April 22, 1981

Mr. Ken Hochler
917 Fifth Avenue
Huntington, W. VA 25701

Dear Ken,

When we met at the Kennedy Library I promised to send you the so-called "Clifford Memorandum," which I hereby do.

I am also sending you an interview with Dick Neustadt in which he outlines the story of the "Clifford Memorandum". I think the explanation that Truman disliked my law partner and Clifford therefore put his name on my memorandum and took mine off, is really an afterthought. But it is so long ago there is no point in calling names!

In any event, I hope you enjoy both articles.

It was good to see you and good to talk about Presidents we have known.

If you come this way let me know and I will take you to lunch.

As ever,

James Rowe

Enclosures
THE POLITICS OF 1948

The aim of this memorandum is to suggest a course of political conduct for the Administration to follow from September 1947 to the November 1948 elections.

What suggestions there are on policy are based solely on an appraisal of "the politically advantageous thing to do." In a democracy, what is politically advisable may often accord with the merits of a particular policy; often it does not. This memorandum makes no attempt to evaluate the merits; that is a matter of conscience for the Administration. For working purposes it is assumed here that the politically wise thing to do is also the best policy for the United States.

An old axiom claims that politics is no more than a study of the probabilities. If that is so there can be no original or unusual thinking in such a survey as this; it must, rather, be devoted to a review of the usual. Most of the elements to be made in modern American politics have already been said and are constantly being restated.

For instance, the basic premise of this memorandum—that the Democratic Party is an unhappy alliance of Southern conservatives, urban progressives and Big City labor—is very true; but it is also true. And it is equally true that the success or failure of the Democratic leadership can be precisely measured by its ability to lead enough men of these three distinct groups to the polls on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November.

It may, however, be useful to attempt an estimate, as of September 1947, of what will probably happen in the next year, and to suggest what steps the Administration should now initiate so that it, rather than the opposition party, will direct (if superficial direction is humanly possible), the decision of the American people on Election Day.

As of today some probabilities are apparent. These should determine the Administration's political course and bearing for the next few months and preferably until the Democratic Convention in July. Some of these probabilities appear almost certainty; others, to say the least, are extremely arguable. Even together, however, they may afford the Administration a working hypothesis on which to base its political actions.

A. The Probabilities

1. Governor Dewey will be the nominee of the Republican Party. This tentative conclusion is of course based on the usual factors. Among those is the fact that, at least at the present time, a strong candidate is required to defeat President Truman, as the recent polls show. Just as a year ago the probability was that any Republican could defeat him, so the solidity fluctuating currents of American opinion may again destroy his strong popularity a few months hence if "the break"—such as an excellent European article which the American government fails to handle ably—were against his Administration. But as of September 1947 it takes a
strong candidate to defeat him. The policies of Senator Taft, for example, have probably so alienated large blocs of voters (viz., President William Green's recent "dare" to the Republican Party to nominate Taft) that he permanently ruptured his chances for nomination. Although he may still be in a position to dictate the nominee, or in the alternative, there may be a deadlock between Dewey and Taft and the choice will fall on someone such as Eisenhower, Vandenberg or Jarrett, these possibilities are so remote as to be quite inadvisable to formulate a political program on them.

It should be assumed, therefore, that the candidate is Dewey (the only man to lead the President in the fortune roll); and that, because of his 15th experience and because of the extremely efficient group of men he has drawn around him, he will be a resourceful intelligent and highly dangerous candidate, even more difficult to defeat than in 1948.

2. President Truman will be elected if the Administration will successfully concentrate on the traditional Democratic alliance between the South and West. It is inconceivable that any policies initiated by the Truman Administration no matter how "liberal" could so alienate the South in the next year that it would revolt. As always, the South can be considered safely Democratic and in formulating national policy it can be safely ignored.

The only pragmatic reason for reconciling the South in normal times is because of its tremendous strength in the Congress. Since the Congress is Republican and the Democratic President has therefore no real chance to get his own program approved by it, particularly in an election year, he has no real necessity for "getting along" with the Southern conservatives. He must, however, get along with the "Easterners" and with labor if he is to be re-elected.

The Administration is, for practical purposes, politically free to concentrate on the winning of the West. If the Democrats carry the solid South and also those Western states carried in 1944, they will have 216 of the required 266 electoral votes. And if the Democratic Party is powerful enough to capture the West it will almost certainly pick up enough of the doubtful Midwestern and Eastern states to get 50 more votes (e.g., Missouri 11 votes). They could lose New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Massachusetts — all the "Big" states — and still win.

Therefore, political and program planning demands concentration upon the West and its problems, including reclamation, floods, and agriculture. It is the Number One Priority for the 1948 campaign. The Republican Congress has already done its share to give the West to the Administration.

3. Henry Wallace will be the candidate of a third party. As of September 1947 the majority of informed opinion does not favor this particular hypothesis. Nevertheless, the factors which impel Wallace toward a third party clearly outweigh those which do not.

For one thing the men around Wallace are committed by the Communist Party line. The First Lord of the Kremlin determines the Party line is still Karl Marx. The Marxists emphasize that the capitalist economy holds within itself the seeds of its own destruction; that it must inevitably destroy itself by depression and
defectors. But within this rigid ideology is the directive that when and where possible the Party must hasten the process. Insofar as sufficient social policies to persuade that a Republican administration would be rigid and reactionary, and would fail to take those governmental steps necessary to eter the capitalist economy in time of crisis. It is also believed there is no longer any hope that the Truman administration will submit to the Russian program of world conquest and expansion. From the Communist long-range point of view, there is nothing to lose and much to gain if a Republican becomes the next president. The best way it can help achieve that result, and hasten the disintegration of the American economy, is to split the Independent and labor union vote between Truman and Wallace — and thus ensure the Republican candidate's victory.

The best evidence supporting this probability is that the men who surround Wallace today are Party-liners such as E. B. Halley, political consultants such as Harold Young, and well-meaning ideologists like Michael Straight. These men will persuade Wallace it is his duty to his country to run, as they have persuaded him to do everything else they ever wanted him to do. The most recent reports on Wallace's personality by men who knew him well are that while his mysticism increases, the humility which once was his dominant characteristic has decreased to the waning point; there is something almost inelastic in his belief today that he is the indispensable man.

There is some evidence to the contrary. Wallace has been silent since the announcement of the Marshall Plan, except to claim that the idea was originally his. Within the last few weeks an American Communist Party manifesto which stated the Party line told the faithful that the American Communists are no longer interested in a third party. And Senator Claude Pepper, a devout if cynical follower of the Party line said on the White House steps that a third party was irrepressible and that Wallace could serve his country best as a private citizen.

But these are simply surface phenomena. A more accurate impression is that the Communists are making a strategic withdrawal for the moment. Tactical considerations, brought about by the refusal of Wallace's old union to back a third party and thus threatening a possible split in the New York American Labor Party which the Communists hope to control, have caused a temporary softening. The Party line can change swiftly with events. Recent events, both international and domestic, such as the Presidential veto of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Marshall plan do not favor preconstituting a third party for the moment.

September and October may well show the Communist Party again moving toward the third party. On Labor Day Wallace broke his long silence to address the Wayne County CIO Council in Detroit. This labor council was recently captured by the Communists. His speech before 65,000 persons again threatened a third party. Reid Johnson and Leo Pressman, both party-liners, called for a third party at the August convention of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, a Communist-dominated union. The New York State CIO Council at its annual convention on September 6th rejected a resolution against a third party.

The casual comment by the professional politicians on third party talk is that it is public since a third party cannot get on enough state ballots. This is.
dangerously unrealistic. Wallace is gambling for high stakes. He hopes to defeat President Truman by splitting the Democratic Party and then inherit its leadership so he can be the candidate of 1952. If Wallace can get on the ballots of only a few states and can then draw five or ten per cent of the vote, that vote alone taken from the Democrats in a close election is enough to give the Republicans the electoral vote of those states and therefore national victory. And Wallace can get on the ballot of New York (American Labor Party) and California and other States.

It is also very dangerous to assume that the only supporters of Wallace are the Communists. True enough, they give him a disciplined hard-working organization and collect the money to run his campaign. But he also has a large following throughout the country, particularly of the young voters who are attracted by the idealism that he—and he alone—is talking and who regard war as the one evil greater than any other. He will also derive support from the pacifists, which means a great number of organized women and from whatever irreconcilable and die-hard isolationists remain. He will attract votes—and money—from the "Dustbowl fringe." The California Townsendites are already pledged to him.

His October speaking tour should reveal his true colors. In any event, the Denver meeting this Fall of "progressive" delegations from eleven Eastern states should resolve the third party question—but that may be too late to stop him.

In a close election no votes can be ignored. The only safe working hypothesis is to assume now that Wallace will run on a third party ticket. Every effort must be made by all—not jointly and at one and the same time—although of course by different groups—to dissuade him, and also to identify him and isolate him in the public mind with the Communists.

The independent and progressive voter will hold the balance of power in 1948; he will not actively support President Truman unless a great effort is made. The Democratic and Republican Parties each have a minimum, a residue, of voters whose loyalty almost nothing can shake. The independent voter who shifts on the issues comprises a group which today is probably larger than both.

The truth is that the old "party organization" control is gone forever. Better education, the rise of the mass pressure group, the economic depression of the 30's, the growth of government functions—all these have contributed to the downfall of the organization. Tammany, Hague, Kelly and the rest of the straight party leaders, while still important, are no longer omnipotent, no longer able to determine the issue. For practical political purposes they are moribund; they cannot be relied on to do the job alone.

