Oral History Interview with
James L. Sundquist
Former staff member of the Bureau of the Budget, speech-writer for President Harry S. Truman, staff member of the Democratic National Committee, and Assistant Secretary to Governor W. Averell Harriman of New York
July 15, 1963
by Charles T. Morrissey
[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.
Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. ) within the transcript indicate
the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.
Opened July, 1964
Harry S. Truman Library
[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]
Oral History Interview with
James L. Sundquist
July 15, 1963
by Charles T. Morrissey
MORRISSEY: Mr. Sundquist, we're interested in your relationship to Mr.
Truman and to the Truman Administration. When did this relationship begin
and what did it involve?
SUNDQUIST: I came into the Government in 1941, as a member of the staff
of the Bureau of the Budget, which is in the Executive Office of the President,
and was a staff member when Mr. Truman took office. In that capacity,
I was borrowed from time to time by the White House, primarily to help
draft speeches and messages and then in September of 1952, I was brought
up into the White House full time for the duration of the 1952 campaign.
MORRISSEY: Why did the White House staff choose you as the one to borrow?
SUNDQUIST: Well, before I came with the Budget Bureau, I was a newspaperman.
So during all the time I was at
the Bureau I got pulled in on various writing assignments and became known
as the Bureau's writer. The first writing jobs I did with the White House
were in the Bureau's own area of concern and the first time I went to
the White House for any length of time was in connection with the 1947
State of the Union Message. Clark Clifford was looking to Jim Webb, who
was then Director of the Budget, to help prepare it, and Webb had in mind
bringing David Cushman Coyle down to help. Someone in the Bureau, Arnold
Miles to be exact, said "Why, we've got a man already on our staff
who would be as useful as David Cushman Coyle," and that was how
I came to be assigned that year to Clark Clifford to work on the State
of the Union Message.
MORRISSEY: Could you give me a little biographical information on how
you came to be in the Bureau of the Budget?
SUNDQUIST: I was a newspaper man in Utah from 1935 to 1939 and during
that period I finished college. Then I took graduate work at Syracuse
from 1939 to 1941, two
years in Public Administration, with the intention then of going back
into newspaper work. But the Government was expanding very rapidly in
the spring and summer of 1941 and Public Administration graduates were
in great demand. So I was hired by Donald C. Stone, who was Assistant
Director of the Budget for Administrative Management, and who was looking
for a combination public administration type and writer. He needed someone
to translate into English the reports that his administrative specialists
wrote. So I came in as a writer, but I soon got rather tired of sitting
in the office and rewriting other people's stuff; I wanted to go out and
do some of the glamorous analysis work too, and Mr. Stone let me cross
over from being a writer to what in the Government is the equivalent of
an efficiency expert. All during the war I was doing efficiency expert
type work -- manpower control and organization studies, primarily in the
military -- although from time to time I was pulled back on writing chores.
I did some speeches for the Director and that kind of thing. I worked
on the message on consolidation
of the War and Navy Departments, which was sent up in the early months
of the Truman Administration, wasn't it?
MORRISSEY: 1945. I think after F.D.R.'s death.
MORRISSEY: From your experience, could you comment on the relationship
between the Bureau of the Budget and the White House staff?
SUNDQUIST: Well, during my time there, it was very close. The Budget
Bureau serves as an extension of the White House and Harold Smith was
very conscious of the organizational role of the Budget Bureau as part
of the Presidency. He was quite a philosopher about it and we were indoctrinated
with the idea that every time we acted, it was the President himself acting.
I believe that relations between the Budget Bureau and the President perhaps
tended to be more direct in Harold Smith's time than later when they began
to filter more through the White House staff. Smith was very jealous of
his personal relation with President Roosevelt.
MORRISSEY: How did Smith get along with Truman?
SUNDQUIST: I guess I really can't answer that. I was not close enough
to either one of them. But Smith was the man who built the Bureau into
the institution it was. It had had a more limited role before he came
and I have the impression that it reached its peak of competence and authority
during his tenure. The Bureau carried out a very active recruiting program
to skim the cream of the Public Administration people out of the colleges
and it was a training ground for public administration personnel throughout
the government. His successors were more politicians than professional
public administrators and I think the agency lost some of the appeal that
it had had -- and, well, agencies go through cycles.
MORRISSEY: Could you elaborate a bit on this impression you have that
the relationship between the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and
the President declined as time went on in the Truman Administration and
the relationship became more one between the White House staff and the
Director of the Budget.
SUNDQUIST: I don't know that I expressed it accurately if
I said it that way. Smith undoubtedly continued to deal with the President.
It may be that the relation between the White House staff and the Bureau
staff simply became more intimate. Charles Murphy was the man who organized
policy work in the White House on a really systematic basis, and in doing
so he spotted people in the Bureau that he could use and worked very closely
with them. I'm thinking particularly here of Dave Bell and Dick Neustadt,
both of whom he eventually pulled up on his staff. Dave Stowe was another
one who came out of the Budget Bureau, but he was on Steelman's side of
the White House.
MORRISSEY: Could you describe somewhat how Mr. Murphy handled his work
and handled his staff?
SUNDQUIST: Well, that's not easy to describe. Murphy impressed me at
that time, and still does, as a man with about as sound a judgment as
anybody I've ever known. He would take great pains to weigh all the angles
of a question in order to come out with the right position from the viewpoint
of the President. He was absolutely selfless and devoted to the
President and completely anonymous. He had a capacity for drawing out
of the staff people who worked with him the best they had to offer. They
were a harmonious, congenial group. He was always very calm and level-headed
and did not get flustered at all under pressure.
MORRISSEY: Could you specify some of the particular chores you did when
you were working in the Bureau of the Budget but working with the White
SUNDQUIST: It was almost entirely on speeches and messages. The first
one, as I recall, was the message consolidating the War and Navy Departments,
an organizational question on which I had been working as a Bureau staff
man. I have already mentioned the State of the Union Message in 1947,
which actually meant, of course, December of 1946. I worked on a series
of speeches Mr. Truman gave during a Western trip in 1950. Perhaps there
will be some historical interest in how the 1947 message was developed.
Do you want me to run through that?
