Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. ) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.
Oral History Interview with
Joseph L. Rauh, JR.
June 21, 1989
Niel M. Johnson
JOHNSON: Mr. Rauh, I'm going to start by asking you to
tell us where you were born, when you were born and what your parents'
RAUH: I was born in Cincinnati, Ohio on January 3, 1911,
making me 78 now. My father's name was Joseph Rauh; I'm a junior. My
father was born in Bamberg, Bavaria, Germany; he was an immigrant. My
mother's name was Sarah Weiler. She was born in this country, but her
ancestors came from Germany. We were German Jews; Cincinnati was quite
a home for German Jews and still is.
JOHNSON: That's where you got your education?
RAUH: Yes. Actually my father was an education nut. He
was a small businessman, but he anted to make enough money to give his
kids the best education. Of course,
in those days, and maybe it's still
true, the prestige lay with Harvard, and the happiest thing in my father's
life was that he had enough money to send both my brother and me to
Harvard. So we got the best education possible.
JOHNSON: You had one brother. Did you have any sisters?
RAUH: Yes. My brother's dead. My sister is alive; she
is 87 years old. She's a pediatrician. She doesn't practice anymore,
but she was a very wonderful, successful pediatrician in Cincinnati,
setting up her office in the poor districts. She was a liberal, a Truman
liberal, all the time.
JOHNSON: So there were three children.
RAUH: Three children.
JOHNSON: And you're what, the oldest, youngest?
RAUH: I'm the youngest of the three.
JOHNSON: What was your brother's name?
RAUH: Carl. He went into my father's business, but the
business folded. It was a shirt business and you couldn't make apparel
in the north after a while because of the southern competition in wages.
So my brother sold out. He got out of the business rather
he died rather young. He was just 67 when he died.
JOHNSON: Your father's occupation then was . . .
RAUH: A small shirt manufacturer. He was a died-in-the-wool
Republican who marched in the 1896 gold parade of McKinley in Cincinnati.
He was a died-in-the-wool, conservative Republican, and all three children
JOHNSON: Did he mellow as he got older?
RAUH: Well, the joke in our house always was, and my mother
would tell the joke; he would denounce Roosevelt, and then say to my
mother, "Sarah, go upstairs and get that clipping about Joseph and the
New Deal." I mean he was proud of his kids even if he disagreed with
them. We had a happy family.
JOHNSON: What was your major in college?
RAUH: Economics, although I don't know a damn thing about
it. I don't know why I did that. When I went into college it was before
the Depression; I matriculated in 1928, September of '28. October of
'29 is Black Monday, and that's when people started worrying and that's
when I went into law. So I went into law school rather than anything
else. There was no room in this
little [family] business for anybody
else, so my father said, "Why don't you go to law school?" I was sort
of treading water, going to law school.
JOHNSON: Are you saying now that your father was probably
the most important influence on you in these years?
RAUH: Up to the time I went to college, there's no question,
he was the most important influence. College and law school changed
JOHNSON: Okay, what influences did you come under there?
RAUH: Well, the most important influence, of course, was
Felix Frankfurter. I am what they called back in the thirties one of
the Frankfurter "happy hot dogs." I don't think there were terribly
many influences that I had in college. I did fairly well; I was not
a bad student. But going to law school, the chief influence was Felix
Frankfurter and that's how I came here to Washington.
One day in my third year in law school, he stopped me
and said, "What are you going to do next year?" I said, "Well, I've
been hired by the best Jewish law firm in Cincinnati." And he said,
"Well, you're not going there." I said, "What do you mean, sir?" He
said, "Well, you're going to Washington. You'd just be silly not to."
And he got me a job; he got me the law
clerkship to Justice [Benjamin]
Cardozo, and the law clerkship of himself when he took Cardozo's spot
three years later. So, yes, that was the greatest influence in my career.
JOHNSON: And Frankfurter was a reformist.
RAUH: He was a reformist. Hugh Johnson, the head of NRA
[National Recovery Administration] hated Frankfurter, but he said--and
this wasn't necessarily right--"He is the single most important person
in Washington after the President." There's some truth in that. I mean
that's obviously an overstatement, but it wasn't so ridiculously an
overstatement. He was a tremendous figure down here. Well, there weren't
many people that were closer to Roosevelt than Frankfurter.
So, my father's belief in the prestige of Harvard and
my going to Harvard Law School affected my life. I mean it changed it
completely. I always say if it wasn't for Felix Frankfurter, I'd be
an overstuffed corporate lawyer like most everybody else.
JOHNSON: So you came into Washington and became a law
clerk . . .
RAUH: To Justice Benjamin Cardozo. There are some pictures
there, and there [pointing to the wall]. Then when Cardozo died, Frankfurter
got the job. I actually
volunteered for law clerk because it was in
the middle of the year that he was appointed to Cardozo's seat, and
it's hard to get a law clerk right in the middle of the year, so I just
volunteered. Of course, Frankfurter took up the volunteer offer, because
he knew me. Also he said, "You've got more experience on the Supreme
Court than I do," because I'd been there for two years with Cardozo.
So I went back for a few months with Frankfurter, and then I went back
into the Government.
JOHNSON: In what year did you start with Cardozo?
RAUH: I came here in '35 and I would have been Cardozo's
law clerk that year, starting in the fall of '35, but Cardozo decided
for the first time to keep his then-law clerk, a fellow named Alan Stroock.
His father was a big Jewish lawyer in New York. Since Alan was staying
an extra year, Felix told me, "You go work for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran
for the year while you're waiting to be the law clerk to Justice Cardozo."
So I worked for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran; it's described a little
bit in Joe Lash's book on Dealers and Dreamers. I worked there
for a year. Then in '36 I went to work for Justice Cardozo, and I was
there until '38. Then there were a few months, after Cardozo died, when
there were no appointees. Roosevelt then appointed
Frankfurter in December
of '38, and he took the seat in January of '39. I was his law clerk
for a few months, and then I went back to the New Deal and was there
until the war.
JOHNSON: Were you involved in drafting any of the arguments,
as in 1937, to defend the New Deal legislation?
RAUH: No. I was working for Cardozo, for example, when
he had the Social Security decision to write; that was in 1937, but
I was working for the Court, not for the outside. Cardozo wrote the
decision upholding Social Security. There was a big attack on Social
Security. There was an attack on everything the New Deal was doing,
but after the Court packing plan, why the Court made quite a shift.
JOHNSON: Of course, one of those conservative justices
retired at a propitious time.
RAUH: Yes, that was in May of 1937.
JOHNSON: Yes, I think they talk about '37 as the time
of revolution in the Supreme Court.
RAUH: That's right.
JOHNSON: And Cohen was one of the drafters of the Social
Security Act, was he not?
RAUH: Cohen had been drafter of a lot of the legislation:
the Securities Act, the Securities and Exchange Act, the Holding Company
Act, the Minimum Wage Act, he drafted all those, and he helped with
some of the others, including Social Security. But as far as the Court
packing plan was concerned, he and Tommy Corcoran were not consulted
on the Court packing plan until it went up to Congress. Then they were
consulted and they changed the whole strategy, those two. What happened
was that Roosevelt had this ridiculous strategy that Homer Cummings
the Attorney General had worked out, saying, "The Court's too old, and
they can't do their work. We're going to appoint one new judge for every
judge on the bench over 70 who doesn't resign."
That was ridiculous because there wasn't anything wrong
with these guys' brains, what was wrong was their goddamn views. They
were knocking statutes out right and left. Cohen really was the architect
of this, but he and Corcoran always worked together. They said, and
they persuaded the President, that the age of the Justices was not the
way to get the packing plan adopted. What you had to do is just say,
"We need minimum wages now. The only way to get them is this
way. We need a maximum hours law now. We've got to stop child
labor now. We've got to have a labor relations act now."
So the emphasis was on the word
"now." If you wanted to have
these things that people wanted, you had to change the Court. The Court
changed and then, of course, interestingly enough, the Court not only
changed but then Roosevelt's plan got defeated. I think that was divine
intervention; this was the perfect outcome. The New Deal was saved by
the Court changing its views,, but there's no precedent for the future
of packing the Court by increasing the numbers. You may say that Reagan
packed the Court, but he packed it by the people he put on; he didn't
add people. So, I think the result in 1937 was perfect. The New Deal
was saved, and Roosevelt's Court packing bill was defeated. See my article
in the November, 1990, North Carolina Law Review.
JOHNSON: So, it didn't set a bad precedent.
RAUH: That's right.
JOHNSON: You know, I think that Truman was critical of
that Court packing bill. He was about 98 percent in line with New Deal
legislation, but I think he was a critic of that approach too.
RAUH: Burton Wheeler was the leader of the negative approach.
I don't know what Truman's relations with Wheeler were.
JOHNSON: Well, he felt favorable towards Wheeler because
Wheeler really helped him take a role in the transportation field, you
know. Truman's the one that helped rewrite the rules on railroads and
made that famous statement about Jesse James being a "piker" in holding
up railroads, in comparison with holding companies that were "looting" them.
JOHNSON: So you were a clerk on the Supreme Court to these
people; and you were very well acquainted with New Deal legislation
as a result. Then you take up private practice?
RAUH: At the end of '45, the beginning of '46, I did.
JOHNSON: Not until after the war?
RAUH: Not until after the war did I go into private practice.
JOHNSON: Were you with Frankfurter then when the war came?
RAUH: No, I was at the Lend-Lease Administration and the
Office for Emergency Management. Of all the times in the New Deal, that
was the most exciting period. You have to realize that there was a lot
of anti-Semitism in those days--Pelley's Silver Shirts, and Father Coughlin's
Social Justice movement, and all of that. Anti-Semitism resulted in
part because many thought the
Jews were trying to get us into the war.
I plead guilty. I felt that Hitler was going to try to conquer the world,
and the sooner we prepared for war and got into it, the safer this country would be.
So in 1941 I worked in two agencies. I was the Deputy
General Counsel of the Lend-Lease Administration under a wonderful man
named Oscar Cox, whose papers are at Yale. Then I also was the Deputy
General Counsel of the Office for Emergency Management, of which Cox
was also the General Counsel. Wayne Coy was the head of that agency.
He was assistant to the President, running sort of a holding company
for all the war preparation agencies.
Here are some things that may be worth recording, not
because they are important as recording my feelings, but I think they
happen to be right. In '40 and '41 when we were supposed to be preparing
for war against Hitler, and most Americans thought we would ultimately
have to fight Hitler, we did a bad job of preparing for war. Big business
didn't want to prepare for war. Big business was making so much money
with civilian production they didn't want to talk about it. The auto
companies, for example, made more cars in 1941 than ever before, when
they should have been making airplanes. The interesting thing there,
affecting President Truman, was that at that time as a Senator he
chairman of the committee to oversee war production for Congress.
The committee made a terrible mistake, I think, and I've
given a talk on this. I gave a lecture on this at a convocation on the
Holocaust at the Harvard Divinity School last year. Here was my point.
I was not here during the Holocaust; I was overseas. When they asked
me if I'd speak, I said, "No, I really don't know that much about the
Holocaust. The only thing I have to offer is that in the two years before
Pearl Harbor we didn't get prepared; we lengthened the Holocaust by
the fact that victory took much longer to achieve than it otherwise
Well the relevance of Truman to all this, in my judgment,
is that they set up this committee for oversight, the so-called Truman
Committee; I can't remember its exact name.
JOHNSON: It was the Senate Special Committee to Investigate
the National Defense Program.
RAUH: That committee, which we can call the Truman Committee,
did a good job on the unimportant things. They did a good job exposing
waste and fraud, but they did nothing about why the Armed Services weren't
getting any guns and planes and tanks. I really made a study of this.
I got every book out of the Georgetown
University Library that dealt
with the Truman Committee, and every book shows that the first time
they criticized the failure of production was after Pearl Harbor. The
Truman Committee had an opportunity there to have hastened preparation
for war and didn't do it. When I say the committee dealt with the minor
things, I'm not saying it was minor politically, but to me the important
event was getting ready to fight Hitler and to get enough planes and
tanks and trucks and guns and ammunition and all of the rest of the
things that go with the preparation for war, and they didn't. The Truman
Committee didn't press business for more military and less civilian
production. Truman was not part of the group that was trying to do more
about that. He limited the work of his committee--that is until after
Pearl Harbor--he limited the work of that committee to waste and fraud
and things like that.
Well, I'm not saying that those are unimportant. I'm saying
though that compared to the importance of our getting ready to fight,
getting the munitions, I consider them unimportant. That was the . . .