They have been supplanted in large measure by the pressure groups—and the support of these must be won since they really control the 1948 election. In these pressure groups are the farmers, still traditionally Republican, and organized labor which became "traditionally Democratic" under Roosevelt. Another loosely organized group are the progressives who followed Roosevelt for four elections but are increasingly restive under President Truman, mostly because of the reactionary domination exercised over the Democratic Party by the Congressional Southeners who, although a minority of the Democratic Party, are a majority of the Party-in-Congress and
are assuming control of the Party organization councils. And also among these groups are the racial groups who have learned to use the voice as an economic weapon and who can no longer be satisfied with a Tannen turkey on Thanksgiving.

(a) The Farmer. The firm voice is in most ways identical with the meaning of the best—The Number One Priority. The Farmer is at least at present, favorably inclined toward the Truman Administration. His crops are good, however the high prices may be affecting the rest of the people, they help him more than they hurt him. Parity will protect him—and the Marshall Plan will aid him. The economic and political trend of the Administration except its tax program is going his way. Whether prosperity makes him the conservative he usually becomes in good times remains to be seen—but, if it does, nothing much can be done about it in terms of more political or economic favors to win him back to the Democratic banner.

(b) Labor. President Truman and the Democratic Party cannot win without the active support of organized labor. It is dangerous to assume that labor may have nowhere else to go in 1948. Labor can stay home.

The rank and file of the workers are not yet politically minded; they will not, therefore, vote or work actively unless they are inspired to do so. They were so inspired by Roosevelt. They were not so inspired in the 1946 Congressional elections. In those elections they did not vote Republican but they did stay home. The labor group has always been politically inactive during prosperity—then they are well fed they are not interested. They will probably be well fed in 1948. The effort to get out the labor vote will thus have to be much more strenuous than in 1946. Labor must be coaxed, flattered and educated. Above all its leaders must be taken into the Administration's councils and must be given a far larger voice than they now have on matters of policy.

The President's veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill, coupled with vehement dislike of the Republicans because they passed it over his veto does indicate that as of today Labor is friendly to the President. But to assume that it will remain so definitely in that quality as other men.

A survey of the attitude of the major labor organizations as of September 1947 shows that intense and continuing opposition by the President himself is necessary. For example, John L. Lewis of the Mine Workers is a man of complex personality. The Administration's tactics in labor circles is to the effect that Lewis, believing he has a will, has quietly aligned himself to Dewey. It is said he even went so far as to counsel Dewey to say nothing on the Taft-Hartley controversy. Whatever his reasons, Dewey did remain silent.

There is very strong evidence that the AFL will shortly form a new political organization to punish the Congressmen who voted for the Taft-Hartley Act—and that John L. Lewis will be formally appointed Political Director of the entity. This presents all sorts of problems for the Administration. Lewis may be
for Dewey or he may be for Truman at the end, but before that time comes, he will try to drive many a hard bargain.

Dedinsky, another AFL-Democrat, is deliberately cynical. He has said within the past two weeks "all they (the Democrats) want from us is our money, our votes and our machines. They had better come trading."

The AFL always looks for a bargain. It will want a new one in 1948; it is well to remember Taft-Hartley was 1947 — and so ancient history. Another AFL-Democrat and the ranking leader of the AFL, George Meany, who heads the New York AFL Council, has always been eager to make a trade when he thinks he has a winner. By his direction, and for the first time in many years, the AFL in 1956 refused to endorse the Democratic candidates for Governor and Senator in New York. A recent radio speech by Meany is a masterpiece of record-building. Assaulting the Taft-Hartley Act he deliberately, and time after time, confined his attack to "Congressional Republicans." He carefully said nothing against the Party as a whole or against such non-Congressional Republicans as Governor Dewey, with whom he is friendly. For a few face-saving concessions from the Republican majority in the next session of Congress, such as minor amendments on Taft-Hartley, the sixty-cent minimum wage bill and a few gestures toward a health and housing program, large segments of the AFL, on the basis of past performances, might sell "no沿着" with the GOP — if the candidate were someone other than Taft.

Only William Green is presently enthusiastic. In a September dinner conversation with an Administration official he outlined the elaborate and expensive plans of the AFL to defeat the Congressional Republicans. After an hour of enthusiasm he said bitterly "If only the President will let us do it." He asserted that he had received no overtures, no offer of cooperation from the Administration. In a need to corner himself and therefore most of his organization irreversibly to the President's reelection, he can find no one even interested in taking advantage of his. His mood will not last forever.

The CIO is almost hopelessly split. As of September 1947 the so-called "right singers," led by William Green, claim they are ready and able to drive the Communist leftingers, with Lee Pressman as the leading victim, out of the CIO to the Convention this fall. Only the most hopeful observer can believe this will happen. But if it occurs it might mean the breakup of the CIO and a consequent lessening of its political strength. However, Philip Murray's past course of conduct indicates that once again he will do anything in his power to hold the CIO together, even at the price of his continued acquiescence in the Communist maneuverings within the CIO.

He may also agree that he will be forced into inactive neutrality between Truman and Wallace, as compared with the great activity of 1946 in behalf of Roosevelt. Murray's bitter and unnecessary remark after the vote of the Taft-Hartley Bill to the effect that the President may have been motivated by political considerations rather than a sincere belief in the intermediate benefits of the Bill, can be explained only on the ground that he is politically, far from ready or able to put the CIO's strength at the Administration's beck and call.
Of all labor, only the Railroad Brotherhoods seem at this stage to be overly friendly to the Democrats. The "flip-flop" of A. F. Whitney, once so bitter at the President and long regarded as a third-party enthusiast, is an encouraging sign.

The moral is plain. Much work must be done with organized labor. The moment will never be so propitious again. Now, while the rank-and-file of Labor is so bitter at the Republicans, is the time to make overtures to its leaders. There is great pressure on them to back the President. The situation can easily deteriorate in a few months, particularly as Labor is cultivated by the Denby forces.

(c) The "Liberal". Nor are the liberal and progressive leaders overly enthusiastic about the administration. Foreign policy has forced the large bulk to break sharply with Wallace and the fellow-travelers. And of course they find no hope in Republican activities as evidenced by the recent Congress. Fear of the Republicans may drive them to activity for President Truman, but at present there is no disposition to do much more than stay home on election day. Whether their reasons are valid or otherwise, many of them feel that the progressive wing has been cut off by the Southerners and the "organization" leaders from any say in the Democratic Party. This is particularly true of such organizations as Americans for Democratic Action where most of the Roosevelt New Dealers have found haven. Then Adlai Stevenson, after calling on the President as chairman of the New York Liberal Party, announced he was against Wallace and a third party and that the New York Liberal Party would support President Truman, an almost universal criticism among the progressive groups of this statement was that Berle acted unethically—he had thrown away the bargaining power of his group a year before the election and had received nothing in return.

The liberals and progressives need to be more idealistic. They cannot, for the most part, swallow the Wallace brand but they are not averse to the kind James Roosevelt, politically sensitive to the powerful California "left," gave them on September 5th when he announced in a radio speech he would introduce a limited "redistribution of wealth" plank at the Democratic Convention.

The liberals are numerically small. But, similar to manufacturers and financiers of the Republican Party, they are far more influential than mere numbers entitle them to be. The businessman has influence because he contributes his money. The liberal exerts unusual influence because he is articulate. The "right" may have the money, but the "left" has always had the pen. If the "intellectual" can be induced to back the President, he will do so in the press, on the radio, and in the movies. He is the artist of propaganda. He is the "ideas man" for the people. Since the rise of the pressure groups, the men of ideas who can appeal to them on their own ground, in their own words have become an essential ally to the alert candidate in modern American politics.

(d) The Negro. Since 1932 when, after intensive work by President Roosevelt, their leaders among the Pennsylvania Negro bloc into the Democratic column
with the classic remark, "Turn your picture of Abraham Lincoln to the wall—we have paid that debt," the northern Negro has voted Democratic (with the exception of 1966 in New York). A theory of many professional politicians is that the northern Negro voter today holds the balance of power in Presidential elections for the simple arithmetic reason that the Negroes not only vote in a bloc but are geographically concentrated in the pivotal, large and closely contested electoral states such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan. This theory may or may not be absolutely true, but it is certainly close enough to the truth to be extremely arguable.

In great measure this explains the assiduous and continuous cultivation of the New York Negro vote by Governor Dewey and his insistence that his controllable legislature pass a state anti-discrimination act. He less an authority than Ed Flynn has said privately in the past two weeks that Dewey will take New York from Truman in 1948 because he controls the Negro and Italian blocs. This explains the arduous efforts made by Hill in the 1940 campaign to get the Negro vote and it of course explains the long continuing solicitude of the New Deal wing of the Democratic Party toward the Negro.

There are several strong, aside from the loyalty of his leaders to Dewey, that the northern Negro is today ready to swing back to his traditional loyalties—the Republican Party. Under the tutelage of Walter White, of the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People, and other intellectuals, educated and sophisticated leaders, the Negro voter has become a cynical, hardboiled trader. He is just about convinced today that he can better his present economic lot by voting his party in a solid bloc to the Republicans. He believes the rising dominance of the Southern conservatives in the Democratic councils of the Congress and of the Party makes it only too clear that he can go no further by supporting the present Administration. Whether his interest lies in a Federal Anti-Poll Tax Statute, in the protection of his civil liberties or in a permanent Federal FICA, he understands clearly that he now has no chance of success with any of these because of the Southern Senators of the Democratic Party.