SUNDQUIST: I went over with Mr. Webb for a session with
Clark Clifford, where I was introduced and it was explained that I would
work on it. Mr. Clifford in a very brief interview talked about the tone
of the message. We were confronted, at that time, with the Republican
80th Congress which had just been elected and we had the special problem
of addressing a message to a Congress of the opposite party. So there
was some discussion as to how conciliatory we should be and so on. It
was agreed that Mr. Webb and I would outline what we conceived the tone
and general content to be and then arrange another conference. I prepared
a document which set out some alternatives. One basic question was whether
the tone would be "boldly New-Dealish," or one of "consolidating
our gains." Those were phrases which I had culled, I think, from
newspaper columnists' speculation. I recall Mr. Clifford scratching out “Boldly New Dealish” and saying, “Well, it won’t be that.”
As it turned out, it was a pretty prosaic message. There wasn't much
innovation in it, as I recall, and it did take a general tone of consolidating
our gains. My assignment was to coordinate the domestic phases
while George Elsey pulled together the international and foreign part.
On the domestic side, I brought in various people from the Budget Bureau
who had particular specialties. One of those, I remember, was Dave Bell,
because what we had to say about labor-management relations in that particular
message was important and Bell was handling that subject for the Bureau
at the time, under Dave Stowe. Joe Reeve wrote a section on the subject
of housing. What I tried to do was pull all those contributions into a
synthesized domestic half of the message, and I turned my drafts over
to Elsey who handled the clearances from there. It seemed to me that it
all went very smoothly and simply. The Budget Bureau fellows were able
to state the policy about as the White House expected it to be stated.
And the White House staff, on messages and policy matters, at that time,
was Clifford and Elsey, and that's about all. This may be one reason why
relations between the Director of the Budget and the President seemed
to be more direct at that time -- there wasn't any White House staff of
any size to filter through.
It was quite a contrast from the closing days of the Truman Administration
when Mr. Truman had Murphy, Elsey, Dave Lloyd, Bell, Ken Hechler, Stowe,
Harold Enarson, Dick Neustadt, and others on policy matters. The brain
power really increased over that span of time.
I went overseas in 1947 and came back in 1949. In the fall of 1950, I
was assigned to the Budget Message to pull together the whole document,
which was done, of course, inside the Bureau without much White House
review. Dave Bell, who had handled the Budget Message in 1949, was assigned
to work with us and he came over and sweated it out in the Budget Bureau
MORRISSEY: When was that message delivered?
SUNDQUIST: January, 1951, covering the 1952 fiscal year. We had to coordinate
the Budget Message with the Economic Report and the State of the Union
Message -- we had the three documents to dovetail.
MORRISSEY: Who was in charge of the overall coordination between these
SUNDQUIST: Charlie Murphy, I'm sure, but Dave Bell handled his relations
with the Budget Message -- although not in the sense that Dave was giving
orders. As the Budget Bureau's man, working for the Bureau and not the
White House directly, I didn't regard Bell as having the final say on
anything. He was just there to help, and his method of coordinating it
was to sit there and work through with us. If we stayed up till 4 o'clock
in the morning, as we did a couple of times, he stayed up till 4 o'clock.
I suspect he worked the same way with Leon Keyserling on the Economic
MORRISSEY: In regard to this point about brain power increasing in the
Truman Administration as time went by, would you credit this Mr. Murphy?
SUNDQUIST: Yes. I guess it was Clifford who brought Murphy in. After
Clifford left, then Murphy built the staff.
In regard to the 1950 Western speech-making swing, we met in Dave Lloyd's
office and it was he who laid out the schedule and assigned the work.
MORRISSEY: Dave Lloyd did?
MORRISSEY: Had Mr. Lloyd arranged the schedule himself?
SUNDQUIST: I don't know. I assume he worked it out with Murphy and then
took on the job of getting the drafts assigned. I was asked to write two
of them -- one on foreign trade and one on foreign policy. I had never
written a speech on foreign policy before, so I recall asking, "What
do I say?" I didn't get any specific guidance.
Dave Lloyd said, "Well, here are a couple of speeches (Dean) Acheson
has given lately; maybe they'll give you some ideas."
So I went around to my room in the Budget Bureau -- this was a Saturday
morning -- and asked myself, "What is my foreign policy today?"
I decided I would write my ideas on foreign policy before I read
Acheson's stuff, just to see how it would work out. I came out with something
pretty good, I guess, because hardly a word was changed and it was delivered
in Laramie, Wyoming. I was told later
that the newspapermen took a poll and voted it the best speech of the
trip. On the foreign trade speech, a draft had been done by some expert
somewhere, and all I did was give it a literary touch. The one on foreign
policy was scarcely even cleared with the State Department; they did contribute
a couple of paragraphs at the beginning on a gift of wheat to India, but
apart from that, they didn't change anything either. As you see, the speech
writing process under Murphy was a rather informal one.
MORRISSEY: Why do you suppose you were chosen to write these two speeches?
SUNDQUIST: They had an extra body and they had two speeches that hadn't
been written. I don't know why they didn't ask the State Department to
do them. It probably was mostly a matter of mechanics. They were starting
at the beginning of the schedule and getting the speeches assigned and
then, as they came up almost against the day of the departure, they discovered
the Laramie speech hadn't been written. So they sat around the table on
and said, "Well, this one better be on foreign policy." And
there I was, so they matched me up with the speech.
MORRISSEY: Did you travel with the President on the train?
SUNDQUIST: Not that time, no. Several of us drove out to hear the final
speech of the swing, at Cumberland, Maryland, where incidentally we developed
one of the more important innovations in the speech process. (I'll have
to enter a caveat here that I'm not sure whether the Cumberland speech
concluded this particular swing or another later one, around Labor Day,
but that doesn't matter for this particular incident.) We had written
a rather good speech on labor surpluses; Cumberland was a depressed area,
one of the first to be recognized. It was a minor speech, written by Hechler
and Bill Batt and me after the President had left and we mailed it to
them. It was about seven pages long -- not much more than that. Mr. Truman
was on the rear platform turning the pages and he'd covered page 4 and
as he went to turn to page 5, the wind caught one of the pages and he
to page 6, and went right on as though nothing had happened. Neither Mr.
Truman nor the audience knew that anything had been left out -- only the
authors were aware of the golden words lost in the wind. The result of
that episode was the development of an isinglass cover in which they enclosed
each page, which protected the manuscripts not only from the wind, but
from the rain.
