing of Bob Gav and that it can be fairly said that his writing set the tone of the speech.

I had been going ahead with the work on outlines for the other steps. Sometime before we left, I remember reading the four outlines to Harry, Bill, and Phil for Nash and getting their comments for the final draft.

When the President delivered his speeches on Labor Day, he followed the text, of course, in the case of the Detroit speech.

Incidentally, he was quite rushed in his delivery of this speech — especially the latter part — as Jack Readin of the National Committee
had made urgent representations concerning the necessity for finishing
the speech within the scheduled radio time. Since the introductory
speakers took longer than they were supposed to, the President's
time was cut short.

In delivering the other speeches on that day, the President
followed the outlines rather closely.

During the course of the morning it was decided that the
outline which I had prepared for Flint, relating to the subject of
Communism, should not be used at all. And, since the talk at
Lansing was to be very brief, it was decided that the President
should speak there without an outline — and save the Lansing outline
for use at Flint later in the day. This turned out very well, as a
matter of fact. This outline covered the subject of the rich man's
tax bill, and we had a copy of a paper published by the Republican
National Committee in which they made a pretty raw appeal to people
who had benefited from tax cuts to contribute a portion of the cut
to the Republican Party. The speech at Flint was very friendly and
responsive. The President used the Republican newspaper very
effectively and appeared to get considerable pleasure out of it.
All together, I got the impression that everybody was having a good time.

During the course of the day, it was decided that we should make a stop at Toledo on the way home that night. Clifford prepared an outline for the President to use there. When we arrived at Toledo the President was making a speech, following the outline, and someone nearby in the crowd called out to the President, saying something to the effect that labor would vote for him. This remark set the President off on a new tack so that he departed from the outline and finished his speech on a different basis. The last part of the speech was the best.

This was another one that the crowd seemed to enjoy.

The Far Western Trip
September 25 - October 2, 1864

This trip began about the middle of September and ended about the first of October. It had been generally expected that I would go on all the campaign trips to help with the speeches, and especially the whistle-stops. However, we were expecting a baby about the last of September and I thought it most likely for a long
time that I would not be able to leave home. As the time came near it became more and more apparent that I could not leave.

Consequently, I began to tell George Ellery that he should plan to make the trip while I stayed at home, and that he should prepare himself accordingly. For several days before the trip began, it was perfectly clear to me that I could not leave under any circumstances. However, it was only one or two days before the party left that I actually got permission from the President to stay home.

As things developed later on, it became clear that it was very fortunate that I had stayed at home because the work which I did here in collecting materials for the speeches could not possibly have been done on the train.

At this point I pretty well bowed out of the Whistle-stop business and Ellery took it over. From time to time I gave him a bit of assistance on one here and there, but spent most of my time on the major speeches.

The first major speech on the Far Western trip was to be a farm speech at the National Plowing Match at Dexter, Iowa. The Dexter speech was on a Saturday; the second speech at Denver on Monday; the third at Salt Lake City on Tuesday; the fourth at Oakland, California, on Thursday; the next at Los Angeles on Friday.
We had tried to make plans for these speeches before the trip began and had not worried much about what would happen on the trip home from Los Angeles. Actually when the trip began the party carried with them the prepared text of only one major speech — Dexter, Iowa. The others were sent later.

**Dexter, Iowa**

*September 16, 1948*

The speech at Dexter was to be a major farm speech which would set the tone for the campaign as far as farmers were concerned. In the same manner that the Detroit speech was supposed to set the tone for labor speeches.

Work on the Dexter speech must have been started shortly after Labor Day. In our group we had hoped that the Dexter speech could be frozen by the Sunday before the trip was to begin on Friday. We had asked the Department of Agriculture to prepare a first draft, which they did. I cannot remember now a great deal about it, but I do know that as always they provided a draft and got it in on time.

I think I had at least one preliminary conference with Charlie Brumah, Wesley McNamara, and Duke蛤sor over in Charlie’s office on that draft at lunch one day.
The weekend before the trip started the President took his staff and Hoyes and Carr on the Williamsburg for a few days to work on speeches for the trip. Mrs. Hayly was not well enough for me to leave her, so I did not go with the rest of the party. During the preceding week Dave Bell and I must have been working on the Teacher speech, using the Agriculture Department's draft as a starting point.

On Saturday, probably, we had Duller and Michie over to see what we had — and so over the draft in its version — which must have been about the fifth draft. They seemed to think we had improved the speech and were quite well pleased with it.

In the meantime, the President had told us at an earlier conference to work with Hoyes and Carr on this speech, but we had not up until this time established any writing relationship for reasons which I did not fully understand then and certainly could not explain now. At any rate I was aware of the fact that they were working on a draft for this same speech.

On Sunday I flew down the river and joined the party on the Williamsburg, taking with me the draft we had been working on with
the Department of Agriculture, which I thought at that time was pretty good. We did not have any meeting on the speech on the Williamsburg that Sunday — although the draft I had was read by several members of the staff, and I delivered a copy of it to the President as we were leaving the ship. Hayes also delivered to him a copy of the draft that he and Carr had been working on.

Sometime early in the following week, the President returned my draft to me and gave me the Cary draft, saying that he would like for me to put them together in one draft. That I undertook to do. Being somewhat prejudiced in the matter, I think that the composite draft turned up about two-thirds from my earlier draft and one-third from Cary's draft.

Then the boys from the Department of Agriculture read that one — which I thought was an improvement over the earlier draft — they thought, on the contrary, that we had taken a step backward.

At any rate, that seemed to me to be the point where we should arrive at some working relationship with Hayes and Cary that would make it unnecessary for the President to continue to draft his own speeches on the basis of two sets of competing drafts which he
got from two different sources. So I undertook to get their con-
currence in the changes I had made. This concurrence was given very
readily — after they had made some slight changes, which consisted
for the most part of taking out everything I had put in their draft
and putting back everything I had taken out of their draft.

I cannot remember the exact course of these negotiations
but I have the distinct impression that the draft ended up with the
substance being based pretty much on the original material we got
from the Department of Agriculture, and the style and tone coming
pretty much from the work of Bob Carr. In any case, I thought it a
very good speech and was well satisfied with the shape it was in when
the President took it with him on his trip.

However, we had spent so much time on that speech that we
were far behind with our work on the others.

Denver, Colorado
September 20, 1943

During the course of our earlier discussions about the
subjects of speeches for this trip, the President had indicated that
he wished to speak at Denver on the subject of conservation, and at
Salt Lake City on the subject of reclamation. These subjects are closely related, of course, and all the way through there was a considerable similarity between the ground covered by these two speeches. Eventually, I think the major emphasis of the Denver speech was placed on the general development of the West and the conservation and use of its natural resources — while the Salt Lake City speech was directed more especially at reclamation and public power.

When I first asked the Secretary of Agriculture to have a draft prepared for Denver, I also asked him to have a draft prepared for Salt Lake City speeches. When I asked the Secretary of Agriculture to have a draft prepared for Denver, particularly in view of the fact that that was his home town, the Agriculture staff in Denver was asked to prepare a draft. Then I asked the Department of the Interior for help on the Denver and Salt Lake City speeches. Carlton Skinner came over to talk with Dave Hall and me and brought with him Mr. Richard Higglehouse. He apparently is a writer in the Department of the Interior. They brought with them brief outlines of the proposed speeches which, although they were very brief, certainly seemed to be on the right track. I turned over to them the Denver draft we had gotten from the Department of Agriculture and gave them a deadline of Monday, September 13th, for...
the two drafts. The drafts did not come in on time but, since we were
so completely involved in the Drexler speech at that time, I was not
able to press the matter very vigorously. As well as I now remember,
we got the draft for Salt Lake City on Wednesday, September 15th.

The draft for Denver was promised day by day but never appeared until
finally, I think it was Friday the 17th — when the President actually
left — that we began to get it a page at a time. And when it came
it wasn't very good. For some reason I believe the man who was
assigned to work on it got sick, perhaps, and then they turned it
over to Ripplemower and he 'fixed up'. Finally I understand they
called in Phil Dwyer from the Nett group, who helped them turn out
the draft that came over here.

I think that have been able to work that over to some
extent between us, and turned it over to Bob Carr who did a very
substantial rewriting job on it. While he sent a considerable amount
of the material which we turned over to him, I think it fair to say
that he was the man who really made a speech out of it.

This draft must have been sent in a pouch that left here
Saturday night, to reach the President's train on Sunday.
SALT LAKE CITY
September 21, 1928

The Salt Lake City draft followed much the same course as the Denver draft. It did come in earlier from the Department of the Interior, and was in better shape when we got it. Dave Hall and I must have done some work on it and then turned it over to Bob Carr, who rewrote it substantially.

