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John S. Service Oral History Interview, Appendicies

Oral History Interview with
John S. Service

Political adviser to the Commander in Chief of American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater, 1943-45; executive officer to the political adviser to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Far East, 1945-46; First Secretary of the American Legation, Wellington, New Zealand, 1946-48.

Berkeley, California
by the University of California Bancroft Library/Berkeley Regional Oral History Office (Rosemary Levenson interviewer)

Appendicies

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional John S. Service Chapters]


Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview donated to the Harry S. Truman Library. The reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word, although some editing was done.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
All uses of this manuscript are covered by a legal agreement between the Regents of the University of California and John S. Service, dated March 7, 1980.

No part of the manuscript may be quoted for publication without the written permission of the Director of The Bancroft Library of the University of California. Requests for permission to quote for publication should be addressed to the Regional Oral History Office, 486 Library, and should include identification of the specific passages to be quoted, anticipated use of the passages, and identification of the user. The legal agreement with John S. Service requires that he be notified of the request and allowed thirty days in which to grant or deny permission.

It is recommended that this oral history be cited as follows:

John S. Service, "State Department Duty in China, The McCarthy Era, and After, 1933-1977," an oral history conducted 1977-1978 by Rosemary Levenson, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981.

Opened March, 1980
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional John S. Service Chapters]



Oral History Interview with
John S. Service

Berkeley, California
October 24, 1977
by the University of California Bancroft Library/Berkeley Regional Oral History Office (Rosemary Levenson interviewer)

Appendicies

[516]

TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIALS

Partial genealogy of the Service family 2a,b

Letter from Roy Service, 02, to the California Monthly. January, 1927 18a,b

A directory of foreigners resident in Chengtu, January, 1919. 25a

[Chinese names of denominations omitted. Ed.] Boggs and Service family photographs 31a

Letter from Grace Boggs Service to her mother describing preparations for an ethnographic trip into Tibet, plus some fashion notes. July 29, 1921 41a-c

Family, school, and college photographs 66a

Ratings on John S. Service's written and oral examinations for the Foreign 93a,b

Service, 1932-1933 General information concerning the Yunnanfu consular district. 104a

Revised, February 1, 1931 Notice of appointment as Foreign Service officer, unclassified, October, 1935 114a

Yunnanfu, Peking, Shanghai, and Chungking photographs 132a

Congratulations on promotion from the division of Far Eastern Affairs, 142a

signed by John Carter Vincent, Stanley K. Hornbeck, et al. , April 15, 1935 Dinner honoring Clarence Edward Gauss: Menu from the Columbia Country 142b

Club, Shanghai, March 30, 1940 Letters of commendation from John B. Sawyer and Clarence Gauss, 1941 153a

Letter from John S. Service to Caroline and Mother, Shanghai, April 7, 1941 158a,b

John S. Service's place card from dinner given by Chiang Kai-shek to honor 165a

Nelson T. Johnson. Personal card, China-Burma-India theater Excerpts from Stanley K. Hornbeck s memorandum on Service's despatch 228a-c

of January 23, 1944. July 27, 1944 Certificate from H.Q. U.S. Army Forces, China-Burma-India theater 266a

[517]

The Dixie Mission, and Ambassador Hurley with Mao Tse-tung and 282a

Chou En-lai, photographs Letter to John Davies from John S. Service, February 14, 1945 306a

Letter from John S. Service to his mother, written from a Washington jail, 313a

July 27, 1945 Editorial on Grand Jury's unanimous decision that Service had no charges to 328a

answer in Amerasia case. Washington Post, August 21, 1945 Theodore White's testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 338a-d

U.S. Senate, 79th Congress, December 10, 1945. United States-China Relations, Washington, 1971 "Senators Told of Tampering with State Department Secret Files" 348a
S
David McConnell, New York Herald Tribune, February 5, 1953 Speech of Senator Joseph McCarthy: Wisconsin Retail Food Dealers 365a

Association, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 6, 1950. And Service and McCarthy departing Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June, 1950 Excerpt of remarks by Herve J. L'Heureux, chairman of the executive 367a

committee, Foreign Service Association, in support of Jack Service, March 29, 1950 Four sample cards from the Service index to the Tydings Committee 377a

hearings John S. Service to the Secretary of State. Formal request to have his name 384a

removed from the promotion list: March 23, 1951 Letter from John S. Service to his mother describing the Loyalty Review 388a

Board hearings, November 10, 1951 John S. Service's press release on his dismissal from the Foreign Service, 392a

December 13, 1951 State Department press release, ibid. 392b Transcript of Eric Sevareid's radio talk, December 14, 1951 394a-c

"They Fought Communism and Were Smeared." National Wage Earner, 401a Vol. 2, #9, p. 25, October, 1951 Collage of newspaper headlines on Service firing, December, 1951 402a

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Notarized letter from Annalee Jacoby (Fadiman) to John S. Service 404a,b

testifying to her knowledge of the birth of Valentine (Yun-ju) Chao's baby in New York, September 19, 1946, seventeen months after Service left China "McCarthy Reveals Review Board 'Transcript' Hitting State Department" 405a

Washington Post, January 6, 1952 History of SARCO 410a

Mrs. Grace Boggs Service s death announcement and poem, written by her, March, 1943. Died October 20, 1954 423a

Letter from Caroline Service to her mother, describing the United States Supreme Court hearings, April 1, 1957 434a-c

Statement of John S. Service prepared in advance of the Supreme Court decision, June 17, 1957 435a

Berkeley and China photographs 460a

"Security Case Star Works at UC Center" Tocsin: The West's Leading Anti-Communist Weekly, February 11, 1965, Vol. 6, #5, p. l 470a

Obituary of Chou En-lai by John S. Service, Los Angeles Times, 480a,b

January 14, 1976 New Yorker advertisement featuring E.J. Kahn Jr.'s profile of 488a

John S. Service, April 6, 1972 "Some Questions for John Stewart Service," suggested by Concerned Voters 491a

Honorary degree citation, LL.D, Oberlin College, May, 1977 513a,b

[519]

NOTE:  Appendix I – PAGES 519, 520, 521, 522 will be added in the near future

 

[523]

APPENDIX 11

SARCO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

Clearances of JSS

A.  Judicial

1.  Grand Jury, August 1945, unanimous no-bill after testimony by JSS

(Parenthetically, Ed, there s a point here that might be relevant to some of MacGuineas' statements before the Circuit Court and to some of the discussion between the Justices and MacGuineas in the Supreme Court:  you will recall that my legal ownership of my copies of the memoranda and reports involved was recognized by the fact that the Department of Justice returned to me personally after the Grand Jury action.)

2.  There was also the Special Grand Jury in New York that "ran away" with an investigation of the Amerasia Case in the Spring of 1950.  So far as I know the only information on their proceedings is their Presentment of June 15, 1950.  No mention is made of me but note sub-paragraph (d):  

"The Grand Jury has also found no evidence to Indicate that the Department of Justice was remiss in its presentation of the case".

The easiest source on this is the Tydings Report, pages 136-7.

3.  District Court proceedings and opinion in my case, June, 1955

4.  Circuit Court proceedings and opinion, 1956

5. Supreme Court 22", 1957

This, I admit, is stretching a long bow. "That I am thinking of is the Govt's stout affirmation before all three Courts that my case did not involve either loyalty or security. This was accepted inferentially by the District Court, specifically by the Circuit...and we await the "Supreme.  At any rate, this argument of the Government's that my case was not one of loyalty or security may be a useful one to turn against them in case of need.

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SARCO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

B. Legislative

1.  Senate:  Committee on Foreign Relations.  December 1945.  Hearings on charges by Patrick J. Hurley against JS and other Foreign Service officers.   Service defended by Secretary of State Byrnes.  Charges found unsubstantiated.

2.  House:  Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary (the "Hobbs Committee").

Investigated Amerasia case and handling of it from April (?) to October, 1946.  Heard witnesses including Larson, bit not JS.  I don't have a copy at hand.  But the tenor of the Subcommittee's findings were that:  no agency or officer of the Government was at fault in any way in the handling and disposition of the case.

3.  House:  Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. January (?), 1949.

During hearings on State Appropriations, Scripps-Howard got hold of the story that I was serving on the Selection Board.  The Subcommittee raised the question and finally devoted considerable time to testimony from Peurifoy, Ravndal (Director Gen. of the foreign Service) and the "State Dept. Security Chief.  Their conclusion was that I was OK but that State's "public relations" may have been questionable in putting me in the spot. Later, one of the Republican members (Stefan of Nebraska) was apparently interested in meeting me, had me to lunch at the Capitol restaurant, said that the Committee was fully satisfied and he was sure I would not have any trouble in future.  All this of no particular relevance.  But I think the Hearings, which are in the Committee's public record and which dealt exhaustively with me (though I personally was not called) can legitimately count as an investigation and clearance.

There follow a number of investigations by various Congressional Committee.  These are enumerated and described on pages 6 to 9 of the Tyding's Report.  They dealt generally with "loyalty" in the State Department.  However, most or all of them had access to the files (including loyalty) and it may therefore be assumed that my case was included.