Early in 1951, I left the Budget Bureau to go to the Office of Defense
Mobilization, where my particular assignment was the quarterly ODM report
to the President -- which was a report to the public too on the progress
of the defense program. Each three months, again, Dave Bell came over
and sweated out the final version with us. Dave Stowe reviewed it one
time when Bell was not available, but he didn't work on it with us line
by line as Bell did.
MORRISSEY: Did you discuss these reports directly with the President?
SUNDQUIST: No, I don't think he gave them any extensive review. I believe
Dave Stowe handled them for him
along with Bell; they had been with him long enough to know his views
and policies and when they gave the O.K., that was it.
I worked on a message proposing special relief for the Kansas flood areas
after the big flood of 1951 and that was all until I got pulled into the
White House on Labor Day, 1952.
MORRISSEY: I've asked you how Mr. Murphy did his work and how he conducted
his staff business. How did his way of doing things compare or contrast
with Clark Clifford's way of doing similar things?
SUNDQUIST: I can't really say, because I only did one job for Clifford.
My impression from that job is that Murphy was inclined to devote perhaps
more time to the detailed structure and content of a major speech or message.
Clifford seemed more the operating executive type who handled a thing
like this very briskly, while Murphy weighed each sentence judiciously,
one by one. But I'm speaking only from one case, as far as Clifford is
concerned. Clifford may have done more writing himself. Murphy did very
few original drafts.
His forte was editing the language and refining the expression of policy.
MORRISSEY: Let me pursue one matter in relation to the State of the Union
Message in 1947. You remarked that the emphasis in this speech was on consolidation of gains, and that in the preliminary stages, Mr. Clifford seemed to take that position. Whose influence was prevailing in the writing of that speech?
SUNDQUIST: Well, at the time I got into it, Mr. Clifford’s mind was made up and from the firm way he expressed it, that it would not be a New Deal type speech, I thought he must be reflecting not just his own feeling but also that of the President.
The greatest frustration for me on that speech was on the
foreign policy side, which I was not handling. I did my best to convince
Mr. Elsey that the time had come for something bold in that area but I
made no headway. After I went overseas came the message announcing the
Greek-Turkish Doctrine and Mr. Elsey wrote me a note saying, "Here
it is. This is what you wanted last winter."
MORRISSEY: In regard to these two speeches you wrote for the President
during the 1950 campaign, how much of a difference, if any, was there
between the preparation of these speeches in Washington and their delivery
out in the hinterlands? Would someone on the train look over these drafts
and adapt them to the local conditions?
SUNDQUIST: Not in this case, no. These were prepared texts. Now, the
President may have opened up with some off-the-cuff banter and local color
comment. But once he got into his text he always stuck to his script.
That was equally true during the campaign -- well, nearly so, anyway.
Of course, he had a much bigger traveling staff in the campaign. Do you
want to go now into the '52 campaign?
MORRISSEY: I was about to suggest it.
SUNDQUIST: The speech-writing staff in '52 under Mr. Murphy consisted
of Dave Lloyd, Charlie Van Devander, Dick Neustadt, Ken Hechler, and me,
with occasional drafts from other people, particularly selected people
in the agencies who had something to offer. In the early
part of the campaign, Van Devander and I were back at home base cranking
out drafts and sending them to the train. Ken Hechler was also there part
of the time. But Hechler specialized early on local color and stopped
doing any drafting. Actually, he was a good speechwriter but he insisted
he was not, and in any case he seemed to prefer the local assignment,
and he was extraordinary at it. Neustadt began to specialize on the smaller
whistlestop type speeches, which were written up in outline rather than
textual form. However, the outlines were so complete that if the President
decided only to read the outline, it still came out as a speech and toward
the end, that's about what happened. Dick had these speeches numbered
and would rotate them somewhat so that if there wasn't anything special
to say at a particular place, he'd pull out number five which hadn't been
given yet that day. The major speeches were the ones that were released
to the press in advance and there were two of those a day -- one for the
afternoon papers and one for the morning's. Ordinarily we had one on foreign
policy and one on domestic policy and the general
pattern was that Lloyd did the former and I did the latter. We could work
at the rate of about one speech a day each, but of course it would be
considerably easier if someone had contributed a good basic draft to start
from. Sometimes there would be an extra luncheon speech thrown in, and
then there were letters and messages too that might be released -- you
might have as many as four or five texts in a day, but the standard was
MORRISSEY: What were your major problems during that '52 campaign?
SUNDQUIST: You mean mechanical or substantive?
MORRISSEY: Either, or both.
SUNDQUIST: Well, the main mechanical problem was the lack of an opportunity
to sleep. The grind on the train was a rough one. I wasn't on the first
trip, which took place in September -- the western swing. I joined the
train at Buffalo on the way back, followed it into New York and later
went on some of the other trips but not all of them -- the others were
would generally get the speeches ready by evening, and then go over them
with Murphy until they were done to his satisfaction. That meant going
over every line with great care. At the beginning of the trip, we'd have
the first speeches ready before we left and we might get the first day's
work done on the train by a reasonable bedtime hour, say 11 o'clock. Then
we'd start losing ground so that by the end of the trip we might not get
them all buttoned up until 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning. At that point,
Dave Lloyd and I -- although I can't speak for sure about Lloyd -- would
go to bed and Mr. Murphy (I don't know whether he slept or not) cleared
these speeches at breakfast with the President and I would wake up in
time to hear one or two of them and then start to work on the next day's
Substantively, I don't recall any particular problems. We had a good
story to tell; we had the administration's policies and record that we
knew forward and backward. The problem was to put it in language that
would communicate. It was Mr. Truman talking about his administration
and at some point
in the speech, making a plug for Adlai.
MORRISSEY: As you recall, how did you view the chances of success during
that campaign? Did you think the Democrats were going to win another term?
SUNDQUIST: I must confess that I got myself convinced at the end that
Stevenson was going to win. This came on gradually. I didn't let myself
fully believe it until the very last weekend in St. Louis when we all
listened to a man named Charlie Hamilton, from Mississippi -- I believe
I have his name right. He said he'd just come back from the convention
of country preachers, and all the country preachers were for Stevenson
and that meant the grass roots were for him. I guess there was a swing
toward Stevenson at the end, but it got started much too late. And I don't
suppose that at best it could have ever produced a majority. People were
convinced that the Truman regime was corrupt, and full of communists,
and even if they weren't sure, they were ready to give the other side
a chance after twenty years.