David Hayes was out of town at this time and when Carr had completed his draft he would ask me for my comments and suggestions. For the most part my comments and suggestions were relatively minor as the work he was turning out appeared to be splendid. Such suggestions as I had he considered very readily and I think accepted them in almost every case. We arrived at an understanding, by common consent apparently, that I was responsible for getting off the final draft of a speech in some form or fashion before it was too late, in every case.

The Salt Lake City draft was sent by pouch probably to reach the President's train in Denver.
This was to be the major speech in the San Francisco area.
The first half or two-thirds of the draft which we prepared was a
discussion of the basic differences between the Republican and
Democratic philosophy, principally in terms of economic matters, as
I recall, and there was nothing startlingly new in it.

Then it raised the question as to why the communists
wanted the Republicans to win and I believe undertook to explain to
the liberals in California why they should support the Democrats
rather than the Third Party.

It seemed to us that the first part of the speech was
rather effectively done for the purpose of getting audience reaction,
although there was nothing particularly new in it and that the
latter part of the speech was really unconvincing and that, all in all,
it would meet the requirements of the situation quite adequately.

Bob Carr did a substantial rewriting job on this one before
we sent it out. I think that Leon Keyserling, Dave Hall, and I had
done considerable work on the earlier drafts that we turned over to
Bob Carr. This speech was to be delivered only in Oakland in the
evening. Earlier on the same day, the President was to speak at
Sacramento, California. I had been wondering from time to time how we could best take advantage of our favorable position on the issues involved in the conservation and use of the water resources of the Central Valley. After studying the President's schedule and the possible locations for a speech on the subject, it seemed to me that the best place was Sacramento. The people who were working with me here agreed with this. Consequently, I undertook to prepare the text for a speech.

As a starting point I used an outline that had been prepared by the staff group, which contained some very good material. I prepared a speech of perhaps fifteen minutes. It was tailored directly to capitalize on the issues in the Central Valley. It was in that sense a special interest speech and rather narrow as to the subject which it covered.

This seemed appropriate for Sacramento, because what happens to the Central Valley is a matter of life and death to that city.

This draft for Sacramento was sent to the train with my recommendation for its use, in the same pouch with the draft for Oakland. They must have reached the train at Salt Lake City.
After those drafts had reached the train George Hay called
as from Sparks, Nevada. At the time I was attending a luncheon party
at John Pye's. It was then, I think, that George told me the draft
for Oakland was not regarded as satisfactory and would not be used —
that it had been decided instead to make a speech at Oakland which
would be based on the Sacramento draft with some changes which would
give it a somewhat greater interest.

In that connection, or some other, George asked that I
obtain some information for him, saying that he would call from
Reno, Nevada, for my report on the matter. I assured him that I
would be glad to get the information, and went back to finish my
lunch. Some ten minutes later, while I was still at John Pye's,
I had another call from George. And when I went to the phone I
asked if he was still in Sparks, Nevada. He assured me that he was
not, but that he was in Reno. I had to confess that I had not obtained
the information. I believe I got a
third call from the train during the course of that same luncheon,
but I cannot now remember the details.
I was not too much upset by the decision to use the Sacramento speech at Oakland, because of one little passage in it which I felt would be newsworthy and keep it from being a flop. This passage was generally to the effect that Governor Warren would not be in a position to accomplish anything much in Washington if he were elected Vice President, and that he could do more good for the people of California if they kept him at home.

When the speech was made, however, this passage was omitted. So far as I can gather, the speech was not a particular success, under all circumstances.

Incidentally, I kept the draft of the Oakland speech at hand and from time to time wished it of various passages to go in other speeches and I believe that finally almost everything in the speech was used in one place or another.

When we were first told that the draft we had prepared for Oakland would not be used, I think we were still working on the Los Angeles speech and decided then to include in that speech an appeal to the Liberals not to support the Third Party. This really seemed more appropriate for Los Angeles anyway, because that is regarded as a center of liberal thought.
The origins of the earlier drafts as this are not very clear in my mind. We got a draft from Leon Keyserling, and I think that right much of that was kept in. I am sure that Bob Carr did the last major rewrite job on the draft and was largely responsible for its general style.

In summary, it now appears that Carr had done a major part of the work on the speeches for Boston, Denver, Salt Lake City, the draft for Oakland that was not used, and Los Angeles.

The latter four of these were done under tremendous pressure, having to be turned out almost at the rate of one a day.

It was during this particular period that it seems to me Carr made a very valuable, in fact, almost indispensable contribution.
San Diego, California, September 24, 1948

Bob Carr prepared a draft of some material he thought the
President might use at San Diego. I cannot now recall the subject or
subjects dealt with by this material, but I do remember that it appeared
to make a ninety degree turn about half way through and started off in a
different direction. I also recall that one part of it seemed to me to be
very good and the other part perhaps too extreme. At any rate, I sent
the material to the train. This material was not used at all for the
San Diego speech; the fact is that the President spoke extemporaneously
and without notes in San Diego. I was told later though that the Carr
material did not actually reach the train or the President did not have
an opportunity to see it until about midnight before he was to speak in
San Diego the next morning, and that he did not consider the material
at all suitable.

I believe that either in that material or in the Los Angeles
draft, we had made a further effort to get the President to say some-
would thing about the fact that Governor Warren /J/ not accomplish anything
in Washington, and that it would be better to keep him in California.

However, I think the President left California without ever mentioning
this subject in public.

Phoenix, Arizona, September 24, 1948

A day or two before the President left on this trip, Jim Webb,
handed to me a copy of a report of the Bureau of Reclamation on the
Central Arizona Project together with other documents relating thereto.
He told me that the President wanted me to have it because I would be
on the train and would be able to study the report and brief him on the
subject. When the President agreed that I might stay home from the trip,
I promised to study this report and send him a draft of a speech he might
use covering that subject. It appeared from the schedule that the proper
place for such a speech would be Phoenix, Arizona, where the President
was to stop about ten o'clock in the evening. The Central Arizona Project
was a ticklish subject to handle for several reasons. First it involved
the division of the waters of the Colorado River between the Lower Basin
states and any suggestion that the President favored the project might
well be seized upon by people in California and Nevada as an indication
that he was siding with Arizona in the rather violent disagreement which
exists between those states. Furthermore the project in the form in which
it is now proposed is of doubtful economic feasibility, and the President
could not afford to commit himself firmly to such a project, since the
project had not been considered by the Congress, it could not be dealt with
on the basis of a matter of which the Congress had approved. At the same
time, it was a matter of such vital interest to Arizona that they had been
extremely insistent that the report should be presented to the Congress,
and it was being made public for that purpose.
As well as I remember, I prepared most of the draft of the Phoenix speech alone except for some editing and revision by Dave Bell. In this case, as in the case of most of the speeches, Bell and I worked together so closely that it was difficult then, and perhaps impossible now, to separate the work that one of us did from the work that the other did.

While the Phoenix speech started out to be a talk about the Central Arizona Project, it naturally covered other aspects of the irrigation and reclamation problem. The part which dealt specifically with the Central Arizona Project was pretty carefully marked. I sent the draft to the train with a note to George Ellery saying that if the subject was to be treated at all, this seemed to me to be the best way to do it, but recommending that it would be best if the President could get through that part of the country without mentioning the Central Arizona Project, and indicating what part of the draft might be omitted to accomplish that purpose. I believe this is the course that was actually followed, and that when the President did deliver the speech he omitted the part which dealt specifically with the Central Arizona Project.

Bonham, Texas, September 27, 1948

The first draft on which we began work for Bonham related to monopoly and transportation, particularly on railroads. Mr. A. C. Wiprud had been sending me material on this subject for some time, and
I had been on the look-out for a suitable place to make such a
speech, and I thought that Benham might do. With this in mind,
I asked Jay Franklin to revise the last draft which had been sent
by Mr. Wypud. We then got word that Sam Rayburn, who was the
host at Benham, thought it would not be appropriate to speak on
that subject, but that the speech should be devoted instead to
agriculture. Mr. Rayburn also mentioned some specific phases of
the agricultural program that might be covered such as support
prices, reciprocal trade, soil erosion and rural electrification.
I passed this information along to Duke DuMars in the Department
of Agriculture with the request that he prepare a draft covering those
subjects. He did prepare such a draft, and sent it to me. When we
received that draft, I read it and Dave Bell read it and I recall that
Bell commented that he did not know that he had ever seen a poorer
draft. As a matter of fact, it was not nearly that bad. It covered the
right subjects, and in the right order; it did have in it so many catch
phrases that the continuity was not very good. I took DuMars’ draft
and re-wrote it entirely. After that Dave Bell went over it and revised
it to some extent. I think Dave Noyes read it and thought it was satis-
factory, and I feel sure that we must have checked it again with DuMars.
Perhaps the most significant thing about this speech was
the way it edged into foreign policy in connection with the reciprocal
trade program. It did in effect that our foreign policy required a
firm economic foundation and that we could not have a firm economic
foundation if we followed the Republican policies of economic isolationism.