4.  House:  Subcommittee of Committee on Appropriations.  Investigators  "given free access to State Department files, including loyalty files".   Public Discussion on the Record, Jan. 23 and 29, 1943.

5.  House:  Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.  Hearings on March 10 and 12, 1948, regarding handling of loyalty cases by State.  Testimony  by Peurifoy and Robinson.

6.  House:  Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee of One - Congressman Bartel J. Jonkman.  Investigated "communism" in the State Dept. and reported (August 2, 1948) that "known or reasonably suspected subversives, Communists, fellow travelers, sympathizers,  and persons whose services are not for the best interests of the United States, have been swept out…of State Department".  )

 

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SARCO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

Legislative - 2

7.  Senate:  Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, March 23, 1948. Questioning of Secretary Marshall.

The Tydings Committee summary of these investigations:

"..the amazing spectacle of four different committees of the 80th Congress ... having considered the very same files and information which provided the predicate for the McCarthy charges—with none of these committees so much as regarding the situation as one meriting a report or citing a single State Department employee as disloyal".  

Still, perhaps, not specific enough to count as investigation and clearance of JS?

8.  Senate:  Subcommittee of Committee on Foreign Relations (Tydings Committee) July 20, 1950.  One minority (Lodge) issued separate report but "cleared" Service.  Other minority member (Hickenlooper)made no report.

9. Senate:  Committee on Government Operations (McCarthy).  Sept. 3, 1953, Executive hearing.  This is hardly a "clearance" (except that McCarthy apparently was convinced that I was not acting as under-cover CIA man) but might well be included in a list of  "harassment by Congressional Committee."

There are also a number of Senate Actions which, technically, might be construed as clearances.  Commissions and Promotions in the Foreign Service require Senate confirmation, which of course, means approval first by Committee on Foreign Relations and then the Senate. There have been at least two such instances since 1945.  There was no dissenting vote in either case.

10.  Senate:  Confirmation as First Secretary, September, 1946.

11. Senate: Confirmation of Promotion to Class 2, April, 1948

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SARCO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

C.  Administrative

1.  August, 1945, hearing by Board of Foreign Service Personnel (Deputy Sec. for Administration – Holmes; Chief of Foreign Service Personnel – Davis; and Director of the Office of the Foreign Service – Chapin).  Hearing was after Grand Jury action.  Board recommended return to active duty and assignment in Far East.  Action approved by Secretary Byrnes and Under Sec. Grew.   However, in discussion of Amerasia case and relations with Jaffe, Service conceded violation of State Department regulations.  Although returned to active duty, Service was put on probation pending further reports from field and review.  Technically, this involved a nominal efficiency rating of "satisfactory"

2.  At some later date, I believe early in 1946, the Board of Foreign Service Personnel (this was the top board then…this was before the F.S. Act and its creation of the Board of the Foreign Service) did review my case (presumably in the light of further reports and investigation), restored my normal efficiency rating, and thus removed the probation and completed its clearance.

3.  1946.  Service case was considered and cleared by State loyalty-security organs (Peurifoy testimony before House Subcommittee on Appropriations:  see Legislative – 3).  This may possibly have been the same action as mentioned just above.  However, as Peurifoy was speaking of loyalty-security, it was more likely the "Advisory Committee on Personnel Security" (ACOPS) which was set up by the Department on July 25, 1946…20 days after the original passage of the McCarran Bider.  See Tydings Report, pages 15 and 16. 

4.  1947.  Service again investigated and cleared by State loyalty-security apparatus (Peurifoy testimony, see above).  This action was presumably subsequent to E.O. 98355.

5.  1949:  Service again cleared (by LSB).   According to State Department press releases at the time, it was this clearance which was before the LRB for post-audit when McCarthy started off.

6.  1950:   LSB reached its decision in June?  We were informed of this decision but I'm not able to find whether it was officially approved by the Deputy Under-Secretary.  

7.  1950, October 24: LSB reaffirmed its clearance after considering further reports and this decision confirmed by Humelsine.

8.  1951, July 31:  LSB reconsidered case under E.O. 10241 and their clearance
confirmed by Humelsine.

[527]

APPENDIX 111

OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON , O. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1950

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Service:

Under date of March 21, 1947, the President issued Executive Order 9835 prescribing procedures for the administration of an Employee Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government.  Under date of March 11, 1949, the Department of State promulgated regulations and procedures, a copy of which is attached, setting forth the revised loyalty and security principles and procedures relating to employees of the
Department of State.

In the course of investigations conducted pursuant to this loyalty and security program certain information has been received by the Department of State which, after initial consideration by the Loyalty Security Board of the Department of State, necessitates the formulation of a charge against you.

The specific charges are that within the meaning of Section 392.2.f of Regulations and Procedures of the Department of State, you are a member of, or in sympathetic association with, the Communist Party which has been designated by the Attorney General as an organization which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means; and further that within the meaning of Section 393.1.d of said Regulations and Procedures you are a person who has habitual or close association with persons known or believed to be in the category set forth in Section
393.l.e  of said Regulations and Procedures to an extent which would justify the conclusion that you night through such association, voluntarily or involuntarily, divulge classified information without authority.

A hearing

Mr. John Stewart Service,
Department of State,
Washington. D. C.

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-2-

A hearing has been scheduled tinder Section 395 of the Regulations and Procedures of the Department of State in order to consider this charge, with a view to making a recommendation to the Secretary of State whether or not, under the provisions of the Department of State Appropriation Act, 1950, Section 104, Public Law 179, 81st Congress, First Session, your employment in the Department should be terminated in the interest of the United States.

You are hereby notified and afforded an opportunity of appearing at such a hearing to be held by the Loyalty Security Board at 10:00 A.M. on April 20, 1950, in Room 2254, New State Department Building, Washington, D.C.  You will be in regular duty and pay status pending the outcome of this hearing.

You are also informed that it is your privilege to reply to these charges in writing before the date set for your hearing or to appear before the Loyalty Security Board at this hearing, to be accompanied, if you so desire, by counsel or representative of your own choosing, and to present evidence in your own behalf, through witness or by affidavit.

In the event you desire further details in order adequately to prepare your answer to this charge, the undersigned is available to discuss the matter with you and your representative.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

 

Conrad E. Snow

Chairman
Loyalty Security Board

Enclosures:
Regulations and Procedures of the Department of State,
Notice regarding Evidence.

[529]

IMPORTANT NOTICE
TO THE EMPLOYEE

Any and all evidence which you desire to submit in connection with the matter under consideration should be submitted at the hearing before the Loyalty Security Board.  No additional testimony may, as of right, be introduced into the record on any subsequent appeal, and on such appeals additional testimony will be received only in exceptional circumstances and in the discretion of the appeal Board.  It is essential, therefore, that you should take care to present all of your evidence, including your own testimony, to the Loyalty Security Board at the hearing before that Board if you wish the same to be thereafter considered in the event of an appeal.

[530]

APPENDIX IV

2226 Decatur Place, NW
Washington, D.C.
May 16, 1951

Dear John Carter:

A man in my position knows little of what goes on behind the scenes.  But a new development (or "snag") has occurred.   I think this may be an attempt by Humelsine (directly or thru SY) to contact you in regard to some remarks which I made to Humelsine.  Therefore I owe it to you to let you know the background.  The explanation will necessarily be lengthy and, I fear, rambling.  Please bear with me. 

From the beginning of my case (commencing with McCarthy's accusations in March, 1950), my lawyer and I have felt that it was desirable to keep you out as much as possible.  It was, of course, impossible to avoid mentioning you in factual connections—you were head of CA or FE at a certain period, you authorized my off the record talk to the IPR meeting in Washington in 1944, etc.  But because of the nature of the McCarthy attacks on you, it didn't seem wise (from your interest, my interest or the interest of the Department) to bring your name into the proceedings any more than absolutely necessary.

Currie, however, was far more important to a full presentation of my case—particularly for background on the vital issue of giving information regarding the situation in China to journalists and writers.  We realized that for any public, political forum (such as the Tydings Committee), any testimony from Lauch would be depreciated because of the Bentley accusations against him.  But the Loyalty Board hearings were to be confidential and Lauch's White House position would have given his testimony considerable importance.

My lawyer (Ed Rhetts—plenty savvy and I'm convinced the best I could have had) and I talked first to Ben Cohen, who was pessimistic as regards Lauch.  We went to Lauch anyway—and got what amounted to a flat refusal to be of any help at all.  Faced with this, we had no choice but to play down this aspect of the case and even to duck questions by Board members that might leads us into it to the extent of specifying names (I assume you have the full 2 volume transcript of the Tydings Hearings—see page 2329).

Of course this was not the only disability I worked under.  The temper of the times, the delicacy of some of the issues involved and the difficulty in getting people to testify on such matters as provision of background information, the death of potential witnesses such as Stilwell and George Atcheson, the fact that practically everyone connected with China has already been smeared, the refusal of Pat Hurley to appear (before either Loyalty Board or Tydings Comm.), the unavailability of witnesses such as Jaffee (and their certain refusal to talk if available), the unavailability of the FBI's

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"confidential informants" (at least one of whom we are certain is an FSO)—there is no need to go on cataloguing them.