To get back to Truman's relation to the speech
writing business on the train; We would get our cues from Mr. Murphy as
to what he was most interested in talking about, but I had the impression
that he had all he could do to deliver the speeches and meet the dignitaries
and jolly up the politicians, all of whom had to ride the train to the
content of the speeches. I remember one evening I was typing away in my
compartment when I felt someone behind me and looked over my shoulder
and there was the President of the United States; he smiled at me benignly
and said, "Don't get up. I just wondered what stuff you're planning
to put in the President mouth tomorrow?" And I assumed he wanted
to know and started out to tell him, but he shushed me and said, "That's
all right, young man, I'm sure that what you're coming up with is going
to be a lot better than anything I could suggest." And he strode
jauntily away. Margaret used to come back and cheer us up occasionally
Another delightful incident was in Cincinnati. I had written a humorous
takeoff on Taft for Taft's hometown as a change of pace after so many
speeches. Dave Lloyd added a few touches, and so did some others. Truman
apparently liked it, too, because he hammed it up and ad libbed a great
many additional lines that added punch and humor. He thought he was so
good -- which he was -- that he stayed up to hear it played back in the
club car. Then he laughed so hard at his own wit -- and ours -- that he
almost broke down and had us all breaking down with him. In short, he
was a fine, relaxed, and enjoyable man to work for.
MORRISSEY: Could you give me your impressions of David Lloyd?
SUNDQUIST: Dave was a careful and penetrating thinker on international
and foreign policy questions. He probably was good on domestic questions
too, but the former was his specialty. He was as good a writer as he was
a thinker -- with a very lucid and eloquent style. I thought he wrote
brilliant stuff during that campaign. He was a delightful fellow to work
with, as they all were.
MORRISSEY: There must have been occasions when there simply
wasn't time to go over some of the speeches prepared for the President
line by line?
SUNDQUIST: No, that didn't happen. Murphy stayed up as, late as necessary
to go over them line by line before he went to bed. Each day he had a
full set of speeches to clear with the President at breakfast.
MORRISSEY: Was there much discussion between the President's speech writers
on whether he was more effective speaking extemporaneously or more effective
speaking from a prepared draft and not deviating from it?
SUNDQUIST: We all thought he was more effective extemporaneously and
so did he. We wrote in what was called, jocularly around the White House,
"Missouri English," which was designed to incorporate his extemporaneous
style into the manuscripts. What that meant really was short sentences
and short words where we didn't have to have big ones. His secretary,
Rose Conway, had devised a way of typing these so that they almost read
themselves. Maybe you've had this story before?
SUNDQUIST: Her trick was to put the natural pauses always at the end of
lines, so Mr. Truman could read on line to the end, pause, then read the
next line to the end, and then pause and so on. And the pauses came out
naturally. This was something, incidentally, that I taught the lady who
typed President Kennedy's speeches in the 1960 campaign.
MORRISSEY: Could you enlarge on that a little bit?
SUNDQUIST: Well, I don't know that this is pertinent to the Truman Library.
MORRISSEY: Well, we'd like to hear it.
SUNDQUIST: I was in the balcony looking over the President's shoulder
when he was delivering a speech in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and
I noticed he was following with his finger to keep his place as he looked
up at the audience. And when he came to the end of the line if he paused
there, it might be pausing at the wrong place. They had just given him
a solid block of type -- the large speech type -- with no spacing whatever,
long paragraphs and sentences which overlapped lines and even
pages. He had difficulty in keeping his place and finding the beginnings
and endings of sentences. In every case, he had to pause at the end of
the page while he turned it -- and these pauses might be at very awkward
spots. So I explained to Mrs. Lincoln how Rose Conway used to type speeches.
I had a feeling that day I had really accomplished something for the Kennedy
MORRISSEY: Is it difficult for a Presidential speech writer not
to take pride of authorship in what he's preparing?
SUNDQUIST: Well, you take some pride, but in the review process we always
had the right of argument and Murphy was never arbitrary. As a general
rule, he would tend to preserve the original draft rather than make changes
where it was an evenly balanced decision. I remember, for example, working
over a speech draft that Laszlo Ecker-Racz had done for Spokane.
MORRISSEY: This was in 1952?
SUNDQUIST: Yes, '52. I remember rewriting it to put the language more
in the style that I'd developed, and to
refine the concepts in a way that the administration had customarily done.
I discovered later that Mr. Murphy had used the original Ecker-Racz draft,
almost without change. I asked him why he hadn't adopted my "improvements"
and he said, "Well, it seemed to be fresher the way Ecker-Racz had
drafted it and it seemed a little stale by the time you'd worked it over."
This illustrates his tendency to preserve the original draft unless there
was a good reason for changing it. He had a remarkably good feel as to
whether a speech could be delivered or not -- whether it was really a
speech as distinct from a magazine article or something written for a
learned journal. He was also good at inserting the colorful phrase. They
still talk about the Hungry Horse Dam speech which began with the line,
"You people here had better take a good look at that dam because
if the Republicans are elected, you'll never see another one." That
line has been quoted ever since for more than ten years. Nobody remembers
a word about what was said in the rest of the speech. The rest of the
speech, I did,
but it was the line that Mr. Murphy wrote in at the beginning that lives.
MORRISSEY: Were you involved in any other campaign activities in 1950
SUNDQUIST: No. In '50, of course, I was a career civil servant. I don't
recall the campaign very clearly.
One reason I got emotionally involved in the '52 campaign was that in
the Office of Defense Mobilization, we had been trying to mobilize the
country and rebuild the Armed Forces and so on, all of which involved
some inconvenience to the American people in the form of controls and
high taxes. The Republicans, and their Presidential candidate in particular,
chose to make political capital out of what seemed to me to be a patriotic
necessity. This got me sufficiently fired up that I probably wrote better
than I otherwise would have. I thought then, and I still think, that it
was one of the most unprincipled campaigns the country has ever seen.
Maybe later on as I mellow it will look more like normal political behavior,
but it did not then.
MORRISSEY: Were you involved in any of the planning during the transition
from the Truman Administration to the Eisenhower Administration?
SUNDQUIST: Well, I worked on the President's Farewell Speech. Other than
that, no, except, of course, I worked with Henry Fowler on getting the
office of Defense Mobilization ready to turn over, and I made my own recommendation
that the report I had been putting out for two years be abolished.