As well aware of this Democratic chink in the armour as the Negro are the Republican politicians. They make no great secret of their intent to try to pass a FEPC Act and anti-poll tax statute in the next Congress. Whether they are successful—or whether Democratic filibusters will block them—they can't see how they can lose in such a situation either way. The Negro press, often vocal, is already strongly Republican.

To counteract this trend, the Democratic Party can point only to the obvious—that the really great improvement in the economic lot of the Negro of the North has come in the last sixteen years only because of the sympathy and policies of a Democratic Administration. The trouble is that this has worn a bit thin with the passage of the years. Unless the Administration makes a determined campaign to help the Negro (and everybody else) on the problem of high prices and housing—and capitalizes politically on its efforts—the Negro vote is already lost. Unless there are new and real efforts (as distinguished from mere political gestures which are today thoroughly understood and strongly resented
by sophisticated Negro leaders) the Negro bloc, which, certainly in Illinois and probably in New York and Ohio, does hold the balance of power, will go Republican.

(c) The Jew. The Jewish vote, insofar as it can be thought of as a bloc, is important only in New York. But (except for Wilson in 1916) no candidate since 1912 has lost New York and won the Presidency, and its 68 votes are naturally the first prize in any election. Centered in New York City, that vote is normally Democratic and, if large enough, is sufficient to counteract the upstate vote and deliver the state to Truman. Today the Jewish bloc is interested primarily in Palestine and somewhat critical of the Truman Administration on that ground. The bundling of the British in the Exodus case is sure to intensify these already complicated and irrational resentments. Unless the Palestine matter is boldly and favorably handled there is bound to be some defection on their part to the alert Dewey. It should not be overlooked, either, that much of this Jewish vote is also the "left" vote and will go to Wallace.

(f) The Catholic. The Catholic vote is traditionally Democratic. But there have been disturbingly consistent and fairly well documented rumors that the Catholic fear of Communism is growing so great that it is actively distrustful and suspicious today of any group which gives even an appearance of neutrality towards foreign or domestic Communism. It has been said, for example, that in 1916 the prelates of the Church deliberately opposed Senator Needham, although he is a practising Catholic, in his candidacy for Governor of New York because he tolerated a loose alliance with the American Labor Party, controlled by the Communists. This same fear presumably also caused the predominantly Irish population of Massachusetts to vote Republican in a number of Congressional districts and the pattern was repeated in lesser degree in other parts of the country as far away as Montana. This particular the need for careful watching the liaisons existing during the Roosevelt Administrations with the Catholic Church must be rebuilt if there are none today. Frank Walker and Leo Crowley were then understood to function as unofficial liaison with the leaders of the Church if there is a liaison in 1917 it is not known.

(g) The Italian. The Italian vote—which has weight in New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, California, and several minor states because it almost always votes as a solid bloc—is notoriously volatile, swinging easily from party to party. Roosevelt once perversely close to losing it with his offhand remark in 1940 about Mussolini's "stach in the back" of France. But he regained it, and in fact almost made it Democratic forever in 1943 when he formally declared Italian aliens were no longer classified as alien enemies for the rest of the war. Today the Italian racial leaders are again somewhat unhappy—this time because they regard the peace treaty for Italy as unnecessarily harsh. They were not made any happier by the casual "brush off" by the Administration of their protests (the State Department was the chief offender).

Here again Dewey has been cautious in his cultivation of the Italian. He has, as with as one example, sent word to Ugo Carusi, until recently Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, and an important figure in Italian circles, that he wished he would start thinking about what Government position he might want in Dewey's Administration after 1948. Dewey has a popular and resourceful Italian leader in Ed Corsi, former United States Commissioner
of Immigration and Naturalization and today New York State Labor Commissioner.
Ed Flynn is said to believe the New York Governor will have the Italian vote
in 1948.

(c) The Allen Group. As of today, the Administration enjoys good standing with
the Horatio group unchallenged in its immigration quotas. This is a re-
sult of the President's forthright fight for the Stetson Bill. But the leaders
of this organization have learned "the hard way" to be politically sophisticated
over the last few years. They deliberately plan to make the best trade they can
for the 1948 "yes" and the other alien group they represent and have no interest in
whether it is to be made with favorer, Republicans or non-Republicans. They are
convinced that both parties are primarily interested only for the votes involved
they are ready to act accordingly. On this issue, too, the Administration
carry as its handicap the fact that the major opposition to lowering the immi-
gerion barriers comes from the non-Republican conservatives. Although not as
severely, the Republicans are similarly obstructed here because so many of their
Congressmen are residents of small towns and rural areas whose people are bitter-
ly opposed to further immigration. The labor organizations, which originally
caused the passage of the immigration laws, have publicly changed their minds
and endorsed the Stetson Bill.

The immigration leaders today lean to the belief the Democrats are more
sympathetic, but they maintain a flexible position.

5. The foreign policy issues of the 1948 campaign will be our relations with the
USSR and the Administration's handling of foreign reconstruction and relief. The
probability that the foreign affairs of the United States will remain on a basis
of "bi-partisan cooperation" is unfortunately remote. The stakes in a Presi-
dential contest are so huge that the temptation to make an issue of anything on
which there is any segment or group of dissatisfied voters is too irresistible.

There is considerable political advantage to the Administration in the battle
with the Kremlin. The best guess today is that our poor relations with Russia
will intensify—and will be clarified at the forthcoming meeting of the United
Nations at New York. The nation is already united behind the President on this
issue. The worst returns get, up to a fairly certain point—real danger of immi-
grant war—the more to their sense of crisis. In times of crisis the American
citizen tends to back up his President. And on the issue of policy toward Russia,
President Truman is comparatively unassailable to attack because of his brilliant
appointment of General Marshall who has convinced the public that as Secretary of
State he is non-partisan and above politics.

In a flank attack tied up with foreign policy, the Republicans are trying to
identify the Administration with the domestic Communists. The President adroit-
ly stake their thunder by initiating his own Government employee loyalty investi-
gation procedure and the secret Republicans admit it. But their efforts will
intensify as the election approaches, particularly when the major results of the
civil service investigations are made public by the Republican Congress.

If the third party effort falters, it is quite possible the Communists will try
to deliver the unions they dominate to the Republicans. This is how many conceivably
be on the Republican foot by election time—and it will be the Democrats' turn
to emphasize their rivals' bungling on the opposition banner. When Bridges, O'Hara, and
Mike Quill went down the line for Hillie in 1946 under the chairmanship of the House
and unopposed, and the Communists so adroit in executing their directives,
that the Democratic assertion, although true, just wasn't believed by a na"ive pub-
lie. If this comes about in 1948 and the Democratic 'thing' is better handled,
it might prove invaluable, particularly as the American public is more sophisti-
cated and more sensitive to the red issue than it then was.

But domestic Communism is merely a sideshow to the "Big Tent." On the main
issues the Republican strategy on foreign policy as it appears to be developing
is a very effective one. It is effective because of its simplicity—"everythings
is Truman."

Republican propaganda is repetitious on the theme that Soviet expansion in Europe
could and should have been stopped long ago and that only Roosevelt's bungling at
Yalta and Truman's equal ineptitude at Potsdam prevented this from happening; that
the money spent, $10 billion, for foreign relief seems to have done no good what-
ever; and that the occupation of Germany is a costly failure. This strategy was
sharpened by Senator Taft in his Ohio speech when he very carefully emphasized that
these weaknesses could not be blamed on the Republican Congress—only a strong
Executive, said he, can give the nation a sound foreign policy. Congressman Bendar
of Ohio, a Taft spokesman, in early September urged that we abandon Europe since
all the money poured in since 1945 had been wasted.

The administrative handling of the Administration's Greek program has not yet
drawn the fires of Taft or other Republican spokesmen but it soon will. The in-
consistency in Greece is a token of the kind of administrative fumbling on the
Marshall plan which may be expected during the initial stages of its execution.
Unfortunately those initial stages of administration will coincide in point of
time with the political months of the 1948 campaign. They will surely be a shining
target for the Republican opposition. The staggering cost of the foreign aid pro-
to show for that cost by campaign time may force the American people to say they
have "had enough."

6. The domestic issues of the campaign will be high prices and housing.

The High Cost of Living will be the most controversial issue of the 1948 campaign
indeed the only domestic issue. Whichever Party is adjudged guilty of causing it
will lose the election. For that reason the presentation of its case by the Demo-
cratic Party—the manner, the substance and the effectiveness of its evidence—is
of crucial importance.

In a sense Housing is a part of the larger price issue. Yet it has its own
separate dramatic possibilities and for most purposes can be treated as separate.
For instance, the World War II veterans, not yet as politically conscious as prices
may force him to be next year, has been led to believe (whether rightly or wrongly)
that he has a vested interest in adequate housing. This alone is enough to cause
concentration on who is responsible for the lack of housing—the Democratic President or the Republican Congress. But the pressures on both landlord and tenant, on builder and buyer, will also result in expanding the issue so that almost every voter will be affected.

As part of the general strategy of their high command to move somewhat more to the "left" in the second session of Congress, the Republicans will push some sort of a housing bill. Whatever they do sponsor, in all probability a "watered-down" version of the Taft-Wagner-Smidler bill, will be anathema to their financial backers but they know they must make a real attempt on housing to hold the so-called "middle class vote," which in 1948 gave them control of the Congress.

The High Cost of Living in general will be the main issue for the devastating reason that neither Party could avoid it if it wanted to— and both have good reasons for wanting to. The Republicans will attack the Administration (they are already doing so) on the ground it has encouraged wage increases for labor. They will, if they can, obscure the fact that they insisted on the removal of OPA price controls.