But despite all this we had a strong case and they reached their firs favorable decision immediately after the hearings ended in late June, 1950.  Before the Tydings Committee we were somewhat more hobbled and, in effect, plead "justifiable indiscretion".  This certainly made things easier for the Democrat majority, which of course was under terrific "whitewash" pressure from McCarthy and his supporters.  Under the circumstances, it is hard to see that we could have done otherwise.  Unfortunately, the admission of indiscretion is going to plague me:  it was emphasized in both the Majority and Senator Dodge's reports although they both absolved me of disloyalty.

Perhaps it will be useful if I take time out here to give a chronology of developments.  McCarthy's charges were mid-March, 1950.  I got back to Washington at the end of March.  Advice was to prepare a full and completely documented case.  For various reasons that took a lot of time.  We commenced Loyalty Board hearings (before the State Dept Board) about May 20 and they lasted until late June.  Tydings Committee hearings were also in late June.  The favorable Tydings findings were announced on July 18.  But as soon as the State Board told me (informally) that they had reached a favorable verdict, they were forced to hold things up because the FBI turned in a new report (associating me with various people I'd never heard of).  That took more investigation.  Finally in October, 1950, the State Board again affirmed its favorable decision.  The file then went to Humelsine for his approval before being passed to the Loyalty Review Board for the ultimate clearance.  It took Humelsine until the end of November to "finish reviewing the file".  Meanwhile the Scripps-Howard fuss over Angus Ward's being "exiled" to Africa, and the elections had taken place.  Humelsine passed the file.  But whereas in October I had been told I was definitely going to New Delhi (the change to which from Calcutta had already been publicly approved by McCarthy because I would not be in charge), I now had my assignment cancelled.  I also received, indirectly but through responsible channels, what I took to be a feeler as to whether or not I considered resignation.  My attitude was that a resignation at this time would be disastrous to both me and the Dept, because it be used by McCarthy as a victory and proof of his charges.  It was decided that I would go to a quiet, class 3 post in Africa.

Humelsine's original attitude had been that I would go to my post as soon as he approved the case and sent it on the Loyalty Review Board.  Now he dropped that, but was very sure that the LRB would act quickly and that I might be at my post "before the end of the year" (1950).  Nothing came out of the LRB.  In February, McCarthy came up with some Chinese "secret intelligence reports" (excerpts published via Fulton Lewis, Jr.) and it became apparent that the stalemate was due to the FBI still investigating.

At the beginning of March, Bert Andrews (NY Herald-Trib) came out with his story:  "Acheson, Truman Split", based largely on your Tangier assignment and my non-clearance.  The Dept's reaction, as far as I was

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involved, was to drop the Africa assignment and decide on assigning me temporarily to Washington, with a job in some division such as Central Services.  The idea being that as soon as the case is finished I go out again to a foreign post.  Any FSO can understand (much better I'm afraid than Humelsine) some of the problems and costs involved in this business of kicking a family around.  Our children are already in their fourth school in 3 years.  Caroline appears to be on the narrow edge of a nervous breakdown.

It was at this period that I had a private talk with Pete Martin.  I felt that I knew Pete well (I had a good deal of close association with him when I was in FP in 1949) and I thought I could trust his discretion.  He has always appeared to be "on my side".  Since Humelsine is hard to see (and because of having to act officially for the Secretary should not be placed in the position of having much personal contact with me), and because people like Durbrow (Chief of FP) are without authority and know little about the developments in cases like mine, Pete has been my chief contact with the powers-that-be.  Our talk was on the new developments and what the Dept expected to do about them (see preceding paragraph).  I sought a course which meant a little more consideration, not so much for me as for the family.  Alternatives I saw were:  to let the New Delhi assignment stand (it was an assignment that made sense and Henderson and NRA objected to cancellation); to go ahead at once with another foreign assignment (there is no regulation or requirement that I be kept in Washington, at least make it a regular assignment with some assurance that we can get a house, unpack and keep the children for a settled period in school. Pete, to give him his due, was genuinely sympathetic.  But, dropping the personal and taking on what I assumed to be the reflection of the official view of this boss, the result was nil.  "Appropriation hearings, with McC on the Senate Subcommittee, are going to be very tough.  Things are going to continue getting worse, not better, for the next two years.  The Dept had to pull its horns in, and keep them in.  Acheson's defense of Hiss had been his greatest mistake; Peurifoy's defense of me was also a mistake."  The justice of this, I could go along with in general.  But I still thought it to the Dept's advantage to try to bring my case to an early end and to get me out of Washington and to work (for a year at this point, I had not done a lick of work).  Pete's counter to that was that my case was a very difficult one and he clearly inferred that my serious indiscretion and poor judgment had caused H to have grave doubts and made it hard for him to pass me.  He thought I had to be kept around Washington because new hearings or investigations were likely.

At this—I shall always regret—I mildly blew my top.  Certainly I had been, and had always admitted indiscretion.  But that indiscretion had been known to and clearance given despite it by numerous State Dept Boards and officials commencing with the Personnel Board in August, 1945:  the recent hearings hadn't changed that picture, or contributed to an enlargement of the facts which had been known.  Furthermore, the Dept knew (or should know) that there was a background to the case, purposely not developed by me for what seemed to be the interests of the Administration and all of us, which might modify the judgment.  That background was

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that I had been used as an active proponent of the CBI Theater point of view, that I had had specific instructions from a White House assistant (Currie) from time to time in regard to giving publicity to the actual situation in China, that these general facts were known to some of my superiors in the State Department who recognized the need of preparing public opinion in the US for the changes going on in China and either had an implicit policy of permitting, or at least made no objection to free discussion of the China situation.  I had not sought anyone's instructions or approval of talking to Jaffe and Gayn but my relations with them were of the same character as with many others, in the field and here."

I apologized to Pete for blowing off steam.  He said that he understood the matter and that it would remain between us.  About two weeks later, Humelsine calls me in (with Pete present) and wants me to repeat.  I replied that of course I would not withhold any information which he, in his position, wanted; but that I was sorry that the matter had been raised because I had intentionally kept it out of my case because of the danger—to the Dept as well as me—of distortion and misunderstanding in the present atmosphere.  Here, as well as I can remember, is what I said (omitting the Army aspect which has no relevance to you). 

At the end of 1942 I came back to the US after my four months trip thru the Northwest of China considerably steamed up over what I considered to be the dangers to the war effort and long-range US interests of the developing situation in China.  In Chungking, you had said that I should see Lauch (then White House man on China).  I had done so and found C much interested and apparently in complete agreement.  At Lauch's initiative an association began which lasted until 1945.  He asked that I write letters directly to him on the situation in China after my return.  He had asked me to call his attention to noteworthy or interesting reports so that he could check to see whether he had received them.  He was perturbed over the effects of the Madame's visit (and Chinese propaganda generally) and said that the White House wanted to set a "backfire".  He discussed the problem of getting more authoritative uncensored news of China into the press and mentioned three methods.  He was able (and in this connection mentioned an assistant named Greenburg) to see that appropriate things got out.  He was encouraging newsmen, commentators, etc. to go to China (even if only on brief trips) and when these arrived with any introduction from him, I should feel free to be rank in giving them the whole picture.  He wanted me to talk to several commentators in Washington (specifically Pearson was one—and as I remember it, he made the arrangements).  I had felt uneasy about the business of writing direct to Currie and had discussed it with you.  Your reply was to the general effect:  "Your not very well able to refuse a direct request of a White House assistant and if that's the way the WH wants to operate, you had better go along."  As time went on, I noted a number of instances of use of material originally written by me by writers who I had never met.  A long memo I wrote in Chungking in June, 1944, on the weaknesses of the KMT was "passed around" at an IPR conference.  Several writers told me quite frankly

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5

that had been seeing some of my reports. My long-standing and positive views were well known.  No restraint was placed (in 1943, 1944 or 1945) on my expressing them freely to damn near every government agency in Washington.  The Dept referred a number of newspapermen to me.  They approved my talking to the IFR in 1944 (your permission) and in 1945 (Ed Stanton), although writers were present and used the material (of course without attribution).  The fact was well known that I had assisted in getting Brooks Atkinson's stories on the Stillwell recall into the country but I had received no admonition and the story had been passed on White House OK.  A press conference had been arranged by the Dept for Ludden to tell about his trip in the guerrilla country.  In addition to the more positive indications that I had received from Lauch (and the Army), I therefore believed that the Dept (certainly CA and to some extent FE) had an implicit policy of wanting the facts about China known.  Since these facts could not help but be critical of CKS and Company, any such policy would have to be implicit and indirect—through giving background information—rather than open.  I therefore asked no specific authority but continued as I had been doing and as I thought it was known that I was doing. 