MORRISSEY: Could you enlarge a bit about the preparation of the President's
SUNDQUIST: Yes. This was a labor of love. Whereas we had been accustomed
in the campaign to turning out four or five speeches a day, as a group,
now we had more than a month to turn out one speech, and everybody agreed
this had to be a masterpiece in which we would express in a sensitive
way our feeling about the
seven years of the Truman Administration and maybe get across the suggestion
that the American people had made a mistake in repudiating it. Dick Neustadt
was assigned to do the first draft and I think took
almost a month just to do that. The pace had slowed down that much. But
at a certain point, when he had a draft to work on, we used to assemble
late every morning in the Cabinet Room and work it over. Then the President
would come in each afternoon and take up some of our time reminiscing.
He got in the habit of putting in a couple of hours there a day -- at
least, it seemed to be almost every day. This was most enjoyable; here's
where the oral history project should have had a tape recorder.
For instance, I remember his saying one day, "Somebody asked whether
there's anything I would do differently if I had it all to do over again.
I said, 'No, I wouldn't do one single thing different,' and that's true."
Somebody said, "How about the appointment of (James P.) McGranery?"
Truman smiled, "Well, maybe I'd do that one different."
He told a lot about Jackson County, Missouri, and cracked jokes. The
high spot was the day he came in, one afternoon, with a thundercloud on
his face and
everybody said, "What's the matter? Why are you so grim?"
And he said, "Well, I never really worried about the future of the
Republic until today, but I just had lunch with that man again,"
(this was his second meeting with General Eisenhower) "and he told
me he was going to do this job on a forty hour week. I started to explain
to him why that was impossible, that you had ceremonies in the Rose Garden
and people you had to see and all those things that had nothing to do
with the office of the Presidency, and running the Government alone took
forty hours a week, and every night you had to go up to your bedroom with
a briefcase full of papers -- National Security Council documents, some
of them fifty pages long -- and Eisenhower interrupted me and said, 'I'm
going to have all that on one page.' And I started out to explain to him
why you couldn't put some of those things on one page and suddenly I realized
that he was just sitting there thinking, 'The trouble with you is you're
just inefficient.' So I gave up. I wasn't really worried until now, but
I am worried about the future of the country under a forty
hour Presidency." I had many occasions to recall that afterwards
when that appeared to be what was happening.
MORRISSEY: Any other recollections from these sessions with the President?
SUNDQUIST: I recall his discussion of Mr. Kefauver and his committee;
he insisted on calling him "Cowfever." I don't think he said
anything there he hasn't said on other occasions, but he recalled how
he had tried to advise "Cowfever" not to go into Kansas City
and Chicago and he said, "Every place that man had on his list was
a Democratically run community and he wasn't going into any Republican
cities at all. I tried to explain to him that wasn't the way to do it
and he just wouldn't listen to me."
MORRISSEY: Let me go back to 1945 and your work on unification of the
Army and Navy. Could you elaborate a little bit on that?
SUNDQUIST: Well, this came out of the efficiency experting.
The Budget Bureau had a staff under Leonard W. Hoelscher that worked
with the Army and the Army Air Forces all
during the war. We began before Pearl Harbor. I went over there the day
after Pearl Harbor. We worked with General (Joseph T.) McNarney on the
March 9, 1942, directive reorganizing the War Department into the Army
Air Force, Army Service Force, and Army Ground Force. Larry Hoelscher
became, I think, the leading philosopher on the subject of military organization
that the country has. He is now the Deputy Comptroller of the Department
of the Army. We went from one project to another. All during the war we
worked extensively with the War Department General Staff. We had a man
who worked on the organization of the intelligence services. We had in
the Budget Bureau, but not under Hoelscher, another group who worked on
war supply problems and did some work with the Navy. When the Air Force
was created we worked extensively on the reorganization of the Army Air
Corps and the Air Force Combat Command, both of which were abolished,
and on the pooling of their functions and so on. A couple of us were assigned
to work with the Air Transport Command. What it amounted to was that throughout
the war the Bureau
had a floating group of maybe 10 to 20 people working with various parts
of the War and Navy Departments, most of them under Larry Hoelscher's
direction. We came to the conclusion, which was probably primarily Larry's,
that the coordination of the two departments ought to be at a level lower
than the White House and the Budget Bureau, and in this he had the complete
backing of Harold Smith and everyone else in the Bureau except probably
the examiners who handled the Navy Department. At some point President
Truman was converted. I'm under the impression that the whole idea was
tried out on Roosevelt and he said in effect, "Come back and talk
to me after the war; we've got a war to win." We came back after
the war, we talked to Truman and got his go ahead. So I was assigned to
write the message, sometime late in 1945 or early 1946. At that time,
Mr. Truman still had as his principal ghost writer, Sam Rosenman, who
was held over from the Roosevelt Administration, and I recall we sent
our draft over to the President and Rosenman wrote a preamble and a conclusion
which largely duplicated what was in the material we sent over but the
original message that I drafted was still intact in the middle. So we
took the liberty of editing out of the preamble and the conclusion the
material that was duplicated and that was the way it was finally submitted.
We took some pride in having rewritten Rosenman and made it stick.
MORRISSEY: Were you concerned with the formation of Civil Defense legislation
SUNDQUIST: Oh, yes. I acted then as a staff member of the Division of
Legislative Reference, which had the job of pulling together the administrator's
position on all legislation. I happened to handle that particular one
and did some mediating of differing departments' views, but I don't recall
having made any great contribution to it.
MORRISSEY: Were you involved in any way with the issue of the steel seizure
SUNDQUIST: I worked then for Charles E. Wilson, the Director of Defense
Mobilization, who was involved. I mainly recall the staff meeting Mr.
Wilson called when he returned from the White House one afternoon and
dramatically announced to all of us that he had just
resigned because his integrity had been questioned. He did not stress
the substantive disagreement between him and the President; what he stressed
to us was that he felt he had been called a liar in front of other people.
Others can reconstruct other aspects of that episode, of course.
MORRISSEY: Did you attend any of Mr. Truman's staff meetings?
MORRISSEY: Did you ever attend any of his pre-press conference sessions?
MORRISSEY: Could you tell me about your months with Stephen Mitchell
when you worked for the Democratic National Committee?
SUNDQUIST: In connection with Mr. Truman, you mean? Or just in general?