JOHNSON: Yes, the committee had actually started, I believe,
because of reports of fraud and mismanagement, during the construction
of camps like Fort Leonard Wood.
RAUH: Sure, right.
JOHNSON: Truman kind of justified the thing originally
on the need to investigate how they were building these new Army camps,
training camps, some of the early construction of buildings.
RAUH: What they could do was shown when the war finally
came, and Truman held hearings on why General Electric was still making
all of this civilian stuff like refrigerators and all of their other
wonderful civilian things when they could have been making war materiel.
There was tremendous conversion to war production once Pearl Harbor
happened, but prior to Pearl Harbor, there's not one line you'll find
in any Truman report or statement criticizing the failure to produce
for war. Yet everybody knew that industry wasn't producing adequately for war.
JOHNSON: So you went with the lend-lease program as soon
as it started?
RAUH: Yes, I was there right at the beginning.
JOHNSON: You left Frankfurter?
RAUH: Well, I had had a year in between at the Wage and
Hour Division in the Labor Department, and at the Federal Communications
Commission, but my heart was in
getting prepared to fight Hitler. That's
why I feel so deeply about the Truman Committee; they did one of their
two jobs and they did that one very well. But the other job that I think
was so important--speeding up production for war--that was not done
at all. At least I tried to make sure before I said that at this meeting
in Cambridge, at this convocation on the Holocaust, I tried to make
sure I had read everything that had been written on or by the Truman
Committee prior to Pearl Harbor. I haven't read everything since then.
They exposed a lot of inaction after Pearl Harbor, but if they had done
more before Pearl Harbor I think we would have saved a lot of soldiers
lives and a lot of Jewish lives.
For example, take something like Walter Reuther's plan
to build 500 planes a day in auto factories. That plan was floated in
the winter of '40. There's no reference to it anywhere in these books
on the Truman Committee. Now, I don't want to say I've done more than
I have. I never went through the files of the Truman Committee, so I
can't say that there's not something in the files somewhere there, but
as far as the books on the subject of the Truman Committee, there's
no reference to the Reuther Plan.
I would have thought somebody that supervised war preparation
would have wanted to see whether Walter
Reuther was right. If we could
have made the Reuther Plan work, we could have won the war sooner and
all the American boys' lives, and the Jews' lives, a lot more could
have been saved. So, I'm critical of President Truman in that respect,
but I'm not able to say what's in their files about why they did and
didn't do what.
JOHNSON: After your work with lend-lease, what did you do?
RAUH: I went in the Army.
JOHNSON: What month and year was that?
RAUH: Well, Phil Graham, later the publisher of the Washington
Post, and I tried to enlist in the Air Corps the day after Pearl
Harbor. I thought the guy was going to die laughing at the two of us.
I'll tell you exactly what my motivations were.
We had been trying to get this country into war. We thought
we had to go to war ultimately, we had to stop Hitler ultimately, and
the sooner you stopped him, the better. I believed you couldn't just
let him conquer more and more and more, and then try to beat him. So
I felt once war was declared --especially being Jewish--that I couldn't
possibly not go into the military. It took a while, but by spring I
was on my way to Australia in the Army.
JOHNSON: The spring of '42?
RAUH: By the spring of '42, I was on my way to Australia
on a ship. In the war I had different posts. I had no military training,
but there were things you could do that were valuable. The most important
job I had was planning and assisting the military government operation
in the Philippines. You have a military battle plan, and then there
are appendices to that battle plan, and there's an appendix on supply
and an appendix on this, and an appendix on that. Then the last appendix
is on what we called civil affairs, but what they called at the Pentagon,
Military Government. Our final plan for civil affairs was completed
in Hollandia just before we shoved off for the Philippines.
MacArthur wouldn't take Military Government people from
the States. He refused to accept any of them. You know, the military
commander in the area can bar people, and he barred any Military Government
troops. He wanted to do it out of his own people. Since I was a lawyer,
the deputy chief of staff put me in G-1 which was where we had the civil
affairs section before we made it into a G-5. I was to draft how you
dealt with Military Government problems. Jeez, maybe I was a good lawyer,
but I didn't know anything about that.
So, what happened was this. A friend of mine had gotten
a trip back home to work on some supply side
problem in the invasion.
He brought a book back with him. It was John Hersey's A Bell for
Adano, a story of the invasion of Italy. It had all of the problems
in civil affairs like roads being clogged by peasants when soldiers
wanted to move to the front and so forth. I've always said I helped
write the battle plan on civil affairs for the Leyte invasion out of
John Hersey's A Bell for Adano. I read it three times; I read
it and read it. A marvelous book; it taught you how to do it. So I was
in civil affairs from, say, the summer of '43 until after V-J Day when
I left in August of '45.
JOHNSON: What was your rank?
RAUH: I ended up as lieutenant colonel. They offered me
the moon to go to Japan, but . . .
JOHNSON: Were you one of these 90-day commissions when
you went in?
RAUH: No, I had a regular lieutenant's commission when
I went in.
JOHNSON: Was this attached to the headquarters, to MacArthur's
headquarters, the civil government section?
RAUH: Oh, yes.
JOHNSON: That's where you met Richard Bolling I suppose.
RAUH: Yes, that's exactly where I met Dick--first at our
Hollandia headquarters and then Dick and I were on the same LST from
Hollandia to Leyte; that's six days at sea, weaving back and forth.
Dick was the adjutant and I was more or less in charge of civil affairs.
It was damn nice to have somebody who could write an order when you
needed an order fast. Dick and I weren't quite military, you know; we
didn't follow routines too much. Anyway, Dick and I were on the same
LST together, but we never talked politics or ideology. I guess you're
a little scared you're going to die on the beach. Even though I wasn't
a shooter, you were on the same beach with the shooting. So we never
talked about anything serious.
That's 1944. Three years later, in March in Chicago, I
bumped into Dick at an ADA organizational meeting and both of us exploded
at each other, "What the hell are you doing here?" We didn't know all
we had in common.
JOHNSON: You didn't talk politics.
RAUH: Not on that LST. I have no recollection of any politics
on that LST.
JOHNSON: Did you share any of your feelings about MacArthur,
the two of you?
RAUH: I don't think so. As a matter of fact, both of us
had fared rather well. Dick was the head adjutant for the invasion.
Even though only a Captain, he was the Adjutant on the invasion. MacArthur
got pissed off, I think, with his regular Adjutant General and he wanted
somebody else. Somebody suggested, "Well, that young Bolling is pretty
good." So Dick was the Adjutant there, and he fared pretty well. I was
in general charge of Civil Affairs, and that's a pretty good job, too.
So I don't know that we were really that hostile to MacArthur at the time.
My wife says that I've changed. She says, "Your letters
were a lot downer on MacArthur than you are now." I said, "Well, I did
get home didn't I?" So, anyway . . .
JOHNSON: And Bolling was rather critical too of what he
saw, especially those around MacArthur.
RAUH: Well, we both felt that, Dick and I.
RAUH: Yes, sycophants they were.
JOHNSON: And those were the only ones he'd have around
him, rubber stampers?
RAUH: I can't think of anybody that wasn't a rubber
JOHNSON: Was [Major General Charles A.] Willoughby then with them?
RAUH: Willoughby was G-2; [Major General Stephen A.] Chamberlain
was G-3, that's for operations; [Brigadier General] Bonner Fellers,
who later was a public right-winger, one of those Birchers, was G-1.
He was my boss, but he gave me pretty much a free hand. And then Courtney
Whitney, who was MacArthur's speechwriter, took Fellers' place and was
my boss in the Civil Affairs. Courtney just said, "Keep them out of
my hair. I don't care what you do, but keep those guys away from me."
We were finally in Manila. Courtney had lived in Manila and MacArthur
had lived in Manila, so a lot of these Manila businessmen would demand
to see us and say something like, "I need three trucks to start my business
up." All Whitney would say was, "Goddamn it, Colonel, get that thing
settled. I don't want to be bothered; I'm writing speeches for the General;"
there was, of course, only one general there--MacArthur.
One of the most interesting things for me from that period,
historically, I think, happened when my father died. I had been overseas
by that time for more than a year and a half, and I was entitled to a trip
home, to see my wife and children. I got the trip home in December
of '43 after my father died. I was on this plane going to the States
and so was Phil LaFollette. You know, you're sitting there all night
on a plane and going home, and you get kind of emotional and talk to
the guy you're sitting next to. I also had some booze which we shared.
Phil says, "I've got something here pretty important." I said, "What
is it?" He said, "It's a letter from General MacArthur that I'm to deliver
to Tom Dewey." I said, "Well, what's it say?" He said, "Well, I don't
know," but he said it in a way that I thought he did know. He said,
"I think; I think it asks Dewey what he, MacArthur, could do to help
in the upcoming election."
You know, it's funny, that's what, 45 years ago. I don't
know if he read me that. I can't remember; I just remember the clear
feeling that he was telling me something, or he showed me something.
I can't remember that, but I do know that he was saying, "I got a letter
from the General to next year's Presidential candidate." I've never
seen Phil LaFollette since that night on the plane.
JOHNSON: It seems that MacArthur was sticking his neck
out. He is a general under the Commander-in-Chief and he's offering
to help the future political adversary of his Commander-in-Chief in
the '44 election.
RAUH: Oh, but he hated Roosevelt with a passion, indeed.
JOHNSON: Did you ever hear him talk about Roosevelt?
RAUH: Oh, I wouldn't know big stuff like that. I wouldn't
have heard MacArthur talk about anything important. I would hear Bonner
Fellers talk pretty loosely. There wasn't any question that he, Bonner
Fellers, was interpreting MacArthur's views, that MacArthur hated Roosevelt.
Of course, there was that big argument, I guess it was in Honolulu,
where FDR, [Admiral Chester] Nimitz and MacArthur met, and Nimitz wanted
to go to Formosa.
JOHNSON: In fact, I think that was during the convention in '44.
RAUH: Nimitz wanted to go to Formosa. And MacArthur wanted
to go to the Philippines, and they both argued their case in front of Roosevelt.
RAUH: And MacArthur won the battle. The witness was Fellers.
I don't know what the hell MacArthur took Fellers along for, but he
did take Fellers along . . .
JOHNSON: He was there with the President and the General
and the Admiral?
RAUH: In that meeting, yes. There was terrible ill-feeling
between Washington and MacArthur. Every time a division went to Europe,
to Eisenhower, boy there was grumbling in our headquarters: "Roosevelt
has screwed it up again." "Why do we want to let the Communists win
in Europe and then we lose in Asia. Why don't we win in Asia, and to
hell with the other side."
JOHNSON: But MacArthur did get his way on that one.
RAUH: Yes, he did.
JOHNSON: And he finally did convince Roosevelt that it
would be a betrayal of the Philippines if he didn't return like he said
he was going to.
RAUH: Oh, yes. Oh yes, no question about it, MacArthur
won that battle. You should have seen Feller's face when he walked in
to report to his staff, in G-1, what had happened there. Boy, you would
have thought that he inherited a million bucks. He was so excited that
MacArthur had talked down Nimitz, and Roosevelt had ruled for MacArthur.
JOHNSON: Roosevelt was on his way to this meeting, when
he stopped in Chicago.
RAUH: Is that right?
JOHNSON: During the convention. And they got this letter
from him in which he said that either [William O.] Douglas or Truman
would be fine as Vice-Presidential candidates. Apparently, Truman's
friends included some of the city Bosses, and they influenced Roosevelt.
RAUH: Who was it that was chairman of the party.
JOHNSON: [Robert] Hannegan.
RAUH: I was always told that Hannegan went on that railroad
car and got the letter with a
reverse draft of that.
JOHNSON: With Truman mentioned first.
RAUH: That's right.
JOHNSON: And Douglas second.
RAUH: Then Hannegan leaped on that, that the President's
real preference was the first one--Truman.
JOHNSON: Yes, they worked that pretty smoothly. That was
a very eventful month, there is no question about it, with the convention
and then the meeting with MacArthur and Nimitz. That would have been
July of '44.
RAUH: The Democrats being in, they had their convention
second. The ins always have it second, because they need less time to work.
JOHNSON: Well, you were released from the Army when?
RAUH: Early September. I got home on the first of September
. MacArthur had promised me. You know about the point system?
After V-E Day in Europe, they set up a point system of getting out.
You could go home, depending on the number of months you were overseas,
if you had a family, a good record. I had enough points coming out of
my ears after Europe surrendered, and I wanted to come home. I put in
for my points, and they didn't want me to go. They wanted me to finish
the job of setting up the civil government there. They gave me MacArthur's
word that they'd get me home by the first of September which was also
my tenth wedding anniversary.
