Oral History Interview with
Economist and administrator, Board of Economic Warfare,
Foreign Economic Administration, 1942-45; economist and political officer,
U.S. Dept. of State, 1946-62; political adviser, European Coordinating
Committee, London, 1949-50; political officer, U.S. delegation North Atlantic
Council, London, 1949-50; and political officer and later director of
plans and policy staff, Office of U.S. Special Representative in Europe,
Clifford C. Matlock
Chevy Chase, Maryland
October 29, 1973
Waynesville, North Carolina
June 6, 1974
by Richard D. McKinzie
[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Appendix | List of Subjects Discussed]
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry
S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee
but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember
that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written
Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. ) within the transcript
indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced
for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission
of the Harry S. Truman Library.
Opened February, 1976
Harry S. Truman Library
[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Appendix | List of Subjects Discussed]
Oral History Interview with
Clifford C. Matlock
Chevy Chase, Maryland
October 29, 1973
by Richard D. McKinzie
MCKINZIE: Could I ask you to narrate something about your experience
with lend-lease settlement? How did you happen to become involved? More
specifically, how was it done?
MATLOCK: As an officer of the Foreign Economic Administration I participated
in the administration of lend-lease during the last two years of World
War II. I was especially involved in lend-lease transfers to the United
Kingdom and British Commonwealth, and to the Soviet Union. The hard work
was done by the area offices for those areas, but for a
considerable period the chief of the Bureau of Areas deputized me to
approve requisitions for him. In that way my initials became the penultimate
set on the lend-lease requisitions as they went on their way to Treasury
Procurement for implementation.
After victory in Europe, the Administrator put me on a committee, largely
of staff people, called the Lend-Lease Termination Committee. It was chaired
by the Administrator or his deputy. Late in 1945 I was virtually instructed
to go into the State Department on detail to work on the British settlement.
We had done much advance work in FEA. In March 1946 we concluded the United
Kingdom settlement, which established the pattern of principle for all
settlements. I remained in the State Department. I hasten to add that
it was not possible to apply principle in any detail to all settlements,
and also that I did not participate in all settlements.
MCKINZIE: Could you tell us about the people you worked with, and how
you proceeded in the matter of the British lend-lease settlement?
MATLOCK: There were two levels of representation. In present usage they
would be called ministerial and official. I was at the official level,
acted as part of the combined secretariat (to produce combined minutes),
and participated in the negotiation of the subsidiary agreements of March
1946 which gave detailed effect to the principal Memorandum of Settlement
agreed, if my recollection is correct, on or about December 5, 1945.
Under Secretary of State Will Clayton and Judge Fred M. Vinson headed
the U.S. delegation. Lord [John Maynard] Keynes and Sir Henry Self (U.K.
Treasury) headed the U.K. delegation. Sir Frank Lee (the knighthood came
later) and Hubert Havlik headed the British and U.S. official level delegations,
respectively. The extensive subsidiary agreements were negotiated at the
official level. I am sure that you have access to the records of
negotiation which would give you the names of the others who participated
in the negotiation.
Hubert Havlik and I had both engaged in the preparatory work in the Foreign
Economic Administration. Among other things, we had worked out with the
British an agreed definition of civilian inventory, a definition crucial
to the settlement, inasmuch as nothing else was charged for. Articles
delivered during the war were not subject to compensation if they were
"lost, destroyed, or consumed" in the war. "Pipeline" deliveries made
after the termination of lend-lease were paid for.
There were a number of loose ends to the British settlement, anticipated
in principle but not in detail, which were taken care of in a "settlement
of the settlement" about a year after the March 1946 agreements. I had
moved on to other work and did not participate.
MCKINZIE: When one worked on lend-lease settlement, obviously there had
to be some kind of goal that
settlement was to produce. There had to be something beyond simply coming
to grips with the legalities, and I understand that there was some attempt
to leave Britain, as a result of the settlement of lend-lease, in a position
where postwar recovery would be enhanced or at least not hindered.
MATLOCK: That certainly was on my mind and Hubert Havlik's. We were not
lectured on the point, but it was a common understanding that the British
were up against the wall financially. This played a part in the broad
perspective of settlement, for example in the decision not to ask compensation
for the military lend-lease inventory. Within the established framework
of settlement principle, however, we negotiated hard for adequate compensation.
Several years before, probably 1942, I had worked with Eleanor Dulles,
Louis Bean, and others in the Office of Economic Warfare on the task of
estimating the U.K. prospective balance of payments
in the first year after the war. It was an inter-departmental effort,
and I think we made a good guess. The fact that we tried to assess the
U.K.'s postwar financial position shows that there was U.S. official interest.
MCKINZIE: May I ask what you perceived that postwar position to be? Was
it a restoration of Britain as the predominant world international trading
MATLOCK: No, there was none of that in it. It was just a matter of British
survival. The U.K. was in a tough spot and needed consideration to avoid
breakdown. The last sharp issue negotiated on the evening before the December
1945 memorandum was agreed was the issue of convertibility of the pound
sterling. U.S. insistence prevailed, and the U.K. agreed to the maintenance
of convertibility. The condition was too severe, however, and the U.K.
had a convertibility crisis in 1949 and, as I
recall, devalued the pound. At that time, the U.S. heartily approved
of the devaluation.
MCKINZIE: Did you or Havlik talk about the repercussions of convertibility?
MATLOCK: We were aware of the problem, but it was not our task to determine
the U.S. position or to negotiate the issue. The Treasury Department,
headed by Judge (Secretary) Vinson, was seized of the question. The negotiation
was at the top level, and the issue was decided in the last hour.
MCKINZIE: I would like to get at the economic outlook of people in the
State Department in 1945 and 1946. The British contended in early 1946
that they required something like 6 billion dollars in order for them
to transform their economy from wartime and then to make the conversion
and to repair the damages of the war and to reestablish themselves in
the postwar system. They asked for 6 billion and they got something like
3.75 billion. Now, is
it illogical to say that it either takes 6 billion or it doesn't, and
that you can't rebuild a torn down house for a little over half?