The Bonham speech was fairly well received by the press,
but apparently it was pretty much of a flop so far as the immediate
audience was concerned. This can be accounted for by the fact that
the public address system was not working, and the immediate audience
could not hear the speech.

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, September 28, 1948

At least as early as Labor Day, we had felt the necessity
for making a speech on the loyalty of Government employees and
communism generally in order to offset the propaganda of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. Before the Far Western trip
was planned, a tentative decision was reached to make this speech
at Oklahoma City on the way back. The preparation of the first
draft was assigned to Steve Spingarn. I believe that his first draft was
based in large part on a memorandum which had come from the Hatt
group, which I found out later was prepared by David Lloyd. Spingarn also worked with Philbee Nash. The assignment to Spingarn was made, I think, by Clifford in the first place, and Spingarn discussed the draft from time to time directly with George Ellery. Spingarn and Nash together went through several drafts, sending me a copy of each of them, I finally got to read one of those drafts some three or four days before the speech was due to be delivered, but had no opportunity to do anything more with it at that time. At about that time we got word from Dave Noyes from California that he had seen the President and that the President wished instructions given to the National Committee that he wanted the Oklahoma City speech, the Louisville, Kentucky speech, and the Charleston, West Virginia speech broadcast on national hookups. I called Bill Boyle to ask him how we might go about having those instructions carried out, and he volunteered to take on the job, which he did. None of the speeches on the trip thus far had been broadcast nationally except the first one at Dexter, Iowa. Consequently that ranked the Oklahoma City speech as a major effort.

Bob Carr took the Spingarn-Nash draft and revised it. As I recall, the revisions in the introductory part were substantial, but otherwise the revisions were not substantial. Then Carr and Spingarn and Nash went over it and did another revision of the draft, together
I think. By that time, I had had a chance to read the draft more carefully, and suggested a number of revisions which were written into the copy I left with the three of them. When they had completed their revision they had incorporated some of my suggestions and failed to incorporate others. They had also ended up with a speech that was right much too long. We had their draft typed and sent to the train. After it reached the President, I talked to the President's party by telephone -- it must have been on a Sunday because I was at home -- and they put Myrtle Bergheim on the other end of the line and she took a copy of the draft and I took a copy of the draft and we went through it together, with her taking my suggestions for changes, most of which were deletions, cutting out substantial parts of it because it just had to be substantially shorter. I understand that Myrtle re-typed it with my suggestions, and that was the working draft of the draft which was used as the starting point by the group with the President. I believe that in this case, as in most other cases, there were no very significant changes made in the draft after it reached the group on the train except those that are indicated here.

However, because of the ticklish nature of the subject matter involved and the necessity for technical accuracy in dealing with it,
the Presidential Party undertook to send the final draft back by wire
for checking and clearance here. Unfortunately, they classified it
for transmission and its receipt at this end went very slowly. Finally,
I think, we got the text only a few minutes before or maybe even after
our deadline for clearance. Spingarn came over here to read it and
I think Philo Nash came in to read it too, and Dave Noyes either
read it or part of it was called to his attention. While there were
some parts of it that Spingarn and Noyes were not altogether happy
about, I think they were pretty well satisfied on the whole. There was
one line which Dave Noyes insisted would be fatal in connection with
the statement that the loyalty of ninety-nine and a fraction percent
of Government employees had been found to be unquestioned, some
one on the train had stuck in a sentence to the effect that that was even
better than ivory soap. We sent a message urging that that be deleted
even though the advance text might have already been distributed to
the press. We were notified quite promptly that the sentence had
already been deleted before our message was received.
I think that the Oklahoma City speech was well received; that
it was sound from a technical standpoint, and very largely accomplished
the purpose for which it was intended, I believe that Spingarn is entitled
to the major credit for determining its form and content.
Louisville, Kentucky, September 10, 1948

This probably should start by introducing John Franklin Carter. When the President and his party left on this trip, it was clear to those of us who were left behind that we had a big job to do, and not much help to do it. So we began to cast about wherever we could for speech writers. Bill Hillman suggested to David Noyes that he might ask Jay Franklin Carter to come in for help. Noyes called Carter at his home, and Carter agreed to come in. Noyes was leaving for California within a day or two and apparently thought that I should look after Mr. Carter while he was gone. At any rate, he asked me to meet with him and Mr. Carter for their first conference, which I did. Noyes told Carter our situation and asked if he would help, and Carter readily agreed that he would. Noyes assigned to him the preparation of the first draft for Louisville. I do not now remember whether any topic was assigned or whether Carter was given free rein on that score. Noyes told him that he should bring in the draft and report to me the first of the following week, which he did.

This must have been ten days before the Louisville speech was to be delivered, so it was necessary for me to find other assignments to keep Mr. Carter busy. That turned out to be something of a job, as he was so prolific and finished assignments so quickly that it
was frequently necessary to try to dig up a new one.

I had also requested that the Bilt group prepare a first draft for Louisville with the major emphasis on the subject of high prices. I had learned by that time that it was safer to have drafts coming from more than one source. The draft from the Bilt group was prepared by Johannes Hoever. When it came in it was about half long enough for a speech, but it contained some very excellent material on the propaganda drive of the National Association of Manufacturers to kill price control in 1946.

I prepared a draft for Louisville, using the material from the Bilt group, and I believe a portion from the first draft of Carter's. The first half of that draft that I prepared was pretty much my own writing, I think. After that I got Carter to write an introduction about Senator Barkley and that was incorporated in the final draft. About this time, I think, we had established a fairly regular pattern under which I would procure a draft from somewhere, and get Dave Bell to read it and revise it as necessary. I think the Louisville speech in its final form consisted mostly of introduction about Senator Barkley written by Carter, a section written by me, and the material on the NAM lobby which I had revised, and the conclusion based on Carter's draft, the whole business
having been gone over by Dave Bell.

Charleston, West Virginia, October 1, 1948

This was the last of the major speeches on the Far Western
trip. It had finally been decided that it would be broadcast through-
out West Virginia, but not broadcast nationally. Consequently, it
was made particularly at the local situation in West Virginia with
considerable emphasis on things of interest to coal miners.

The first draft of this speech was prepared by Philes Nash,
and I took Nash’s draft and revised it. He was out of town at this
time. The revisions I made were substantial enough so that I was
afraid Nash would be offended at the extent to which I had departed
from his work. However, he told me later that he was very well
pleased with the way the speech turned out and, in fact, I think he
said that it was one of the best political speeches he ever saw.

I also submitted this draft to Dave Noyes before it was sent
to the train, and he thought that it was in good shape. I do not recall
whether he made any suggestions or changes or not, I do recall
that he referred to that draft a number of times after that and seemed
to think that from then on we could count on getting a speech whenever
we had to have one. And I am afraid at that point that he eased up on
his efforts to get more help for us.
Before the President's party reached the West Coast, and
in connection with the switch in the Sacramento and Oakland speeches,
we received from Matt Connell some rather pointed observations
about the quality of the Oakland speech, and also about the necessity
for getting the speeches to the train earlier than we had been doing.
He thought that they should reach the train at least twenty-four hours
ahead of the time scheduled for delivery. I checked back through our
records, and found on this trip, at least, all our speeches had reached
the train at least twenty-four hours ahead of time. That was a record
which we were not able to maintain during the rest of the campaign.
Bob Carr was considerably put out by Connell's comments as to
the nature of the speeches, and for a time was right much agitated
about it. However, that all blew over, and everybody was pretty
well satisfied by the time the party returned to Washington, but Mr.
Connell continued to talk about the necessity for getting additional
help. These were matters in which I was in thorough accord.

My recollection is that we sent the texts of ten prepared
speeches to the train within a period of twelve days on this trip. Up
until that time that was a record far beyond anything we had done
before.
Trip Number Three
October 6 to October 9, 1948

The major speeches on this trip were to be at Philadelphia, Jersey City, and Buffalo. The Philadelphia speech was on a nationwide hook-up. There were several days ascending the end of the Far Western trip and the beginning of this one. During that time our work on speeches was interrupted by a number of conferences of one kind or another. A number of these conferences related to the proposal to send the Chief Justice to Moscow. In that connection, Bob Carr, with the advice and assistance of Dave Noyes, had prepared a draft of radio speech which it was proposed that the President should deliver from the White House on that Sunday night. In the meantime, we were working from time to time as we had the opportunity on speeches for the next trip.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 6, 1948

Several days before the end of the Far Western trip, David Noyes had suggested the desirability of making a speech on atomic energy, and I had requested William Casey of the Bureau of the Budget to prepare a some material which could be used in writing such a speech. Then Clifford told me on the phone that they had been talking about a speech on the same subject on the train and asked that I put
somebody to work on it, suggesting that I get in touch with Dave Lilienthal, whom he said he would also talk to on the telephone.