MORRISSEY: In general.
SUNDQUIST: I went over to the Committee in February of 1953 because it
seemed like the best opportunity to appeal
the results of the election, which had left me feeling out of sympathy
with my new employer. It seemed like ages before I was able to get out
of the administration. Actually, it was only about three weeks, but we
were, of course, all thoroughly demoralized before January 20. Arthur
Flemming seemed to be intent on dismantling everything that the Office
of Defense Mobilization had been doing and there didn't seem to be any
good reason to stay there. Mr. Mitchell needed a speech writer and by
that time I was a specialist. I stayed with him until he retired at the
end of 1954, as his principal speech writer, traveling research assistant,
and general handyman.
MORRISSEY: Could you comment on the problems of trying to revitalize
a party that had just suffered a major defeat?
SUNDQUIST: Well, it turned out to be easier than I had thought it would
be and I think Mr. Mitchell had the same reaction. There were an awful
lot of people in the same frame of mine as we, who felt as though the
wrong man had won. They consisted particularly of a whole breed of new
idealistic politicians who had sprung up as personal
admirers and supporters of Stevenson; the kind of people that possibly
no other presidential candidate since, maybe, Woodrow Wilson, had been
able to attract into politics. They were rarin' to go; they could hardly
wait for the next election after November '52. And we began having in
January of '53 some of the biggest political rallies that the particular
localities had ever seen. Even before I joined him, Steve was telling
about a meeting in St. Cloud, Minnesota, in a high school auditorium in
below zero weather that had 2,000 people there from all over Minnesota.
Steve had an amazing talent for inspiring party workers. He went all over
the country for two years giving pep talks -- and they took. He could
go into a state where everybody was gloomy and down in the dumps and by
the end of the day raise their spirits to a pretty high level. He had
a very contagious enthusiasm.
MORRISSEY: Any particular states where this...?
SUNDQUIST: Oh, I recall seeing it particularly in Arizona. When we arrived
in the morning they began telling us all their problems and troubles and
difficulties, but at the end of the day they were telling us what
they were going to do. This happened in more or less degree everywhere
where the Democrats were out of power. Where they were in power; of course,
then they tended to have a little different outlook on life.
There was an interesting progression in Mr. Mitchell’s thinking as National Chairman. When I first went to work for him in February of ’53, he was still quite suspicious of the Truman image. Occasionally, I’d turn out a speech for him which he would toss back at me and say, “It sounds too much like Harry Truman.” By the time he had left office, he was sounding more like Truman than Truman himself. He became convinced of the general Truman idea that there is a class struggle in the country and that the Democratic Party can’t really hope to appeal to the upper classes and be all things to all people, and that as Truman used to love to do, we ought to call a spade a spade. I was toning his language down at the end.
Mr. Mitchell was very careful, always, to maintain correct and cordial
relations with Mr. Truman. He went to see him as often as he could. The
distrust seemed to be a little bit both ways at the beginning, but I
believe they both warmed up to each other substantially before it was
over. The old Truman crowd didn't care much for Mitchell and I think Mitchell
felt that the President himself might have had something to do with that.
Probably Mr. Mitchell himself had something to do with it, because he
occasionally took cracks at various old line politicians who were closely
identified with Truman -- sometimes not expecting to be quoted in print.
MORRISSEY: Could you comment on the influence an ex-President has on
politics in general and party affairs, specifically?
SUNDQUIST: Well, as you know, I went through the '56 campaign with Mr.
(W. Averell) Harriman, and when Truman came out for Harriman in Chicago,
it didn't appear to change a single vote among the delegates. We had Frank
McKinney on Harriman's staff, and his mission was to round up the old
Truman people and deliver them to Harriman, but I'm not sure he produced
anybody either. There's a great tendency in politics to look to the future,
not the past, and what can Truman do for anybody from now on? I guess
there was also a feeling that no matter how much you loved and respected
the man, his public image had been hopelessly tarnished in the '52 campaign
and by the press treatment of him during and prior to the campaign. His
audiences, of course, loved him, particularly in what was known as "Truman
Country." After 1952, he was particularly invited by places like
the steel towns of Pennsylvania and some of the farming areas. He wasn't
much in demand as a speaker in most of the suburbs.
MORRISSEY: Were you involved in any way in the relationship between Harriman
SUNDQUIST: Well, I was an observer; the go-between, I guess, was Sam
MORRISSEY: Could you comment on your observations?
SUNDQUIST: Well, Harriman knew, of course, all through 1956 that he was
way behind. Stevenson had got commitments out of practically every incumbent
governor -- the principal exceptions were Governor (G. Mennen) Williams
and Governor (Frank J.) Lausche. But Stevenson had commitments from George
Leader of Pennsylvania and Bob Meyner of New Jersey and most of the others
including the New England governors. Stevenson also had most of the old-line
bosses for one reason or
another. He had a peculiar combination or the best elements in the party
and the worst. He had people like Eleanor Roosevelt and Walter Reuther
from the North and he had some of the worst segregationists of the South.
He had his personal, idealistic, worshipful following that stayed with
him from 1952. So Harriman knew that something dramatic would have to
happen. Stevenson would have to stub his toe in some manner in order for
him to have a chance. Stevenson would have to alienate some of his established
After the Minnesota primary, where Kefauver beat Stevenson, Harriman
thought maybe Stevenson's Achilles heel was going to be his weakness in
the primaries. But then Stevenson went into Florida and won and he overwhelmed
Kefauver in California, so that didn't come through. Harriman began, I
guess, from that time on, to count more and more on Truman's endorsement
as perhaps the thing that would somehow make the difference -- the important
dramatic development. So during the first half of '56, he maintained very
close contact with Truman and at some point along there, well before the
convention, Truman gave him a promise. It's at that
point where McKinney came aboard, and McKinney had the mission of getting
the word across to all of Truman's old friends that Harriman was the man.