MATLOCK: I think your metaphor has no utility for the purposes of this
discussion. To talk about a torn down house implies a simple concept and
known quantities. The U.K. economic position -- like the U.S. economic
position in 1975 -- was complex with thousands of variables. It would
be much more appropriate to talk about the total U.S. expenditure required
to prosecute the cold war successfully for a period of five years, or
in the present era the amount of tax rebate required to restore prosperity
in the U.S. without generating inflation. No one knows the answer.
The U.K. needed funds and had to frame their loan request in terms of
their estimates of need and their estimates of probable U.S. reactions
to the request. A figure was negotiated -- a figure that was possible
and practical in the circumstances
of the negotiation.
The U.K. settlement obligation ran for 30 years at 2 percent interest.
The loan provided the U.K. with immediate resources and was also, as I
recall, payable over 30 years at 2 percent.
MCKINZIE: What kind of information or order, and what feeling of awareness
did you have from the Secretary of State at that time?
MATLOCK: To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Clayton handled the whole matter
with full delegated authority from the Secretary. The buck stopped with
Clayton. When it came time for signature, Acheson signed for the U.S.
and Lord Halifax for the British.
The December 1945 Memorandum was directly negotiated by Clayton and Vinson.
I believe that Acheson was also involved in the final stages. The Memorandum
was drafted partly at the top and partly at staff level.
The subsidiary agreements of March 1946 were
negotiated at official level. On the U.S. side, the final drafts were
reviewed by Mr. Collado for Mr. Clayton, and approved by Mr. Collado before
they were approved by Mr. Clayton. Most of this was last day activity.
MCKINZIE: How was the negotiation with the French different from the
negotiation with the British in terms of purposes and also kinds of people?
MATLOCK: The U.K. settlement was the big deal. The British got 31 of
54 billion dollars total lend-lease. The U.K. requisitioned all of it
and received about 27 billion for its own war needs. The other 4 billion
went to British Commonwealth countries. Principles of settlement were
worked out in the British negotiation.
The French situation was quite different.
MCKINZIE: In their own way the British were in more desperate straits?
MATLOCK: Perhaps so. I don't remember making that particular comparison.
We addressed the French situation on its merits, got the most equitable
settlement we could get, and extended substantial assistance through Export-Import
As in the British settlement, there were two levels of negotiation. We
had the same top people -- Clayton and Vinson. The top French negotiators
were Blum and Monnet. Henry [Harry] Labouisse had charge of our second
level French War Settlements Committee. I was secretary, or something
like that. Valensi was the official level French chief, opposite Labouisse.
There were some thirteen agreements which the principals signed in an
elaborate ceremony covered by newsreels in the famous old press conference
room of Old State (now called the Executive Office Building of the White
The French approach to negotiation was distinctly different from that
of the British. The French preference for logic and principle
was evident; of course they chose their own premises. The British were
pragmatic. They wanted an acceptable deal, as much to their advantage
as possible, as in the French case, but the British were not interested
as much in the rationale. If the deal was okay, the rationale was of secondary
MCKINZIE: Could you address yourself for a moment to meetings you attended
dealing with the attempted lend-lease settlement with the Soviet Union?
MATLOCK: The Soviet Union thought it didn't owe us anything. However,
they did come to a couple of meetings - I forget the number. Harry Labouisse
was our Chairman and Arutunian [spelling uncertain] was the Soviet chief
of delegation. He was the principal economic officer of the Soviet Foreign
Ministry. George Truesdell was secretary of our side. Aside from opening
the subject, nothing was accomplished.
Later on there was another committee of which
Robert Hooker was chairman. I was a member. The task of the committee
was to secure the return of three icebreakers and 27 or 28 frigates. An
admiral represented the Soviets. That negotiation was successful and all
but one of the vessels (a wrecked frigate) was returned.
I have not been involved since then. It is my belief that nothing much
happened until recently when the Soviet Union did agree upon a lend-lease
settlement as part of a package deal involving trade and credits. When
the package fell apart, the Soviets (according to the press) again rejected
any liability for lend-lease settlement.
MCKINZIE: Could we go back to 1945 after VE-Day and President Truman's
decision to stop lend-lease?
MATLOCK: At that time I was involved in the line of approval of lend-lease
requisitions, but did not participate in policy decisions.
MCKINZIE: Did you hear any discussion about why Leo Crowley told President
Truman or convinced President Truman to cut off lend-lease?
MATLOCK: I never knew that it was Crowley's idea; only that he favored
it. I understood that Will Clayton would not have let it happen if he
had been in the U.S. But he was in London and the decision was apparently
made without his participation. There was a good deal of feeling at the
time that lend-lease should not have been terminated so abruptly. If lend-lease
had been continued for a time, it would have in some measure anticipated
the Marshall plan and would have helped with the "interim aid" problem,
as well as complementing the "aid in the wake of battle" which the armed
forces could give.
MCKINZIE: How well and by what means were you able to keep your hand
on the pulse, so to speak, of European economies through the years 1946
and 1947? This is my way of asking whether or not
and at what point you recognized that there was some kind of serious
problem in Europe that was going to have to be dealt with?
MATLOCK: Our diplomatic missions in Europe were reporting regularly on
the conditions in the European countries, as were our occupation authorities
in the occupied areas. In the State Department, the Office of Financial
and Development Policy, a part of Mr. Clayton's organization, regularly
considered the economic horizon around the world. Paul Nitze and several
others in Mr. Clayton's immediate office had a perspective of the problem
and were a brilliant group. From that, following "interim aid," emerged
the Marshall plan.
MCKINZIE: From your vantage point in the Department of State, there was
no particular warning that a grave European problem was evolving?
MATLOCK: My work was on lend-lease settlements and surplus property disposals.
I attended staff
meetings which brought all factors together, and the settlements had
to take account of the other countries' economic or financial capability
for settlement, but the question you raise was not front and center. I
do not remember an atmosphere of crisis when the Marshall plan was proposed,
and you will recall that it took about a year to get started after it
However, the question of the gravity of Europe's postwar economic position
had been under prospective consideration by the U.S. since the middle
of the war. The question was not whether there was a problem, but what
to do about it. Some form of aid was continuous from the end of hostilities
up to the end of the Marshall plan (which was completed ahead of schedule).