The next day I called Lilienthal, who said he had not heard from Clifford. He seemed rather reluctant to take part in such a project, but finally agreed that he would ask some of his public relations people to talk with Carey if he came over.

Next, Dave Noyes told me that he had gotten Martin Agronsky to prepare a draft of a speech on atomic energy. This flurry of interest in the subject of atomic energy apparently was aroused by a speech that Dewey made in Phoenix, Arizona, where he said something about the necessity of preventing the dead hand of government from stifling the development of atomic energy. For some reason the expression of "the dead hand of government" in connection with atomic energy seemed to get under Mr. Agronsky's skin, and I think he took considerable pleasure in undertaking to prepare an answer to it. Noyes indicated that he, himself, would undertake to look after this speech, and I turned over to him the material that I received from Carey and, I think, asked Carey to talk with Noyes a time or two.

While this work was going ahead on the atomic energy speech,
which we all agreed should be scheduled for Philadelphia because of its importance, I was working on a draft for Jersey City.

We had received information about the nature of the meeting at Jersey City which indicated that the attendees would be composed largely of organized labor, and that they would like to hear about subjects of particular interest to organized labor, such as the Taft-Hartley law and high prices. I was preparing a draft to meet these specifications and, as well as I recall, I started pretty much from scratch.

On the afternoon before the Philadelphia speech was to be delivered the following night, I had the first opportunity to read the Nye's draft of the atomic energy speech. I must confess that I was disappointed and dismayed -- it was not a good speech.

I happened to be sitting in Matt Connelly's office at the time, and told him of my reaction to the draft. He suggested that I go in and tell the President, which I did. I then suggested to the President that he call the staff together to go over that speech and the drafts of the speeches for Jersey City and Buffalo. I further suggested to him that he might wish to consider using either the Jersey City draft or the Buffalo draft at Philadelphia instead of the draft that
had been prepared on atomic energy. The Buffalo draft was one
which had been prepared by Bob Carr, and was devoted generally
to a detailed examination of the legislative history of the housing
bill with a view of showing how serious the public interest had
been blocked by the housing lobby. I do not remember whether I
had read the Buffalo draft at that time or not. However, Carr had
turned it over to me for such revisions as I thought proper, and I
think I had somebody working on it, but I do not remember.

At any rate, the President did call the staff together then
and there in the late afternoon — that must have been a Monday —
and I read the draft of the atomic energy speech, and there was a
profound silence all around the table. Finally the President said,

"Well, what do you all think of it?" And Jonathan Daniels was there
and Jonathan said, "To tell you the truth, Mr. President, I think it is
just as dull as it can be" and then a number of others began to make
critical comments and Mr. Nowak had very little to say. Finally
it seemed to me that it was getting unnecessarily rough and I under-
took to make some observations about the dull subject and the diffi-
culty of dealing with it in any case.

Then the President began to tell about some of the things he
remembered in connection with his activities on the subject of atomic
energy -- the way he first heard about the project while he was still in the Senate, the way it was explained to him when he became President, and how he first heard while he was in Potsdam about the explosion of the bomb in New Mexico, and about the decision to drop the bomb in Japan. It was, as so many of these things are when the President tells about them, a fascinating story and all of the group had much the same thought -- how wonderful it would be if some of it could be brought into the speech. Consideration was given to the possibility that the President might make the speech off-the-cuff, or that he might dictate it. Finally, it was decided that the group, with nobody being specifically designated, should undertake to revise the speech that night, trying to incorporate some of the spirit of the President's story. There was considerable hemming and hawing about who was going to do it. Finally I managed to put the finger on Jonathan Daniels.

In view of the situation in which we found ourselves at that time, I had very grave doubts as to whether it would be possible to get that speech into shape within a single evening or, as a matter of fact, within a few days. So, after dinner I came back to my own office, and took the draft of the Jersey City speech I had been working
on which was a bit too long at that point and needed some other editing and revised that draft. I completed that about eleven o’clock in the evening and went back across the street to the West Wing where I found that Mr. Daniels had dictated and revised the draft with the assistance of some records he got from Charlie Ross. Apparently Noyes and Carr had gone off to their hotel at dinner time, and they returned to the West Wing about the same time I did.

George Elsey had been there right along. Clifford had been out to dinner somewhere, and by the time I got there Clifford showed up in a toga. Elsey had passed him in, I think. It was apparent to Elsey, and soon became apparent to me and Clifford, that the Daniels draft wouldn’t do either. Elsey was considerably disturbed by the fact that he was likely to have to stay up all night to write the speech. I then approached Clifford with the thought that my draft for Jersey City might be used at Philadelphia. I gave him a copy of it to read, and after he read it he was very easily persuaded. He then called in Charlie Ross, and I think Ross read the draft and Clifford and Ross then took it upon themselves to decide that the President would use the draft I had prepared for Jersey City at Philadelphia the next night, and would use something else for Jersey
City which was coming along the following night,

I think the Jersey City draft was then typed in the Staff Room
with my latest revisions, and I left it with Clifford and Elsey to make
such changes as they saw fit, and I went home -- it must have been
about midnight. When I got home, I called Elsey who had by that
time had an opportunity to read the Jersey City draft. I found that
he was greatly relieved at the decision to drop the atomic energy
draft and use the other one, and highly pleased to find that he would
not have to sit up all night writing the speech. The Jersey City draft
was used at Philadelphia, and I believe without major revisions.

Jersey City, New Jersey, October 7, 1945

The switch in drafts for Philadelphia had left us without a
speech for Jersey City. Clifford and I agreed that the best course
under the circumstances was to recommend that the President make
the speech from an outline covering some of the subjects that he had
covered a number of times before, and which were therefore familiar
to him.

Before he left that Tuesday night, Clifford dictated a memorandum
setting forth some of his thoughts as to what the outline might contain.
The next morning I came in and took Clifford’s memorandum and sat
down to write the outline,

I wrote this outline in longhand, and the reading copy was
typed directly from that first draft. About two-thirds of the way
through I switched my outline form to running text, as the words
seemed to be coming along pretty well at that point. During the
afternoon Clifford called up from Philadelphia to see how I was
getting along, and I reported the situation to him. The typing of
the draft was completed by dinner time and it was sent in the
pouch that night.

As well as I remember this was the only speech that went
from the first draft to the reading copy without any changes. Some
changes may have been made in the reading copy -- I am sure there
were -- after it reached the train, but I do not think any of these
changes were substantial.

Buffalo, New York, October 8, 1944

While I was working on the Jersey City outline -- on Wednesday
it must have been -- Dave Bell was working on the Buffalo speech.

This, as indicated above, was a revision of the draft written by Bob
Carr. On the following day, Thursday, we continued to work on the
Buffalo draft, and sent it off that night. For my part, I do not recall
that I made any substantial changes in it or any substantial contribution
to that speech.
Mid-Western Trip

October 10 - 16, 1914

This trip began on Sunday, October tenth, with five major speeches scheduled, as follows:

Akron, Ohio - Sunday night
Springfield, Illinois - Tuesday night
St. Paul, Minnesota - Wednesday night
Milwaukee, Wisconsin - Thursday night
Indianapolis, Indiana - Friday night

The St. Paul speech was broadcast on a nation-wide hookup.

On Sunday morning, before this trip began, the President had a staff meeting at which the subject matter of the speeches for the trip was discussed. I indicated at this meeting that I had arranged for preliminary work to go forward on these speeches, and told about what I had in mind for each speech and the status of the work at that time. I suggested that since the first of the speeches had to be made the following night, and one each night thereafter, I saw no practicable course other than to pursue the arrangements which I had already made. These arrangements had been made, of course, in the light of a considerable familiarity with the President's wishes.
and viewpoint in such matters, and he indicated that they met with
his approval.

The Presidential party started on this trip with a draft
of a speech for Akron — and on each day thereafter we sent a draft
of another speech which was received on the train in the morning of
the day when it was to be delivered that evening.

I believe that it was on Monday of this week that I
brought David Lloyd over from the New group to work directly with
me, which he did during the remainder of the campaign.

* * *

* * *

June 9th
October 15, 1940

The starting point of this speech was a book by Congressman
Hartley called "Our New National Labor Policy — The Taft Hartley Act
and the Next Steps". This book came to our attention before the
start of the Buffalo trip, and the President's party took a copy
of the book with them on their trip with a view to using it in a
speech somewhere in New Jersey.

Before the end of the Buffalo trip, however, Clifford had
told me on the telephone that they had decided not to use the
Hartley book on that trip. The President had decided that it was
of sufficient importance to use in a major speech and wished to use it in Akron where he wanted to make a labor speech. Clifford re-
quested me to put somebody to work on such a speech, using quotations from the Hartley book.

I examined the book with this in mind and found that, in addition to its discussion of the Taft Hartley law and the labor question, it also contained a broad-scale attack on the New Deal. I had collected from other sources various pieces of information concerning attacks made by other Republicans on the New Deal.