Both parties will do a great deal of talking about inflation but neither will really do anything about it. Politics will make it impossible in 1948 to touch the farmers yet farm price support and large food exports abroad are the main reasons for high food prices. In an election year the farmer is everybody's friend. Certainly the Administration is committed to the Marshall Plan which, whatever it means, is the very least means the export of materials and food during the crucial months of the campaign. The resulting smaller supply to meet domestic demand means another inevitable rise in the price level—just at the worst time from the political point of view.

The big political question is who will be blamed? The Republicans because they removed the OPA controls and refused to subsidize housing? Or the Democrats because of the high prices, labor "coddling" and "restrictive" tax policies? There is a third possibility—that the public won't "give a damn" who caused it. By November 1948 it may again be in that irritable and irrational mood it found itself in during the Congressional Election of 1946—and vote the "ins" out and the "outs" in. If so, "ins" should be translated to read "the Democratic President"—since the nature of American elections means the spotlight is concentrated on the Presidential contest.

Now the Administration dramatizes the High Cost of Living, how effective it is in presenting its story to the people—beginning now—can determine the next incumbent of the White House.

7. The conflict between the President and the Congress will increase during the 1948 election. With both major parties making their records for the campaign, and with each trying to claim credit for popular issues and to place the blame on the other party, the political atmosphere will be so pervading that little real "triumph" will be won. The mutual distrust which such combat necessarily engenders must result in a continual conflict almost from the beginning of the session.

This probably means the end of "bipartisan cooperation" on foreign policy. In the election year atmosphere it is quite difficult to "set apart" issues. To expect reasonableness and, in foreign affairs, the kind of "apart" "bipartisan" issues is going on in domestic matters is to expect that politicians overnight have
become more than the mere mortal beings they are.

In so far as it has control of the situation, the Administration should select the issues upon which there will be conflict with the majority in Congress. It can assume it will get no major part of its own program approved. Its tactics must therefore be entirely different than if there were any real point to bargain ing and compromising. Its recommendations—in the State of the Union message elsewhere—must be tailored for the voter, not the Congressmen; they must display a label which reads "no compromises." The strategy on the Cutl-Harley Bill—refusal to bargain with the Republicans and to accept any compromise—paid big political dividends. That strategy should be expanded in the next session to include all the domestic issues.

B. The Course of Action.

If the "probabilities" (as discussed above), or most of them, are correct, there remain the twin problems of how to take advantage of those which are favorable and how to effect changes in those unfavorable.

The action required to achieve this should take place on two levels—the political level and what can be called "the program" level.

3. The Political Level.

(a) "The Party Organization." The one particular upon which all politicians agree is that the leadership of the Democratic organization is moribund. It is hardly important on this late day whether this is anyone's fault. The blunt facts seem to be that the Party has been so long in power it is fat, tired and even a bit senile. Those alert party machines which, beginning with 1929, turned out such huge majorities in the big cities for the Democratic ticket have all through the years of their victories been steadily deteriorating underneath—until in 1944 the Democratic organization found itself rivaled, in terms of money and workers, and exceeded in alertness and enthusiasm by the PAC.

Everywhere the professionals are in profound collapse.

Bogie and Kelley admit publicly they are through as political bosses of the first magnitude. They have left no one in their place; their organizations are shot through with incompetence. There are a few signs of revival in New York under Mayor O'Dwyer but hardly enough to justify any optimism. In Ohio the regular organization wars with former Governor Lausche. Jim Farley, still Boston's great vote getter, fills his cell with threats of smashing the party in Massachusetts—and no one doubts for a minute that he can do it. Pennsylvania is torn between Lawrence and Joe O'Curry and every time Lawrence gets some Federal patronage to dispense, O'Curry sings the praises of Henry Wallace as publicly as possible. The California quarrel is so dramatic it needs no comment. In worse or less degree the situation is the same in most of the states.

The present "organization" pears out names of publicity; it is dispatched by mail by press and by radio, but there seems to be hardly anyone cut "baiting the bushes" to harmonize where possible and desirable, to reconstruct where necessary, the leadership in the states and the cities, the towns and the counties.
If this state of affairs is accepted as true, the specifications for the next Democratic Chairman are obvious. They make quite irrelevant the public discussion and comment about whether the new Chairman must be acceptable to the liberals and labor or to the Southern conservatives, should or should not be from New York, or from the Pacific Coast, and so forth. The real, the crying need is, as it has often been phrased, "for another Jim Farley."
The new Chairman must be a man who will ride the trains.

Since this is the prime requisite the Chairman should not come from the Senate. Not only are Senators rarely good organizers (they are too accustomed to working on their own) but no Senator, Senators being what they are, will give up his seat to be Chairman—and no Chairman, who is also a Senator, is going to absent himself from the second session of the Congress. But this is just the period when the Chairman should be absent from Washington. In effect, then, the Senator-Chairman would be trying to perform two part-time jobs. And this one is an "overtime" job.

The second requirement of the new Chairman is that above all else he must be a professional politician. No must be acceptable and well known to the Party leaders. He simply has to be "one of the boys." A year ago this might have been unnecessary. In the short time left, however, the Party cannot afford the luxury of "getting acquainted." There is not that much time. If he is not known to the professionals, the arbitrary decisions he must make just won’t be accepted.

If, after all this, he happens also to be acceptable to the progressive and labor groups, that is so much "velvet." (This hardly requires discussion; he won’t be.) Harmonising their interests with those of the organization does present a difficult problem. The practical solution which should satisfy all wings of the party is to select a professional politician as Chairman and give the other wing (the real vote-getting wing, it should be remembered, if the premises of this memorandum are sound) the consolation prize—appoint a liberal with labor contacts as Vice Chairman or Executive Director.

The one essential is to have a new Chairman as soon as possible—working to rebuild the Party organization from the ground up and trying to harmonize such appalling Feuds as that in California. The practice of today’s Democratic organization is spending almost all its time in raising money and doing favors for "the faithful" may be useful but it does little to rebuild the Democratic Party—and that is what it needs.

(a) Misgivings with Labor and Independents. Just as vital to eventual political success is the renewal of the Administration’s working relationship with progressive and labor leaders. Whatever may be the reasons, these seem to have entirely ceased except on a perfunctory basis in the past year. No moment will ever be better for the President to make political capital out of the present frustration of the labor movement.

The leaders of labor must be given the impression that they are once more welcome in the councils of the Administration.
Each of this cultivation can be done only by President Truman himself. Im-
mersed in the staggering burden of his work and preoccupied with his day-to-
day problems it is easy for the incumbent of the White House to forget the
“magic” of his office. The mere extension of an invitation to William Green,
Dan Tobin, Philip Murray, Dubinsky or any of the prominent leaders to “come in
and talk with me” has a stupendous effect on them and their followers.

One by one they should be asked to “come by” and the President should ask
them for their advice on matters in general. (This is a question of delicate
“timing”—it is dangerous to ask a labor leader for advice on a specific matter
and then ignore that advice.) No human being—as every President, from Washing-
ton on, has painfully learned—can resist the glamour, the self-important feeling
of “advising” a President on anything, even if it is only his golfing backswing.

Thus the relationship looking toward 1948, which is after all a common
goal for Democrats and organized labor, can begin to function. But more than
that is needed. The President should select a lieutenant, or lieutenants, with
whom he personally trusts who would continue to “make hay” for him. A fresh “face”
is desirable. He should have, besides the President’s ear the confidence of the
labor leaders. There are several such men already in the Administration who
have the ability to handle such a complicated political operation. This Presi-
dential agent should be instructed to begin general conversations with the CIO,
AFL and the Railroad Brotherhoods. If he is successful, well and good; if he
fails, no great harm has been done and someone else can be selected to plow this
field. But a man with vigor and intelligence—and a good sense of how far to go
and when—should start immediately.

In this way perhaps the mistakes of the Pennsylvania Congressional byelection
on September 19th which proved so disastrous to labor might be avoided in the
future. Experienced politicians saw the pitfalls of such a test and disapproved
the amateur methods of the CIO, including “outside interference,” emphasis on
the labor issue, in the worst kind of district for it, and so on, almost right
through the book.

But if the Administration’s labor lieutenant (never appearing publicly in the
campaign) could have worked out the general strategy in concert with the AFL, the
CIO and the progressives, and coordinated them with the local Democratic machine,
the harmful effect of the Pennsylvania election could have been avoided. It
must be avoided in the pre-convention tests remaining.

A program of cultivation should also be carried on with the progressive and
independent leaders around the country. Again some one lieutenant—personally
selected by the President—should be entrusted with this campaign.

By such mechanisms as these, the complaints, the attitudes and the points
of view of these two vote-getting groups can be funneled into the White House
so it will be really informed about just what is going on. These regular re-
ports added to those made by a revitalized party organization will increase the
Administration’s political intelligence, today sadly atrophied.
And by election time the Administration, labor and the progressives will have built a mechanism of coordination with one another equipped to function throughout the storm and stress of a presidential campaign.

(c) The isolation of Henry Wallace. Wallace should be put under attack whenever the moment is psychologically correct. It is clearest that organizational work is being undertaken by his men in the West either for a third party or for delegates to the Democratic Convention—and that work seems to be taking effect—the Administration must persuade prominent liberals and progressives—and no one Wallace banking is made up of Communists and the fellow-travelers. At the same time some lines should be kept out so that if the unpredictable Wallace finally sees the light and can be talked into supporting the Administration, he will have a handy rope to cling back on the bandwagon—if he is wanted.

But there is only futility in the delusion that Wallace can be insulated merely by yelling at him. As his own lieutenants say, and accurately, in their private conversation, Henry can be stopped quite easily; all Truman has to do is move to the left and our ground is cut off from under us; but we are quite sure he won't do it.* Now the administration can move "left" belongs in the discussion of the "program" (below).