JOHNSON: In '45, just before the signing of the surrender terms.
RAUH: So I'm getting ready about August to go home, and
along comes the [atomic] bomb and the surrender. My superiors said,
"Won't you come to Japan," and I said, "No, everybody has promised I
can go home for staying this extra couple of months." They took it to
MacArthur and he signed the order, and gave me an "A" Travel Priority,
which was the earliest plane you could get. I got home on the first
of September, my tenth anniversary. MacArthur lived up to the promises
made to me.
JOHNSON: You came back here to Washington, D.C.
RAUH: That's right.
JOHNSON: And to your family. Did you take up where you'd
left off, in the Government?
RAUH: No, I didn't go back. I started to practice law,
but within a few months, Wilson Wyatt, the President's Housing Expediter,
called up and said, "You've got to come over here and help run this
place; it's a mess." What this place was, was
the . . .
JOHNSON: Veterans Emergency Housing program?
RAUH: Yes, the Veterans Emergency Housing Program. He
says, "The place is a mess and everybody says you're a great guy, and
we'll get along fine, and why don't you come over and run this thing
for me. I can deal with the problems that I have, with the Congress
and the Administration, and all that, and will you come over?" Oh, hell,
I was still young, see, I was 35, and I said, "sure." So I went and
worked with Wilson until Wilson got canned, and then I left with him.
The housing program was very difficult. We were past the
war. There was no fear of war. There were only very small areas of controls
left from the war. I used to put it, "We're an island of control in a sea
awash without any controls whatever." There were some controls.
Price controls were still on, on most things. There was still some controls
on supplies, but they were very weak.
So, on the housing thing, we were pretty much alone, and
we just had no way of getting housing built. We weren't getting the
houses, let's face it. There wasn't much being built. There weren't
any nails, there wasn't any plaster, there wasn't any anything, because
you had to get it all going and we tried to do it too fast. Hell, there
were 15 million new families that you had to get places for. Wyatt was
a dynamo, and he's a great guy, but the obstacles were overwhelming.
JOHNSON: Did you get involved with the Lustron Corporation?
RAUH: Oh, yes. Sure.
JOHNSON: And that was going to be a prefab aluminum type of home.
RAUH: Oh, boy did I get involved. I'll tell you about
that. We decided that the veterans housing program just wasn't going
to work unless something new and drastic was inserted in it. So, what
we tried to do was to get RFC to give 100 percent loans to companies
who could really offer something new--either on-site
or like Lustron, who we thought could offer off-site prefabrication
out of steel.
Well, several things were going forth at the same time.
We were trying to get 100 percent loans from Jesse Jones at RFC. That
was one of the things we wanted. We also needed a factory for Lustron,
and the available factory was the big surplus engine factory, Pratt
and Whitney, in Chicago. A guy named [Preston] Tucker, who wanted to
build a rear-engine car, got an option on Pratt and Whitney. It was
an engine place in Chicago; that is my recollection now. And Lustron
came in and said, "That's the perfect factory to build prefabricated
housing, the perfect place, and we want it."
There was no need for automobiles, for Christ sake; there
were plenty of companies who could build automobiles, but there was
only one company that said they could build prefabricated houses en
mass. Wilson was out of town, so I signed the order taking Pratt &
Whitney away from Tucker and giving it to, I think the man's name was
Strandlund, of Lustron.
Then we lose the election. All of this happens about the
same time; and then we lose the '46 election. Then, Wyatt wrote a letter
to Truman saying what had to be done to save the housing program. We
were pretty well admitting we were not building the number of
that we needed. And so Wyatt wrote this letter outlining everything
that needed to be done. We all worked on it all night, and the letter
was delivered to the White House in the morning. I don't know the sonofabitch
that leaked that letter, but somebody showed Truman the outlines of
that letter in the Wall Street Journal, and he went through the
roof. Wilson got a letter back. I got a call from his Secretary, "Get
in here." Wilson handed me a letter from Truman. He was ashen. It said
something like, "I do not like to read my mail in the Wall Street
Journal." I can't quote the exact language but you probably have
it anyway. You've probably got that letter.
JOHNSON: You got this letter from Harry Truman, President Truman.
JOHNSON: Complaining about reading this letter in the
Wall Street Journal.
RAUH: Reading the letter in the Wall Street Journal.
I think it was the Wall Street Journal.
JOHNSON: And that letter concerned . . .
RAUH: It was our new program; what had to be done if the
program was to be saved. It had l00 percent loans in
it; we had to have
the right to cut off sending nails to any place except housing people.
It was really a . . .
JOHNSON: Somebody leaked that letter to the . . .
JOHNSON: And you have no idea who it was?
RAUH: I have no idea. I'm a big leaker, but I didn't leak
that one. I engaged in a lot of leaks because I believe that the only
way you ever get anything done in the Government is to get the problem
out in the open. So, I'm not saying I wouldn't have leaked it, but I'm
saying before I even thought about leaking it, Goddamn if Truman doesn't
see it in, I think, the Wall Street Journal. At any rate, from
there on it was pretty clear we were going to have to get out.
JOHNSON: And that was not his favorite newspaper, either,
RAUH: I guess that's right. At any rate, Wilson came into
my office one day early in December I guess, and said, "Joe, we're going
over to the White House." I said, "What are we going to do over there?"
"Well, we're going to negotiate my withdrawal, my resignation." I said,
"What do you mean?" He said, "Oh, I'd like to
give them a nice letter,
and get a nice letter back, and so we're going over." I said, "Who are
you going to deal with?" He said, "Clark Clifford."
So, we went over and we were seated in some room or other.
I've been in most of the executive rooms there. It wasn't the one the
President uses; it was some small room. Clifford and Wilson and I were
the only ones there, and Wilson says to Clifford that he's ready to
resign if that's what the President wants. Clifford made clear in that
oily fashion of his, that the President wanted Wilson's resignation.
They were talking about that, and everything was going very reasonably.
Wilson was trying to work out the language, why he's resigning and so
forth; that's always the hard problem when you're really being fired.
I hadn't said boo, but then I said something to Clifford such as, "I
don't think that's fair to Wilson," something concerning what Clifford
had written. Clifford said to me, "I don't know what you're doing here
anyway." Boy, I will love Wilson to the day I die for this; Wilson said,
"Clark, I'm packing up, and we're leaving unless you apologize to Joe."
Oh, boy, that oiliness went out the window. I got such
a fast apology. So I'll love Wilson until the day I die for that one.
At any rate, Charlie Ross soon came in. He was then, I
guess, the press secretary. He came in and said, "How's it going, boys?"
I guess the press people were on his ass for news. I think both said,
"It'll be all right; it will just take a little while." So, he resigned
that afternoon. I resigned the next day, with a fellow named Norton
Long, who was the program director. Long has never been the same since
because he made a crack that was much quoted then: "The greatest disaster
in American history is when Jacobson's haberdashery went broke." Long
got drunk and went to New York after he made that crack, and he saw
it in the New York Times and in lights on Times Square. It's
got this thing, that Norton Long said, "The greatest disaster in American
history is the Jacobson haberdashery going broke." I don't think Long
was ever the same after he saw that. That headline was on the Times
I resigned the next day and went on a vacation, but I
did get out to see the Strandlund house, and it was a very interesting
thing. I don't say it was economically feasible, but it was a very interesting
experience. We took some vacation, and then I went back into law practice.
Wilson and I remained great friends. I love him; I can't
understand his book, but I love him. He's a
wonderful guy, but his book
is rather strange on the issue of whether we were canned or not. I have
never felt as sure that I was being canned in all my life. You'd have
to judge for yourself.
JOHNSON: He wrote his autobiography and it was published?
RAUH: About 200 pages, very short. But this thing I just
couldn't understand. Anyway, Wilson and I became great friends.
Now, on January 4, 1947, the ADA is formed. That's less
than a month of our being canned, of Paul Porter and the OPA going out,
and everything happening.
JOHNSON: Did they dissolve that emergency housing, or
was he replaced?
RAUH: No. He was replaced and the thing was cut to almost
nothing. It was not dissolved, but it was cut. They pretended like we're
still going to have the program, but it was all cut to nothing.
JOHNSON: So you went back into private practice. Were
you by yourself, here in Washington?
JOHNSON: Your own office. Did you decide to orient yourself
toward certain cases?
RAUH: No, I didn't. I was just waiting to see what would
happen, and many things happened fast. There was the ADA [Americans
for Democratic Action].
JOHNSON: How did you get interested in the ADA? Were you
in the UDA [Union for Democratic Action]?
RAUH: Well, I was not in the UDA because that was during the war.
JOHNSON: That was [Reinhold] Niebuhr's and [James] Loeb's
JOHNSON: Had you met them, or did you know them before '44?
RAUH: No. Not before '46. I met Jim in '46. Well, Jim
sought me out in '46 to go into the planning sessions for the ADA, and
into the UDA, which was to move over into ADA. Jim sought me out and
we became fast friends. Jim Loeb is one hell of a guy.
JOHNSON: But he knew you were interested in civil liberties,
RAUH: Well, I was just starting out. My interests weren't
so obvious yet.
JOHNSON: You had worked for Frankfurter, though.
RAUH: Oh, yes, I would be known as a liberal because of
Frankfurter. But I guess if you'd take my interest in the Government,
I always felt that the greatest contribution, if I made any in the Government,
was in trying to get preparation for war in '40 and '41. At any rate,
I did start to practice and we did start the ADA. There was an all day
meeting at the Willard Hotel on January 4, 1947, and then two months
later there was a two-day meeting at the Washington Hotel, and that's
when Wilson was elected chairman of the Board of the ADA. All of these
things were happening at once. Truman was at a very conservative, unpopular
stage, under the Clifford regime, which was getting out of price controls,
and we're going to be tough on labor, and he had the strikes you know.
JOHNSON: A record number of strikes in '46.
RAUH: And they were very tough.
JOHNSON: But he had a fact-finding board to try to work
RAUH: That's right. And he threatened to draft the railroad
strikers--all of this. There was this period--and everything's going
forward at the same time. Wyatt's out, [Paul A.] Porter is out, the
ADA is being formed, there are strikes and labor is angry; so
all that in this period.
JOHNSON: Anti-Communism was starting too because of . . .
RAUH: I don't know what you would call the dominant motivation
of the ADAers in '46 and '47. In '46 we had a steering committee. It
was Loeb, Jimmy Wechsler of the New York Post; Arthur Schlesinger
[Jr.], the historian; myself, I guess; and somebody from the AFL, Boris
Shiskin. There was also somebody from the CIO, George Weaver. So that
was sort of a steering committee that put the thing together for the
Willard Hotel meeting on the fourth of January and the Washington Hotel
in March or April. That's how the ADA started. The motivations were
clearly two-fold. One was Truman's movement towards the conservative
side, after the '46 election, the disaster to the Democrats there. The
other was the effort to separate the Commies from the liberals, and
the anti-Wallace feeling on our side, and the anti-liberal feeling on
the Wallace side.
JOHNSON: You were trying to restore the respectability
of liberalism after the Republican victories in '46?
RAUH: Well, it wasn't just the Republican victories, although
that helped in what we were trying to do, but we also had a number of
the issues there regarding the
Communists. There was no question that
in the PCA, Progressive Citizens of America, the Communists had control.
Indeed, Wallace wrote a piece in 1950 flatly stating that he had not
realized that the Communists had control of the group then. That was
a real watershed in American liberalism.
JOHNSON: How about the American Veterans Committee? Had
you been a member?
RAUH: Yes, I was a member of that.
JOHNSON: As soon as you came back, after you came back here?
RAUH: I have a 1945 card in the AVC. It's pretty frayed;
I've kept it in my pocket.
JOHNSON: And that kept you identified with the liberal
veterans didn't it?
RAUH: Yes. And [Charles] Bolte, the chairman of the AVC,
was at the ADA founding. Those things were going forward in '46 and
JOHNSON: Did the American Veterans Committee ever have
any links to the White House, or any correspondence with any staff people
at the White House? Or any support of any kind?
RAUH: I don't have any remembrance of it.
JOHNSON: But the White House did give support to ADA, did it not?
RAUH: In other words, there were people in the Administration
who were members of ADA.
JOHNSON: David Lloyd, of course.
RAUH: Yes. I'm trying to think of other people who were
there. There were people in the Administration that were in the ADA.
I mean, basically, we were pushing from the left on Truman. We had many
disagreements. For example, there was Truman's loyalty program in 1947.
ADA was screaming about the loyalty program, and I was working a great
deal defending loyalty cases. When you say, "How did your practice get
set up?", well, your practice gets made for you. That was the pre-McCarthy
period, but you already had all of the loyalty cases. It's very hard
making a living on that, but I did have a little . . .