On Saturday after Clifford returned, I told him that it appeared to me that Hartley’s book would be very useful in making a good speech — but that a speech based on that book alone and on the subject of labor alone would be too narrow for a major speech from two standpoints. First, that it would hardly do to have a major speech with the President depending altogether on what was said by a single Republican Congressman, particularly one who was not running for re-election. Secondly, that if it were confined to labor alone, we would not be able to use some of the most valuable material from the Hartley book in which he attacked Fundamental
reforms of the New Deal which were now well accepted by most all the people.

I suggested that a suitable speech could be prepared using the Hurley book and references to statements of other Republicans to show that they were engaged in a general attack on the New Deal. We agreed that I should undertake a draft along that line. I prepared the major portion of this draft on Saturday night and completed it after the meeting in the President's office on Sunday morning. I believe that I delivered it to Clifford on Sunday afternoon, or surely by Sunday evening.

The references to Dewey's attack on the New Deal were based on a chapter from Irving Stone's book "They Also Ran". This chapter was published after the 1944 election and was entitled "Dewey Also Ran". I believe it was sent to me by Bill Boyle.

I was told later that the book by Dewey entitled "The Case Against The New Deal" which was referred to in the Irving Stone chapter was no longer available as the Republican organization had withdrawn it from sale.

The references to other attacks on the New Deal made by Republicans were based on the research which had been done at my request by Franklin Parks.
Springfield, Illinois
October 30, 1948

This was a farm speech and the first draft was prepared by Duke Dohar over in the Department of Agriculture. I believe that I gave him only about two days’ notice before the deadline he had to meet. I think this was the best of the drafts which we got from Dohar. While I revised it to some extent, I think the basic structure of his draft was not altered, and that probably more than half of it was left substantially intact. When this draft reached its final stages, it was too long, so I lifted one section from it bodily to use in the St. Paul speech for the following day.

St. Paul, Minnesota
October 30, 1948

A good many days before this speech was delivered, I had asked John Carter to prepare a draft for St. Paul which would deal with the subject of liberalism and present the Democratic Party as the best hope for liberals, with a view to appealing to the liberal tradition in Minnesota. He had worked on this from time to time, going through some two or three drafts. I had turned his draft over to David Lloyd for his comments and suggestions, together with a
draft from Leon Keyserling. Lloyd prepared a draft combining
some of Carter's material with some of Keyserling's, and probably
adding some of his own. I took these various drafts and prepared
another, resting right much of the Carter material which Lloyd
had prepared to edit. I also worked in the material from Dollars
which I had lifted from the Springfield speech. This was the
catalogue of things that Republicans stood for, which proved to
be so effective when the St. Paul speech was delivered.

While working on this speech on Tuesday morning, I received
a copy of the speech which Dewey delivered at Louisville, Kentucky,
on that same day, on foreign policy. It seemed to me that the
President should make some answer to Dewey's speech and, after
considerable reflection during the course of the afternoon, I wrote
the portion of the St. Paul speech which touched upon Dewey's speech
on foreign policy. I recall that at the same time I was working
on this and discussing it with Dave Bell, Bell was working on the
craft of the Atomic Energy speech which was to be delivered at
Milwaukee the following night. That situation illustrates what was
more or less standard operating procedure during that week. We
were ordinarily working on two drafts at the same time, having our
final day on one and next to the final day on the other.

During this period I was showing drafts to David Hayes
and asking for his comments in those cases where there was sufficient
time and when he was available. I remember that I did show him the
draft of the St. Paul speech, and he suggested some changes in the
order of the portion which dealt with Dewey's foreign policy speech.
Otherwise, Hayes thought the draft was quite satisfactory.

In the final draft of this speech as it was sent from
here, the part dealing with unity came largely from Lewis Keynesing,
the part dealing with foreign policy came from me, the catalogue
of things the Republicans stand for came originally from Nahoe
although it had been revised by Lloyd and me, and most of the rest
of the language came from John Carter. David Lloyd had made a
considerable contribution in editing and revising various portions.

Millesime, Wisconsin
October 25, 1928

After our unsuccessful attempt to get an aside on energy
speech ready for Philadelphia, it was still thought desirable to
make a major speech on this subject. The effort to get this done
was transferred back to my jurisdiction. I began by turning over
to Bill Cary on Jonathan Daniels' draft. That he saw there upset him considerably. It appeared that the draft contained at least one figure which was one of the closest held of all sources. It also contained some other very confidential information.

This part of the Daniels' draft apparently was based on the records which he had obtained from Charlie Ross.

I arranged for David Bell to work with Cary in going ahead with a draft of this speech. They had various conferences and went through various drafts which I did not follow very closely.

In the meantime, I had been trying to reach David Lilienthal on the phone for several days to see if we might obtain help from him. I have not been able until this day to talk to Mr. Lilienthal on the subject. Finally, I was told that I should talk to Mr. Volpe who was familiar with Mr. Lilienthal's views on this matter and would be able to give us valuable assistance. In the course of a day or two, I was unable to reach Mr. Volpe. Finally, someone reminded me that Adrian Fisher was the General Counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission.

I then called Fisher, who is a personal friend of mine, and he immediately responded that he would give us all the help he possibly could. This was on our next to the last day on this speech.
Fisher came over during the afternoon and got Volpe here that evening. Volpe was of very little help, if any. Fisher was helpful in raising and helping to clear up some technical questions and during the course of the next day went into the question of facts which could or could not be used in the speech because of their confidential character.

As a result of my attempted dealings with Mr. Lilienthal at this time, I have said that when and if his nomination is again submitted to the Senate, I expect to be sitting at the right hand of Senator McKellar giving him advice and counsel.

To return to the draft of the Milwaukee speech, Carey and Bell had, with such guidance as I was able to give them, a rough draft which was basically the final draft of the speech. I took it on Tuesday morning and did a fairly substantial revision which consisted of putting in things or changes of some political or oratorical value. My general objective was to put some life in what was a fairly dull technical document. After that Bell, Carey and I worked together on revisions with the help of Adrian Fisher as indicated above.

I believe the speech was used by the President in
substantially the form in which it left here. However, the last line was changed. As it left here the latter part of the draft undertook to describe the President's concept of the importance of atomic energy and the way in which it should be handled. Then came the final line of the speech, as follows:

"No man with any lesser concept is fit to be President of the United States."

In the context of the whole speech it was obvious that this last line referred to Dewey. It will be remembered that this speech from the beginning had been undertaken as an answer to a speech made by Dewey in Phoenix, Arizona. I am still a little regretful that this line was cut out of the speech.

Indianapolis, Indiana
October 15, 1948

Before the President left on this trip, he had agreed that the speech at Indianapolis should be on the subject of health, education, and welfare. Phillee Nash had been asked to prepare a draft. I cannot remember whether Clifford made this assignment or whether I did. Oscar Neig had also undertaken to have a draft prepared in the Federal Security Agency. This speech had to leave
here on Thursday night. I think that I had had an opportunity to
read the Mao draft and the Federal Security draft sometime before
Thursday, but I was not able to actually start to work on the
speech until Thursday evening.

It seemed clear that neither draft was anything like
adequate. After careful study of the Mao draft, it appeared that
there was very little in it that could be used. The Federal Security
draft was in three distinct parts, prepared by different individuals,
and was decidedly bureaucratic in tone. While it contained some
worthwhile facts, it was not in anything like the necessary shape
for a speech.

I then undertook to write a draft on the basis of the
information in the Federal Security paper. I wrote about half
of the speech and then logged down — and was able at that point
only to add enough of the material from the Federal Security draft
to meet the necessary requirements as to length for a speech. I
had that draft typed about the middle of the afternoon. It was
along about that time that Philbo Shub came into the office to
see how the draft was coming, and read a copy of my draft in the
outer office. He came in to see as about it, apparently somewhat disturbed that his material was not used. I explained to him as best I could the difficulties of the situation. But his comment was that since it turned out the way it did, he was sorry that he spent so much of his time on it. Coming from Philco, that was pretty strong language.

About the time this draft was completed, John Carter came into the office. I explained to him the sad condition in which the situation then rested. He sympathized for a bit, and finally inquired if I would like for him to take the draft and see what he could do toward re-writing it. I assured him that I would be delighted.

He returned I think in less than an hour. He had revised the first part of the draft to some extent, although he left it substantially intact, and all the last part he had completely rewritten, writing out a draft of his own in longhand. He had introduced the idea of the Republican firemen playing checkers while the house was burning down and in other respects managed to put some life into what was, up until that time, a completely wooden piece of writing.
Carter left them, to return after dinner. David Bell
came in about six o'clock. I took a nap from six until seven,
while Bell read the drafts that we had. Bell and I went to dinner,
and after dinner Bell and Carter and I did our final draft, —
Bell making most of the decisions as to what ought to be done —
Carter making suggestions as to how it should be done — and I
was doing the recording. I was just about able to tell that they
were doing a pretty good job.