Gayn was a well known magazine writer and author and had been obviously (from his articles) been seeing some of my reports.  Amerasia was a specialist magazine with considerable authority.  It had also apparently had access to my material.  Both supported the Gauss-Stilwell attitude on China.  They were friendly with a bunch of young IPR and young ONI and CA people whom I also knew.  The subjects they were interested in were normal news material of the time and were coming into the public domain by articles and books written by men who had been to Yenan.  The same material had been used repeatedly by me in semi-public talks as to the IPR.  These memos I let Jaffe read (and unfortunately borrow for a few days because he claimed he had to return to New York and couldn't read then and there) had been circulated widely and I had reason to believe been read by other newsmen.  There was nothing secretive, or in my mind, improper in the association.

I made it clear that I did not claim that the contacts with Gayn and Jaffe were authorized or under any instructions, but that I had no information at the time to cause me to believe that the Amerasia operation was a phoney or that giving them background in the way I did was in conflict with what I took to be an understood policy.

H said little but seemed to feel that my failure to have testimony from Lauch (and perhaps substantiation from you) had left me in an unfavorable position.  My attitude was that I didn't want it and had been cleared without it. It was an area better left untouched.

To my astonishment, a couple of FBI agents call on me about a week later and start asking questions on the Currie angle which obviously indicated that H had made some sort of a report.  The agents were of the usual type and clearly unable to grasp the China picture objectively.  I simply refused to discuss the subject but insisted twice that I knew nothing in the matter that had any bearing as far as I could see on the 

[535]

6

question of loyalty or the commission of any crime; and that it concerned only policy regarding giving background info to the press.  Greenberg I had never met, and could say nothing about.  On Currie I knew absolutely nothing that could throw any light, as far as I could see, on the Bentley accusations as I had read of them in the press.  They did not press the matter and went on to various other things (such as an accusation that I'm the father of a child by an old friend in Chungking born 17 months after I left that city and saw the woman for the last time).  However, I understand that they have included some reference to the conversation in a report to the Loyalty Board but merely saying that I refused to discuss it—omitting my repeated statements that I refused on the basis that it had no bearing on the question of loyalty of any of the individuals concerned.

Well, that the story.  Humelsine's action is completely inexplicable to me.  One logical assumption seems to be that LC is worse medicine than I had any idea of.  Greenberg, at least, seems to be pretty well tagged.  So instead of an association with a White House assistant (and the association being known to the head of CA) being a help to a junior FSO, it looks as though the association may yet prove to have been a harmful one.

It goes without saying that this letter had best be destroyed.  Perhaps it had better not have been written; but your being uninformed on how this developed has caused me some sleepless nights.

Cheers,

PS.  I told Humelsine of the reasons why I had refused to discuss this business with FBI.  He made no comment.

 

[536]

APPENDIX V

WASHINGTON
REPORT

By Fulton Lewis Jr.
Copyright 1951 King Features Synd., Inc.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13.  Chiang Kai-shek has had a wily crew of Chinese counter- intelligence agents on his pay roll for a number of years now whose principal assignment was keeping track of State Department officials and other Americans who traveled to China to hold hands with Communists there.

Senator Pat McCarran, Nevada Democrat, who is setting up a staff designed once and for all to wring out the Reds on the Federal payroll, might be able to borrow some of Chiang's files.  The State Department probably would again cut off military aid to Chiang if McCarran did get access to the files, but it might be worth it in the long run.

For instance, one document in a strong box on Formosa, where Chiang is holed in with a 400,000-man army, is particularly interesting in the light of a lot of testimony by certain State Department officials regarding their activities in China.

John Stewart Service, one of the State Department diplomats arrested by the FBI in the Amerasia case, but later released; Philip Jaffe, convicted of possessing top secret State Department files, and a number of others who figured in the Tydings whitewash investigation of Reds in the Government received considerable attention from Chiang's footpads.

A copy of the document is already in senatorial hands.  It makes interesting reading.  For instance, it relates how an intelligence agent in a United States embassy in China kept peddling secrets to the Communists for transmittal to Vassili  M. Zubelin, chief secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Other details in the report which lists the license number of automobiles used by Americans on inland trips in China to confer with the Communists, disclose the activities of Communist women and their American boy friends.

The report, translated from Chinese into English several days ago by experts In the Library of Congress, gives particular attention to one feminine operative.

This Mata Hari wandered from bar to bed all over China, concentrating on Americans who looked like soft touches for the Chinese Communists.  Some were not so hard to persuade.

This woman is the present wife of a Chinese Communist who was in the United States not long ago as a member of the nine-man Communist cease-fire delegation from Peiping to the United Nations.  Mama stayed home. She was busy.

The loyal Chinese intelligence agents on Chiang's payroll describe her in words of Oriental understatement, thus:

"Using her title as a newspaper correspondent, along with others, she frequently ran about among the personnel of the various embassies in China, the American news office, and the correspondents of various nations in order to ferret out information, even sacrificing without compunction womanly qualities in order to accomplish the mission.  A particular objective of hers was ---."  Until such time as the document is made part of an official record the names will not be printed here.

One or two State Department officials at the Tydings fiasco admitted knowing the woman, one even admitted being on friendlier terms with her husband.

The Nationalist Chinese intelligence report, one of several dozen in and around Washington, doesn't overlook Owen Lattimore.  This Baltimore sage got a daily workout from Senator Joseph R. McCarthy for his part in the China blunder.  He is slated for another go-around before the McCarran subcommittee, principally about two of his acquaintances in China, Chiao Mu and Kung Peng, two characters who never got near a Chinese laundry but who know all about the Moscow part in the betrayal of China.

Lattimore was in on the ground floor of the sellout, but it is hard to locate any large cries of alarms he ever uttered about the danger of Communists seizing power in China.  He was the late President Roosevelt' s political adviser on China, In 1941, but didn't stay in China long. Chiang Kai-shek couldn't stand him, and told Roosevelt so.  As a reward, Lattimore was made head of the Pacific Office of War Information.  In 1944 he traveled to China with Henry Wallace. While there he was busy visiting his old pals. The Chinese intelligence report goes into detail about the visits, but I shall go into that another day.

The State Department and its China "experts" have spent many a day kicking Chiang Kat-shek around.  It wouldn't be surprising if Chiang stepped up now for a little revenge. The sweetest way, to get it is to dump some of his secret file data about our Government officials who wandered around China playing ball with the Communists.  Senator McCarthy has a big basket handy…

[537]

APPENDIX VI

". . . pertinent excerpts. . ."

By John S. Service

(John S. Service, born in China of American parents, was graduated from Oberlin College, B.A. in 1931.  He joined the Foreign Service in 1933, first as clerk, and in 1935 after examination as Vice Consul and Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, assigned Peiping as language officer.  He served continuously in the Far East until 1946, then at Wellington, New Zealand until assigned to the Department in 1948.  Posted as Counselor at New Delhi in March 1950, he was recalled when enroute to India and is now on duty in the Department in the Office of Operating Facilities.)

The JOURNAL has commented generally on the current threat to the integrity and independence of Foreign Service reporting which can result from investigative autopsies without regard to context, either in time, substance or circumstance.  No less ominous is that type of public investigation which by "interpretation" ascribes to a report a meaning completely unwarranted or opposite to the writer's intent and language.

A recent example of both techniques is the treatment a few weeks ago (September 19, 1951) by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee of a memorandum I wrote in April, 1944.

First, some background is necessary.  In the Spring of 1944, I was a relatively junior officer—FSO VII—attached to the staff of the Commanding General of the China-Burma-India Theater, then General Stilwell.  Popularly (but never officially) called a "political adviser," my duties consisted of many minor chores and very occasionally providing a little advice.  A fully operating Embassy was just down the road and routine liaison between it and Headquarters was one of my regular duties.  Ambassador ?Gauss, by specific instruction of General Stilwell, received a copy of everything I wrote and any advice I might give the Army was always known to the embassy.

During this Spring of 1944, there was a flurry of excitement in Chungking over a border incident in the remote Central Asian Chinese province of Sinkiang.  Sometime before, the USSR—for reasons not relevant here—had withdrawn its longstanding protection of a local warlord and the Chinese national Government, for the first time, had assumed de facto control.

The shift in administration was amicable and the local situation peaceful.  Nonetheless, the National Government, despite a still unchecked Japanese threat in China proper, proceeded to send several divisions of troops into the province.

Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang

The need for this foray was not readily apparent:  the war with Japan was a very long distance in the opposite direction.  There appeared to be some basis for the gossip-report from Kuomintang circles that the intention was to create a military base for post-war establishment of Chinese control over Outer Mongolia and Tibet and to provide an "impregnable bulwark" against Russia.

There is no space here to detail the "pipe dream" aspects—politically, economically or logistically—of Sinkiang as a Chinese military bastion to dominate Central Asia.  Whatever their objective, the Chinese soon began having troubles—as might have been predicted from their comparatively large scale invasion of a poor and sparsely settled desert country, with a limited and non-expansible oasis-nomad economy, and a population some 95 percent non-Chinese.