But along with programs there are the men who execute these programs. And here is the strong weapon of the President's arsenal—his appointing power. Politicians, like most other people, think of issues in terms of men, not politics, when the bank.

The September 11th speech by Wallace was his first really adroit one. It was a bid to the discontented liberals wavering behind Truman. What he said publicly they have been saying privately with increasing bitterness—even those who support the President. Henry Wallace appealed to the statist fear of all progressives—the fear of Wall Street. This fear is not the sole property of the progressives. It belongs traditionally to the Democratic Party. It began with the agrarian Jefferson's battle against Hamilton. It continued with Jackson's fight against Nicholas Hamilton's bank. It became the silver tongue in the crusade. Roosevelt. In a very important sense it is the reason for the Democratic Party—because the only way to explain the lasting alliance between the South and the East is their natural fear of domination by the industrial East. Today the South can agree on no issue with the last—except "Wall Street."

Wallace's man went to Nachisavelli and to America history when they put his September 11th speech together. Its appeal is devastating. In effect all he had to do was call the roll—: Harriman, Perretta, and Lovett, Wall Street investment bankers; William Draper and Saltonstall, investment bankers; Jack Salley; Wall Street lawyer, and so forth. And to cap his climax, Wallace reminded his listeners of the White House visits by Herbert Hoover, the man against whom Roosevelt ran four times and met defeat from the Republicans nominated.
The Wallace plan is simplicity itself. It should be — because it has been used before. He merely borrowed it from fighting Bob LaFollette who received five million votes in 1928 by attacking Coolidge and John W. Davis as "prospectors and tricksters, the money bags of Wall Street." And the significance of the LaFollette third party was not its total vote but that the Progressives ran ahead of the Democrats in eleven Eastern states. The combined Democratic-Progressive vote was larger than the Republican vote in thirteen states, including President Truman's own state of Missouri. Democrats who voted for Davis would have voted for any Democrat and the LaFollette Progressives would have voted for any liberal Democrat. In effect, then, this was a present of 56 electoral votes to the Republicans, not enough to change the 1920 election (295 minus 56 equals 239 votes; 126 plus 56 equals 222); but it is more than enough to raise havoc for a close election. Henry Wallace may be formulate [illegible] many matters, but his mathematics is all right.

Truman must carry the West to win. To carry the West he must be "liberal"; he cannot afford to be shackled with the Wall Street label by any so-called progressive movement. And Wallace talks only too well that the spiritual father of the New Deal was not John W. Davis but Bob LaFollette, and that the New Deal can only eight years later.

A President — harassed by the mounting problem of Europe, and by the numerous resignations of men who can no longer afford to work for the Government, and also by the desirability of selecting men who can be confined — may justifiably be strongly tempted to reply: "Demagoguery?" to the Wall Street charge. True as this may be, and unfair as such labelling is to the persons attacked, who are doing what they can for their country, the charge is nevertheless filled with too much political dynamite. In politics, many things are unfair.

The man-in-the-street understands little and cares less about the personal difficulties of public administration. These difficulties have no glamour, they are too complex — and so they just don't get across. The Wallace attack does. In the blunt words of the ILGWU (Interlocking Union Convention):

"Foreign policy is not the private property of ....
...retired financiers. Foreign policy is the burning concern of the great mass of the people."

And that is all that the working man will remember of that issue.

It is imperative that the President make some top level appointments from the ranks of the Progressives — in foreign as well as domestic affairs. His fight for Lindenthal made him the hero of the independent voter. His refusal to withdraw the name of Friends Middle as justice delegate to the Economic and Social Council until Middle requested it made him many friends among the Liberals. Top ranking appointments of men like young Bob LaFollette are needed. The pattern must be repeated even if some of them are not confirmed. Under their impact, Wallace will fade away.

(c) Portrait of a President. A crucial — but easy — step forward to November 1948 is to create in the public mind a voice-getting picture of President Truman. The man around the President, naturally the best devoted of his followers, are
Inevitably so immersed in the details and execution of his day-to-day orders that they do not "see his whole." They cannot see the forest for the trees. Possibly it is helpful if the impress President Truman makes on the public is summarized from a more distant, and therefore more objective, perspective:

Both the original "honeymoon" and the later violently critical period of public opinion toward the President seem to be over. Emerging instead is the picture of a man the American people like. They know now that he is a sincere and humble man and, in the cliché so often heard, that he is a man "trying to do his best."

But on the whole they insist still on regarding him as primarily the politician. And the politician does not hold first place in the ranks of American heroes.

Today's public picture of President Truman is not sufficiently varied. The people want something more.

It is said invariably, and always without analysis, that the President is the Chief of the State, the Symbol of Government. What the theorists as well as the politicians do not observe is that the public gets its impression of its President mostly from the actions he takes when performing as Chief of State — as the Head of Government. The masses of the people rarely if ever think of him in his role of Government administrator, or as the responsible policy maker on our national economic problems.

They really form their lasting impressions from watching his incidental gestures — when he appears as the representative of all the American people.

An apt illustration is the contrast between his Mexican trip and later Canadian trip. The Canadian trip might have been, so far as anyone knows, more important for the United States than his visit to Mexico. It is a reasonable guess, however, that today few American citizens ever remember he went to Canada. But almost everyone remembers his graceful gesture about the Mexican cadets. Whether it was planned deliberately or was a last-minute improvisation is unimportant. In the future such gestures should be more numerous and should be planned deliberately; that is the way the public should remember its President.

The trip to the Rio Conference will be recalled not because of the success of the conference but because of the Brazilian ovation to "our" President, because he went duck-hunting and was changed from a polo player into a sheikh — and he gets more newspaper attention and much more interest from the American people than do the transparent journeys of Hoover, Dewey and Taft.

But at home the American people are daily forced to think of their President as a politician for the good reason that the news stories deal only with his activities as politician — because that is what he is engaged in doing. His calling lists, week in and week out, are filled almost entirely with Government and Congressmen with whom he consults on problems that are important to the nation, but appear to the average reader complicated and dull.
The public is hungry for something new in its Chief Executive. It does not want these stereotyped gestures, so often done to death in past years that they are routine. No one really cares any more about a round-the-world flyer, or the little girl with the first poppy of the Disabled Veterans, or the Eagle Scout from Idaho. Granted that such appointments often cannot be avoided and must be borne with fortitude, they have long since reached the stage of diminishing returns.

The kinds of gestures desired anywhere which, taken altogether and repeated again and again, will form a carefully drawn picture of the President as a broad-gauged citizen with tremendously varied interests. If well done there will be countless variations on this theme. This does not mean he should do anything which puts him in a false or unnatural light. These artificialities conceal within themselves too much political danger (viz., Calvin Coolidge wearing his Indian bonnet or Senator Taft catching his fish).

Anyhow, there are many gestures of substance to be made. Secondly for purposes of illustration, several are here suggested (these particular ones revolve around the most superb of all backdrops — the White House itself):

(1) The President could lunch with Albert Einstein; it will be remembered he was the man who prevailed upon Roosevelt to start the atomic bomb project. At his next press conference he can explain that they failed, in general, about the possible uses of atomic energy and its potentialities for our civilization. At the time casually mention that he has been spending some of his leisure time getting caught up on atomic energy; he has been having "informal sessions" with the Atomic Energy Commission; and he has also been doing some reading purely from the Japanese point of view. He suggests to the Pressmen it would do them no harm at all to read such and such a book (as long as he picks the right one) which he has just read. In another connection ("The Signing of the Pact"), this memorandum suggests later that he visit Los Alamos and Oak Ridge, but its point of "interest" the Einstein visit and the New Mexico visit could be done together.

(11) Henry Ford II as a member of the President's Temporary Air Policy Commission is often in Washington these days. The Pressmen should casually invite him to lunch just to talk over matters "generally." This picture of the American President and the Young Business Man together has appeal for the average reader. Any other business leaders should be asked in occasionally.

The press must print own of the President, so he controls his publicity by his own whim. One or two non-political personages a week should be the target. The need for conference with labor leaders has already been emphasized for other reasons. The technique of success to the State House has the added virtue, besides publicity, of building good will. An organization is flattered that its leader is considered important enough to be consulted. This takes that most important of commodities — Presidential Time — but it is well worth its expenditure. It is worth it because of the American's inordinate curiosity — he will watch that lunch with a new interest, even a sense of personal participation, if the other participant is someone other than a Government administrator or Congressman.
The President should concentrate on other fields. The literary field, for example, has its uses. A novelist with the latest best seller is just as good as an international banker for these purposes. Outstanding women in various activities should be invited. (But Hollywood has probably been run into the ground.) The new magazine, "Alf," recently listed the 64 persons who "rule America:" possibly there is an appointment list ready at hand for this project.

The President will have more than enough to do in the coming months; he cannot be expected to think much about this sort of thing. But it is intrinsically important. Seniors with imagination should be delegated to draw up this type of agenda and present several alternatives weekly to him. His own good sense of political judgment will accept or reject these suggestions if all he is required to do is check the ones he prefers.

But he will need to do something of this nature for an entirely extraneous -- and much more valid -- reason: Since he is President he cannot be politically active until well after the July Convention. The people are inconsistent and capricious anywhere is no argument that they feel deeply on this. He must be President of all the people and not merely the leader of a party, until the very last minute. Therefore he must act as a President almost up to Election Day. Lincoln set the pattern by remaining "judiciously aloof" (to use his own phrase) in Illinois while his bankmen carried on the political war for him. Dewey, Taft, Stassen and Wallace are free as birds to attack him but once he stoops to answer them on their level he has done himself severe damage. Only Wilson broke this rule of being President of all the people -- in 1916 by asking for a Democratic Congress -- and the people punished him for it by returning a Republican one.