JOHNSON: They gravitated toward your office?
RAUH: Well, probably the most famous loyalty case for
that entire period was in my office. It was William Remington. Some
people did contribute to the cause, and you could eke out a living.
JOHNSON: Okay, so you were pronouncing a strong anti-Communist
position, and at the same time you were promoting a strong pro-civil
liberties position, and I suppose that created some perception problems.
RAUH: Precisely, or presumptive problems. The Communists
would say, "You don't believe in civil liberties, because you're against
us," and then we'd say, "Well, we're not against you, and we'll defend
your civil liberties to the extreme, but we don't think we have to have
your crowd wreck our organization for us."
So there our ADA is started, basically on civil liberties
grounds, even though we didn't want the Communists in our organization
to wreck it. They had pretty close to wrecked the AVC, and we had the
benefit of that experience.
JOHNSON: Civil rights maybe was secondary at this time.
In other words, civil liberties comes first, and then civil rights entered
the picture and becomes more common?
RAUH: Civil rights takes over pretty fast.
JOHNSON: By '48.
RAUH: By '48, because by July of '48, when the Democratic
Party had its convention, we were able to win with our minority plank.
Now, that story has been told many
JOHNSON: Before we get to that, of course, Truman set
up Presidential commissions on civil rights.
RAUH: Yes. To Secure These Rights. A fine report.
That's right, and so Truman had a pro-civil rights aura, from that event
of setting up that commission, a very liberal commission, which made
a very liberal report. But, when we came to talking about the party
platform, Truman was not for a strong civil-rights platform.
Incidentally, in his memoirs he says he wrote our civil
rights dissent. That can only be called a monumental mistake of fact.
Truman was on the wrong side of that fight. We beat the whole machinery
of that convention in '48. The Missouri delegation voted unanimously
against us; that was the President's delegation. The Kentucky delegation
of Alben Barkley, the nominee for Vice President, voted unanimously
against it. The Rhode Island delegation of Democratic chairman [J. Howard]
McGrath voted unanimously against us. So Truman's story is just not
correct. Mr. Truman must have had a blur in his memory.
JOHNSON: Before that, many ADAers had said, "Well, we
like your programs for the most part, but we don't think you win, and
we need a winner." So they started talking about [Dwight D.] Eisenhower
and [William O.] Douglas.
RAUH: And/or Douglas.
JOHNSON: What were you doing at this point? Were you trying to . . .
RAUH: I wasn't for any of them. I mean I was against
Truman. I don't think you're quite accurate when you say that the ADA
was satisfied with the platform, or . . .
JOHNSON: Let us say, before the convention.
RAUH: Or, I mean was satisfied with Truman's actions,
and the only ground for opposition was that he couldn't win. There was
great dissatisfaction with Truman's actions. There was the loyalty program
which was violently opposed. There was no civil rights legislation.
I mean he had helped with To Secure These Rights, but he didn't
do anything to follow up that report. There was a great feeling that
he was wrong on Israel at this particular time. Later, he changed, but
at the time of the ADA convention in February of '48, he was all wrong
on the Jewish crisis, and you couldn't get him to change.
JOHNSON: Was he going for a mandate again, or a trusteeship
by the U.N.?
RAUH: All that I remember now, over forty years later, is
that he was getting hell from every side. I know I was against him
on Palestine, but I don't remember exactly what the position was.
JOHNSON: Maybe, at about that point he was suggesting
a trusteeship under the U.N.
RAUH: Well, whatever it was, what you had then was a great
resentment against Truman on the merits. Also there's this tremendous
change in personnel away from the New Deal people. Take, for example,
the situation involving [Francis] Biddle. I heard this from Biddle;
this is Biddle's side of the story: Biddle was the Attorney General
when Truman became President. A few weeks or maybe a month maybe before
Roosevelt's death, Biddle had told Tom Clark to look for another job.
Tom Clark had some moderately top spot in the Justice Department, but
Tom wasn't so hot, and Biddle thought he ought to look for another job.
Roosevelt dies, and Tom Clark goes to [Robert] Hannegan
and says, "Do you want a pliant Justice Department?" "Sure, how do I
get one?" Clark replies, "Make me Attorney General." Truman fired Biddle
and made Tom Clark Attorney General. Truman said in his memoirs that
Biddle had resigned and had recommended Tom Clark. Biddle wrote a letter
to the [Washington, D.C.] Star--I think it was the Star--saying,
an utter fabrication. I didn't recommend Tom Clark. Mr. Truman
asked for my resignation, which I, of course gave him." There was a
lot of feeling about this sort of action. Almost all of the Roosevelt
New Deal people were out under the new President. There was a piece
in the New York Post, either just before or just after the ADA
was founded, about all the New Deal people who had left the administration.
JOHNSON: [Henry] Morgenthau, of course, was succeeded
by [Fred] Vinson, as Secretary of the Treasury, and then by [John W.] Snyder.
RAUH: There was a lot of that, you know. And so all of
this created the Eisenhower and/or Douglas movement, and I was part
of that Eisenhower and/or Douglas movement. I am not the least bit sorry
about it. I think, if Eisenhower had been elected President in 1948,
he probably would have been a liberal President on the Democratic side.
But he was a goddamn reactionary on the . . .
JOHNSON: He didn't have a record at that point, did he?
RAUH: Yes, the record that we were going on were his speeches,
which were very internationalist in substance and tone. In fact, we
used to say, "Well, it's all
right with us, that the Chicago Tribune
calls Ike 'FDR in uniform'." We said, "That's exactly what we're looking for."
At any rate, we did have that position and Paul A. Porter,
who was for Truman at this time in 1948--he was back being an adviser
to the President--said to me, "I've got a message for you, Joe." I said,
"What's the message." He says, "It's from President Truman." Truman
says to tell you that "Anybody, any shit behind his desk, can get himself
renominated and I want the ADA crowd to know it." That was the message
that Porter gave us. I didn't hear Truman give Porter that message for
us. And he proved to be right, although in [Lyndon B.] Johnson's case
twenty years later, that didn't prove to be right, that anybody behind
that desk could get renominated. But there were more primaries by the
time Johnson came in.
JOHNSON: Well, at the convention, I guess by that time
the ADA had decided to be more or less neutral?
RAUH: Well, by convention time, it was all over. We endorsed
Truman. I mean, "what the hell." Even dumb liberals like me could see,
when it's hopeless, and . . .
JOHNSON: So that kind of patched things up to a large
extent, with Truman, your endorsement, the ADA
RAUH: Everybody worked in the campaign for Truman. That
was the last campaign where you could say "lib-lab" won--liberals and
labor. That was the last of the lib-lab successes.
JOHNSON: I suppose that's been a paradox, or a tension,
or whatever, in trying to match labor, labor unions, especially labor
union membership, with liberal causes.
RAUH: I think that's the last time. I gave a lecture on
it. I can send you a copy sometime.
JOHNSON: That was the last time, you say, that you had
a real collaboration between liberals and labor?
RAUH: I think it was the last big lib-labor collaboration.
Stevenson didn't arouse the labor people very much the way Truman had
done. Then you get into the '60s: Meany was for the war in Vietnam;
liberals opposed the war. That [the 1948 election] was a real lib-lab,
liberal-labor, victory. As a matter of fact, the term "lib-lab" was
used over and over again in the '48 campaign.
JOHNSON: And, of course, farmers contributed to that.
RAUH: Well, sure, but people could treat them as labor.
JOHNSON: And the Black vote wasn't all that much?
RAUH: Oh, you didn't have that much of a Black vote. That
would have been lib-lab, but you didn't have any real big Black vote.
JOHNSON: But you had a switch coming now, in party loyalties
by the Blacks that did vote? That is, they were switching to the Democrats?
RAUH: Well, they shifted really under Roosevelt. But there
weren't so many voting.
JOHNSON: I notice Niebuhr was skeptical of Ike and of
his military background, having a military man possibly.
RAUH: We had a lot of skepticism, and that's where the
Douglas thing came in, "and/or." Bill Douglas wanted it--bad. I was
on the phone with him from the convention. The call was put in by Leon
Henderson Sunday afternoon, but Leon asked me to sit in with him. I
heard that whole conversation. Douglas still thought he had a chance,
but he was wrong. We were there and we knew it was over. We knew it
was over from the time Truman got there. It proved Truman had it under control.
There is one thing about the convention I want to
In this book by Hamby [Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry
S. Truman and American Liberalism. New York and London: Columbia
University Press, 1973.]--I looked at it this morning for a minute . . .
JOHNSON: I've used that for some references too.
RAUH: Hamby says that after Eisenhower and Douglas were
out, I went for [Claude] Pepper. That is an absolute mistake of fact;
and he had interviewed me. I didn't remember he had interviewed me,
but I looked in the notes and he said he interviewed me. He said I had
been for Pepper at the convention. That is absolutely a falsehood. I
agreed with Leon Henderson's wonderful remark, "I've had two horses
shot out from under me and I'm not getting on any red roan." I mean
it was ridiculous. I don't know if Pepper ever endorsed Wallace, but
he agreed with the Wallace view, and there was no way any ADAer could
have been for Pepper against Truman. The story is just not true.
The other person he mentions is Ted Thackrey, and that
is true. Thackrey tried to keep going against Truman. He was editor
of the New York Post at the moment, and I believe he made Jimmy
Wechsler write a column for Pepper. The poor guy almost died; he wasn't
for Pepper at all, he was for Truman.
JOHNSON: It is clear that ADA did have a positive effect
in this election, for the Democratic candidate, for Truman. Do you think
the ADA ever had as much influence in subsequent elections as it had in '48?
RAUH: I think probably not.
JOHNSON: That was the high point of ADA's influence on
Presidential campaign politics?
RAUH: Things are a little hard to measure, but there was
a good deal of influence in 1960. After Hubert [Humphrey] got trounced
by [John F.] Kennedy in '60, in Wisconsin and then in West Virginia,
the ADA leadership swung to Kennedy. Walter Reuther and I helped swing
ADA to Kennedy. That, I think, may have prevented the Stevenson movement
from getting strong enough not to win, but to block Kennedy and give
the nomination to Johnson. You know, the galleries were packed with
Stevenson people; someway or other they got the tickets. I don't know
who the hell's brainstorm that was. Letting the tickets out of hand
was the way [Wendell] Willkie got nominated and that's the way Stevenson
had the gallery in 1960; there's no question about that. But I think
the ADA's role there really was to block Johnson, and I think that's
JOHNSON: You still had [Walter] Reuther and the CIO backing
the ADA in '60?
RAUH: Yes. And what I considered the "Stevenson Movement"
was really a "Stop Kennedy Movement." And Truman was in on stopping
Kennedy; he didn't want Kennedy.
JOHNSON: He wouldn't go out there; he said the convention
was being rigged by the Kennedys. But he patched it up afterwards with
the Kennedy people and party leaders.
RAUH: Oh, yes, he patched it up. But he made a statement
one Saturday afternoon before the Convention, and I remember listening
to it on the radio and television. It was a statement against Kennedy,
that he hadn't been tested enough to be President. I don't think Truman
wanted Stevenson, for God's sake, but he didn't want Kennedy either.
JOHNSON: No. He was supporting [Stuart] Symington in '60.
RAUH: Symington? But that would require stopping Kennedy,
too. I think the ADA pulled the roots out from under the stop Kennedy
movement, and I think if you say, "Where did we have a real input?"
I think it was on that. You see, there was a letter from the ADA leadership,
liberal leadership, to Kennedy, that we support you and that really
cut into the Stevenson support. I mean the Stevenson campaign was a
dichotomy. It had [Senator A.S. Mike] Monroney and the Johnson people
running it in large part, but it also had some damn good liberal support,
I mean true general, liberal support. But it was a dichotomy and nobody
ever thought Stevenson would get the nomination.
I think Monroney was running it out of Johnson's pocket.
At any rate, I think the ADA influence there, to hold the liberals for
Kennedy as against Stevenson, not as against Humphrey. The ADA had endorsed
Humphrey; I mean we were all for Humphrey, but he just got slaughtered
in the primaries.
JOHNSON: In 1948 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. and James
Roosevelt were among those who were promoting Eisenhower for President,
and this really irritated Harry Truman. I think Truman says that when
he got to Los Angeles, in that '48 campaign, why he just read James
Roosevelt the riot act, that his father would have been ashamed of him
for doing this. Did you talk to James Roosevelt or Franklin, Jr. during
RAUH: Sure, to Franklin Roosevelt, Jr.