The mention of military and defense considerations was taboo in connection
with the Marshall plan, but after the Marshall plan was over, renewal
of economic aid came with NATO under the label "defense support."
MCKINZIE: Could you tell how you became involved with
the work of the Marshall plan and before that with the Greek-Turkish
MATLOCK: I had little to do with the Marshall plan except for some staff
responsibility in the period before the formal operations began. George
McGhee and Harry Labouisse were co-chairmen of the Inter-departmental
Committee for the Marshall Plan (or some such title), and inasmuch as
I was a special assistant to McGhee and available, I was assigned to the
job of secretary to that committee. I forget whether there were two of
us, but there may have been. I was never a part of the Marshall plan organization,
either in Washington or in Europe.
My connection with the Greek-Turkish aid program arose from my earlier
acquaintance with George McGhee. Before I joined his staff, he was at
one time (early in 1947) in need of help on a negotiation with the U.K.
I took time off from other work to negotiate for him the agreement with
the U.K. transferring financial responsibility
to the U.S. from the U.K. for aid to Greece. It was probably the first
"off-shore procurement agreement," as it provided for the purchase of
certain supplies and equipment from the U.K. for Greece. I believe you
could find it under the heading "Marshall-Balfour Agreement," after the
men who signed it.
Later that year I transferred to McGhee's staff. He was the Coordinator
for Aid to Greece and Turkey and reported to the Secretary and Under Secretary
of State. [Matlock, shortly after Truman's pronouncement of his "Doctrine"
and "in support of the Truman initiative in world leadership," drafted
an American Credo, (See Appendix) a copy of which, with pertinent documents, is
appended to this transcript.]
MCKINZIE: When you worked for George McGhee, were you not involved in
political and economic considerations of the highest order?
MATLOCK: Yes, to be sure. McGhee's job was high policy and top program
administration. As his "Special assistant for Interdepartmental Relationships,"
my work was on military aid to both countries. I worked closely with the
MCKINZIE: You presumably attended some meetings in which the Secretary
of State was present?
MATLOCK: Yes, I often accompanied McGhee or his deputy, Walter Wilds,
to such meetings.
MCKINZIE: Were you present at the Secretary's meeting for briefing General
James Van Fleet prior to his departure for Athens to assume command of
the U.S. Military Advisory Group?
MATLOCK: Yes, and it was a most interesting occasion. Some generals and
colonels from the Pentagon had come over for the meeting, and it was a
good civilian-military mix. Two things about it struck me as interesting
and significant. The first was that the active generals still regarded
Secretary [General] Marshall as the "old man," and were ready to follow
his guidance without interdepartmental scuffling. The second was Marshall's
comment to Van Fleet that the latter should bear in mind that the U.S.
was not prepared to go to war over Greece. That information was of course
crucial to the
way in which Van Fleet approached his job -- at least that is my view.
I do not know whether Marshall was making policy when he said that, or
was repeating a point he had agreed with the President.
MCKINZIE: The problems that later came up in the European Recovery Program
were in a sense all dealt with before in the Greek-Turkish aid program...
MATLOCK: There was no economic aid to Turkey. Also, Turkey needed development,
not recovery. So rule out Turkey.
Greece was a different matter. It had in its program military aid, budgetary
aid, and development aid. The middle category is intended to mean what
"defense support" later meant. So I would say you are correct in the case
You will recall that Turkey did not participate in the first year of
the Marshall plan.
After that it was drawn in.
MCKINZIE: In Greece there was a question of what the distinction should
be between development aid and defense support. This same thing became
an issue in Europe after 1949-1950, particularly with the advent of the
Korean war. Since you did deal with the Pentagon aspect, I am wondering
if you were aware at your level of this dispute about what portion of
available funds should be spent for military aid and what should be spent
for economic development?
MATLOCK: Achievement of balance among the several components of a program,
both as between economic and military, and within each of the two, is
a continuous problem that generates strong views among the proponents
of the several elements. I do not recall a program that didn't have stresses
within it. In order to comment on your question at length, I would have
to know whom you have in mind. I worked in a staff capacity with the
people at the top who had to put the whole program together and achieve
a balance with due regard for need and policy priority. I did not make
the decisions; I contributed to them.
MCKINZIE: At the staff level was there any discussion about whether the
action taken in the Greek crisis was appropriate? That is, would it have
been more appropriate to have resolved the problem within the framework
of the United Nations. There were critics at the time, as you know, who
contended that unilateral U.S. action in the case of Greece and Turkey
dealt the United Nations a lethal blow...
MATLOCK: I do not recall our having to contend with any forceful criticism
of the kind you describe. The question was whether we should relieve the
U.K. of its burdens in Greece, which the U.K. said it could no longer
carry, or the Greek struggle should be left to write its own ending. The
U.N. didn't really enter into it.
Bear in mind that the U.N. did not have then, as it does not have now,
the unity and resources to determine the outcome of a civil or other war.
The U.N. was built upon the premise of unity and agreement among the permanent
members of the Security Council, in which all enforcement powers were
vested. The policies of the Soviet Union, and the opposition of ourselves
and our allies to them, made such unity and agreement impossible and precluded
the success of the U.N. as a peacekeeping agency from the outset. The
U.N. idea was good, but world conditions made it impractical. Granting
full credit to various U.N. agencies that are doing useful economic, social,
and humanitarian work, there has never been a U.N. capability for resolving
a military conflict. There was no way to resolve the Greek struggle in
favor of the non-Communist side except for the Greek Government to win
The U.N. is not an "it." The U.N. is a "we." If WE the great powers in
the U.N. cannot agree, there is nothing the U.N. as an IT can do to resolve
our differences. The U.N. provides a forum, a place to meet, a sort of
international grand hotel. If we are fighting the Soviet Union, or contending
with it, if you prefer a different expression, we can keep the contention
out of the U.N. or move it in, but the resolution of the conflict will
not depend upon whether the contention is outside the framework of the
U.N. or housed within it in some sense. The steps we and our allies took
to bend the U.N. Charter to give the General Assembly some policing powers
in such a situation as developed in the Congo, or as now exists in the
Middle East, does not in my estimation alter the above conclusion.