So a President who is also a candidate must resort to subterfuges -- for he cannot sit silent. He must be in the limelight. He must do the kind of thing suggested above to stay in the limelight and he must also resort to the kind of trip which Roosevelt made famous in the 1932 campaign -- the "inspection tour." No matter how much the opposition and the press pointed out the political overtones of those trips, the people paid little attention because what they assumed was the Head of State performing his duties.

One other point must be made. No matter how unfair it may be, the American public still has the "Missouri Gang" in mind. The Republicans have no intention of allowing that picture to die; it is too good for them politically. The press will keep it alive; it is too good a story. Andrew Jackson had his "Kitchen Cabinet;" Wilson, his Council House; Roosevelt, his Harry Hopkins. and his Brain Trusters. All were sitting targets. And the opposition -- as always unwilling to attack a President directly-- proposes to pound away at President Truman's "Missouri Gang." Despite the President's reaction against its unfairness, this picture must be changed. Harry Hopkins disappeared from the White House in the 1936 campaign and Tommy Corcoran disappeared from the public eye in the 1930 campaign. George Allen and others of the President's circle can do no less.

In deference to the Presidency and to the high stakes at issue, he must no longer allow himself to "smear" them -- for the simple reason they will be hurting his chances -- and those of his Party.
These few comments on "The Portrait of a President" are meant to be no more than illustrative of the careful thought which must be devoted to presenting a well-rounded, broad-gaged, and versatile candidate to the American people.

(e) Foreign policy. Since the general strategy of the opposition in the field of foreign affairs is their claim that "what is good is Marshall, what is bad is Truman," the portrait the public sees must also undergo alterations. President Truman must assume before the eyes of the people the leadership on foreign policy. Today the American people identify Secretary Marshall, and not the President, as our spokesman. This may have substantive advantages because of its non-partisan aura — but unhappily it is bad politics for 1948. For example, one of the reasons privately circulated by the men promoting today's tentative coalition for Eisenhower is that the General knows foreign policy much more than theoretically; that he is accustomed to dealing directly with British, Russians, French and Germans. Unless cholerier than usual, the Republicans will be cautious that they do not provoke Marshall into such a defensive attitude that he will be forced to attack their obstructionism. Indeed Governor Dewey may go so far as to say that if elected he will keep Marshall as Secretary of State.

But if the President is to be attacked on what his opponents believe are the vulnerable aspects of our conduct of foreign policy, he must allow himself to be in a position where he can take credit for those aspects the public regards as the virtues of that policy. He cannot afford to continue allowing them to go by default to Marshall.

It is no answer to say this is a risky and delicate operation. Marshall, it can be agreed, has convinced the public he is above partisan politics. He is of course a vital force in national affairs and it would be politically dangerous to antagonize or to alienate him; this might happen if he were given some reason to believe his efforts were being subordinated and warped to political purposes.

On the other hand, he is a soldier, and trained to be loyal to his Commander-in-Chief. In the American Republic the President is responsible for foreign policy. He cannot be responsible in fact if he cannot use his authority. It is on his record, not that of Marshall, that the people will make their judgment in 1948, and he must be given the credit if he is subject to the blame. Democratic Government means no less and no more than that.

In terms of technique, this means he must use his authority publicly (as well as the private may be undoubtedly does exercise it); that he must speak out more often on specific matters of foreign policy, particularly at press conferences — his great and useful sounding board. The dangers of speaking "off the cuff" on foreign policy are obvious. But there is no reason why, after a detailed "briefing," any announcements today being made constantly in the State Department (and many of these by subordinate officials) should not come from the White House.

(f) The Commander-in-Chief. World War II taught the American people something they too easily forget — our President is also the Commander-in-Chief. They are forgetting it again, and ironically enough one of the reasons is a pet project,
of the President — Unification. There is now a "Super-Cabinet Officer," — the Secretary of Defense.

It is a commonplace that one of the great difficulties of our Government is that Cabinet Officers, in contrast with the British system, are not as amenable to Presidential discipline as they ought to be. Lincoln suffered as greatly as any President from the vagaries and personal ambitions of his Cabinet, and even Franklin Roosevelt, never inclined to take too high a view of Cabinet Officers, suffered the disloyalty of Jesse Jones far longer than any President should have. There are some indications today that several of the incumbent Cabinet Officers tend to regard themselves as the rulers of independent baronies. This is always true in some measure but there is no good reason why it should be so (except that the Presidency has never properly been staffed). There is serious danger — irrespective of the personality or talents of whoever happens to have the job at any moment — that this tendency will become really exaggerated in the Department of National Defense. This is particularly so in the world we live in today.

Military affairs, whether we like it or not, will be a leading preoccupation of the average American citizen for the next year. If nothing else he feels it in his pocketbook — 7½ cents of the Budget Dollar. Again the White House can be the scene of many announcements on military affairs; and the Commander-in-Chief, not the Secretary of Defense, should make them. The President, as soon as he can arrange a schedule, should appear on the scenes of important military projects.

The press for instance is filled with stories of the plight of military aviation. The temporary Air Policy Commission meets in the fall in California with the air industry. If the President is travelling that way — to Los Alamos? — it could be synchronized with his schedule so he might attend informally — "drop in" as he does so well. A visit to Wright Field at Dayton may be in order. The Ground Forces would be content if he would take a look at the WAC training program at Fort Knox. The Navy had one of its innings — and the President his — on the trip back from Rio.
2. The Program Level.

The suggestions made on the political level go almost wholly to "form", the manner and method with which things that need doing are to be done. But it is the things that are to be done -- the "substance" -- that determines the outcome of elections.

The issues are there for anyone to see. What remains is only the decision how and when they are to be handled, so their advantages are politically exploited to the utmost, their disadvantages politically minimized as much as possible.

How does the opposition plan to handle them? It is hardly a secret.

Having performed yeoman service for these interests (e.g., the "Real Estate Lobby") which provide the financial airmen for political warfare, the Republican strategists proclaimed their intentions to swing "left" in the next session.

Senator Taft, their leader on domestic policy, has three strings to his bow: Housing, Education (relief for teachers) and Health. The people, including the veterans, are stirred up about housing and rents, and the teachers have votes. The Republicans plan to raise the minimum wage level, do what they can for the DP's, and give the Negro his FENC and civil rights legislation, or try to.

All this means they are chasing votes in earnest. And it emphasizes the only tenable Democratic strategy, which is to swing further "left" than they do.

The Democrats hold the Presidency. To make use of it they must understand it. The Presidency is really more flexible than the Congress, which means merely that a President can act much faster -- and more often -- than can any group of Senators or Congressmen.

The only time the Republican Party can have an effective public platform (until its convention) is when the Congress is in session. When it is not in session, the press, the radio and the newspapers belong entirely to the President. A good illustration was the President's recent review of Congressional action on his 1960 Budget. It was front-page, first-column, all over the nation. The replies of Taft, Taft and the Republican National Committee were 10 hours late and were buried on the back pages -- for the good reason that Congressmen Taft, for example, was at his home in rural New York and did not have the facilities or figures at hand which were available to him had he been in Washington.

The Administration must take every advantage of its mobility, while it can. It should use this unobstructed platform to lecture -- it does not have to debate with Congress away -- for the next four months. WORK should start now on a broad economic program which it will recommend to the next session of the Congress.

The most important part of that work is its press campaign on the issues, waged primarily through the White House press conferences, but also by the administrators concerned.

By the time Congress convenes the people will know thoroughly what the President has been asking of them. He won't get it, his program will not get
very far, but whatever is done will be regarded as a Democratic gain, and the Republican Party will be a sitting target for having been obstructionist. President Truman will be handed his campaign issues tailor-made.

This "program" must be blueprinted in several fields: (a) Housing; (b) High Prices; (c) Foreign Reconstruction—the Marshall Plan; (d) The Test—"America's Needs and Resources"; and (e) A Tax Revision.

(a) Housing. Senator Taft, despite the well-organized lobby fighting any governmental action on housing, knows his party must make a real effort next year to pass his bill. He understands that, with the exception of food prices, housing has a more direct impact on "the greatest number" than any other of today's issues. The latest named Rent Control Act has made the man-in-the-street conscious of the economic and political power of the real estate interests which, unlike most lobbies, takes the money directly out of the people's pockets. Although the public reaction has been slow in starting, it is now steadily building up. For instance, there are persistent signs of a revolt by the young veterans against the conservative American Legion policy on housing which has been dictated in toto by the Real Estate Lobby.

Another example was the success of the President's attack on the Real Estate Lobby in his message approving the Rent Control Bill. It has already had effect in the spontaneous manner it was taken up by different groups. It is the essence of politics to wage an attack against a personal devil; the Real Estate Lobby should be built into the dynamic equivalent of the Public Utility Lobby of 1935. Purely on the merits, the performance of the real estate interests in their post-war gouging fully deserves everything they get in the way of retaliation. There can be no possible comparison about using such a tactic against them.

The always over-cautious advisers of the Truman Administration will again recommend caution here. But there is no need for caution—there will be no political reprisal—already the Real Estate Lobby is lined up solidly against the President—and cannot be conciliated without antagonizing the voters irreconcilably.

If there is any way of doing it, the Congress should be made to investigate the lobby. But it is hard to see how a Republican-controlled Congress will touch it. Even if the pressure of public opinion forces them to go through the motions and there is an alert and aggressive Democratic minority appointed, the cloakroom maneuvers will stifle any effective expose.