JOHNSON: And do you recall some of his comments, or statements
about why he was promoting Eisenhower so strongly?
RAUH: I think it was anti-Truman.
JOHNSON: Because he was really anti-Truman?
RAUH: I think so.
JOHNSON: Would you venture an opinion as to why he felt
so strongly about that? Didn't he think Truman was upholding his father's programs?
RAUH: I think that's right. I think that's true of Mrs.
Roosevelt too. Why did the two of them come on January 4, 1947, to the
first ADA meeting? They knew what it was going to be. And what did Elmer
Davis say when he opened the meeting? "This is the New Deal Government
JOHNSON: And this loyalty program that you said ADA was
very critical about. Wasn't that in response to terrific public pressure?
JOHNSON: In a way, then, could it have been a safety valve
to vent some of that pressure which could have resulted perhaps in something
worse? You didn't see it as a pragmatic response?
RAUH: We didn't see it that way. Now, if you're saying
this 45 years later, for gosh sake, to think about that, you're raising
a different point. Would it have been worse if Truman had not done the
That requires some thought. I don't want to swear one
way or the other off-the-cuff. Right then, I thought not. I mean, I
thought you had to fight it. The worse thing about it was his yielding
to [J. Edgar] Hoover, because generally Truman was pretty tough on Hoover;
but on this one instance, he yielded to Hoover.
The Loyalty Review Board wanted to let the employee face
his accuser, and Hoover said, "I will not agree to have my informants
identified where they don't want to be." And Truman's crowd backed down.
I'm going to get ahead of the story, but I'm going to
do that if you'll let me. This is in Bob Donovan's book, because I gave
it to him, but I would like to put it in my oral history now.
One day in '51 I got a call from Lloyd or Charlie Murphy
or someone over there. Truman is living in Blair House. It was early
in the morning and they said, "The President would like to meet with
the leadership of the ADA this evening. Will you round it up?" I said,
"Sure." I rounded up ten people. There were several labor people. I
remember one Al Hayes, of the machinists, and there were a couple of
others. Jim Carey, I think, was there. And there was Biddle and me;
we were the officers then. And there were four or five others. There
were ten of us. We were sitting around the table there in Blair House,
and Truman said,
"I am considering whether to run again in 1952, and
I want your honest appraisal of the situation."
We had not been prepared for this, so there was no collaboration.
Each of us gave our individual views. But the views were quite similar
in the statement that we don't know for sure, but there was no Republican
on the horizon that would get much ADA support. We went around the room
to the different people. Everybody had their say, and since I had arranged
the meeting, I was last. I called on the different people; Biddle was
second to last.
My time came, and I went after the loyalty program. I
gave him case after case where there were terrible blunders and Truman
didn't seem to know that the employee couldn't face his accusers. I
told him of one case where I found the accuser by accident. We had called
the landlord to testify on something or other and we didn't know he
was the accuser. We called him as a favorable witness, and I asked him
some question. He made clear that he told the investigator that this
guy was a Communist, my client. I said, "Well, how did you know he was
a Communist." He said, "Well, it's the literature he got." I said, "Well,
did you read it?" "Oh, no. I simply saw the word 'Communist' repeated
there." I said, "Well, could it have been statements that were anti-Communist?"
And he said, "Oh yeah,
Communist, anti-Communist. This had happened
in a hearing under his loyalty program and I was able to tell this to
the President of the United States. I was up to my ass in these kinds
of cases and I gave him two or three of the worst horror stories.
The President turned to Charlie and Dave, who were not
at the table, but a few feet behind it at the end of the room. And he
said, "Is Joe right, is this stuff going on? Is it like this?" Dave
and Charlie vowed as how this kind of stuff was going on. And Truman
said, "We've got to do something about that. Damn it, we're going to
do something about that."
Three weeks later, Truman tightened the screws on the
program. To me, that is, of all things of the Truman days, that I find
incomprehensible, that is to me the most incomprehensible. The tightening
of the screw as I remember it, that occurred a few weeks after the meeting
with Truman, was an Executive Order. I think it changed the finding
of reasonable grounds that the employee is disloyal to reasonable
grounds that he may be disloyal. That was the tightening
of the screw if I remember correctly. Never, to this day, can I tell
you what happened inside the White House. You may know.
JOHNSON: Well, yes. It involved the review board, and
there was a hardliner that changed the interpretation.
RAUH: From reason to believe he is, to reason
to believe he may be. I was going around town telling
everybody that the President really had his mind set against this type
of thing, this kind of an unfair program and we're going to see something
better. And the next thing I read is the news story, "President Tightens
Loyalty Program." I couldn't believe it; but I read the story, and it
was absolutely true. I called Dave Lloyd, and Dave knew nothing about it.
JOHNSON: I wonder if that slipped around them somehow.
RAUH: Yes. Dave didn't know about it. Now, whether Charlie
knew, I can't say. I didn't talk to Charlie. I talked to Dave and he
did not know about it. That is in Donovan's book, that story I just
told you. I told it to Bob.
JOHNSON: Yes, it does seem a little out of character.
RAUH: I mean, how much does the President understand.
Did he realize that he had said to this group that he was going one
general direction and that signing that Executive Order was going the
other direction? Did he realize that, do you think?
JOHNSON: I'm trying to recall what he had to say on that,
but yes, it does seem somewhat out of character.
Andrew Biemiller, apparently, was a labor official
Congressman from Wisconsin.
RAUH: Yes, and he also was in the ADA. He would win his
race for Congress one time and then lose the next time and work with ADA.
JOHNSON: He claims he broke with ADA when some of their
people promoted Eisenhower.
RAUH: No, he stayed at ADA; that's not correct.
JOHNSON: He made this claim in an interview the Truman
Library did with him in 1977. [oral history interview with Andrew J.
Biemiller, July 29, 1977, p.75, Harry S. Truman Library]
RAUH: No. He worked on the political side of ADA after 1948.
RAUH: Look, even though the majority of the ADAers were
for Eisenhower and/or Douglas, the majority will tell you they weren't.
You'll get as many views as you want on that, Niel.
I got ahead of the story, but I'll tell you when we were
working the closest with the Truman administration; that was on the
Marshall Plan. The ADA was very much for the Marshall Plan and we were
working on it all the time, providing speakers and material on
Plan. In some respects there was a close relationship with Truman, and
in some, there was not.
JOHNSON: Well, maybe we can get back to that civil rights
issue in 1948 at the convention because that is one of the big issues
and interesting events of that whole period.
On the civil rights question, James Loeb in an interview
that we have comments about a meeting of the ADA board in March 1948
in which the decision was made to campaign for a strong civil rights
plank on the Democratic party's platform. Among those involved in this
decision, that he identifies, is Edward Prichard. Do you recall anything
about that, about Prichard's role? [oral history interview with James
Loeb, June 26, 1970, pp.28-30, Harry S. Truman Library]
RAUH: I do not. Prich was a brilliant strategist until
he put those goddamn crooked ballots in the box in November 1948, one
of the dumbest things that ever was done. I love Prich; he was one of
my best friends. My recollection is that the 1948 civil rights fight
sort of evolved out of the failure of the Presidential fight. We had
gone out to get a lot of delegates and there wasn't going to be much
to do. I had the feeling that the only fight we were going to have at the
Convention was over the platform as it got clearer and clearer Truman
was going to be renominated. As the opposition to Truman went down,
the desire for some action in the civil rights field went up. That's
really when it started. Then you had this letter from Jimmy Roosevelt,
Hubert Humphrey, and Mayor [William] O'Dwyer to all of the delegates,
saying that we're going to make the fight on the civil rights plank.
JOHNSON: Well, let me say, too, that Jim Loeb mentions
Eugenie Moore Anderson and yourself, as well as Milton Stuart, providing
important support. Eugenie Anderson, he says, had the "genius of putting
in that minority plank, [the statement] 'We support President Truman's
civil rights program,' in so many words...." [Loeb interview, p.36]
RAUH: That's right.
JOHNSON: So that's your recollection, too? By the way,
Eugenie Anderson became the first woman ambassador in American history.
RAUH: Well, she was the first woman minister and then
the first woman Ambassador.
JOHNSON: She was Ambassador to Denmark [1949-1953].
RAUH: Yes. Well, anyway, I had written the plank.
JOHNSON: You wrote the plank?
RAUH: Yes, but you see, our plank was developed over several
days because we were fighting to get something into the Platform Committee's
report to the Convention.
JOHNSON: You were on the Platform Committee?
RAUH: No, I was outside, but Hubert kept coming out to confer.
JOHNSON: Okay, so you were feeding Hubert.
RAUH: Oh, yes. But the point I want to make was that Hubert,
between about 4 and 5 in the morning, was shaky on whether he was going
forward. The ADA had had a meeting that might in their rented fraternity
house near the convention center and decided to go forward, but we didn't
have a decision from Hubert. The final decision was with Hubert. The
ADA was pushing him to go forward, but he was really shaky because of
pressure coming in from the Truman regulars not to take the issue to
the floor. Dave Niles, Truman's civil rights advisor, was pressuring
JOHNSON: He was an ADA man, was he, Dave Niles?
RAUH: I can't swear he was a member.
JOHNSON: Philleo Nash; was Nash another one?
RAUH: I can't swear who had an ADA card, you know, an
ADA card in their pocket. But Dave Niles was telling people to call
Hubert and tell him not to do it. The genius of Eugenie Anderson was
to offset Administration opposition to our minority plank. She said,
"Well, let's add a sentence saying, 'We commend President Truman for
the report of his Commission on Civil Rights,'" or words to that effect.
That was put into plank and Hubert said, "I'll do it." So, there is
no question about Eugenie's tremendous contribution to that fight.
JOHNSON: I think ADA was saying too, wasn't it, that we're
trying to get Truman to live up to his statements that he's made in
the past in regard to anti-poll tax, anti-lynching, pro-voting rights,
and pro-FEPC [Fair Employment Practices Committee]?
RAUH: We were saying that in public. But you know what
we were saying on the floor? And do you know who bought it? We were
saying on the floor, "Goddamn it, if you want to beat Henry Wallace,
you sure better go for our plank." And who did we get with that argument?
Jake Arvey, Ed Flynn, David Lawrence, and what's that guy's name in
Philadelphia? Green? Anyway, all of the big Democratic bosses. Strange
bedfellows: ADA and all the bosses. What people generally forget about the '48
fight is that Truman could not control the bosses on the civil
rights issue. They took our side of it and the argument that got them
was sort of, "Well, maybe we will lose this election, but we don't want
to lose the whole ticket. If we want Blacks to support the ticket, we
better adopt this minority plank." They bought that argument hook, line
and sinker, and that was more important than all the goddamn rhetoric
used on the floor.
JOHNSON: So what role did you play in the campaign, then?
RAUH: Oh, we went out and talked, wrote speeches, argued--tried
to get organizations to support Truman.
JOHNSON: So you went all out for Truman in '48?
RAUH: Yes. I can't remember if there was any particular
fight about what we should do for Truman. Christ, who could be for Dewey?
I don't remember any argument about what we were going to do for Truman.
We endorsed him right there at the Democratic Convention--not happily,
but then once he had the nomination, he made a good speech that night,
his acceptance speech.
JOHNSON: Were you there, then, about two or three in the
morning when he finally got to give his acceptance speech?
RAUH: No, what happened was that we were up all the night
before, and we won the platform fight in late afternoon. We had to talk
to reporters until oh, late in the evening. And then we sat around the
fraternity house and watched the floor action on TV. I never went back
to the Convention. I couldn't stand up, I had been on my feet for so long.
JOHNSON: But he was on TV then?
RAUH: Oh he was on TV. Yes, and we watched it from the
JOHNSON: When did you first meet President Truman?
RAUH: I may have met him someplace else, but the first
time I ever talked to him was in early 1942, when he had his first hearing
on why the country hadn't converted to war production. This was his
committee's first hearing on conversion despite our complaints of the
year before prodding business for more war preparations. It was in connection
with those hearings that I first spoke to Senator Truman. There was
a guy whose name I'm having trouble remembering who worked for General
Electric and the Committee had him come and tell about his efforts to
get conversion to war production which didn't work.
JOHNSON: Way back in '42?
RAUH: Oh, yes.
JOHNSON: How about after the war? When did you first meet
him again then after the war?
RAUH: I'm trying to recollect if there was any meeting
before Wilson and I saw him on the housing program one day.
JOHNSON: Well, when you went over there for that resignation . .
RAUH: No, I didn't see him then. I can't swear where it
was; it may not have even been in the White House, it may have been
that he was somewhere else and we got a chance to talk to him about
the housing program.