Although the British were clearly hurting and in no position to continue
in Greece in 1947, it was my impression that they thought having the Greek
problem as our own would wake us up a little
and get us committed to the struggle against Communist domination of
MCKINZIE: Did the British official ever intimate that to you?
MATLOCK: Not directly. However, on more than one occasion officials of
the U.K. or Commonwealth countries, pursuant to the general U.K. line
laid down by Churchill in his Fulton, Missouri speech, stressed to me
as to many others that the U.S. and the U.S. alone could block Communist
domination of the world. There was, before our commitment in Greece, an
air of British impatience about our slowness in realizing our manifest
destiny in this respect.
The U.K. estimate that the U.S. was the only country that could block
Communist world domination, a 1947 line, was confirmed in a measure by
the Soviet estimate at the party conference in 1952 in Moscow that the
main problem was to isolate and reduce the U.S. They have made considerable
progress in their efforts to do it, helped, of course, by circumstances
they did not contrive. Now, of course, world communism is subdivided badly
from the Soviet point of view, and the demise of the U.S. would leave
a fundamental conflict of intentions between the Soviet Russians and the
Communist Chinese. The world might be Communist, but not unified.
MCKINZIE: I am concerned about the administration of the Greek-Turkish
program, and about the difficulty that came up there before it came up
in the Marshall plan or the Technical Cooperation Program: the compliance
control regulations, the strings, if you will, that are attached to systems
and which amount to willful intervention in the internal affairs of a
sovereign nation. This may have been done with a willingness, with invitation
of the Greek Government. Was that a large issue for you who were working
on this problem?
MATLOCK: It was a problem more than an issue. The
Greek Government at that time acted in full cooperation with the U.S.
Government. The Greek Government was desperate and badly needed the administrative
help it was given in administering itself. I remember an American or two
who were Greek Government officials in a functional sense. The U.S. idea
was to deliver the aid, see that it was used properly and effectively,
support the main objective: win the war. In Greece it worked. Look at
Greece in 1975: Is it a puppet of the U.S.?
In point of fact, the U.S. has often had little ultimate say in the affairs
of countries to which it has been most heavily committed. The leaders
of the countries involved have always realized that the U.S. became involved
with them because of a U.S. interest and has little choice. This gives
the other countries' leaders considerable latitude for maneuver.
In Greece we did not have the intense conflicts of will that sometimes
characterized our later wartime relations with the Koreans.
You characterized our action as intervention in the "internal affairs"
of a "sovereign" nation. A Communist "war of liberation" which the Soviets
and the Chinese still and will support, is never an "internal" affair
of a country. It is international from the start, and may be international
in its conception and origin, i.e., actually imported. "Sovereign" means
having power and from it free choice. What we did in Greece was to ensure
the sovereignty, at least for a while, of the non-Communist Greeks (of
many political persuasions) in their own country.
The sovereignty of a government fighting a foreign supported rebellion
or revolution is inherently abridged. The Greek Government's position
in its fight to reestablish and preserve its sovereignty was made exceptionally
difficult by the existence of the Yugoslav sanctuary for tired or beaten
Communist troops. The Greek Government began to win when the sanctuary
MCKINZIE: Were you who were working on specific military problems aware
at all that there were negotiations going on with the Yugoslavs -- between
the Yugoslavs and the State Department -- to try to get the Yugoslav Government
to stop providing a refuge to Greek Communist forces?
MATLOCK: I was not involved in such negotiations. I knew of the Department's
great interest in the matter. I knew they were doing what they could.
My impression was that deterioration of relations between Tito and Stalin
made a change possible.
MCKINZIE: Mr. Matlock, do you think we should break here for this session?
MATLOCK: If you like.
Second Oral History Interview with Clifford C. Matlock,
Waynesville, North Carolina on June 6, 1974. By Richard D. McKinzie.
MCKINZIE: It might be well for us to pick up the narrative of your career
in late 1947. George McGhee had given you a title which you said was a
special assistant for interdepartmental relations, but that in fact, it
really dealt more with...
MATLOCK: It was really military aid, working with the Pentagon. There
was a man in the Pentagon, Lt. Col. Charles Davis, who was the principal
figure in logistics for the Greek war and he was my principal contact
in the Pentagon, so we were just partners in getting the job done.
MCKINZIE: When the Greek-Turkish aid program was being implemented, the
Marshall Plan was, of course, in the process of being worked out. I wondered
what knowledge you have of all of that, and if you anticipated that there
going to be a military aid component.
MATLOCK: My association with and knowledge of Marshall Plan preparations
as such came after Marshall's speech at Harvard opening the subject. It
would be improper to speak of a military aid component of the Marshall
Plan at any point in the highly tense psychological history of
that program. The Marshall Plan people would scream at you if you mentioned
"defense" or "military" in connection with the Marshall Plan.
MCKINZIE: But, doesn't that betray on their part a belief that economic
solutions were in themselves enough to save Western Europe? Didn't they
consider the need...
MATLOCK: I didn't think that was it. Most of them understood as well
as anybody the need for a defense of what is now called the North Atlantic
area, but they felt that if the Marshall Plan psychology were contaminated
as to motivation by
a military and strategic consideration that was always coming to the
fore, it would greatly impair the success of the Marshall Plan and prejudice
its acceptance in a number of European countries.
You know, in the beginning Czechoslovakia was invited and wanted in the
Marshall Plan, but the Russians told them to get out. It was a non-war
kind of thing, but basically its purpose was to strengthen Western Europe
to make it invulnerable to internal conquest by communism. And it succeeded
I think at that -- as well as anything could, it did.
MCKINZIE: How long did you stay with the Greek aid?
MATLOCK: I did some work for George before I moved into his office and
then from November 1947 I was there until in August 1948. I went into
the Office of European Affairs where I was a special assistant for economic
affairs (they called it "economic adviser"). It was Harry [Henry R., Jr.]