That was one occasion on which I am sure that our speech
would have been broken by a hissing of John Carter had not come in just in the nick of time. As it was, I
think that the draft we finally got off was in pretty fair shape.

**Southern Trip**
**October 20 - 21, 1940**

This trip required one speech for the American Legion
at Miami, Florida, and two speeches in Raleigh, North Carolina —
one a non-political speech for the dedication of a monument to
Andrew Jackson, Andrew Johnson, and James I. Holley; the other a
political speech at the North Carolina State Fair.
Elbert, Florida
October 31, 1914

Jonathan Daniels had been left here in Washington at the beginning of the Mid-Western trip with instructions from the President to coordinate the speech writing. I had been urging that the President ask somebody to do that for some time. At my suggestion the President had called Sam Boasman and asked him to take over that job. Boasman was unable to do so because of some earlier commitments which he could not break. However, he did agree to prepare drafts of two speeches to be used. At any rate, I was pleased that Jonathan Daniels would be here to help with getting the speeches together.

The President had decided that I should finish out the speeches for the Mid-Western trip along the lines that had been indicated in the staff meeting in his office on Sunday morning. And he had indicated that Daniels, Moynihan and Carr would provide the speeches which were to be made later at Chicago and Boston — and that Sam Boasman would prepare the speeches to be made at Madison Square Garden and Brooklyn.
During the time of the Mid-Western trip, because of the pressure of getting out the speeches for that trip, I was not able to work with Daniels on any of the latter speeches.

On Friday, after the Indianapolis speech had been sent off the night before, I talked with Daniels and found that he had drafts of the two speeches for Raleigh to which reference will be made later, and that he had received word from Matt Connally that the President wished to use in Miami the speech which he had earlier proposed to make on the radio concerning the sending of the Chief Justice to Moscow, with such changes as were appropriate by reason of the passage of time and changes in circumstances.

Daniels had prepared an alternative suggestion to replace that part of the speech which dealt with sending the Chief Justice to Moscow which, of course, was no longer appropriate. I agreed to think about the matter overnight and come back with my suggestions.

The following morning I met with Daniels again and we decided that Noyes and Carr should be asked to come in because of their original interest in the speech. Daniels called Noyes, who came over and discussed the matter for a while and went away with the draft of the original speech and the proposed modifications.
which Daniels and I suggested. It was our thought that Hayes and Carr would then revise the speech to indicate what they thought would now be appropriate.

The President called a meeting for Sunday morning to go over the speeches for the Southern trip. Sometime before that meeting began, we discovered that Hayes and Carr had not done anything about revising the draft of the Convention speech, as we called it then. Daniels then had a copy of the original speech with his suggested modifications typed in the staff room so that we would have available at least some kind of a working document as a starting point.

When the meeting with the President began, that was the only draft of the speech for Miami that was available to work on. We then began a process of criticizing and editing and revising that speech with the President. This was the first time that the members of the staff, other than Hayes and Carr, had had an opportunity to consider the speech. As a result, the suggested revisions were quite extensive and the process of revision went on most of the day. For the most part, the revisions consisted of deleting parts of the speech which were found objectionable.
The length of the draft must have been cut some forty or fifty per cent.

And that was the way the Miami speech was written.

Raleigh, North Carolina
Non-political speech—October 17, 1943.

This draft was furnished by Jonathan Daniels who said that in its preparation he had the assistance of Dr. Frank Graham and some historian whose name I cannot now remember—(I think it was Johnson). At any rate, he was a man who had written some books about at least one of the Presidents to whom the monument was being erected.

Daniels asked me to go over this draft and make any suggestions which I thought appropriate. I did make a number of suggestions of an editorial nature, most of which he accepted.

This speech was in excellent shape and was a good speech from the time I first saw it.

(Note: The non-political Raleigh speech was
about Whittly The Unit for
World Johnson — C.G. (a.)
The first draft of this speech was prepared by Jake Daniels in the Department of Agriculture. I made the request, I think, at the same time I requested the Springfield, Illinois, speech. I indicated that the subject of the Rankin, Texas, speech was about what we wanted, except that emphasis should be placed on tobacco rather than on cotton.

I turned Daniels' draft over to Jonathan Daniels with the suggestion that I wanted us to try somehow to bring Hoovervets into the speech. Daniels was in hearty accord with the suggestion and, as a matter of fact, was the first person I had found in Washington who knew what a Hoovervet was. But we were quite certain that it would strike a responsive chord in North Carolina.

Daniels revised the Daniels draft and worked in some references to Hoovervets. I believe that next he turned it over to me and I did one draft without any basic changes in the speech. I think that he asked John Carter to do a draft, and he elaborated on the issue of the Hoovervet considerably.
The drafts of the two Raleigh speeches were ready for the meeting with the President on Sunday, and were read, corrected, and frozen at that time. On this trip, at least, the President was able to start out with the drafts of his speeches prepared when he left Washington.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
October 23, 1862

The Pittsburgh speech was an attack upon a speech which had been made in Pittsburgh by Governor Dewey sometime earlier.

I cannot now remember when and how the decision to reply to Dewey's speech was arrived at. I do remember that John Carter and I talked about it on Monday morning, and agreed that he should undertake to write the first part of the speech and that I would undertake to write the latter part. I was to do the substantive part of the reply to what Dewey had said because of my familiarity with the Democratic and Republican records.

When I started out to write I found that I could not very well begin in the middle — and ended up by starting with the beginning of a speech. I saw John Carter about noon on Monday and told him
what I was doing, and we agreed then that I should end up by
dictating such thoughts as readily occurred to me concerning the
appropriate answers to the points made by Dewey in his speech.

This, together with the first part of the speech which I had written,
I left here for Carter when I went to Raleigh Monday afternoon.

He prepared a draft on the basis of this material and as well as
I recall now my chief criticism of it was that he had not made
enough changes in the draft which I had dictated.

I got help on the later drafts of this speech from David
Bell and David Lloyd. Lloyd's major contribution was the dialogue
at the beginning of the speech about the visit to the doctor.

When he first showed that to me, I was very doubtful about
being able to use it. In fact I was on the verge of saying that I
thought we should drop it at that point, when I happened to be
talking to Clifford on the telephone. He said something to the
effect that we should make an effort to get some life into our
speeches. I then told him about the visit to the doctor that we
were then considering, and asked if he would come over to read it
and give us his judgment on it. He came right over and was really
delighted with the dialogue. He suggested some changes in it and
we then agreed that we would submit it to the President.

Bell helped principally in straightening out the latter part of the speech which undertook to answer Dewey's points.

Carter and I continued to read the various drafts and to suggest revisions of various kinds.

At one stage of this activity, Lloyd and Bull and I had done considerable work on the draft, while Carter was not present. Then Carter saw the draft he liked it well enough so that he began to insist that arrangements should be made to have it broadcast. Up until that time I believe it had not been scheduled for broadcast except locally. Then the draft was submitted to the President and his staff on Friday morning, it must have been, they had hardly finished reading the dialogue with the doctor at the beginning of the speech before David Hooper began to insist that it must be broadcast on a nation-wide hook-up. Steps were taken promptly to have it so broadcast, and that was done. However, the arrangements for the broadcast were made so late that it was not given very wide publicity ahead of time.
The Final Trip
October 24 - November 1, 1948

This trip began on the evening of Sunday, October twenty-fourth. The major speeches were made at Chicago on Monday night, Cleveland on Tuesday night, Boston Wednesday night, Madison Square Garden on Thursday night, and Brooklyn on Friday night, and St. Louis on Saturday night. There was an Election Eve broadcast from Independence on Monday night, November first.

For some time J. Franklin Carter had been urging me to arrange for him to make this trip. By reason of the arrangements that had been made earlier for various persons to furnish drafts for this trip, it appeared that the President would have drafts for most of the speeches to take with him when the trip began. It appeared, therefore, that most of the work on speeches done after the beginning of this trip would have to be done on the train. Under these circumstances it seemed to me best that Carter and I should both make the trip. Arrangements were made accordingly, with the consent of the President.

As several days intervened between the end of the Southern trip and the beginning of this final trip, the President had hoped very
much that most of the major speeches for the final trip could be
frozen before we left Washington. However, we were not able to
accomplish that objective. The speeches for Chicago and Cleveland
were completed before we left Washington, but the others were
substantially revised or written from scratch during the course of
the trip.

Chicago, Illinois, October 25, 1948

This speech was prepared by Bob Carr, and no one else on
the staff except Dave Noyes had an opportunity to read it before it
was presented to the group when they met with the President.

This was the speech which dealt with the subject of dictatorship,

with very strong implications that Dewey, like Hitler had in

Germany, was the frontman in very sinister forces.