JOHNSON: But he was acquainted with you and your background,
by the time of the '48 campaign?
RAUH: Well, I think he would have had reports. I had made
an awful lot of public statements about the loyalty program. Now, if
Truman thought he was cutting off worse deprivations of civil freedom
by his loyalty program, well, he may have thought so. I can't challenge
that position; it's a possibility. But I brought several law cases trying
to knock out the principle that you could be found disloyal without
facing your accusers.
JOHNSON: In other words, hearsay evidence could get . . .
RAUH: Well, what could be more hearsay than an FBI report
that says, "Confidential Informant TX says, quote." You know, oh, boy.
JOHNSON: Steven Gillon in his book Politics and Vision
[New York: Oxford University Press, 1987] says you argued for flexibility
in regard to whether ADA should work within or outside the Democratic
party. Trying to obtain or retain labor support was one big problem
you had to work with, and another was what kind of relationship, or
connections, you should have with the Democratic Party itself. What
was your position? Would you care to describe your position?
RAUH: My feeling always was that we had to have both working
relations with the Party and independence from the Party. By independence
from the Party, we meant the freedom to criticize when we thought they
were wrong, and even to back somebody else when the Democrats put forth
a bad candidate. There weren't too many non-Democrats you could find
to back, but there were a few Senators that you could find, such as
Cliff [Clifford] Case and Jack [Jacob] Javits. I mean there are a few
but not too many outside the Democrats.
JOHNSON: Gillon says, "You remained faithful to this view
but the organization did not." I wonder what he means by that?
RAUH: Well, I'll tell you what my present view of the
organization is. It is too much tied to both the labor movement and
the Democratic Party. It's reluctant to criticize either the Democratic
Party or the labor movement where a lot of money comes from. So my feeling
is that now, 40 odd years after ADA was founded, it's awful hard for
a general liberal organization not to build up a lot of resentments
and so forth. I'm not sure ADA wouldn't do better starting a new liberal
organization from scratch, but at 78 I'm not capable of starting one.
JOHNSON: Is it true that the word "liberal" has been corrupted
by modern political campaigns?
RAUH: No, I don't think so. Well, they try to make "liberal"
a dirty word, but I don't think it has worked. I think [Michael] Dukakis
played right into their hands when he denied he was a liberal. He should
have said, "I'm a liberal and proud of it."
JOHNSON: And not let the other party define liberal for him?
RAUH: That's right. Why didn't he define it?
JOHNSON: That's what I mean.
RAUH: He let the other party define it. I think he should
have said I'm proud of it, and said what it was. I think what we have
to do is make clear we're the only idealistic party. How can it be idealistic
to help the rich get richer? We've got a built-in idealism--to help
those who've got too little. We get the idealistic side of politics
without even having to try. Why we blow it is beyond me. I don't know.
Take Truman as an example. He was at his lowest ebb in
1946 and '47 when he was most conservative. When he won in 1948 it was
"look out for your neighbor," and it was a real lib-lab campaign that
he put on. You never had better proof that the Democratic Party thrives
on liberalism than you had in Truman's 1948 campaign. Also, a Democratic
President goes down when he takes the conservative side, as Truman was
doing in '46 and '47, and early '48. It's when he shifted his position
that he won out. There is a debate, I gather, whether [James] Rowe wrote
the memorandum or [Clark] Clifford wrote it proposing the shift for
the '48 campaign.
JOHNSON: Strategy, yes.
RAUH: I don't care. It was a goddamn good memorandum whoever
JOHNSON: I think Clifford's given credit for it, but James
Rowe wrote the original draft.
RAUH: A professor at the University of California in San
Diego told me that he had been through the papers and it looked to him
like Rowe had written the memorandum and given it to Clifford and Clifford
had given it to Truman as his own.
JOHNSON: Yes, I think Rowe was the originator really,
but it was edited or changed at least slightly.
RAUH: Clifford defended having given it to Mr. Truman
as his own, that the reason that he did that was that if you told Truman
it was written by Rowe, Tommy Corcoran's partner, Truman wouldn't have
paid any attention to it. I don't know whether that's true or not.
Oh, that reminds me of one thing that I wanted to mention.
Why did Truman allow Hoover to tap the wire of Tommy Corcoran?
JOHNSON: That's a good question, and I should ask you
that. Do you know anything about the wiretapping of Corcoran by the
FBI? We don't know really the background for it. This is something we
would like to know.
RAUH: The first I ever heard of the tapping was when two
guys came to see me, or called me, I can't remember which. They said
that they had been out at the Truman Library and had asked what a stack
of papers in a corridor was, and one of the staff said, "It's not important;
they are taps on Tom Corcoran." They went through them, and the reason
they were calling me was they asked if I objected to their using one
tap that's about me. There's one about me in 1946 I think. A conversation
was tapped between Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran, and Tom is criticizing
me for trying to run the ADA and be a lawyer at the same time. He said
something like "You've got to represent the interests if you're going
to be a successful lawyer in Washington." And Ben is defending me, and
they have this wonderful conversation about being a lawyer. Tom says,
"It's impossible to be a liberal and do what Joe's trying to do here.
He's trying to do good for the ADA and practice law; you can't do it,
the law's all negative." He's mad because he got me a client or something,
and I went to an ADA meeting instead of taking care of it, or something
like that. Anyway, I've read that tap and enjoyed it.
JOHNSON: Do they imply that Truman had authorized the
FBI to do the tapping?
RAUH: Oh, yes. And they implied that Hoover was trying
to ingratiate himself with Truman, and thought that Truman probably
didn't care much for Tommy. [See Kai Bird and Max Holland, "The Tapping
of 'Tommy the Cork,'" The Nation, February 8, 1986, pp. 129,
142-145. Also see "Tommy the Cork: The Secret World of Washington's
First Modern Lobbyist," The Washington Monthly, February 1987,
JOHNSON: He apparently was lobbying for the United Fruit
Company and other special interests.
RAUH: Yes, that's right.
JOHNSON: And there was some concern about what he might
be telling his clients how he might be trying to influence officials
in the Government.
RAUH: Yes, that's right. Well, also, wasn't Truman a little
concerned that the old Roosevelt people really didn't want him, and
might start a counter-movement? There was a counter-movement but it
didn't result from what these two guys who originally broke the story
uncovered. Actually, I think they were out there writing a book on John
JOHNSON: Yes, I remember them being there, and I know
they aroused some controversy with these transcripts. But we still do
not really have information, solid information, about how and why that
was started. There is nothing in our files at the Library that reveals
clearly how it started.
RAUH: Well, they must have surmised something. In the
Nation article about this, they say that Truman started it.
JOHNSON: We don't have records how it started, so if you
find anything out, let us know.
RAUH: I will indeed. These two are the only people I've
ever talked to about it. Ben and Tom were dead when I heard about it.
JOHNSON: Well, J. Edgar [Hoover], of course, is no longer
around, and Corcoran's not. Of course, I don't know when he found out
RAUH: I understand he was informed of the wiretaps, but
that he died before he had a chance to read the transcripts.
JOHNSON: Yes, that's one of those strange episodes.
In March 1950 from Key West, Truman wrote to [Hubert]
Humphrey, saying, "I'm glad as always to send my greetings to the National
Convention of Americans for Democratic Action. I'm sorry that my schedule
prevents my being with you in person to talk over our mutual interest."
Was it common at these national conventions for a letter from Truman
to be read
RAUH: It was, whenever we had a Democratic President,
up until the Carter days. Whenever we had a Democratic President. I
don't think we very often got something from the Republicans.
JOHNSON: Okay, but Truman was using the word "liberal"
without any fear?
RAUH: Oh, yes, he always did. I don't think that word
bothered him one bit.
JOHNSON: Because he said here in this last paragraph,
"Your meeting will show that the forces of liberalism would be martialed
in full strength. This 1950 campaign may well be one of the most crucial
tests of liberalism in this century."
RAUH: Oh, I think Truman never had any trouble with that
word. I never had the slightest thought that he did.
JOHNSON: Well, unfortunately for Truman, Democratic seats
were lost in 1950. Democrats did lose seats. It was an off-year election.
RAUH: [William] Benton lost in a victory for Joe McCarthy.
JOHNSON: The Korean war had started by this time. Yes,
I think that's when Biemiller was defeated, and Millard
Tydings, I believe,
was defeated. McCarthyism was in the air.
RAUH: Biemiller came back to the ADA in '50.
JOHNSON: Yes. There are quite a few glittering generalities
in that statement, but it certainly is clear that Truman did not back
off from liberalism.
RAUH: No, you are right on that.
JOHNSON: Well, that 1950 election, as I say, did result
in some losses of Democratic seats, but they still retain control. But
then you have the conservative Democrats always, you know, in that equation,
from the South.
RAUH: Sure, that's why you couldn't get any civil rights
JOHNSON: So ADA certainly must have been disappointed
in the election.
RAUH: Oh, yes.
JOHNSON: And through this period, 1947 to 1952, civil
rights and civil liberties remained, of course, major issues. The loyalty
program, the presidential commissions, desegregation of the Armed Forces
did start. Desegregation was accelerated apparently during the Korean war.
RAUH: Oh, and you got the Executive Order by Truman on
the Armed Forces. [EO 9981, July 26, 1948, established the President's
Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces.]
RAUH: I've never been sure why Truman did want to beat
us on civil rights at the '48 convention. I have never quite figured
that out. We won, and we won because we were right politically and it
did help him; and Wallace didn't get any Black votes at all.
JOHNSON: It's a little ironic. I think they were lifting
that so-called soft plank from the '44 Democratic platform.
RAUH: Sure. Oh, absolutely. You didn't have a civil rights
movement during the war.
JOHNSON: And of course, the Roosevelt New Dealers had
to recognize the fact that Roosevelt had not done as much as Truman
up to this point.
RAUH: No question about it.
JOHNSON: It is said that ADA generally favored Truman's
approach to the loyalty issue, but you were critical of the Smith Act.
RAUH: Well, ADA was against disloyal people being in high
positions, but that's just loose talk. Of course, you're against that.
But the question is how are you going to ensure that? And the ADA violently
opposed the idea that you couldn't face your accuser. I had a majority
of the ADA on that; don't let anybody tell you otherwise.
JOHNSON: So that was the crux, right there.
RAUH: That's really what it was all about. You wouldn't
want a guy in on atomic bomb secrets and have doubts about his loyalty.
What are you going to do? Are you going to say he's disloyal without
ever his knowing who said he was disloyal or what facts he had to base
JOHNSON: Now, you were critical of the Smith Act, under
which the Communist leaders were convicted.
RAUH: I wrote an article in the New Leader attacking the
JOHNSON: You had a statement ready to praise the reversal
of the conviction of the Communist leaders, if that would happen. You
had a statement ready, but a poll of the chapters caused you to change
RAUH: My mind didn't change; I just lost the vote. I
change my mind. The Smith Act was wrong. Actually, we ultimately pretty
much prevailed. In the Yates case, the Smith Act was really nullified.
JOHNSON: Okay, the ADA remained consistent in challenging
the constitutionality of the Smith Act.
RAUH: They did.
JOHNSON: Is it correct that the ADA was defending the
advocacy of ideas versus advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government?
In other words, the Smith Act made it criminal to advocate the violent
overthrow of the Government.
RAUH: My view is that you may advocate anything you want,
as long as you're not making clear and present advocacy of violence.
I wouldn't want to say you had a right to shout "fire" in a theater
if there was a clear and present danger of violence. But my God, the
Communists, they had nothing there. Where the Communists were a danger
was on espionage or sabotage. Their goddamn performance over here--they
couldn't overthrow your Aunt Tillie. They were wreckers, not doers.
JOHNSON: So it had to be more or less an overt act?
RAUH: It had to be the way [Wendell] Holmes always put it,
that you can't advocate the overthrow of the Government by violent
actions, when that advocacy would bring a clear and present danger of
JOHNSON: Did the Korean war, which was not legally a war,
but in fact was a war, create a situation in which the "clear and present
danger" doctrine could be applied, whereas later, after the war, wasn't
it in '54 that the Supreme Court did declare unconstitutional certain
portions of the Smith Act?
RAUH: In '57. Well, I think the real change wasn't the
Korean war, as much as the composition of the Court under Warren and
JOHNSON: Okay, when the Supreme Court upheld the conviction
of the Communist party leaders under the clear and present danger doctrine,
you and James Wexler prepared a statement criticizing the decision for
making free speech into "a political football." But the majority on
the board, including Schlesinger and Biddle, felt that was too harsh.
It sounds like maybe the majority on the board of ADA was being very
cautious and rather conservative on this issue and you were more toward
the liberal side on this. Were you in the minority position then on that?