Now, whether McKinney was authorized to tell them that Truman was going
to come out for Harriman at the right time, I don't know. Harriman himself
never said right out, even to his closest advisers, that he had a promise
from Truman, but we all were certain he did. The right time was selected
out at Chicago and Truman made his television appeal. The rest of us waited
after that for other leading delegates to make their pronouncements following
Truman, but to the best of my knowledge, nobody did not even one. My own
feeling then was that if as many as ten or fifteen or twenty-five came
out for Harriman, including maybe a few conspicuous switches away from
Stevenson, that it might start a trend because there was an awful lot
of dissatisfaction among the Stevenson supporters with Stevenson. Of course,
we heard mainly from the disgruntled people who didn't like Stevenson
for one reason or another and so came to Harriman. But that included some
who were publicly committed to Stevenson and who wound up voting for him,
and Stevenson to this day may not have known were disgruntled. I've
often said that in a secret ballot, Harriman would have won the nomination,
but with everybody voting on the record and with the governors and the
state chairmen and the party organizations whipping their people into
line to make good on their commitments, it was just not possible for people
to vote the way they felt. We would have gotten a substantial number of
votes out of the Illinois delegation, for example; conversely, Stevenson
would have gotten a few out of New York.
MORRISSEY: When did you go to work for Governor Harriman?
SUNDQUIST: January, '55, after the election -- at the point where Steve
Mitchell left the National Committee.
MORRISSEY: What kind of work did you do for him?
SUNDQUIST: I had two jobs. First, I was in charge of all of his speech
materials, speech drafts, public appearances, getting his briefing materials
ready, working on his speech schedule and handling other documents that
carried his name like proclamations and messages of various kinds. Second,
I was his staff man on national affairs as distinct from state affairs.
Originally in 1955 that didn't mean national politics, but during the
year 1955, it developed into
that. Whether Harriman had in mind my experience with the National Committee
and my political contacts when he hired me, I have no idea. He told me
when he interviewed me for the job in November of 1954 that he was committed
to Stevenson for President and intended to support him. But early in '55
politicians from all over began coming to Harriman and saying, "Look,
you're the only alternative we have. You've got to get off this Stevenson
kick and keep yourself available" -- and they persuaded him that
he should. Then he became convinced that Stevenson was not the man for
the job. I think I was with him at the moment where he made up his mind. We were going to the Statler Hotel in Washington one night when the Washington Post front paged the story that Stevenson had just come out for what could be interpreted as unilateral disarmament. Harriman said something like, “That does it; you can’t trust that man to deal with the Russians.” And from that time on, he was an active candidate although he didn’t announce his candidacy, of course, until long after that.
MORRISSEY: How long did you stay with Governor?
SUNDQUIST: Through the year 1956.
MORRISSEY: And then you...
SUNDQUIST: Then I came with Senator Clark of Pennsylvania. I decided
to leave Albany on the general theory that my days there were numbered
anyway; that I couldn't make a career at Albany and I had better get back
to Washington where there would be more long-range job opportunities.
So I wrote to three of the new Democratic senators. One or two of them
didn't answer my letters, but Senator Clark did and hired me.
MORRISSEY: What kind of work did you do for him?
SUNDQUIST: I was in charge of the legislative side of his office, as
distinct from the Pennsylvania political and errand-running side. I stayed
with him during his entire term.
MORRISSEY: When did you come into your present position in Agriculture?
SUNDQUIST: January, 1963, at the end of Clark's first term.
MORRISSEY: In regard to this hand-written speech draft* -- would that
be the right word for it? -- that you brought over today, could you give
me the background on it?
SUNDQUIST: Yes. That draft presents an outline of a speech on corruption.
The Republicans, of course, had been campaigning on "Korea, Communism
and Corruption" and the President was extremely sensitive on this
point. He felt that he was being severely maligned; that he had run a
good, clean, decent administration and that he had been shamefully misrepresented
by the Republican press and that speech there reflects his ideas on how
to answer the charge. My recollection is that that was incorporated practically
verbatim into a speech which Charlie Murphy personally wrote and which
was delivered at Fargo, North Dakota, the opening speech of his first
whistlestop train ride.
MORRISSEY: Could you give an approximate date when you think that the
President probably wrote this?
SUNDQUIST: It was three or four days before the departure of the train.
MORRISSEY: Do you recall how you...
SUNDQUIST: It seems to me that the train left about the middle of September,
which would put the date of that about September 10. Murphy did a draft
and then handed me the draft and the President's notes and said, "Would
you go over this draft, and here's what the Boss wanted written."
Murphy had stuck very faithfully to the President's text, and I don't
recall that I edited it much. Then I kept that as one of my prize mementos.
MORRISSEY: Could you give me your general impressions of how Mr. Truman
ran his office?
SUNDQUIST: Well, maybe it isn't a general impression, but one very strong
impression I have is that he was the master attended one of his press
conferences where he bounced back answers to every question that was thrown
at him. I went with Fred Lawton to present the issues contained in the
budget in December of 1950; Fred asked him a lot of detailed policy questions
pertaining to Veterans affairs and Social Security and odd bits of legislation
-- did he want to endorse them in the Budget Message or not -- and with
not a single exception Mr. Truman knew
what those questions were about and he knew exactly where he stood. He
was a man with a very clear and simple frame of reference -- to use that
horrid term that there seems to be no good substitute for. You could watch
him throwing a specific question against that general frame of reference
and getting the rebound instantaneously. He didn't take long to make decisions;
he didn't fret about them and having made them he slept on them with no
difficulty, and this is something he boasted about during his post-election
period when he used to philosophize with us in the Cabinet Room. He was
quite a philosopher about the office of the Presidency and had a strong
sense of history. He developed the analysis of the five parts of the President's
job which Dick Neustadt worked up into a whistlestop speech. He worked
hard at his job all the time to the very end. He was very much on top
of his job; he knew what was going on. He was a good executive -- although,
as so many others have noted, he may have placed too much trust in people
that he happened to like and that he felt were loyal to him.
MORRISSEY: Anything else you care to talk about?
SUNDQUIST: If I think of anything else, I'll add it to the record.
MORRISSEY: Thank you very much Mr. Sundquist.