When this speech was read by the President with the staff,

various members of the staff criticized some of its specific provi-
sions as to matters of detail. I was much dismayed as to its general
tone. It appeared to me that the case it undertook to make was so
much overdrawn that the philosophy of the speech would not be
generally accepted by the public. I had this feeling so strongly that

I felt advised to speak up in the meeting, and I did so. It then
appeared that other members of the staff had been having thoughts of the same nature.

As a result of this conference, instead of freezing the speech at that time, it was assigned to Clifford for the purpose of undertaking to make changes which would lighten its tone to some extent, and also provoke audience reaction. This conference must have been held on a Friday or Saturday.

After the draft was referred to Clifford, he and Elsey worked it over. They did not alter its basic construction or theme but did modify some of the more extreme statements and added some life to the draft. When the draft was brought back to the President, probably on Sunday, the suggested changes from Clifford and Elsey were very largely accepted and agreed to, and the speech was then frozen.

Tahlequah, Oklahoma, October 26, 1948

This was not a major speech, but it was I think a good one, and its preparation is a matter of some interest.

The President was scheduled to speak in Gary, Indiana on Monday on the way to Chicago, John Carter had helped Elsey with revising a draft which had come from the Batt group. We were not
very well satisfied with this draft, and after the train left Washington
Sunday night, Carter and I were talking about trying to revise it or
to get a new draft, Carter said that he had some ideas about what
he thought would be a right good little speech, and he sat down there
and there and wrote a draft in longhand,

Bouncing along on the train, writing on a scratch pad in his
lap, Carter went ahead without any hesitation whatever, without any
erasures or corrections in his text; turning out a draft of some
twelve or fifteen-hundred words in about thirty minutes, Elsey came
in about the time this draft was completed, and was all ready to go.
It seemed to be a good speech but was something of a departure from
anything we had done before. We agreed that we would recommend
it to the President for use at Gary or some other city.

It turned out that it was too late to make the change in the
draft for Gary. However, Carter’s draft, with some relatively slight
modifications was used at Toledo on the following day, and seemed to
be very well received by the audience and by the press.

During the remainder of this trip, Carter and I gave Elsey
some help from time to time in connection with speeches for whistle-
stops. However, Elsey continued to do the vast majority of them by
himself.
Cleveland, Ohio, October 26, 1948

Some two weeks earlier, I had asked Bill Bell to have someone in his group prepare a draft of a speech for use, probably at Cleveland which would tell the story of the Special Session of the 89th Congress that began in July, 1948. This assignment was given to Phil Dreyer, who prepared a draft that was delivered to me some days in advance of the time that it was required.

John Carter also prepared a draft of a speech for Cleveland some time in advance of the beginning of our final work on this draft. When we began to concentrate on the Cleveland draft I think parts of Carter’s draft had already been used in other speeches.

The Dreyer draft was built around the theme of a “house of democracy” with various parts of the President’s program being likened to various parts of the structure of the house. While it was a nice thought, the more I studied it, the more thoroughly I became convinced that it would not carry a speech. Consequently, I think I made a substantially fresh start on the draft, using such portions of the Dreyer draft and the Carter draft as I could. I think that Dave Lloyd and Dave Bell must have worked me on revising this draft.

It was at about this time that we were being urged from
several quarters to say something about public opinion polls with a
view to persuading the people to pay so attention to them. We had
something on this subject in the first part of the draft which was
submitted to the President and the staff on Saturday or Sunday before
the trip began. That part of the draft dealing with public opinion
polls did not seem to go over very well, and the group began
casting about for ways to improve it. Bob Carr suggested language
which was substantially a complete substitute for that portion of
the draft, and his suggestions with some editorial modifications
were agreed to and incorporated in the final draft. Otherwise,
I think the draft was frozen in substantially the form in which it
came from Bell and Lloyd to me.

It is undoubtedly apparent by this time that during the
time of the campaign, the Sundays which preceded the President’s
trips were not observed as rest days.

Boston, Massachusetts, October 27, 1948

The first draft of this speech was prepared by Bob Carr.
The President went over this draft with his staff before the trip
began. At that time it seemed to be generally agreed that it was
by and large an excellent speech, but that in some important respects
it needed modification. Consequently, it was decided not to freeze it at that time.

We took this draft with us on the train, and on Monday John Carter and I talked about the nature of the revisions which it required. I think that he must have turned out a revised draft while we were at the Hotel in Chicago that afternoon and evening. At that time I believe that I was busy polishing up his draft that was eventually used at Toledo.

When Carter had completed his revision of the Boston speech, I suggested some further changes and that draft was turned over to Clifford, probably on Monday night. Clifford made further revisions in the draft before it was submitted to the President. I do not remember when the President met with the staff to freeze the draft of the Boston speech, but it must have been Tuesday afternoon or evening after we left Cleveland.
Madison Square Garden, New York City
October 23, 1938

This was one of the speeches for which Sam Rosenman had undertaken to prepare a draft. The President had agreed with Rosenman that this speech should be in the nature of a general round-up on domestic issues.

I believe that he got some help from the Bilt group and from Leon Keyserling on this draft, as well as on the draft he prepared for Brooklyn. Rosenman's draft for Madison Square Garden was delivered to us on the train on Monday, I believe. The draft covered the right ground, made the right points, and presented a very logical argument. However, it was pretty dull and heavy for a speech. We felt that it was by no means up to the standard we had achieved in audience appeal. As a matter of fact, we thought that we had gotten to be pretty good by that time, and were not satisfied unless a speech appeared to have at least some forty or fifty places where applause might be brought from the audience.

With a view to getting some life in the Rosenman draft, I asked J. Franklin Carter to revise it. He gave us one revised draft which represented some improvement—but the speech was
still quite dull. Carter and I agreed that it still needed some kind of major transformation.

After this draft had been prepared, I was in the dining room when Carter came up to me to say that he had another one ready — and sent on to explain his idea about using as a theme for the Madison Square Garden speech the way that Dewey was following the President around. We discussed this idea some and developed it to some extent. Then Carter went off to prepare another draft. This one, when he completed it, had few traces of the Roosevelt draft left in it. Although this draft of Carter's required some substantial editing and revision, it was the draft that definitely set us over the hump on this speech.

Clifford and I took this draft and worked it over together, paragraph by paragraph, in his compartment on the train. That was on Wednesday on the way to Boston. The part of this speech dealing with Israel was based largely on Roosevelt's draft. In Carter's last revision, he dealt with the question of Israel in an entirely different manner, but the substance of the Roosevelt treatment was restored by Clifford. Since Clifford was our expert
on the subject of Israel, I offered very few opinions or suggestions on this part of the speech.

We went over the draft of this speech with the President and from it Wednesday night after he returned from the delivery of his Boston speech. I had been rather worried about the speech but it was so well received by the President and other members of the staff that I was much relieved. I remember Matt Connelly's comment that it seemed to him to be the best one yet.

The following day going into New York the text of the speech was released to the press. We began to get reports that friendly newspaper men were concerned because the speech had no big lead in it and did not seem suitable for Madison Square Garden.

There was even some suggestion that the speech should be recalled and that the President should make a foreign policy speech that night instead of the following night at Brooklyn. After a little reflection it was clear that it was completely impracticable to make such a change in arrangements. Moreover, there were several of us who by that time were pretty well convinced that the speech was all right in spite of the comments of newspaper men.
I believe that reports of this speech mention
were
carried to the President and probably account for the fact that
he ad libbed considerably more when he delivered the speech
than was his custom.

Brooklyn, New York
October 27, 1921

The draft of this speech was prepared by Sam Rosenman
and delivered to us on the train after we left Washington.

After studying this draft I believe we generally agreed
it would be necessary to make a fresh start. Franklin Carter
prepared another draft at my request. In the meantime, I was
carrying around a draft of a foreign policy speech which had been
prepared by David Lloyd. He wrote this draft just after Dewey's
speech at Louisville, Kentucky, on the same day that I was working
on the St. Paul speech. In its essentials the Lloyd draft was an
elaboration of the foreign policy part of the St. Paul speech.

I had sent a draft of it to the train along with the St. Paul
speech, suggesting that it might possibly be used at Indianapolis
on that same trip. There was a good deal of excellent material
in this draft which I felt sure would be useful in connection with a foreign policy speech.

When Carter had completed his draft of the Brooklyn speech, it was apparent that a great deal of it could not be used. However, it seemed to me that between his draft and Lloyd's draft we could get enough material for a speech. I took these two drafts to Clifford on the train on Thursday morning and we went over them together.

He was badly disappointed at the Carter draft, and I believe we didn't spend much time on the Lloyd draft. Our discussions were interrupted at length by the flurry over the reaction to the Madison Square Garden speech when it was released to the press.