RAUH: It's hard to remember exactly. But if I had to try
to put it now in some context, I would say something like this: I think
everybody, or almost everybody in the ADA--a great majority at least--favored
repealing the Smith Act. But the degree to which, when you have the
Act on the books, the ADA should be the one to say you shouldn't prosecute
Communists under the Act is another matter. I think these people didn't
want the Act, but they also didn't want to bear all the burden of public
obloquy like the Communists did. If you could get rid of the Smith Act,
then you didn't have that problem. In other words, the ADA was against
the Smith Act, but it wasn't prepared to put all its political marbles
in that basket.
One of the reasons, I think, was that I got terrible hell
for what I said right after the conviction of the Dennis crowd, the
first group of Communist leaders tried. What I said was that [Judge
Harold] Medina was wrong in not giving them bail. You don't repeal the
Constitution because there are some communists here. But my statement
was very, very ill received. People just felt it was pro-Communist.
JOHNSON: Felt they didn't deserve bail. The majority of
the Americans felt they should put them in jail and throw away the key?
RAUH: Right. I think that probably was true. Many of the
political leaders of the ADA, or people in Congress like Hubert Humphrey
and others, didn't like the idea that the ADA was talking about you
giving bail to convicted Communists.
JOHNSON: On the other hand, here was Acheson saying that
he would not turn his back on Alger Hiss, and then Truman getting all
that flak because of the "red herring" remark in a press conference.
RAUH: Sure you had a great deal of that. I think almost
all ADAers were against the Smith Act, but they just realized there
was an awful lot of heat there, politically. This was the McCarthy period.
By '57, when Warren's in charge and with some of the ugliness of the
Communist feeling having been drained a little bit, you get an end to
the situation. Indeed, by a few years after '57 there weren't any Communists
in jail under the Smith Act.
JOHNSON: You had a kind of a restoration of a traditional
view of civil liberties, the rights of free speech, first amendment rights?
RAUH: Right. There was a good free speech case today;
we won 5 to 4. The Court overruled a conviction for flag desecration.
JOHNSON: Yes, I saw that on TV.
This kind of raised the problem again with the labor unions.
Labor union members had this kind of gut feeling about Communists by
this time, didn't they? You were having a problem, I imagine, with the
labor union membership if you were perceived as a little soft on Communism,
even though you . .
RAUH: Well, there was no doubt that we were perceived
as soft on Communism.
JOHNSON: By labor union members.
RAUH: By some labor union members, but I don't know that
there was much of the union leadership that believed that. Walter Reuther
for example--I was UAW general counsel and Washington counsel for many
years and Reuther always let me write UAW's civil liberties resolutions.
JOHNSON: Well, was he the exception rather than the rule?
You had the teamsters, for instance.
RAUH: I don't know how much they knew about these matters.
Jim Carey of I.U.E. was a civil libertarian, and Walter was, and there
JOHNSON: Were David Dubinsky and Reuther the most consistent
labor leaders who were supporters of ADA on these matters?
RAUH: Yes. They disagreed on foreign policy. Dubinsky
was very conservative on foreign policy, but he let us have our head.
Dubinsky was a great man, I always thought. He never tried to throw
his weight around, or his money around, and control the ADA. On domestic
affairs we didn't have much difficulty; on foreign affairs there were
some differences, and he was in the minority. But he never used his
money and strength to force ADA to his position.
JOHNSON: He had the garment workers, and didn't they provide
much of the income?
RAUH: The I.L.G.W.U. was the largest single donor. As
a matter of fact, on ADA's opening day at the Willard Hotel on January
4, 1947, Mrs. Roosevelt got up towards the end of the meeting and asked
for the floor. I was in the chair at that moment when she asked for
the floor. She said, "We're about to adjourn. This has been a wonderful
day, and we're going to do something fine here. But I don't believe
you should adjourn without having some finances for the organization
as it starts out tomorrow." And she said, "I'll raise $l,000. I'll give
you $l00 right now, and I'll raise the remaining money." And Dave Dubinsky
said, "I'll give five thousand," and that started ADA off.
JOHNSON: In '52 we have the Stevenson campaign. You have
ADA apparently backing Stevenson in '52.
RAUH: Oh, no question.
JOHNSON: He's known to be strong on civil liberties but
soft on civil rights.
RAUH: Soft may be too tough a word, but he was not a passionate
civil rights advocate. I will admit that. I wouldn't have used the word
"soft." I would have said that he was--I'm trying to find a word to describe him.
RAUH: Lukewarm is even too tough on him. I think he believed
in civil rights, but he was going to take it slow and wasn't going to
allow it to interfere with the nation's politics.
JOHNSON: He wasn't going to revive that '48 plank on civil
rights was he? He wasn't going to let that in the platform?
RAUH: Well, the issue in '52 was different.
JOHNSON: You've got "Korea, Communism, and corruption,"
the three big issues used by the Republicans.
RAUH: I'll tell you the things we didn't get in '52 that
we wanted. We didn't get, for example, a provision to
and things like that, but those were pretty far-out provisions. I'd
say on one-to-ten on civil rights, Stevenson would be about six or seven,
and if you want to call that soft, okay.
JOHNSON: Where would you put Truman on that scale?
RAUH: Oh, eight.
JOHNSON: Apparently, Stevenson was no great supporter
of Federal aid to education, or national health insurance.
RAUH: He was the most conservative of the three candidates:
[Estes] Kefauver, [W. Averell] Harriman, and Stevenson. If that's what
you mean, I agree with that. He was more conservative than Kefauver
JOHNSON: Did ADA give any support to Harriman in '52 or '56?
RAUH: Not really. I'll try and tell you what happened
on Harriman. ADA didn't take a position between Harriman, Kefauver,
and Stevenson in 1952. During the summer [of '52] Stevenson was acting
like Hamlet; "I don't want to run. Maybe yes; maybe no." The question
arose, "What are we going to do?" Most ADAers were for Stevenson and
were scared that Kefauver would lock it up. He had won all the primaries.
It looked like Stevenson might not get it. Herbert Lehman called me
up and said that
Harriman was going to run in the District of Columbia
primary in May and he wanted me to be the campaign manager. I said,
"But I'm for Stevenson." He said, "If you're really for Stevenson, in
a Kefauver-Harriman fight you better see that Kefauver is licked." He
said, "The best thing you can do for Stevenson is to win for Harriman."
I thought about it for a few hours. I asked a couple of
people, including Jim Loeb, who went for Harriman too. I asked Jim what
he was going to do. He wasn't working at ADA any more; he wasn't running
the ADA at that time. I said, "What are you going to do?" He said he
bought the Lehman argument. A couple of other people bought it, too.
JOHNSON: Yes, FDR, Jr. and Reuther apparently . . .
RAUH: Well, they bought the Lehman argument. FDR, Jr.
went for Harriman. I don't think Reuther ever did.
JOHNSON: Well, Gillon puts Reuther in that group.
RAUH: Does he? Maybe he does it because of me; I don't
think it's right. Anyway, you're certainly right on FDR, and you're
right on Loeb. Harriman, to win, had to beat Kefauver, and some bright
analyst saw that there would be a lot of Black votes here. So in my
talk with Harriman on whether I'd do it or not, I said,
"We have worked
out a civil rights position for you which is far to the left of Kefauver
and Stevenson." He said, "Okay." We won four to one here. That's the
only time in my life I ever had more money than I needed.
JOHNSON: Harriman then was behind a strong civil rights plank.
RAUH: He didn't know exactly what it was when we started.
But he stayed with it.
JOHNSON: But of course, he lost. In '56 Truman was backing
Harriman's candidacy. Did you support him in '56?
RAUH: No, I was for Stevenson.
JOHNSON: You were for Stevenson the second time around.
RAUH: I was for Stevenson the first time around.
JOHNSON: Were you being a little more pragmatic?
RAUH: Well, you know, we sort of favored Stevenson because
of his candor, eloquence and civil liberties stands. Harriman was the
most liberal of the three; there wasn't any question about that.
JOHNSON: Why didn't the ADA support him instead of Stevenson then?
RAUH: Well, all I can tell you is, I used to introduce
Harriman, and when I would finish, and when Harriman would finish, people
would come up to me and say, "Joe, why don't you run for that office.
That guy can't make a speech if it killed him." Averell Harriman was
tongue-tied. He got a little better as he went along, but gosh, he couldn't
have been elected dog catcher. He just couldn't speak to an audience.
The poor guy; I mean he just didn't have it on a platform.
JOHNSON: Despite his great wealth, do you think he was
a true liberal?
RAUH: I think, yes. He worshipped Roosevelt. My answer
to that question is yes.
JOHNSON: The Republicans apparently painted the ADA as
socialist, "popular-fronters," and that sort of thing.
What could you do about that?
RAUH: Well, we worked with the press as best we could.
I remember talking to different people. I remember one night Eric Severeid
got on CBS News and just blew the whistle on the Republicans, giving
our positions and the whole history of how we fought as liberals for everything.
JOHNSON: Do you agree with Gillon when he says that the
ADA's influence on the Democratic Party reached a new
low between 1952
and '56 when Stephen Mitchell, for instance, was DNC director. He was
Stevenson's choice. Do you remember Stephen Mitchell?
RAUH: Oh, I was about to tell you about that. He made
a mistake in attacking the ADA. Jim Doyle and I went to see him. Jim
was a Wisconsin politician, who became a Federal judge. Johnson appointed
him a District judge. Jim and I went to see Steve Mitchell, and we said
to him, "Come on, what's going on here. You say you're a liberal; we're
liberals. Why can't we live together? We have a right to criticize you;
you can criticize us, too. But don't make it out as though we were doing
something venal." He said, "Well, you are." And I said, "Well, what
is it?" He said, "Every time I'm about to say something or have a new
idea, and I've told our people let's say this or say that, they have
said, 'Well, last month, the ADA said that,' and I'm tired of hearing
all this stuff." I mean there was a fight for turf on the liberal side
and he really didn't want that. I became friends with Steve in '68 when
we worked for Gene McCarthy on his anti-war campaign.
JOHNSON: Truman didn't like Mitchell. McKinney, Frank
McKinney had been, I think, Director of the DNC, and he liked McKinney,
but he didn't like Mitchell.
RAUH: Well, Mitchell wasn't really an old-line political
hand, was he?
JOHNSON: Was he a pragmatist really, a political pragmatist?
RAUH: I think so. I was quite surprised when Mitchell
called me up one day in 1968 and said, "Will you be the credentials
coordinator for Eugene McCarthy at the convention?" We hadn't been friends
but I would have done anything for McCarthy. I was that much against
the war. I wasn't particularly close to Gene McCarthy, before 1967-68,
but he was the only one standing up against the war until Bobby Kennedy
got in later, and then Bobby got shot.
JOHNSON: This is a letter, dated May 7, 1956, that was
written to you by Truman, to you as National Chairman of the ADA. It
is really kind of a quintessential statement of liberalism.
RAUH: Well, was this the letter for the convention?
JOHNSON: Yes. It says, "Please extend my good wishes to
the delegates of the ADA, meeting in their ninth annual convention."
RAUH: I'm sure I would have given the original to the
ADA for its files. I wouldn't usurp something like that.
JOHNSON: But he's certainly still promoting support for
ADA, that is Harry Truman is.
RAUH: For liberalism.
JOHNSON: Yes. Well, he says, "The country has unfilled
needs for education, health, roads, and expanded community services
of all kinds. Civil rights and civil liberties must be high on any liberal
agenda. But I would invite your special consideration on three major
problems." Then he goes into foreign policy, into agriculture . . .
RAUH: Who would have helped him with that letter? He was
out of office.
JOHNSON: David Lloyd, I suspect. Do you remember when
he died? I wonder if he didn't have some authorship of this. Maybe it
was David Noyes. Did you know David Noyes, who was working there?
RAUH: Yes, I knew him. Yes, he was a nice fellow.
JOHNSON: He wrote a lot of post-Presidential correspondence.
RAUH: That may have been his.
JOHNSON: Was he a liberal?
RAUH: I really don't know.
JOHNSON: He came out of big business. He came out of advertising.
RAUH: I don't remember him too well, actually.
JOHNSON: The third point that Truman makes in this letter
is probably kind of traditional liberalism. I'm quoting: "Third--the
growth of a new feudalism. Centers of private power, beyond democratic
control, are exerting greater and greater influence over our national
life, driving small business to the wall, and strangling individual
enterprise. This curse of bigness dominates our press, our airways,
our amusement industries, and is beginning to shape our thoughts and
beliefs. We must oppose the socialism of corporate power quite as much
as socialism by Government. Liberals can serve their country by devising
means to reverse this trend." Does that kind of represent to you the
basic philosophy of the ADA, at least in that period?