Labouisse's job slot, and he moved to a Marshall Plan top job. Some months
later I discovered that personnel management hadn't been able to change
our job positions yet, and he was still technically in mine and I was
still technically in one of George's jobs. It didn't matter, because operations
had outrun the red tape. But Harry Labouisse and George McGhee were co-chairmen
of an interdepartmental committee for preparation of the Marshall Plan.
We had had an "interim aid" operation and a man named John Murphy, who
was later controller of the Marshall Plan. He was very conspicuous in
the interim aid program and also very conspicuous in the preparatory days
of the Marshall Plan, but George and Harry were co-chairmen of the committee
and there was somebody from every office on the committee. That was a
State Department committee. When [Paul] Hoffman actually started the first
day of work of the Marshall Plan, I think he spent somewhere in the neighborhood
of 50 or 55 million dollars on
supplies immediately. Requisitions were immediately issued so he could
say, "We're in business, you know, we started today, we have done a lot
of business the first day."
A new man, a head of a program, always wants to do that, but the State
Department was in some disrepute at the time and Hoffman didn't want any
State Department contamination with his new agency's psychology and failed
to mention that all of these requisitions were written for him in the
State Department. Well, that's Washington. We understood.
MCKINZIE: Do you recall the work of that committee?
MATLOCK: Bits and pieces. It was just a good standard preparatory operation.
There weren't any mighty issues fought out in it. It had been decided
that there would be a Marshall Plan; the job was just to get ready to
work. Then when Paul Hoffman's Marshall Plan agency was ready to go, it
simply did everything from then on.
MCKINZIE: You said there were no major issues hashed out, but there were
some issues that were touchy from the very beginning. One of them was
the question of whether or not material aid should be transported to Europeans
in their own ships. There was this thing that a certain percentage of
it had to be carried in American bottoms and
MATLOCK: I don't remember any discussion of that in the Committee. I
do remember the issue, which was a persistent issue.
MCKINZIE: I talked to a young man a couple of weeks ago who is trying
to get at pressures of various sales groups -- wheat farmers and potato
farmers, and suppliers of various sorts -- involved in the evolving of
the Marshall Plan...
MATLOCK: Well, they didn't knock on my door. And so far as I know George
McGhee didn't have to bother with them, and I never heard Harry Labouisse
that he did. But remember that the Marshall Plan evolved in operation,
not in the preparation.
MCKINZIE: Well, that's what I was trying to get at, were you able to
do this without an awful lot of outside...
MATLOCK: I don't remember any outside pressures during the pre-operational
period. I think the most difficult thing I did was to make a telephone
directory of the people in the Government who were doing preparatory work
on the Marshall Plan. You see, it was a new thing, a big thing, and nearly
everybody wanted some kind of conspicuous relation to it.
I remember one fellow who called me up and said that he didn't really
have anything to do and he needed something for survival. He was a good
economist and had been looking over the different things that needed to
be done. He was proficient in a certain subject, and asked me if I would
put his name in the telephone book for that subject.
There was no competition for it, so I put his name in and nobody objected
and that became his responsibility.
But there was also a good deal of contention where officers were competitive
as to who was supposed to do what, and that affected the telephone book.
There were about eight or nine drafts of that book before it was approved
by McGhee and Labouisse, and I had to go through those.
At the same time I was working on a top secret operation of dispatches,
letters, between the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense [James
V.] Forrestal, and so on, about some very sensitive things that I thought
were really difficult and might, if they were handled wrong, cause a conflict
with Russia. Everything was approved in a first draft, right through that
whole thing. That hot and cold contrast impressed me. But, you see, when
people's individual careers are at stake, that's serious business!
MCKINZIE: In August 1948, you left McGhee's office for Hickerson's; was
there any particular reason for that?
MATLOCK: I left because I wanted the job in the European Affairs Office.
The Greek war was approaching an end. I didn't have any problem with George,
that I knew about. I was just moving. We'd gotten very well on with the
program and somebody asked me if I wanted that job, and I said I did.
MCKINZIE: When you took it there was already a great deal of planning
underway for NATO.
MATLOCK: Yes, there was. Ted [Theodore C.] Achilles was the NATO negotiator,
under Acheson. The Canadian, [William Lyon] Mackenzie King, I think got
the idea in the beginning -- involving fewer countries. Achilles was a
non-communicative person, at least to me. (Others also had that experience.)
MCKINZIE: To your knowledge were any economic people brought in to talk
about the impact of NATO on the
MATLOCK: There were many economists working with the committee, and some
on it. Such matters always come up, but I don't think that was a problem.
Priorities prevail. I think that the Marshall Plan was successful. It
stopped early, and by the time I was in my first year in London, it was
pretty well over. Bill [William L.] Batt became the economic minister
in the London embassy, and another man became the economic minister in
the Paris embassy. They were consolidating the positions of the economic
man in the embassy and the economic man over the Marshall Plan mission.
But the Marshall Plan was over before NATO got serious.
MCKINZIE: What was the analogy you used about Europe...?
MATLOCK: A camel ready for water, yes. Europeans were highly competent.
European countries in the Plan had gotten what they needed and they
knew what to do with it. The Marshall Plan was a huge success, and it
was over sooner than expected.
Some other economic problems did develop later and then the phrase "defense
support" was coined to label economic aid. (I don't remember its being
used in aid in Greece, but it may have been.) In the beginning of NATO,
the U.S. contemplated about a one billion dollar appropriation to buy
up mainly U.S. surplus equipment from the Second World War and ship it
over there. That's token armament. You can't fight a third world war with
Second World War junk.
In point of fact it didn't exist. You couldn't have gotten it out of
the surplus. The Greek war had shown that while there was a lot of stuff,
you couldn't get complete units. If you could get the guns, you couldn't
always get the ammunition. If you got the planes you couldn't get the
spare parts, things like that. So you plan a huge total inventory, but
when you go to
get what you want in complete units that you can ship to another force
for use, you find that you can't put them together. Then you have to go
out and contract new production for the missing things. We had to buy
some parts back from private industry to go along with some excess airplanes
for Greece and Turkey, I remember that. By the time I moved to the European
Office I already knew that we were scraping the bottom of the barrel on
surplus. But the people working on European armament hadn't been dealing
with the Greek program and they didn't know that those surplus figures
weren't real. I told them. They didn't know that you couldn't dip into
that and get a billion dollars worth of useful armaments to give Europe
a modest rearmament. But the figure of a billion dollars, I think Ted
Achilles would tell you (I believe it's what he and the others were saying
at the time) was simply a figure they thought they could get through
Congress and it wasn't until after the Korean war started that it was
escalated to five billion. Then it was for real and it was new production.