One difficulty was with the Kazaks, a hardy nomad tribe living on both sides of the Sinkiang-Outer Mongolia frontier.  Chinese official sources reported in march, 1944, that planes "bearing a red star insignia" had committee repeated acts of aggression by bombing Chinese forces in this area.  Tass, reporting from Ulan Bator, presented an opposite account:  the Chinese were the aggressors.

While a battle of communiqués raged, the National Government plied the Army Headquarters with requests to send American officers to the spot to investigate and fix the blame.  Headquarters was puzzles:  we were fighting the Japanese—not the Kazaks, Outer Mongols or Russians; how to transport American investigators into that remotest part of Central Asia; and, by the time they got there, would a few shell or bomb craters on the vast Gobi mean much?  I was told to watch the situation and "advise." 

This was not easy from Chungking.  After struggling with daily-different reports, I hit on the idea of comparing the best available maps:  American, Chinese, British, Russian and any others.  To my surprise there was the wildest disagreement on this particular section of Sinkiang.  Even some official Chinese maps did not support the Chinese boundary claim.  The "aggressor" depended on which map you used.

We could assume Russian sponsorship of the Outer Mongolian action.  But how immediately important was a sharply defined line in this un-mapped, open and semi-desert country, containing no permanent settlement worthy of the name and peopled by nomads continually moving back and forth with the pasture and seasons?

I questioned the motives behind the Chinese request.  To have given no inkling of the vagueness of the border was less than forthright.  Chinese policies in Sinkiang had dangers which made our involvement seem unwise.  Finally, we had enough problems in our relations with Russia in early 1944 without an added controversy of doubtful validity and certain futility.

I could not see that American interests would be served by our intervention.  They might be harmed.  I recommended that we decline the Chinese request to investigate.

China, Russia and the United States

I had written a series of reports on the border incident.  In my final memorandum on the subject, I related my recommendation to the broader aspects of the situation in Sinkiang and then went on to some general remarks concerning China, Russia and the United States.  The following is the relevant passage, dated April 7, 1944 (Italics have been added; their significance will be apparent later.)

Preprinted from FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, October 1951

[538]

"We must be concerned with Russian plans and policies in Asia because they are bound to affect our own plans in the same area.  But our relations with Russia in Asia are at present only a subordinate part of our political and military relations with Russia in Europe in the over-all United Nations war effort and post-war settlement.  We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are.  A good way of gaining material relevant to this will be a careful study of the strength, attitudes, and popular support of the Chinese Communists.  But in determining our policy toward Russian in Asia we should avoid being swayed by China.  The initiative must be kept firmly in our hands.  To do otherwise will be to let the tail wag the dog.

"As for the present Chinese Government, it must be acknowledged that we are faced with a regrettable failure of statesmanship.  Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies—or lack of them—are accelerating economic collapse and increasing intern al dissention, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism.  The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious.

_______________
"Do You Swear To Preserve, Protect, and Defend The Government Of Chiang ' Kai-Shek?"

[cartoon]

But it would also appear that Chiang unwittingly may be contributing to Russian dominance in eastern Asia by internal and external policies which, if pursued in their present form, will render China too weak to serve as a possible counter-weight to Russia.  By so doing, Chiang may be digging his own grave; not only North China and Manchuria, but also national groups such as Korea and Formosa may be driven into the arms of the Soviets.

"Neither now, nor in the immediately foreseeable future, does the United States want to find itself in direct opposition to Russia in Asia:  nor does it want to see Russia have undisputed dominance over a part or all of China. 

"The best way to cause both of these possibilities to become realities is to give, in either fact or appearance, support to the present reactionary government of China beyond carefully regulated and controlled aid directed solely toward the military prosecution of the war against Japan.  To give diplomatic or other support beyond this limit will encourage the Kuomintang in its present suicidal anti-Russian policy.  It will convince the Chinese Communists—who probably hold the key to control, not only of North China but of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria as well—that we are on the other side and that their only hope for survival lies with Russia.  Finally, Russia will be led to believe—if she does not already—that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available; in other words, the extension of her direct power or influence."

The Army accepted my recommendation.  The Embassy raised no objection and forwarded a copy to the Department.  Months later there came one of those always pleasant surprises—an instruction from the Department saying that my memorandum had been "found of much interest and value…given the grade of Excellent."

The scene shifts now to September 19, 1951—almost seven and a half years after the memorandum was written. 

General Wedemeyer, who took General Stilwell's place in China and to whose staff I was attached for a short while in early 1945, is being interrogated by the Internal Security Subcommittee in public session.  The General has been led to testify that subsequent re-examination of reports made to him by his State Department "advisers" has caused him to believe that their recommendations were pro-Communist and contrary to American policy.

Testimony

The Subcommittee Counsel (Mr. Robert Morris) has therefore turned to some specific reports to provide illustration of the General's testimony.  The following is from the official transcript of the Subcommittee hearing:

"Mr. Morris.  General, may I call your attention to the report of April 7, 1944, that is before you?

General Wedemeyer.  Yes, sir.

Mr. Morris.  Mr. Mandel, will you read pertinent excerpts from that?

The Chairman (Senator McCarran).  Before we go into that, what is this instrument, where does it stem from and what is the foundation for it?

Mr. Mandel (the Research Director of the Subcommittee staff).  The date is April 7, 1944, "Subject:  Excerpt from memorandum, April 7, 1944, by John S. Service forwarded to Department as enclosure no. 1 of dispatch no. 2461, April 21, 1944, under title 'Situation in Sinkiang; Its Relation to American Policy vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union'."

This was also introduced in the Loyalty Board proceedings before the State Department in the case of John S. Service.

'Chiang's persisting in an active anti-Soviet policy, at a time when his policies—or lack of them—are accelerating economic collapse and increasing internal dissension, can only be characterized as reckless adventurism.  The cynical desire to destroy unity among the United Nations is serious.'

Mr. Morris.  What paragraph is that?

Mr. Mandel.  The second paragraph.  Further,

'Finally, Russia will be led to believe—if she does not already—that American aims run counter to hers, and that she must therefore protect herself by any means available:  in other words, the extension of her direct

[539]

power or influence.'

Mr. Morris.  General, can you comment on that?

General Wedemeyer.  This statement was made at a time when there were a lot of people in our country who were making similar statements.  Today they are on the bandwagon of opposing Communism.  Quite a few Americans were making statements along that line.  in fact, when I came back after the war, I found it rather dangerous and I could talk to a very few people, found it very dangerous to talk realistically about the implications of Communism in this country and in the world in general.  I am very glad that Chiang Kai-shek even at that time epitomized opposition to Communism and thank God for General MacArthur out in Japan for the same reason when others were playing footsie with Communism, many others.  I think Chiang showed a shrewdness, a political shrewdness, in continuing his opposition.

As far as cooperation was concerned, the Soviet Communists did not persist in the China Theater.  The contribution they made in the war against Japan was negligible.  The American people ought to understand that clearly.

Senator Ferguson.  Might I ask in relation to this, is this not an indication that this was a warning at least to America that she had better see what Russia wanted in Asia and go along with Russia's desires rather than what was well for America or the world?  That is, when he says 'We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are,' and the previous sentence that was read to you about Russia having her way.  Is that right?

General Wedemeyer.  It could be interpreted that way.  I think that is a sound interpretation of the statement.

Mr. Morris.  General, may I refer you to a report now of Mr. John P. Davies, one of the four political advisers?"

Let us analyze this transcript.

We will pass over the fact that although the General was supposedly testifying concerning my views while working for him, the Counsel selected and interrogated him on this memorandum written nine months before I joined the General's staff.  There are more important matters.

Gerrymandering an Excerpt

First, the Subcommittee did not use the whole memorandum, not to mention the series of which it was a part.  It used only an excerpt from the memorandum's conclusions without any of the essential background—the border incident, the Sinkiang situation and related events of the period—which led to those conclusions.  Unexplained and shorn of context, many of these statements are meaningless—or capable of varying interpretation.

Second, not even the whole excerpt was actually considered.  The Research Director, by some unexplained logic, selected three unrelated sentences as "pertinent excerpts."  These poor fragments are actually subordinate to the principal thesis.  From them one cannot hope to discover—much less understand—what I was recommending.  But they are all that are put into the transcript.  The question presents itself:  to what does the Research Director consider these excerpts "pertinent"?

Third, required by the Counsel to comment on these meaningless fragments, the unfortunate witness could hardly be expected to give a very meaningful response.  He can scarcely be blamed for seeming irrelevancy:  ". . . a lot of people in our country were making similar statements.  Today they are on the bandwagon of opposing Communism
. . . I found it very dangerous to talk realistically about the implications of Communism in this country and in the world in general. . . thank God for General MacArthur out in Japan . . . Chiang showed a shrewdness . . . the contribution they (the Soviet Communists) made in the war against Japan was negligible.  The American people ought to understand that clearly."