Nor has the Department of Justice investigated any real possibilities. And it should not be relied on too extensively. First of all, there is already a widespread suspicion that the Department's motivation was purely political. And since it is an anti-trust investigation, probably nothing new will be found in the housing field that is not already known. The Administration cannot afford to lose a housing bill before the campaign is over. However, the useful material already gathered by the Department's investigators should be made available to those who can make propaganda use of that material.
Attack on the Lobby is negative. The other approach must be affirmative.

The Administration is itself vulnerable on housing. It is vulnerable because it has fallen over the same stumbling block for the past fifteen years.

The housing problem is simply one of cost. Some way must be found to lower the cost of private housing (mass production, mass production of prefabrication by aircraft factories which have a large supply of technical labor), and to provide large subsidies for public housing.

In the four months before the Congress returns the Administration has time to devise its own housing bill. Even those parts of the Taff-Laird-Jagner Bill which had merit are largely obsolet. And in terms of 1948 the Administration simply cannot afford to allow a bill with Taff's name to pass. This bill can be worked out in all its detail by housing experts in and out of the Government; probably it should be designed particularly for the unskilled group just below the buyers and tenants who are getting that little aid being built today. The President's special message on his housing program should go to the Congress soon after it convenes (Housing would have already been stressed in the State of the Union message). But everyone would know what was in the message because the press and publicity campaign would have started long before the session opens.

This program will not get very far in the Republican Congress but it has the two advantages mentioned above — it at least liberalizes the Congressional attitude and further it places the Administration squarely on the record as having done its best for housing — a best that was blocked by Republican obstruction.

(b) High Prices. Prices won't wait for the CWA. They will go higher in the face of the rising clamor and discontent. Spontaneous buyers' strikes are talked about but they will disappear for the adequate reason that the rises are on necessities as on luxuries. And everything contributing to the myth will continue to do so contribute. The orthodox theory, that eventually buyers are priced out of the market and prices then tumble, seems to have no validity when the inflation affects the necessities of life. Department store sales tumble (this incidentally was the bellwether warning of the 1929 depression) but food goes up.

With the abandonment of CWA controls— as the CWA leaders pointed out at the time— there is no way to keep prices down. In an election year, parity and support of the farm is not going to be radically changed. The market for raw materials, such as steel, is not getting better. In some ways it is worse. What ever rise is done to improve 1948 will not show up by election. Automobile orders are higher now than ever before although it is two years since V-J day. And there seems no way in the foreseeable future in which demand can catch up with supply. The Marshall Plan will require considerable export of both these articles which are contributing to domestic high prices and thus is another inflationary incentive. In short, the inflation is here and is still growing.

Something must be done. As time goes on this cry for action from the salaried people and from labor (so better off in "real" "take-home pay" than in 1939 according to BLS statistics), who feel the squeeze more and more, will rise to a roar. It may well be as vital an issue in the 1948 campaign as were the
irritations caused by CPA controls which, ironically enough today, were the
major contribution to the crushing Democratic defeat in 1936.

Of course the President has a good record with his vote of the first CPA
decentral bill. He should hand out copies of this vote at the next press con-
ference - that is a dividends. A gesture. And he can quote Senator
Mailer against Senators Taft andIkerry. He must do this sort of thing. Other-
wise the Republicans will deliberately obscure the issue--as they are already
doing. They (except those who feel inflation closely are con-
fused; they aren't sure whether the Republicans or the Democrats caused the in-
flation. With an effrontery worthy of a Huny long at his best, and an audacity
which amazed the political initiates, Senator Taft on September 34th calmly
blamed President Truman for "abandoning CPA controls." And when the alert
Senator Beautiful calls on the President to act on food prices, the impulse is in
the hands of the Republicans until he does act.

To say "something must be done" is much easier than to do it. The only
real solution is to go back to the CPA controls system--and there is no way of
going back to that position. But despite the hopes of anguish, the nation is far
from educated for such drastic steps. It should be educated, as fast as possible
because they are inevitable. If the Marshall Plan is not too late and if it
works, it will set into effect a chain reaction which will result in a program
of controls as drastic and complicated as was CPA. This will probably not
occur until after the campaign however.

The President--after a long and careful study by the technicians--should ask
the Congress for a price control, and, possibly rationing. Congress won't
give either to him but he is once again "on the record"--and in an offensive
rather than defensive position for the campaign.

In the meanwhile, something should happen in a hurry. A great deal of thought
should be expended on what else can be done. "The experts" talk constantly of
"voluntary" meatless days, "voluntary" rationing, etc., but this, as they will
know, is the counsel of desperation. It didn't work during war; it certainly
won't work now. The President has steadfastly refused to accept Hill Harry's
suggestion of a conference of business, government and labor on high prices.
His refusal is logical since little or nothing can come out of such a conference.
Although illegal, this refusal has irritated the labor leaders.

The Administration might reconsider whether such a conference should be
called. It will be a gesture toward labor and among other things it will have
the advantage of throwing out the high price problem in public. The more con-
versation about it, the sooner something constructive can be done. This sugges-
tion is not made because of any faith in voluntary price reduction. Under
our free enterprise system such a program is impossible. But the people expect
their President to do something, and since it is a gesture toward labor, and
since it would hurry up the solution of the people and the Congress as to the
need for government controls, there is nothing to be lost and something to be
gained--if the conference is not overdone as a panacea and if the President
maintains a publicly cautious, skeptical attitude toward it.
(c) Foreign Reconstruction - The Marshall Plan. If the European nations can agree on a program after revision and suggestion by the State Department, it will probably be accepted by the Congress after much public debate and a long fight.

At that stage the President becomes responsible for its efficient administration. The experience to date with the Marshall Plan should prove that if better planning does not take place now the fumbling on the Marshall Plan not only will be costly, it will be most obvious to the voters just at the crucial months of the 1948 campaign. Some sort of elaborate export controls will be a first necessity. Eventually a government priority and allocation system operating domestically will be required. And later (as discussed above), a price control system may result because of the strain the export will put on our domestic economy.

In some ways the Marshall Plan may well be as large a governmental operation as the wartime agencies. If that is so, the planning for its operation and administration, the complicated timing on economic and social problems it will cause, had better begin soon. In this field particularly the operation problems are peculiarly difficult.

The relevance of the Marshall Plan here is that if this planning now is set of a higher priority than any seen in Washington during the war years, the poor condition can and may well be, the biggest political issue for 1948 that the Republicans can have.

(d) The West--and America's Needs and Resources. In the Land of Electoral Votes, the West is the "Number One Priority" for the Democrats. Its people are more liberal because they need the economic help of government and in the years of the New Deal have come to understand how it functions. Even the Chambers of Commerce of all size rarely praise governmental economy; they learned better long ago.

There is no need for an extended discussion here about what should be done politically for the Western States. They know their needs -- less discrimination in freight rates, roadbuilding projects and lots of them, better roads (their roads often suffer from lack of maintenance in the war years), public power, help in the development and protection of their resources, and so forth. Their needs are not hard to understand. The Administration, which in the last year or two has at least budget-wise not shown much sympathy (although far more than the Republicans), must display a constant and increasing interest in these Western needs.

Although it is kept for the President to make a political tour of the country at this time, he should--as President--visit the West--Grand Coulee and Boiseville, the Hungry Horse of Montana, Los Alamos in New Mexico, the aircraft factories and Navy Yards on the coast and the military installations of the Rocky Mountains.

But he can go much farther and that he is an imaginative leader. In a world of fear and of accelerating despair, the people need a strong voice
talking about the America of the Future. The appeal of Wallace to the young voters during his western swing several months ago was because he dared to talk in an idealistic strain. No other American figure (not even Stassen, who leads Truman almost 2-1 among the independent and western voters, according to the Harris poll) has had the imagination to "pitch" his arguments at that level.

Yet it is just that level, other things being equal, that has always had more appeal to the American people than any other. A planning program for the United States, with 1950 as the target-date, may well have that kind of political glamour. It might catch on.

If there is a world in 1960, the United States will unquestionably be the leader of its age. And our domestic economy, what it has done for our own people in every field of endeavor, security, recreation and worldly goods will be the measure of our greatness—for all the world. Twelve years before the event is just about right to start estimating those needs and expanding our resources, all within the framework of free enterprise. A recent Twentieth Century Fund study, "America's Needs and Resources," could be taken as a convenient starting place. If the Administration will have the imagination to talk and act in such terms, despite the screams of the conservative part of the press and the "practical men," (who are all Republicans anyway) it can effectively kill off the Wallaces and the demagogues who will come after him. More pragmatic, it will mean money in the political bank in November 1968.

(e) Tax Program. Although not as inevitable as death and taxes, it is almost certain that in the election year of 1948—and whether the Administration likes it or not—taxes will be reduced. The Republicans plan to cut them, and Democratic Congressmen in sufficient numbers simply cannot stand up in a campaign year against the pressure to support tax reduction and to override the President's third veto if it comes.

His two vetoes of the first session have enhanced his prestige in the eyes of the disinterested and thoughtful few, but unless all the political actions are wrong it has hurt him with the rank and file of voters (although the Gallup poll shows not as much as might be expected). If the huge surplus now estimated is correct, there is no possibility of stemming the tide in the next Congress, despite the foreign aid requirements. The inflationary pressures on the people will make them think they need more "take home" money in their pockets; the quickest way to put it there is a tax cut.