MCKINZIE: But there were a few people who were saying that if the North
Atlantic Treaty required defense production on the part of the recipients
of Marshall Plan aid, it would alter the economic priorities that had
been established under the Marshall Plan and therefore...
MATLOCK: I don't doubt at all that the issue you mentioned came up among
those people at that time. It must have been a very real point to them.
I didn't hear much about it, but it must have been very real. I didn't
hear Bill Batt talking about it in London though.
MCKINZIE: When you went into Hickerson's office what were the major problems
that you were assigned to immediately?
MATLOCK: Well, a special assistant does what comes
up, and he usually takes on things that have gotten a little too hot
for the desk officer, who takes them to the boss and the boss says to
the special assistant, "Will you take this and look into it?" So I did
what came up, and it was an array of things. I didn't have some big single
responsibility. I was a member of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armament,
and of the Berkner-Lemnitzer committee for the preparation of draft military
aid legislation for European rearmament.
MCKINZIE: Was the Policy Committee on Arms and Armament important, at
MATLOCK: It was important, but it was just a routine action. It wasn't
a big thing, but there had to be a committee like that, there had to be
members on it, and the European Office had to name one, and designated
That's where I met Major General [James Kerr]
Crain. It had some subcommittees. I worked with General Crain on things
that came out of SWNCC and SANACC, you've seen those names. I was with
him when he opened up the first estimate of the total number of divisions
we'd have to support around the free world to implement our armament policy.
We looked at the figure and both said, "It's impossible. It's impractical.
What we ought to do is concentrate on a few strong countries and not try
to arm the rest." But that isn't what we did, that's just what he and
MCKINZIE: When was that, by the way?
MATLOCK: It was when SWNCC and SANACC were operative and they produced
their first report, and it was when I was in the Bureau of European Affairs,
which means it was before November 1949 when I went to London and it was
after late 1948 when I left McGhee's office.
General Crain was the one who received the report in the State Department.
He was a State
Department officer in retirement from the Army, and we looked at it together.
We thought it was an enormous number of divisions (over 200), but I think
it's in line with what we tried to do for a generation of time after that.
MCKINZIE: Many people have said that the State Department doesn't have
to keep its finger much on the pulse of public opinion, but from what
you have told me and from what other people have told me, the State Department
is very conscious of public opinion and in such matters as rearmament
in early 1949 or 1948, a very touchy issue in the United States. To what
extent was a man like General Crain or yourself upset, and concerned about
MATLOCK: Not at all. We were just working on the problem before us. The
problem was to estimate what you could and should do. Once when Eisenhower
was President I was asked to head a small subcommittee of about three
people to figure out how to save
money on the military budget in Korea, our budget and the Korean budget.
I had to make a report as chairman of that group. The State Department
member is always the chairman of an interdepartmental group on a foreign
policy matter. I remember our coming up with the unanimous conclusion
that there couldn't be any saving of money through reduction of the size
of the Korean Army. Eisenhower said he wanted to save some money on Korean
defense. What we said in effect was, "If you want to save money, you can
do it, but you have at the same time to redefine your defense obligation
in Korea. You have to give up the territorial obligation to defend the
38th parallel and retreat to some vague general principle that you will
do something effective to discourage the North Koreans from renewing the
war." That would have been a far cry from maintaining certain forces in
Korea and maintaining certain numbers of Korean divisions and all of that
sort of thing.
We then had the second kind of commitment, greatly watered down, in Vietnam.
We didn't have a commitment in Vietnam like the Korean; our combat commitment
in Vietnam developed piece by piece as the war came on. That comparison
was made at the time we were talking about how many divisions the Koreans
needed and how much force the U.S. needed in Korea. The State Department
Far East Bureau, my bureau, made the point that the commitments were different.
In Korea we have a 38th parallel to defend and all of South Korea, whereas
in Vietnam the SEATO Treaty was simply that a member does what seems reasonable
at the time. In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty an attack on one
is an attack on all. You're at war but you do whatever seems reasonable
and constitutional to you. In fact, however, NATO has no actual way of
deciding to go to war, because it runs by the rule of unanimity in the
Council, and it includes some countries that might be overrun the first
So, everyone in NATO just tacitly assumed there would be a Soviet attack
starting a war and you'd react and be in it and that's that, which is
probably true. If you've just been clobbered and you're reacting, you're
at war and Congress will do what it did in the First and Second World
Wars, recognize that a state of war exists. What else could it do in the
Second World War? We were more or less dragged into both wars, after which
we fought them for "noble" reasons. There are some American myths about
MCKINZIE: How did you happen to get an assignment to London after you
had gone into Jack Hickerson's operation in European Affairs?
MATLOCK: I was interested in it. The European Bureau was being reorganized.
A whole new set of people were coming in. Jack Hickerson and Llewellyn
Thompson, my bosses, were going out. A good spot wasn't offered to me
by the new Director. So I was looking around for a new assignment and
interested me. That's how I got it.
MCKINZIE: Was there intense competition for it?
MATLOCK: I don't think so. I don't know that I wasn't the only one considered
for the job of Political Adviser. [Charles H.] Bonesteel got the job of
Executive Director that had been slated by Berkner for Walter Surrey (who
picked me), but Harriman got it away from Surrey for Tick Bonesteel. Surrey
started a law firm, now very large, fine, and important. I think his comment
to me was, "Three times a bridesmaid and never a bride, I'm going to do
something else." Surrey and Berkner picked me, and Bonesteel and Ambassador
Douglas accepted me. There is a nuance. Surrey is a very prominent man
today, but I guess Tick wanted the London job of Executive Director, and
Tick had been a special assistant both to Harriman and to Secretary Marshall.