RAUH: I think that letter could have been written by an
ADAer. That reminds me now; I wonder what Truman would think of all
these take-overs. He probably would have had a hemorrhage, wouldn't he?
JOHNSON: Yes, I think so.
On another topic: Stephen Spingarn, you're
with Stephen Spingarn?
RAUH: Oh, sure. He tried to move into local politics,
which you haven't gotten into.
JOHNSON: We have an ll00-page transcript with Stephen
Spingarn. He had something to say about a lot of different things. In
1956 he was special activities director for the Vice-Presidential campaign
of Estes Kefauver. Spingarn was on Kefauver's side, and a little irritated
by ADA, which he called "An excellent organization, but one which I
have found often too 'Ivory-towered' and perfectionist."
RAUH: Well, there may have been something to that.
JOHNSON: "Who insists on going down to defeat with perfection
rather than winning on an effective compromise." Oh, he mentions an
episode in which he needled you and you referred to him as a "dirty,
yellow-bellied, sonofabitch." You invited him outside to beat him up.
RAUH: Oh, I might have said that. He gave that story to
Drew Pearson. That quote is directly out of Pearson's column.
JOHNSON: He says that occurred at a housewarming at the
National Capital Democratic Club. I think that was in
'56. Well, there
isn't too much that's significant here, but in '64 you were Democratic
Chairman of the Washington, D.C. city committee. And Spingarn does mention
RAUH: Well, at one point he ran a slate against us without
JOHNSON: That's right--what he called the Reeves-Lanahan
slate against the Rauh-Jackson-Shackleton slate.
RAUH: That's right. Steve came out and got himself what
do you call them, a truck, a campaign truck.
JOHNSON: One of these sound trucks?
RAUH: Yes. He got a sound truck, and he came up our street
on the sound truck. He was shouting about me and so forth. My son, Carl,
that's in '56; Carl would have been . . .
JOHNSON: He said your son had a little confrontation with him.
RAUH: That's right. Carl went out there and said, "You
get out of here." Let's see, in '56, he was 15 I think, and he ran Steve
off the block.
JOHNSON: Spingarn also says that you were against LBJ
in '60 but you loved him in '64.
RAUH: That's true. The civil rights law of 1964, whose
25th anniversary we celebrate this year, is my reason for that.
JOHNSON: Apparently, Polly Shackleton held a grudge against
Spingarn for some time, but then he wrote a letter, I think to you.
He sent a letter to you and you forwarded it on to Polly and things
got patched up. He said that you were a "good politician" who can differ
politically but still remain friendly after all that. He does say at
one time you insisted on perfection, and also in reference to you, Spingarn
says, "He was too quick to denounce in very intemperate terms the people
who were against him, which is a mistake." He said one should be selective
on this. He adds, "I think that Joe has moderated with the years." Do
you have any response to that?
RAUH: I think Steve's probably right.
JOHNSON: How would you characterize Spingarn very briefly?
RAUH: Oh, I have this recollection of him at the Federal
JOHNSON: Yes. He was on the FTC.
RAUH: And I would say he was a very valuable guy there.
He was always on the side of the angels, as far as I can
the Federal Trade Commission. I didn't see him in enough political situations
to be able to tell much about him as a politician. What I do remember
is that anybody that he should have seen that in the 1964 local election
he was throwing his weight into something which he didn't know anything about.
For another example, getting on a sound truck back in
1956 and going in front of our house was crazy. I don't think anybody
on the street knew there was a primary election or gave a goddamn about
it. But after Steve got done, I had so many supporters I didn't know
what the hell to do. It was a slaughter. He may have felt that I used
language sometimes that I shouldn't have, and that's quite possibly
true. But I would say he had no understanding of the political forces
of the city, how Black it was and things like that. I had the advantage
of having been the first white civil rights activist around town, and
all of that. So I had all sorts of advantages. There was just no chance
that we were going to lose an election. Why he wanted to jump in, I don't know.
I would say that, with the exception of two or three incidents
of the kind that we've discussed here, we were perfectly good friends.
I think he did a hell of a job on the Federal Trade Commission. I think
that was the important part of his life. And he was very
good at publicity.
He had Drew Pearson's ear, and naturally that was very important for
the muckraking that the Federal Trade Commission wanted to do.
JOHNSON: That letter to you in '1956, from Harry Truman,
was that the last correspondence as far as you know with the President?
RAUH: What was the date of his death?
JOHNSON: December 1972. Did you have any personal correspondence
other than this sort of thing where he was corresponding with the ADA
after he left the Presidency?
RAUH: Well, I did talk to him the night, I believe it
was in '59, when he presided over a beauty contest of all the possible
Democratic candidates for 1960. It was in New York City, and Truman
was the master of ceremonies. Kennedy, Humphrey, Symington, Jackson,
Stevenson, Johnson all spoke that night. I can't remember what was said,
but it was a beauty contest at a big dinner in New York. At the cocktail
hour I did have a talk with Truman. Maybe that was the last talk. I
guess I said something nice about Humphrey, because I and most of my
friends were all for Humphrey at that time. Truman, a good politician,
said, "Oh, we've got wonderful people; we've got a lot of wonderful
candidates." I don't know who his candidate was at that moment, maybe
it was Symington.
JOHNSON: I think he always was very respectful of Humphrey,
RAUH: Well, not at the beginning. When Hubert got to Washington
in 1949, they were very hard on him because of the '48 fight.
JOHNSON: But, of course, he won the election, and you
say he takes credit for that strong plank, in his memoirs.
RAUH: Yes, I know; I told you that. But that was the most
ridiculous thing I ever heard.
JOHNSON: When Hubert Humphrey, you think, and the ADA
should have gotten the credit?
RAUH: And Eugenie Anderson. I mean there's enough credit
to go around. You don't have to grab credit there. There's plenty of
credit to go around. But Truman did write in his memoirs that he wrote
the minority plank and that's a joke.
I think the Truman story that seems almost the worst was
the one on Francis Biddle, and Biddle felt he had to correct it. I don't
know if you have Biddle's letter in your files. Biddle wrote a letter
to the [Washington D.C.] Star or the Post in which he set the
straight on the Tom Clark matter and it wasn't at all the way Truman
had written about it. The incident shows how smart Tom Clark is; he
parlayed getting fired by Biddle into becoming Attorney General and
a Supreme Court Justice. Now, you can't do much better than that.
What happened, as I recall, was this: Clark had a job
at Justice. Biddle was dissatisfied and asked him to look for a job
elsewhere. FDR died. Clark went to Bob Hannegan, head of the Democratic
Party, and asked Hannegan if he wouldn't like a "cooperative" Attorney
General. Hannegan got Truman to fire Biddle and appoint Clark. Truman
wrote that Biddle had wanted to resign and recommended Clark. Biddle
contradicted this in the letter to which I referred.
JOHNSON: But Clark was on the Supreme Court when the Brown
vs. School Board came down in '54. He was on the side of Brown, wasn't he?
RAUH: It was unanimous.
JOHNSON: It was unanimous, yes. So that perhaps helped
prepare the ground for desegregation and what followed.
What grade would you give to the Truman administration
after all these years on say civil rights, and civil liberties?
RAUH: It would take a little more thought than we have
tonight. There were some terrible breaches of civil rights and civil
liberties and there were some good things. The record is mixed.
JOHNSON: Well, thank you.
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Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]
List of Subjects Discussed
Acheson, Dean, 79
Americans for Democratic Action, 35, 38-41, 44-45, 48-51, 53, 57-66, 69, 71-79, 81-84, 85-88, 90-91
American Veterans Committee, 38, 40
Anderson, Eugenie Moore, 59, 61, 96
Arvey, Jake, 61
Barkley, Alben, 41
Benton, William, 72
Biddle, Francis, 43, 53-54, 77, 96-97
Biemiller, Andrew, 56, 72-73
Bolling, Richard, 18-19, 20
Bolte, Charles, 38
Brennan, William J., 77
Cardozo, Benjamin, 5-7
Carey, Jim, 53, 80
Case, Senator Clifford, 65
Chamberlain, Stephen A., 21
Civil liberties, 35, 40, 79, 97-98
Civil Rights, 40-41, 58, 74, 97-98
Clark, Tom, 43-44, 97
Clifford, Clark, 32, 36, 67, 68
Cohen, Benjamin, 6, 7, 8, 69
Corcoran, Tom, 6, 8, 68-71
Court Packing Plan – FDR, 8-9
Cox, Oscar, 11
Coy, Wayne, 11
Cummings, Homer, 8
Dewey, Thomas, 22, 62
Democratic National Convention – 1948, 41-46, 58-63
Democratic Party relations, 65, 86-87
Donovan, Bob, 53, 56
Douglas, William O., 25, 41-42, 44, 47-48, 57
Doyle, James, 87
Dubinsky, David, 80, 81
Dukakis, Michael, 66
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 24, 41, 44-45, 48, 51, 57
Flynn, Ed, 61
Frankfurter, Felix, 4, 5, 6, 14, 35
Fellers, Bonner, 21, 23
Gillon, Steve, 65-66, 84, 86
Graham, Phil, 16
Hamby, Alonzo, 48,
Hannegan, Robert, 25, 43, 97
Harriman, W. Averell, 83, 84-86
Hayes, Al, 53
Henderson, Leon, 47
Hershey, John, 18
Hiss, Alger, 79
Hitler, Adolph, 11, 13, 15
Holmes, Wendell, 76-77
Hoover, J. Edgar, 53, 68
Humphrey, Hubert, 49, 51, 59-61, 71, 95-96
Javits, Jacob, 65
James, Jessee, 10
Johnson, Hugh, 5
Johnson, Lyndon, 45, 49, 51, 87, 92-93, 95
Jones, Jesse, 29
Kefauver, Estes, 83-85, 91
Kennedy, John F., 49, 51, 95
Kennedy, Robert, 88
Korean War, 72, 77
Lafollette, Philip, 22
Lash, Joe, 6
Lawrence, David, 61
Lehman, Herbert, 83-84
Lend Lease Administration, 10-11, 14
Lloyd, David, 39, 53, 56, 89
Loeb, James, 35, 37, 58-59, 84
Long, Norton, 33
Loyalty Program, 39, 52-56, 64, 73-74
MacArthur, Douglas, 17, 19-26
Marshall Plan, 57-58
McCarthy Eugene, 87-88
McCarthy, Joe, 72, 79
McCloy, John, 70
McGrath, J. Howard, 41
McKinney, Frank, 87
Medina, Harold, 78
Mitchell, Stephen, 87- 88
Monroney, A. S. Mike, 51
Morgenthau, Henry, 44
Murphy, Charlie, 53
Nash, Philleo, 60
National Recovery Administration (NRA), 5
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 35, 47
Niles, David, 60-61
Nimitz, Chester, 23, 25
Noyes, David, 89
O’Dwyer, William, 59
Pearson, Drew, 91, 95
Pepper, Claude, 48
Prichard, Edward, 58
Porter, Paul A., 34-35, 45
Rauh, Carl, 2
Remington, William, 39
Reuther, Walter, 15-16, 49, 50, 80, 84
Rowe, James, 67-68
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 52, 81
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 5, 8-9, 23-24, 43-44, 47, 86
Roosevelt, Franklin D., Jr., 51-52, 84
Roosevelt, James, 51, 59
Ross, Charlie, 33
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 37, 77
Severeid, Eric, 86
Shackleton, Polly, 92-93
Sishkin, Boris, 37
Smith Act, 74-79
Snyder, John, 44
Social Security Act, 7
Springarn, Stephen, 90-95
Stevenson, Adlai, 46, 49-50, 81-87
Stroock, Alan, 6
Stuart, Milton, 59
Symington, Stuart, 50, 95-96
Thackery, Ted, 48
Truman Committee- Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, 12-15
Truman, Harry S., 9-10, 11, 25, 29-31, 36-37, 41-44, 45, 48, 50-64, 67-69,
70, 79, 84-85, 87-90, 95-97
Tucker, Preston, 29
Veteran’s Emergency Housing Program, 27
Vinson, Fred, 44
Wallace, Henry, 38, 48, 74
Warren, Earl, 77, 79
Weaver, George, 37
Weschler, Jimmy, 37, 48
Wexler, James, 77
Wheeler, Burton, 9-10
Whitney, Courtney, 21
Willkie, Wendell, 49
Willoughby, Charles A., 21
Wyatt, Wilson, 27–34, 36, 64
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