So if there is to be one, the Administration might as well get the credit for it and save what it can of its taxation principles. But whatever compromise is made must be done without obvious political intent. The Republicans have cleverly publicized their suspicions that there were vetoes in 1947 only so a Democratic President could reap the credit in 1948.

These cries for tax reduction can be turned to an economically sound and useful purpose and remove the political suspicion at the same time. The perennial cutbacks for revision of our entire tax structure are even more strident than usual. Such requests are always with us, are invariably justified,
yet nothing is ever done about it. To revise the entire Federal structure is not the appallingy difficult matter as many "experts" pretend it to be, because the necessary studies have been made time and time again. In fact the Treasury is revising its estimates right now. Only the area of disagreement on policy are causing the trouble that goes on year after year.

In the few months before the Congress returns the Administration can publicly initiate a study of the tax structure with a view to recommending its complete overhaul as soon as Congress convenes, including desirable reductions, if any, in the tax rates. The best approach is for a Commission of tax experts appointed by the President to advise the Administration on the matter (such men as Randolph Paul, former General Counsel of the Treasury, who has recently written a definitive history suggesting such a tax revision, would be on the Commission. Paul's views for instance are known to be in sympathy with those expressed in the President'smemo).

The President would direct his commission to investigate the entire tax area and to base their revenue recommendations on several hypotheses: (1) The estimate of surplus is correct; (2) an even larger surplus will be found in the Treasury; (3) a 1945 recession will barely get the tax yields; (4) there will be a Marshall Plan of four or five billion dollars annually; (5) there will be no such plan. With this approach the Administration can take credit for any tax reduction and also for initiating the tax overhaul. Although Congressional committees have already asked such studies, the White House platform as usual will focus the public's attention almost entirely on the President's Commission study. Thus tax revision is at worst noted to seem non-partisan, and at best the Democrats get the credit for it.

C. The Mechanics for 1946

This memorandum has made two points—(1) It is "probable" certain things will happen in 1946; and (2) A certain "course of action" must be followed to shape those probabilities to bring about the President's election.

The question remains how to create the necessary machinery.

For without intelligent, and even devoted, execution such a program as outlined here is nothing more than a conversation piece—a pleasant finger-exercise. Such of the Democratic "politicos" is just that. The Chairman of the Illinois Democratic Committee may brag that his committee has no financial worries and in fact has more money in the till than ever in its history, and the Democratic National Committee may have relaxed in the assurance it can get sufficient funds to finance the 1946 campaign. Both organizations seem to have forgotten that the money-raising is after all only the means for a desirable end.

What kind of a mechanism will work?

Some sort of a small "working committee" (or "think" group) should be set up. Its function would be to coordinate the political program in and out of the Administration.
(This does not mean it would run all over the departments; indeed, if it works right, no one in any of the agencies will ever hear of it.)

The members of such a committee would be imaginative men with understanding of and experience in government, and with some knowledge, even if only a theoretical one of the salient, legislative-and-executive functions of politics. To put it bluntly (although it is poor semantics to do so) they would be the counterparts of Roosevelt's "Brain Trust" and "The Team" of Dewey.

They would be close-mouthed (the hardest requisite of all)

Although its makeup must be flexible, in general they should be active government administrators. This is so for two reasons: (1) the administrator is too overworked already and preoccupied with his own problem; and (2) he is invariably cursed with "the departmental view". His problem is vital, the most important of all, and no one else's are. The curse of our government is that with few exceptions only the President has an overall Administration point of view. The men on the committee must be "truce men", thinking for the President and how the President can take political advantage of this or that program. The head of X Agency invariably tries to get everyone else involved in X.

The first proposition for the success of such a committee is that it has access to the President—i.e., a conduit to him. This does not mean it has to see him or talk up his valuable time on details. It probably means no more than that the committee representative can reach the President quickly on any subject requiring speedy action; that he must be able to talk at leisure with the President on matters requiring considerable planning and careful attention on details. It means, in short, that there be a "two-way" flow between the President and his "working committee."

This too is really easier said than done. Certainly it requires a member of the White House secretariat as a member of the group, acting as "clearing house" and coordinator for ideas, and as Director of their execution. He would for instance have to initiate requests for research within the government on those problems which the government might properly do—and in many cases probably is the only agency which can. (There are many areas there, because of the Hatch Act and for other reasons it would be neither proper nor wise to use government energies.)

Whether the work can be performed within the framework of the Democratic National Committee depends entirely upon the temperament of the new Democratic Chairman—whether the atmosphere of his National Committee is friendly or unfriendly to this kind of planning. Based on past performance, that atmosphere will be frigid and lead to friction. This seems to be eased mainly by recanting of the professional politicians towards any kind of "planning" and their feeling (often justified) that the party funds are thrown away on "bureaucracy."

If however it could be done there and if the individual in the Committee heading the work is really coordinated with the representative of the White House secretariat, that is the place for it. The only other way is to rely on volunteer assistance. Because of the Hatch Act the group would, then, consist of private citizens living in Washington and interested in the President and Party to devote some of
their time to such work.

What sort of work would "working committee" do?

It would, even at this early date, start the preparation of memoranda looking toward the drafting of the 1948 Platform.

It would begin assembling material for approximately ten major political speeches—the campaign speeches after the Convention. As part of this project it would draw up tentative plans for the campaign itinerary, including folders on the cities and towns to be visited, information on the industries, personages, their occupations and the past voting habits of the inhabitants.

It would create a functioning political intelligence. To illustrate, it would send out to Pennsylvania an experienced scout to find out from the politicians, the labor leaders and the citizenry why there was such a debacle in the Congressional by-election. In the future such checks would be made before the commitments, not after the event.

It would do research on the "availability" and the disadvantages of the numerous Vice-Presidential candidates. Surely for the purpose of keeping of Party interest it would stimulate a continuing interest in the subject of Vice-Presidential Circus by politicians and press—thus countering, in part at least, the terrific publicity the Republicans are receiving here.

It would present to the President a "Monthly Estimate of the Situation" (somewhat similar to this memorandum, but scientifically based on reports and statistics and polls), informing him of recent political trends, the rise or fall of the leading Republican candidates, the disintegration or consolidation of any large social group or potential political or sectional organization, the weakness in certain geographical areas, and so forth. The "Estimate" would include a list of recommendations as to what he should say, when he should say, etc., for the next month. In short, it would be replacing the present haphazard hit-or-miss annual system with an intelligent political intelligence method which if used would enable the President to get ahead of and to anticipate his political problems.

It would do research on the various personalities to be involved in the campaign. There would be a Henry expert. Everything that Henry ever said or did, beginning with his college speeches, and continuing through his career as prosecutor, as Governor and as Presidential candidate, would be carefully reviewed to determine his inconsistencies, his mistakes and his bad pictures, as weighed in unfriendly fashion by the hindsight of 1928. There should also be a Taft expert, whether or not the Senator is a candidate. The President is running against the Taft record no matter who his opponent is. To play safe there must also be an Truman expert—a Devil's Advocate. The President was a Senator for a long time and he has been in the White House for two and a half years. His record too must be examined with a synthetic but an active hostility to find the errors he has made or will make—and to think up the explanations for them.

The White House leader of this group would be in charge of "riding herd" on the Administration programs on housing, prices, taxes and foreign policy. This is essentially a liaison job, an "oversee" position because government administrators
in the several Departments will have the main responsibility for their execution—and administrators recent interference. But as these programs develop he will extract politically useful nuggets and shape them for use by the President in speeches, press conferences or statements. And he gives the President a second sight, a check on performance. The "working committee," being advisory, in character and personally disinterested, would furnish memoranda on the weaknesses, either in planning or performance, of these several programs.

The Republicans are already examining every speech ever made by the Truman Cabinet; and perhaps the "working committees" should review the past utterances of the Cabinet to make sure their own records are consistent with that of the President.

The "working committees" would set up its own private polling system similar to one used with some success in the 1940 campaign. Louis Bean, now in the Department of Agriculture, could continue his political studies on geographical areas and keep them up to date throughout the campaign. (The usefulness of the Bean approach has always been underestimated by the politicians and even properly used in a campaign.)

If the private Princeton poll can be made available to the Truman Administration (as it was to the Roosevelt Administration), tests would be made of certain questions and submitted to various groups or in certain geographical areas; these would show where hard political work is necessary. For example, the attitude toward President Truman of the Negroes in Harlem or the farmers of Iowa, or the Italians in Detroit would be scientifically checked at regular intervals. This poll was useful in the 1940 campaign; it can of course be applied to general political issues as well as to groups.

The "social experts," the liaison agents with the labor and progressive organizations would work within the framework of this group, which would coordinate all political intelligence, including the usually accurate reports from the practical politicians to the Democratic Committee.

Another badly neglected function the "working committee" would take on is preparing answers to Republican charges. Its performance must be efficient enough so the answer will be carried in newspaper stories the same day, and not on the back pages a week or so later. This requires a precise coordination, long absent, between the government agencies which have the information, the Democratic Committee, the White House and such administration congressional lieutenants as Leslie Hefle, Senator Barkley and former Speaker Rayburn.

Then for instance the Administration is attacked on the floor a Democratic Congressman should be able to answer within two or three hours. And when the Republican leaders put their foot in their mouth, as they often enough did, in the last session, they should be "put on the spot" within the hour.

These are illustrative of what a good "working committee" can do. Someone must do them if there is to be success in 1948. The Presidential election is being determined now by the day-to-day events of 1947.
In national politics the American people normally make up their minds irrevocably about the two Presidential candidates by the end of July.

If the program discussed here can be properly executed it may be of help in getting them to make up their minds the right way.

(Signed)
James E. Rose, Jr.
September 18, 1947