Along toward the end of the discussion on that subject, Clifford outlined to several members of the staff who were still gathered in his compartment some thoughts that he had discussed earlier with me about what might go into the Brooklyn speech. His outline was devoted chiefly to the subject of Communism and it sounded good.
As a result, Clifford undertook to dictate a draft of a speech along that line. He did this, completing his dictation as the train pulled in to New York City. His draft was typed after we reached the hotel in New York, and copies were distributed to Clifford, mine, and me, I believe. After some study each of us reached the conclusion that the draft was too much like the Boston speech and was not what we were looking for.

I got out the Lloyd draft again and began to study it, and the more I looked at it the more it looked like the best basis we had for making further progress. I believe that I put together a draft early Thursday evening based largely on the Lloyd draft but with some of the material from Carter's draft in it. At that point it began to look something like a speech, and we agreed to work on it during the night in shifts.

We were still without a suitable introduction. Carter returned to my room after attending the Madison Square Garden speech and I told him what ground I thought the introduction should cover and that it should be designed to evoke considerable applause, as the rest of the speech was going to be pretty serious stuff.
He wrote an introduction while I took a nap. Then he left about 2:00 A.M., and I worked on revising his introduction and the rest of the draft until about 5:30 o'clock. I delivered this draft to the typist with instructions to wake Clifford up when it was finished—having in my own mind at that time very little idea whether it was good, bad, or indifferent.

Clifford woke me up about 8:30 to say that the draft had turned out well, that he had added some material on the subject of Communism, and that the President wanted me in his room to go over a draft of a speech for Harlem.

After we finished reading the Harlem speech with the President, we went hurriedly over the Brooklyn draft with him. This work was interrupted from time to time by various matters.

The President indicated that the draft was generally satisfactory and a number of revisions were suggested but there was no time to agree on the exact text.

When the President left for his trip about the city, the text was left with me for revisions in accordance with the discussion with the President. I got George Kelley to sit with me to check my work for obvious mistakes and revise the draft.
for the last time. As each page was completed, we delivered it
to Bess Ayers for mimeographing and typing of the reading copy.

The President got his reading copy when he returned to
the hotel, and I believe found it generally satisfactory.

This was one of our closest shaves but a number of
people singled this speech out for favorable comment later.

I suppose that is an indication that it turned out all right.
During the earlier part of the week we had received a draft for St. Louis from David Lloyd together with draft language on some other matters that were not covered in his draft of the speech.

Because of the pressure of the work on the other speeches, Clifford and I were not able to devote much time to the St. Louis speech until after we left New York Friday night. However, I believe that I had asked John Carter to get out a draft on Friday making use of Lloyd's material. Carter turned this draft over to me either late Friday night or early Saturday morning.

We had a rather settled practice by this time of seeking some device to carry the theme of each speech, as, for example, the doctor and the crash in the record in the Pittsburgh speech, and the "following me around" business in the Madison Square Garden speech.

In the draft for St. Louis which Carter delivered to me there were two of these devices, one of which had originated with
him and the other of which had come from David Lloyd.

In the meantime, Clifford had one which he had spoken to the President about, and which the President agreed should go in the St. Louis speech. Clifford and I took the Carter draft and worked it over together. We saved Carter's device and Clifford's — and I can't remember about Lloyd's.

The draft as revised by Clifford and as was presented to the President late Saturday afternoon. The President had been saying for several days that he would like to make the St. Louis speech off the cuff and was seriously considering doing so. After he saw the draft of the St. Louis speech which we had presented to him, he reached a firm decision to make the speech off the cuff.

He requested that we prepare an outline for his use. During the campaign experience had taught us that the most satisfactory form of outline was an abbreviated text which could be followed more or less closely as the President wished. We prepared a draft of the speech in this form and I believe that was the draft which was released to the press as the advance text. Earlier in the day, Charlie Ross had told the press about some of the points that would be covered in the speech, and we were careful in this draft to see that those points...
were actually covered.

During the late afternoon and early evening before we arrived at St. Louis, the President was working on his own notes for the speech. Several of us had dinner with the Trumans in their car that night. The President excused himself from the table early to return to his work on his notes. I believe that he must have ended up with something like two pages of his own notes in longhand in his reading binder.

When he delivered the speech in St. Louis he used his own notes. He glanced at these notes occasionally but I don’t believe that he ever turned the page. He did not read from the outline or draft which we had prepared for him. This speech as it was delivered was in many respects the best of the campaign. It was certainly the best so far as stirring up the enthusiasm of the audience was concerned. The crowd literally went wild.

As for myself, I enjoyed the speech tremendously and was clapping and cheering as vigorously as any one else — not just as a member of a clique, either, but because it was the kind of speech that generated a great deal of spontaneous applause.
On or about Friday, October 29, I heard that the President had a draft which he was proposing to use for the Election Day broadcast from Independence. Friday night after we left New York City I asked the President about the matter. He told me that he did have a draft which he had turned over to Bebe Gomoney for typing. He told me to get the draft from Miss Gomoney and read it to see what I thought about it.

I did this and found that the draft was based largely on some notes that Bob Carr had written several weeks earlier on the nature of the President's task. The President had edited these notes to a considerable extent himself, but had not changed their basic character.

While this material was interesting and well written, I was disturbed about it because I could not see clearly on which it would lead people to vote for the President. That, it seemed to me, should be the primary aim of the speeches up to and including Election Day.

Later in the evening, when the President asked me what I
thought of the draft I told him I had not been able to make up my
mind and would like to have an opportunity to tell him later.

In the meantime, Franklin Carter had written a draft
which he turned over to me Friday night. By Saturday morning it
was pretty clear in my own mind that Carter's first draft as it
stood was a better speech than the one based on Carr's material.

The more I considered the matter the more firmly I became convinced
that we should make a serious recommendation to the President not
to use the Carr draft. This was a matter we would not have an oppor-
tunity to take up with him until after we left St. Louis. Clifford
was leaving the train at St. Louis, and I was considering leaving
the train at St. Louis, also. I was anxious to return home and,
in fact, had hoped at the beginning of the trip to be able to
come home when the President's party left New York City.

In these circumstances I went to Charlie Ross to talk to
him about the matter and showed him the two drafts of the speech
which were involved. I explained my desire to leave the train but
told him that if he would join me in a recommendation to the President
not to use the Carr material, that I would stay with the party until
we had a chance to take the matter up with the President. He said
he thought that Carr's material was not the right thing to use and
that he thought I should stay with the party if I could.

By this time George Klapp had completed his work on the
whistle stop speeches. Although he too had been anxious to leave
the train as soon as possible, he agreed to go on to Kansas City
to work on the speech for Independence.

We did not have an opportunity to discuss the matter with
the President before he left the train at Independence on Sunday
morning, but Charlie Ross agreed that we would try to arrange
somehow to discuss it with him before the end of the day on Sunday.

After we reached the hotel in Kansas City on Sunday
morning, Klapp and I started to work, using Carter's draft as a
basis. Shortly after noon I was in Milt Connelly's room explaining
to him the things that concerned me in the Carr material. While
I was in Mr. Connelly's room the President called him from
Independence about another matter, and Connelly put me on the phone
to talk with the President about the draft of the speech for the
next night.
I told the President about the things in the Carr material which bothered me, and especially that I was concerned because it appeared clearly to present him to the American people as the indispensable man in the Presidency. I told him that as far as I was concerned I thought he was indispensable or nearly so, but I did not think it in keeping with his character for him to go on the radio and say that to the American people.

At the conclusion of our conversation he agreed that he would not use the Carr material and instructed us to go ahead with our work on another draft.

Esey and I completed a draft Sunday night, and I showed this draft to Matt Connally. He was not very favorably impressed with it. His position basically was that the President should put the speech in his own words to the fullest extent possible. With that theory I agreed completely. Also, in the light of Connally’s criticisms, I thought that some of the material in the original Carter draft which Esey and I had omitted might well be considered again.

On Monday evening the President came in to the hotel. He submitted to him the original Carter draft, as well as the revised
draft which Kluey and I had prepared. He went over these drafts
and discussed them with Connally, Ross, Carter, Kluey and me.

As a result of that session, the President — who had about an
hour he could devote to that purpose — went in a room by himself
and wrote out a considerable portion of a draft in long-hand.

In the meantime, Charlie Ross had gone off by himself
and prepared a draft which was a combination of Carter's original
draft and the revised draft which Kluey and I prepared.

When it was time for the President to leave the hotel,
he brought what he had written in to Ross' room and left it with
us. With Ross taking the lead, we then prepared another draft,
using the material which the President had written and filling it
out with material from Ross' most recent draft and even, at that
stage, I think we added several new paragraphs.

The President had an opportunity to go over this draft
when he returned to the hotel early in the afternoon and he approved
it at that time.
In its final form I think this draft consisted for the most part of what the President had written himself and the material which at one stage or another had been written by John Carter.

Judging from the comments I have heard since that time the final product was a very effective speech. Several people have told me that it was the most effective Election Eve broadcast they ever heard.

* * * *