Should not this investigative body, after such loose criticism by innuendo, have asked General Wedemeyer how my views differed from some of his own?  As late as September 19, 1947, in his report to the President after a survey of China he said:

"Adoption by the United States of a policy motivated solely toward stopping the expansion of Communism without regard to the continued existence of an unpopular and repressive government would render any aid ineffective.  Further, United States prestige in the Far East would suffer heavily, and wavering elements might turn away from the existing government to Communism."

Fourth:  The omission of the actually pertinent material, even from the limited excerpt used by the Subcommittee, leads a Subcommittee member to come to the apparent conclusion—and permits the witness to agree—that an isolated sentence:  "We should make every effort to learn what the Russian aims in Asia are," really meant that America "had better see what Russia wanted in Asia and go along with Russia's desires rather than what was well for America or the world."  Is this not the exact opposite of the meaning of my whole memorandum and particularly that portion of it which was omitted by the Research Director between his first and second "pertinent excerpts"?

Such an investigative technique, I submit, is neither helpful to public understanding nor fair to the reporting officer, be he an officer of the Foreign Service, the Department of State, or any other part of our government.

[540]

APPENDIX VII

 

ADDRESS ONLY
"CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION"
In Your Reply Refer to
FILE LRB:WBH:
and Date of this Letter
 

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Washington, 25, D.C.

October 11, 1951

REGISTERED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

Mr. John S. Service
4608 Butterworth Place
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Service:

Reference is made to the investigation in your case by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under Executive Order 9835, as amended by Executive Order 10241, which established the President's Employee Loyalty Program, and to your hearing before the Department of State Loyalty Security Board. You are advised that the Departmental Board made a determination favorable to you on the matter of loyalty and that the complete file in the case was subsequently reviewed by a panel of members of the Loyalty Review Board under authority of and pursuant to Regulation 14 of the Regulations for the Operations of the Loyalty Review Board.

Regulation 14 reads as follows:

"The Board, or an Executive Committee of the Board, shall, as deemed necessary from time to time, cause post-audits to be made of the files on loyalty cases decided by the employing Department or Agency, or by a Regional Loyalty Board.

"The Board, or an Executive Committee of the Board, or a duly constituted panel of the Board, shall have the right, in its discretion, to call up for review any determination or decision made by any Department or Agency Loyalty Board or Regional Loyalty Board, or by any head of an employing Department or Agency, even though no appeal has been taken.  Any such review shall be made by a panel of the Board, and the panel, whether
or not a hearing has been held in the case, may affirm the determination or decision, or remand the case with appropriate instructions to the Agency or Regional Loyalty Board concerned for hearing or for such further action or procedure as the panel may determine. In exceptional cases, if in the judgment of the panel public interest requires it, the panel may hold a new hearing in the case and after such hearing, affirm or reverse the determination or decision."

[541]

After review of the complete file, the Loyalty Review Board has determined that "public interest" requires it to hold a new hearing in your case as provided for in the above-mentioned Regulation 14.

The hearing, before the Loyalty Review Board will be based upon the charges heretofore issued to you by the Department of State Loyalty Security Board and the issues to be heard at the hearing will be within the framework of those charges. The Loyalty Review Board will arrive at an independent judgment in this matter. The transcripts of all
testimony taken below are a part of the complete file now before the Loyalty Review Board.  However, you are invited to present any evidence you desire in your behalf at the hearing.  You may present oral argument and you may, of course, be represented by counsel or other representative.

Arrangements will be made to hold your hearing at Washington, D.C. We are not able at this time to set a date for the hearing.  However, you will be notified approximately ten days in advance of the time and hearing room address.

Very truly yours,

Hiram Bingham
Chairman
Loyalty Review Board

[542]

APPENDIX VIII

U.S. News & World Report

EVERY ABLE-BODIED BOY TO BE DRAFTED

Interview. . . Hiram Bingham Tells About Catching the Disloyal

 
[Photo]
Chairman
Bingham
Of  U.S.
Loyalty Board

[543]

Interview—with HIRAM BINGHAM, Chairman, Loyalty Review Board


CATCHING THE DISLOYAL

EDITOR'S NOTE:  What check is there on the work of the 200 boards in Government agencies that test federal employees for loyalty?

If a field investigation of a person by the FBI has been found desirable but a board calls him O.K., does that end the case? What results have the loyalty hearings shown?

To discuss such questions the editors of U. S. News & World Report invited to their conference rooms Hiram Bingham, Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, which has the final say on the loyalty of individuals in Government service.

HIRAM BINGHAM, son and grandson of missionaries, was born in Honolulu 76 years ago.  He taught history, explored in South America, helped develop the Army's World War I air service and wrote several books before he was elected Lieutenant Governor of Connecticut in 1922.

Mr. Bingham was Republican Senator from Connecticut for eight years prior to 1933. Business activities and biographical and historical writing followed.  Early this year President Truman named Mr. Bingham Chairman of the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission.

Q  As chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, Mr. Bingham, your work is to review the work of the 100 or more loyalty boards--is that right?

A  Our first job is to lay down rules and regulations so as to make the whole procedure of the loyalty program uniform. The department and agency boards had been doing different things, so we were instructed by the President to lay down the rules and regulations for the entire program.  Also, we are the highest board of appeal for any persons adjudged ineligible by lower boards, and by the heads of the different departments and agencies.

Also, we review under what's known as "post audit" cases that are cleared by the lower boards after full field investigation.

Q  Your Board doesn't have any investigating machinery itself?

A  No. The FBI is the sole investigating agency under the loyalty program.  Loyalty boards don't investigate; they weigh the reports received from the FBI, hold hearings as necessary and decide loyalty cases.

Q   You have two main considerations, loyalty and security?

A   No, we have nothing to do with security.

Q   What is the difference between the two as you see it?

A  Security is much broader than loyalty.

Q  Do you have the feeling that somebody is trying to infiltrate into the Government?

A  We know that they have infiltrated.  We know Through the Amerasia case that confidential Government documents were given away. We know that that
is the way in which the Communists operate. They try to infiltrate and learn what's going on and make trouble.

Q  Do they try to get into any particular department?

A  Most of our cases now are in connection with the national-defense activities of various agencies, including activities at field installations.  Of course, here in Washington the cases that come up are people trying to get in the headquarters offices of Governmental agencies.

Q  Are charges ever placed against an individual without an FBI investigation?

A  No. The only cases that come to us are cases that the FBI has found it necessary to investigate.  They make no charges.

What about all this that you hear about some employee being accused of not having any information given to him as to where the charges arise from?

A  Those cases, so far as I have been able to discover are mostly in the security field, where you don't have to give specific charges, where under the law the head of any one of the 10 departments and agencies mentioned, and any others the President may put in, may be told by his security officer--they all have security officers--that he is a "security risk." The head of the agency may suspend him.

1 have known of cases where a man got a letter telling him that he had been suspended and the reason that he had been suspended was too confidential to tell him. There is something wrong about that, but that has nothing to do with loyalty.

Q  Is he eligible for another Government job?
A  No, under the law he is not.

Q  Then do you take over his case?
A  No, we have nothing to do with security.

Q  If you find that a man was a member of the Communist Party at one time, say, 10 years ago

_______________
Copyright 1951, By U.S. News Pub. Corp
22
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

[544]

Tricks of Communists . . . What Raises Doubts of Loyalty. . . 1.800 Who Quit During Investigation . . . Role of FBI

does that mean that he is ineligible under your rulings?

A  If he was a member 10 years ago and has had nothing to do with it since, he probably would be cleared.  During the first three years of the loyalty program, the standard for ineligibility was that we must find reasonable grounds to believe that the individual is disloyal.

Q  At present?

A  Yes, that was the way in which most lawyers interpreted it.  You can imagine a case where a man had been a member of a Communist organization from, let us say, 1940 to 1945.  In 1946 the Communist Party started calling in all membership cards. There may be no evidence whatever of his being active since then.  However, when he applies for a job, let us say, in the Philadelphia Navy Yard and the record shows that he was a Communist for five years back in the early '40s and that he hasn't been a Communist so far as any body knows in the last three or four years, under the old standards the chances are that the lower board and the agency head would have declared him ineligible. Then he would appeal the case to the Loyalty Review Board, and it would be my duty to appoint a panel of three from the 24 members of the Board who would look at all the papers, hold a hearing and listen to the case. They might decide, as sometimes they did, that they find no reasonable grounds to believe that the person was "presently" disloyal.

Tighter Loyalty Standards

It was the discovery of cases of that kind which I made when I became Chairman on the 3d of January, 1951, where some of the lawyers on our Board--and we have a number of very distinguished lawyers--felt that since there was no evidence of disloyalty for three or four years they ought to hold him eligible because there was nothing to make them believe that he is "presently" disloyal. There was no question that they might have had a reasonable doubt of his loyalty and under such a standard they could have declared him ineligible.

Cases of this kind led me to ask the Loyalty Review Board to request the President to change the standard and make it "reasonable doubt of loyalty."  Now, if a person had been a Communist for five years and hadn't done anything for the last three or four years you know that the Communists have told him not to carry a membership card; you can't find positive proof--you can still have reasonable doubt of his loyalty.