[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]
List of Subjects Discussed
Acheson, Dean, 12
Arizona, Democratic party workers in, 39
Armed Forces, unification of the, 3-4, 7,
Batt, William L.,14
Bell, David E.,6, 9, 10,
Budget, Bureau of the:
Air Force, work in connection with creation of the, 34
Budget, U.S., 1952, 49-50
staff members assigned to the White House, 6
Sundquist's, J.L., job in the, 1-3
War Department general staff, work with during World War II, 33-34
White House staff, relationship with the, 4-6
California, 1956 Presidential primary campaign in, 43
Campaigns, Presidential. See Presidential campaigns
Cincinnati, Ohio, 23
Civil Defense Act of 1950, Federal, 36
Clark, Joseph S., 47
Clifford, Clark M., 2, 8, 11,
Congress, 80th, 8
Congress, messages to. See Presidential messages to
Congressional campaign, 1950, 18
Corruption, H.S.T. draft speech on, 1952, 48-49
Coyle, David Cushman, 2
Cumberland, Md., 14
Democratic National Convention, 1956, 43-45
Democratic Party, revitalization after 1952 defeat, 38-39
Dewey, Thomas E., 29
Ecker-Racz, Laszlo, 27-28
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 32-33
Elsey, George M., 9, 10, 17
Enarson, Harold L., 10
Fargo, N.D., 48
Flemming, Arthur S., 38
Florida, 1956 Presidential primary campaign in, 43
Fowler, Henry, 30
Greece and Turkey, aid to, 17
Hamilton, Charles, 22
Harriman, W. Averell, 41-47
Hechler, Kenneth, 10, 14, 18,
Hoelscher, Leonard W., 33-35
Hungry Horse Dam, H.S.T.'s 1952 speech at, 28
Kansas flood relief, 1951 Presidential message on, 16
Kefauver, Estes, 43
Kennedy, John F., 26
Keyserling, Leon, 11
Laramie, Wyoming, 12
Lausche, Frank J., 42
Lawton, Frederick J., 49
Lincoln, Mrs. Evelyn, 27
Leader, George M., 42
Lloyd, David D., 11-12, 18, 20,
McGranery, James P., 31
McKinney, Frank, 41, 44
McNarney, Gen. Joseph T., 34
Messages to Congress. See Presidential message to Congress
Meyner, Robert B., 42
Miles, Arnold, 2
Minnesota, 1956 Presidential primary campaign in, 43
"Missouri English," 25
Mitchell, Stephen A., 38-41
Mobilization as an issue in the 1952 Presidential campaign, 29
Murphy, Charles S., 6-7, 10, 11,
13, 16, 18, 21,
25, 28, 48
Navy, Department of the, consolidation with the War Department, 3-4,
Neustadt, Richard E., 6, 10, 16,
18, 19, 30-31
New Deal, 8
New England governors, 42
1950 Congressional campaign,18
1952 Presidential campaign. See Presidential campaign,
1956 Presidential campaign. See Presidential campaign,
Office of Defense Mobilization, 15, 29,
H.S.T.'s concept of the, 50
Presidential campaign, 1952:
Smith, H.D.'s concept of the Bureau of the Budget's role in the, 4-5
H.S.T.'s speech on corruption, 48-49
Presidential campaign, 1956, 41-45
H.S.T.'s speech at Hungry Horse Dam, 28-29
H.S.T.'s speeches, preparation of, 18-23, 27-28
staff for preparation of Presidential speeches, 18-19
Sundquist, J.L., joins Presidential train at Buffalo, N.Y., 20
Presidential messages to Congress:
Budget message, 1952, 40, 49
Presidential primaries, 1956, 43
relief to 1951 Kansas flood sufferers, on, 16
State of the Union message, 1947, 2, 7-9,
unification of the Armed Forces, on, 3-4, 7,
Presidential speeches (Harry S. Truman):
at Cincinnati, Ohio, 1952, 23-24
Presidents on politics, influence of former, 41-42,
on foreign policy and foreign trade, 1950, western trip, 11-14
at Hungry Horse Dam, 1952, 28
isinglass cover to protect reading copy of, 15
at Laramie, Wyoming, 1950, 12-13
1950 western trip, 7
loss of page at Cumberland, Md., 1950, 14-15
preparation of for 1950 campaign, 18
preparation of for 1952 Presidential campaign, 18-19,
Sundquist, J.L., assigned to work on, 1-2
See also State of the Union message, 1947
Reeve, Joseph E., 9
Republican Party, conduct of the 1952 Presidential campaign by the,
Reuther, Walter, 43
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 35
Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin D. (Anna Eleanor Roosevelt), 43
Roseman, Samuel I., 35-36, 42
St. Cloud, Minn., 39
Segregationists, southern, in 1956 Presidential campaign, 43
Smith, Harold, 4, 5-6, 35
Speeches, Presidential. See Presidential speeches
State of the Union Message, 1947, 2,
Steel industry, 1952 seizure by the Government, 36-37
Stevenson, Adlai S., 22, 39, 42-46
Stone, Donald C., 3
Stowe, David H., 6, 9, 10,
Sundquist, James L.:
Agriculture, joins staff of the Department of, 47.
biographical information concerning, 2-3
Budget, Bureau of the, as employee of, 1, 36
Clark, Senator Joseph S., works for, 47
Harriman, Gov. W. Averell (ICY.), as assistant to, 45-47
Office of Defense Mobilization, employed by, 15
Presidential campaign, 1952, work in, 18-25
White House, on loan to as speech writer, 1
White House staff, joins, 1
Taft, Robert A., 23-24
Transition from Truman to Eisenhower administrations, 30
Truman Doctrine, 17
Truman, Harry S.:
corruption in government, 1952 speech on, 48-49
"Truman image," 41
Cumberland, Md., 1950 speech on, 14-15
estimate of Dwight D. Eisenhower, 32-33
farewell speech to the Nation, 1953, 30-31
Harriman in 1956 Presidential campaign, support of W.A.., 41-44.
Kansas flood relief, 1951 message to Congress on, 16
Mitchell, Stephen A., relationship with, 40-41
in the 1952 Presidential campaign, 18-27, 48-49
in the 1956 Presidential campaign, 42-45
on 1950 western tour, 7, 11-14
politics, his influence on, after leaving the Presidency, 41-42
preparation of Presidential speeches for, 18-20
role of Bureau of the Budget in the administration of, 5-6
seizure of the steel industry, 1952, 36-37
and the State of the Union message, 1947, 17
Truman, Margaret, 23
Turkey and Greece, aid to, 17
Unification of the Armed Forces, 3-4, 7,
Van Devander, Charles, 18
War Department, consolidation with the Navy Department, 3-4,
Webb, James E., 2, 8
White House staff:
during last years of the Truman administration, 10
Williams, G. Mennen, 42
and 1947 State of the Union message, 7-9
relationship with the Bureau of the Budget staff, 4,
Wilson, Charles E., 36-37
[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]