He was well qualified and did a fine job in London. Lloyd Berkner, a scientist,
and General [L. L.] Lemnitzer, who's a good friend
of Bonesteel's, were co-chairmen of the committee for preparation of
legislation for European rearmament, the U.S. military aid program for
That's another thing, I was on that committee. I have forgotten its acronym.
The European Bureau assigned me to that committee, so I was a member of
the committee to prepare legislation. I think it was called FAMACC, something
like that. Being on the committee got me into a lot of work. Then I saw
the opportunity to go to London and asked for it.
MCKINZIE: Do you remember much about the work of that committee?
MATLOCK: There was nothing routine about it. It had hundreds of tasks.
When you get ready to do something new and big, it's not a routine thing
for the U.S. Government. It's urgent, intense, and demanding. But I spent
most of my life in Government doing things that were not routine, but
routine to do them. It was just a day's work, every day, all day, sometimes
a good part of the night, but usually we got away at the hours that State
Department people usually get away, between 6 and 7 o'clock at night.
Berkner was not less important than Lemnitzer. Perhaps it was the other
way around. Berkner was a friend of Dean Acheson and Acheson brought him
in to work on that. Berkner, the famous scientist, Lloyd Berkner, went
to the South Pole with Admiral Byrd. Later on he was head of a defense
research program in a bunch of colleges. He was the head of the weapons
evaluation system during the Second World War in the Navy Department.
He was a very able man.
MCKINZIE: They must have been concerned about what was politically possible,
in the way of...
MATLOCK: Oh yes, foreign policy work is always political in the sense
of inter-governmental relationships. But in the State Department during
the last ten
years that I was in it, I remember that we had an occasional reference
to the question of domestic politics, and our instructions in staff meeting
were, "When you make a proposal, do not consider American domestic politics.
If you do, you'll confuse the issue. The Secretary, the Under Secretary
and the Assistant Secretary and the seventh floor apparatus will take
account of those things, and the White House will take account of those
things, and the congressional leaders will take account of those things.
But if you take account of them too, then your recommendations won't be
pure foreign policy -- which they ought to be. They won't be a
professional evaluation, they'll have a domestic political content and
then nobody up the line will know what he's doing. The top echelon can
introduce the domestic political considerations and say, 'Well, we couldn't
do it now, it won't work,' or 'Yes, the Congress and American people will
So, the politics, the political acceptability
of an idea, comes at the Assistant Secretary level and above. There they
get into the whole American domestic political evaluation structure such
as it is. I never had to give any thought in anything I
ever did to the question of whether the American people wanted to do it
or not. I just recommended what seemed to be the right thing to do. And
then the memoranda would go and bounce back and lie flat for years, or
they'd go on up. General [Fred] Anderson said to us in Paris once, "Fellows,
you're doing the most important work in this building, and you'll be successful
when your ideas are adopted and everybody has forgotten that you had anything
to do with it."
Some of the most successful pieces of paper have never been cleared with
anyone, but turn out to be the basis of a major policy development. Anderson
was assigned, in the Pentagon, the job of figuring out when the Russians
would have the atom bomb. That was Air Force Major General Fred Anderson.
(There were two Fred Andersons, both
generals, but he was an Air Force general and he was Draper's deputy
in Paris.) He assumed that the Russians were just as smart as the Americans,
no smarter and no more stupid, just the same. And then he found out from
intelligence where the Russians stood in the atomic bomb development work.
He found out from the scientists how long it took the U.S. from where
the Russians were -- how long it took for the Americans to develop the
bomb after that point. He just added that much time to the date and came
up with a year and said the Soviets would have it in that year. He told
me he picked the correct year.
He also made a study of Air Force requirements. He said he never cleared
it with anybody, he just had a committee and they put together a fine
document and made a lot of copies and put it around. Then when Vinson's
committee studied the Air Force and [Thomas K.] Finletter's committee
studied the Air Force and were looking to see what there was on the subject,
they found this
report. They were in business. Two-thirds of their work was done. That's
one of the best ways to be successful in getting your ideas adopted. The
best way is to be President.
MCKINZIE: Could I get you to begin to talk about your work in London?
MATLOCK: By the way, you were asking what I did. I also did some economic
things. I remember working on the question of British devaluation. We
had a really sharp issue, and I was on the conservative side of it. The
issue was whether or not to press the British into devaluing the pound.
That was in '49 and I said we shouldn't push them into it at all, and
we shouldn't tell them they should do it until they had decided that they
were going to do it whether we liked it or not. I said there had never
been an economist who knew after the fact precisely what the consequence
of a prior devaluation had been, and there certainly wasn't one who knew
beforehand what the consequences
would be. Therefore, anything that went wrong could be blamed on the
U.S. if we shoved the British into it.
I saw Jack Hickerson for a split second. I was sitting on the edge of
a chair, going to a meeting with Assistant Secretary [Willard] Thorp,
economics, and he had some advisers who were saying, "You've got to hit
the British over the head and make them do this." I wanted to know what
to say, so I asked Jack. He said, "Say just what you said." And I went
off and said it. The British did devalue after a while, but I don't think
Thorp hit them very hard on it. Of course, he's an independent minded
Many years later I gave a talk once a month in tandem with Marshall Green,
who's been an Assistant Secretary and is now an Ambassador in East Asia
somewhere. Marshall and I went once a month to the Military Assistance
Institute. He made a political talk for about an hour and
I made an economic talk on the Far East for about an hour. Then we had
a coffee break, and after that a two-hour question period.
The general reads your whole career to introduce you. It sounds as if
you own the Government or something, and I had a habit of breaking the
ice by just saying, "Well, I just do whatever comes up."
Then I told the story that always got a laugh. It was a one-month training
course for officers from about major through general, going overseas on
advisory work. I said, "I do what comes up." Now you'd understand that
if I tell you the story that followed. Once on a very bad day, crossing
the English Channel, there was a poor soul who was leaning over the rail;
it was in the evening, and he was miserably seasick. Then there was one
of the sturdy types who can smoke a pipe or cigar and stomp up and down
the deck and enjoy the fresh air while everybody else is leaning on the
rail. One of these men came up and slapped this
poor fellow on the back and said, "I say, my good man, has the moon come
up yet?" And the fellow said, "I guess so, everything else has."