Take the hypothetical case where a man has married a Communist and has a job with the Government.  He himself has not taken any part, except for going to some meetings with her and having a subscription to a Communist paper at home.  Under security standards, he might very well be regarded as a risk because his wife could find out what he is doing.

You remember the case of that man who stole the secret of the atom bomb from Los Alamos, and who was allowed by the Army to leave Los Alamos for weekends to visit his wife in Santa Fe or Albuquerque.  His wife got all the dope and passed it on to Russian agents.

We in the loyalty program are in the difficult position at the present time of not having anything to do with a security risk; our job is to find out whether there is a reasonable doubt about the loyalty of the individual to the United States Government.

Separating the Security Cases

Q  Why isn't your Board empowered to consider the security risk?

A  The President, in the last paragraph of Executive Order 9835, says, "You will have nothing to do with security cases."

Q  But why is that?

A  It may be because the Acts of Congress relating to security matters gave the authority to dismiss for security reasons to only a few departments and agencies, whereas the order establishing the Loyalty Review Board is more comprehensive.

Q  Wouldn't it be better if just one board did it?

A  It would be much better, in my opinion. There are a number of times when our panel is in doubt about a person but cannot say that there is a reasonable doubt.

Incidentally, if you look in the dictionary for the terms "loyal" and "disloyal," you will find that one is not just the opposite of the other. A loyal subject is one who is more than a faithful subject.  He is a loyal friend who will go to bat for you.  A loyal citizen, under the modern meaning of loyal, will do more than is required for his country.  He'll put his country first rather than himself. Now, disloyal means something infamous, perfidious, treacherous.

Under the old standards--"on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist to believe a person is disloyal"--I have had to sign a paper stating that the Loyalty Review Board has found reasonable grounds to believe a person is disloyal!  I have hated to do that, because
to brand a person with disloyalty is a very serious thing. I don t mind saying that we find reasonable

(Continued on page 24)
NOVEMBER 23, 1951
[Page] 23

[545]

. . . 'It is difficult to pin anything on topflight Communists'

doubt of loyalty.  So I am much happier under the new standard.

Q  Do you think that the present standards ought to be changed in any way?  Could they be improved?

A  The right standard for eligibility is that which was put into effect at the beginning of World War II, in 1942.  It is the standard we are now working under.  The President and the Civil Service Commission said that no one could be employed by the Government concerning whose loyalty there was reasonable doubt.

A  lot of people got into the Government, then, under that change in standard?

A  There were some people declared eligible prior to the recent change in the standard that may not be declared eligible today.  Such cases are being reviewed.

Q  Do you think that there ought to be any changes in the standard of loyalty?

A  No.  I don't think so.

Communist Agents Under Cover

Q  If the Communists had an important agent whom they wanted to get into the Government, would they permit him to clutter up his background with memberships in various organizations?

A  At one of the New York Herald-Tribune Forum sessions the other day, Mr. Philbrick, who was one of the principal witnesses at the trial of the 11 Communists, who had served in Boston for nine years as undercover agent for the FBI and was one of the most successful undercover men that the FBI has ever had, told of how, after he had been a Communist for five or six years, he was told to destroy all evidence and was no longer supposed to be a Communist and was told not to associate with his former party comrades.  There is no doubt that the very topflight Communists are so very well protected that it is difficult to pin anything on them.

Q  So that membership in an organization doesn't mean anything?

A  It is an opening wedge, and the FBI makes a comprehensive investigation.

Q  Couldn't people infiltrate into a place like the State Department as Communists and not be known as Communists?

A   Yes, or any other agency.  There's the famous case of Alger Hiss.  He got very far.

Q   Did his case ever come before any loyalty review board?

A   No.

Q   Did it ever come before any departmental board?

A   No.  He left Government service before the loyalty program went into operation.

Q   From what is known of the Hiss case, would he have been made ineligible from any evidence on him, or would he have been passed except for the disclosures that came later?

A  That I don't know.

Q  There is no open evidence that he was a member of the Communist Party?

A  I don't know. I have been told that it was reported to certain Government officials that he was a Russian agent, and it was not believed.

Q  Was he checked for loyalty?  Did the FBI check him?

A  This happened before the loyalty program was set up.

Q  But everybody was checked during the war, even though they had been in the Government before—I suppose some of that mass checking was pretty routine?

A  The first time that the Civil Service Commission was authorized to do anything resembling a character investigation from the loyalty angle was as a result of the Hatch Act passed by Congress in 1939. Then, in 1942, after we had gotten into the war, the President decided to give the Commission the right to refuse employment to applicants when investigation showed that there was a reasonable doubt of their loyalty.  The Commission, however, could investigate only a small percentage of persons entering the service.   While the Commission adjudicated these cases, it did not have jurisdiction over persons already employed.  The various departments and agencies handled loyalty matters involving their own employees, each in its own way.  There was lack of uniformity.  That was one reason why in 1946 the Congress asked the President to set up a committee to advise him on a review program, and the committee reported in the early part of '47.   In March, 1947, the President issued Executive Order 9835 to make the loyalty program uniform and more effective.

FBI's Investigating Job

Q  Does the FBI investigate the activities of these persons in the Government outside of their offices, or do they investigate where they are active at their jobs?

A  My understanding is that they don't go directly to the person.

Q  I mean, do they have any investigation of what the person does in a Government office?

A   Oh, yes, the FBI does investigate wherever it is necessary.  Practically all Government employees have been screened. That was virtually completed last year.  Under Executive Order 9835 the President has said that the head of each department and agency in the executive branch of the Government is personally responsible for an effective program to make sure that disloyal employees are not retained in employment in his department or agency.  He is responsible for prescribing and supervising the loyalty-determination procedures of his department or agency in accordance with the provisions of the executive orders and the rules and regulations of the Loyalty Review Board.

24

[546]

'We reversed many cases that came to us'

Q  They have what they call "security officers" in a department, for example.  Do their reports go to a loyalty board?

A  No, that's security.  But in most departments it is the same board.  In the State Department the board is called the loyalty and security board.  The Commerce
Department is the only one that separates them, and has a loyalty board and a security board.

Q  Such a double board, then, might know from security channels damaging facts that could be used in judgment on the loyalty question?

A  Yes.

Q   Does anybody keep any check on the disloyal former employees, what becomes of them afterwards, where they go to get jobs, whether they drift back into these Communist-front organizations?

A  No.

Barriers Against 'Disloyal'

Q  How do they make a living?

A  Having chosen to act in a manner which led the Loyalty Review Board to find a reasonable doubt as to their loyalty, they have put themselves in a very bad position to -get a job requiring loyalty.  For instance, they couldn't get a job in one of the plants that
make Government defense material.  It's just too bad when a man does something of that kind.  It's too bad when a man who happens to be a bank teller finally, under pressure from his family, helps himself to the till.  He has put himself outside of the pale of high-grade citizens.

Q  When they are dismissed from the Government, they are dismissed because they are assumed to be dangerous, or disloyal, and then they go somewhere else to get a job where they might continue their disloyalty?

A  They have to try to get a job.  We never publish the names.  We give no publicity to any of our activities.  If there s any publicity, it is all given by the man himself or his counsel.

Q  It has been charged, or implied, that some of the loyalty boards are unwilling to believe what the FBI considers to be pretty conclusive evidence.  Do you believe that the boards pass up such cases?

A  The FBI never reports an analysis.  It is their duty to investigate and give you the result of all the investigation they were able to make.

Q  It simply provides a complete file on a man?

A  Yes.

Q  It's the duty of the board to determine whether that evidence is worthy or not, isn't it?

A  Yes. The FBI furnishes us with a report of a full field investigation.

Q  Well, to put it more directly, do you think that the department loyalty boards have done a good job?

A  Yes. They do a very faithful job, by and large.

Q  If a Government employee within the last six months knew that he was being checked on by the FBI, that his family and home town were being interrogated, could he infer that he was under suspicion?

A  I should think that he might draw that inference.  Perhaps that's one reason why 1,800 of the 16,000 resigned before the investigation was completed.

Q  It wouldn't be checked on to that extent unless there was some degree of suspicion?  I'm thinking of someone who has been in the Government a few years--

A  Of course, everyone was asked to reply to questions, which were drawn up in consultation with the FBI, when the President first put the loyalty program into effect. Everyone was subject to investigation then.

Q  Do you think it's possible that some of these 1,800 quit because they felt that they wouldn't have any chance for a fair hearing?

A  Undoubtedly they quit for various reasons.  I hope that nobody quit because they wouldn't get a fair hearing.

Q  But at a time when accusations are made rather freely in high places, sometimes a man can be smeared and never get rid of it?

A  Unfortunately, that's true.  I don't know what we can do to prevent it.

We have reversed many of the cases that have come to us from the lower boards.

What kind of reversals do you mean--where they have been convicted by the lower board?

A  Where the lower board has ruled that they are ineligible.

Who Can Appeal

Q  You get an appeal only when they are found guilty by a lower board, don't you?  Can the department appeal it to you if the lower board clears a man and the department head thinks he is guilty?

A  No.  In all cases where there are field investigations, and there has been a hearing below, and it is passed favorably, it comes up to us on "post audit." We have a section which is known as the inspection section.  Three or four of our examiners inspect all
cases that are passed by the lower boards as eligible.

Q  Do those cases that you have reversed fall into any particular category, any particular reason, or any particular situation?

A  I couldn't say that there is any general reason.  I think, after reading a great many of the cases that have come to us, my impression is that sometimes a lower board is, perhaps, unduly influenced by the personality of the individual.  Most of the cases now are applicants.  If the applicant appears to be uncertain in his answers and, perhaps,
doesn't do himself justice, the members of a lower board may go too far in giving the Government the benefit of the doubt.

(Continued on page 26)

NOVEMBER 23. 1951
25  U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

[547]

. . .' Sometimes the lower boards are too strict'

I have read cases from lower boards that the Loyalty Review Board reversed because the lower board was inclined to spill over into the field of security. Our panels try to be very strict and stay in the field of loyalty.

Q  That's a strange and hard distinction to make, isn't it?

A  Yes, it's a difficult distinction.

Q  There are cases, aren't there, which could be a security risk without having anything to do with disloyalty, like persons who talk too much when they're drunk and various other categories?  You can be ruled out as a security risk and it has nothing to do with loyalty?

A  Certainly.

Problem of Unfairness

Q  But can't there be some way for all the problems to be dealt with centrally?

A  The only criticism that I have to make of the program as it is at present is that the individual has no right of appeal from a decision on security outside the agency.  If the security officer makes up his mind that this person is a bad risk, that person can be heard
by the agency, but--perhaps you remember in the middle of July the President decided that this question needed investigation by the National Security Council.  He is the Chairman of it himself.  About the middle of July he wrote a letter to the executive  secretary of the National Security Council, asking the Council to investigate the question of security and the charges of unfairness, and to make recommendations to see if anything should be done about it.

Q  You said that some of the lower boards have resolved a doubt in favor of the Government.  Does that mean that the Review Board would resolve doubts in favor of the individual rather than in favor of the Government?

A  No. The business of the Review Board is to try to do right by the Government and the individual.  The President, in establishing the loyalty-review program, said that it was of vital importance that persons coming into the Government be of unswerving loyalty.  He also said that it was very important that individuals in the Government service should not be thrown out for trivial reasons, reasons of prejudice and imaginary doubts. You can have a doubt about any person. When we put the new standard into effect with regard to reasonable doubt, we stressed the point that, under the courts' interpretation, reasonable doubt means doubt based on reason.

Now, sometimes the lower boards go overboard in being too strict.  The Loyalty Review Board is composed of seasoned veterans who have supposedly had lots of experience and who try to maintain a position of absolute fairness, to protect the individual against any unfairness and, at the same time, to protect the Government against having to take any individual concerning whom there is reasonable doubt.

Q  Have you reversed any cases that were cleared?

A   In "post audit," yes.

Q  From the State Department?

A  That I can't answer.

Q  Well, there haven't been any "post audit" cases from the State Department?

A  Oh, yes, all those that were field checked. There are cases that come up from the State Department for "post audit."  Philip Jessup's case is an example.

Q  But you haven't had any "post audit" reversals on the State Department to date?

A  That I can't answer.

Q  How many cases have you reversed?

A  That I can't answer.

Q  You are not permitted to answer, or you don't remember?

A  I'm just not supposed to answer that question.

Q  That refers to the number of cases that have been reversed on "post audit"?

A  Yes. I can give you a general impression.  We have had about 25 "post audit" cases that were ordered for hearings.

Q  On "post audit"?

A  Yes.  Of those, seven or eight resigned rather than face the panel examination.

Q  That is, your panel now?

A  Yes.

Q  They've never been before your panel?

A  No.  I think about 5 cases have been definitely decided unfavorably in "post audit," and about 12 have been finally cleared on the hearing in "post audit," and about 8 resigned rather than face the review on the merits of the case.

Q  In view of the very small number there and the rather large proportion reversed on the other side, that is, the 150, or so, ruled ineligible that you reversed--you reversed half of them, did you not?

A  Yes. I think we've decided about 300 appeals from the entire Government, and about half of them were cleared by us.

Errors in Lower Boards

Q  In view of the very small number of reversals on favorable cases and the very large proportion of reversals on unfavorable cases, would you say that that indicates that the lower boards, when they do err, err on the side of the Government's security?  Assuming
you have caught them in error, you've caught half the cases of error favoring the Government?

A  Yes.  We have "post audited" over 9,000 cases, and "post audit" means that the lower board found the person to be eligible.  The examiner's first duty is to see whether the lower board followed the procedure correctly in issuing the interrogatory, in taking testimony under oath, and so forth. If the case has been properly

26   U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

[548]

…'An oath means nothing to the Communists'

handled, the examiner clears the case right away wit out referring it to a panel.

Q  In other words, when the report of the lower board doesn't prove anything?

A  That's right.  When I say "properly handled," let me give you an imaginary case that would cause the examiner to ask for a panel to study it.  Let us say that a new appointee has married a Communist.  He is not a Communist.  She is the stronger character of the two.  He has belonged to one or two of the mild organizations, and taken no active part in them, and he is investigated, and a loyalty board sends him an interrogatory.  The answer to his interrogatory was dictated by his wife, and he swore to it. When he is before the lower board and a question is asked, he says, "What did I say on the affidavit.  I'll say that now."

When our examiner reads that answer and finds that the lower board was willing to accept such a reply and had accepted the applicant as eligible, he notes that that is not a proper procedure and he submits it to a panel of the Loyalty Review Board. The panel would then probably remand the case to the lower board for a rehearing.

Sometimes the lower board passes a man but doesn't seem to have given attention to certain things in the FBI report that should have been brought out in the hearing.  The examiner spots that and refers it to a panel for action.  But in the great majority of cases, 99 per cent of the cases, the procedure is correct, and we don't question them.

Methods of the Reviews

Q  How many cases has this Loyalty Review Board had to consider from the beginning?

A  To carry out the President's order, the FBI was ordered to investigate all Government employees and all applicants.  Up to date more than 3 million persons have been screened. About 16,000 full field investigations have been made.  When they find somebody whose record calls for a field investigation, they make a field investigation, and as soon as it is completed, they do not pass upon it, but send it to one of the 200 junior boards. The Navy Department and the Air Force each have many loyalty boards in the field in addition to a central board; the Department of the Army has 14 lower boards.  The Commerce Department has one large board which meets in several panels, and the State Department has a similar arrangement.  

Every executive agency must have at least one board.  In addition, the Civil Service Commission has 14 regional loyalty boards for cases of persons seeking appointment in the competitive Civil Service.

So there are some 200 lower boards altogether.   All these loyalty boards look into the records.

In about half of the cases the investigation disproves the derogatory information upon which the investigation was initiated.  The board does nothing more about it; the person is found eligible for employment with the Government.

It's the board's privilege to decide whether to rate the applicant eligible or to proceed further.  Now of the 16,000 cases in which the FBI conducted full field investigations, almost half--over 7,200--were held by lower boards to be worthy of further scrutiny. That is to say, the loyalty board concerned decided to send the individual an interrogatory or a letter of charges, charging him with having belonged to this or that organization on the Attorney General's list, with having associated with Communists, with having solicited subscriptions to the Daily Worker, etc.

The individual involved is given at least 10 days and usually about two weeks to answer such questions. The answers must be under oath and the affidavit must be sent in to the board. The individual under charges may request a hearing, or the board may decide that a hearing is necessary; some 2,500 cases have required hearings by the lower board.  Or, a board may decide that an individual's written answers to charges are perfectly satisfactory and let it go at that.

Incidentally, 1,800 of the 16,000 individuals whose cases went to loyalty boards decided before they got through answering the questionnaire, or before going through a hearing, or at some point prior to a decision, that they would rather work elsewhere--perhaps they didn't care for any more inquiry into their activities--and so they just dropped out of the federal service.

Also, one of the interesting things is that not nearly so many applicants today are found to be requiring field investigations as when the program started.  In other words, if you know that you are active in some of these organizations you may decide not to apply for a Government position.

Great Majority Were Cleared

Of the 2,439 loyalty cases that the lower boards have held hearings on, the great majority have been cleared.  Of these individuals, 542 were found to be in eligible.  Quite a number dropped out at once; about two thirds of those found ineligible by lower boards  appealed.

As a result of appeals to agency heads and to the Loyalty Review Board, some 204 of the 542 were cleared and restored to duty or permitted to enter the Government service. These figures were taken from a recent recapitulation.

Q  Have you any idea from an examination of these cases whether these people are directly connected with foreign governments, or whether they are sympathizers with foreign governments?

A  They never admit it.  Of course, in the usual case they deny everything.  One of the things you have to do at these hearings is to try to see if they are lying or not.  An oath means nothing to the Communists.  At the hearings we try to find out the truth.

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