Well, that's a good way to put it, "everything else has." Now, as a person
just under a top figure, you may be assigned a project, as I often was.
For example, I was assigned to work on the devaluation of the kip in Laos
in 1958 when a couple of other high ranking officers practically got sick
trying to finish it and decided they would give it to a subordinate. That's
when I got it.
We worried with it until finally it happened in October of '58. You get
a project assigned, and then you know all about that, and then you drop
it because it goes back to the desk officer, and you don't know in detail
what happens after that unless it becomes a crisis again and they bring
it back to you. Then you get acquainted with all the facts and everything
and work on it again. So, you only get it while it's a hot issue, while
top boss wants you to fuss with it, and the minute it's under control
as far as he's concerned it goes back to the hierarchy the way it should;
just the right way to do it.
Anyway, for an ordinary staff assignment you get a few subjects that
are characteristically yours. But when you get all through, you don't
feel as if you have mastered anything, or been the principal or sole factor
I was sitting next to a geologist once at a luncheon meeting of Boards
of Trustees and Overseers of American Colleges and Universities at the
Hilton Hotel in Washington. He asked me what I'd been doing and I told
him. I told him I envied him. When he built a steel mill he could look
at it and say, "There I did that." Whereas in the State Department it's
like walking on water. It's very hard to do, but it doesn't leave any
Well, there's some truth in the matter. You
get all through and you say, "Well, what did I do? Oh, I was there,"
that's about it. One had a lot of experiences, very strenuous and all
that, and yet no one ever did anything all himself. Very few ever made
a final decision; they just made a succession of decisions, but not a
One ambassador told me he liked to fix water taps and things at home,
put new washers on, because he could make a final decision.
MCKINZIE: Sounds like Henry Grady to me.
MATLOCK: It wasn't Grady, it was Jack Bell, Ambassador John Bell. At
home he could make final decisions, at least some final decisions.
I saw Harry Labouisse once when he was getting the Marshall Plan ready.
He was walking down the hall and we just stopped to chat for a minute.
He had a paper in his hand and I asked, "What's that?"
And he said, "Well, it was a very fine draft in the beginning, but now
it's just an agreed
MCKINZIE: Could we have a little local color about London in 1949? Was
London a decent and livable place as far as you were concerned by 1949?
MATLOCK: Yes, it was very nice. Of course, I made my own arrangements.
The Embassy put me and my wife up at the Mt. Royal Hotel. It was a modest
accommodation and it didn't cost very much. Most officers want to save
money and I'm not different. On the other hand, I had never been to London
and you couldn't see the sun. The first 10 days I was there there was
no sun. After 10 days we had gotten acquainted with the neighborhood,
and we moved into a room in Grosvenor House on Park Lane. After three
months we got a flat in Grosvenor House with a seven-year lease on it,
and a diplomatic clause.
In 1964 when I was visiting London on the Colombo Plan, I was asked whether
I wanted to come back to Grosvenor House. I said I couldn't
come back as a diplomat. I couldn't ask for a diplomatic clause, and
I couldn't take on a seven-year lease and so on. And they said they thought
that since I was an old friend they could do it again for me. And then
they said, "You know, you're the only person who's ever had the diplomatic
clause at Grosvenor House." I've felt complimented ever since. My wife
and I simply found a place at Grosvenor House and lived there. In Paris
we lived at the Hotel Continental for a while and then moved to the Hotel
Crillon, which is on the Place de la Concorde. We lived at the Crillon
all the rest of the time I was in Paris, except the last month.
MCKINZIE: It was much more pleasant then.
MATLOCK: Well, yes, but I had an invalid wife and I had to be sure that
she was surrounded by things that relieved physical strain or hazard --
in terms of heating, for example. Grosvenor House has central heating,
which was hard to find in London,
and many services. You see, we had a maid, valet and a waiter -- three
buttons to press. Then we employed one of the servants with the permission
of Grosvenor House as a fulltime servant, including cook. So, we had a
very comfortable, nice operation; brought our furniture from America.
In London if you rent a flat you have to buy new lighting fixtures and
everything, even in Grosvenor House. They remodel the whole flat (apartment)
and refurbish it. They do it for every tenant and charge the previous
tenant. I think I paid a thousand dollars to prepare the apartment for
the next tenant, but it had also been done for me. They took all the fixtures
out of the bathroom and re-chromed them; all the doorknobs off the doors,
re-chromed them; took all the wood paneling in the closets and refinished
it, put it back in.
The Embassy didn't arrange those accommodations at all. I wasn't a VIP.
I was just another senior officer coming over to be on duty. The
Embassy got me a hotel room for the first few days I was there, and after
that I was on my own. The Ambassador has a residence in London, and the
Minister has a residence, and nearly everybody else is in business for
MCKINZIE: Could you talk a little bit about what kind of a setup they
had waiting for you when you arrived, as far as your work was concerned?
MATLOCK: Just a desk and an office. I don't think Tick Bonesteel was
there yet. I think he came a week or so later. We just went in from scratch,
you know. Tick had to organize himself, and then we had to decide what
we were going to do and things like that.
MCKINZIE: You waited until he got there and...
MATLOCK: Yes, I think I was a bit of a novice at that time and it took
me a while to figure what I ought to be doing.
MCKINZIE: Well, there were a lots of important things
going on by that time and...
MATLOCK: Of course, but there are embassies in every country, and the
telegrams are going back and forth every day. The ambassadors --
except Douglas -- probably thought the whole London operation was unnecessary
and stepped on their toes.
MCKINZIE: How do you mean that?
MATLOCK: An intermediate State Department regional organization between
Washington and the embassies overseas is never welcome. Tick Bonesteel
could call a regional meeting and somebody had to go from every embassy
to London and spend a week there. A lot of documentation had to be prepared
and all that sort of thing, and I think they would have preferred dealing
exclusively with Washington. I've never known anybody in a diplomatic
establishment who didn't prefer dealing as directly as possible with the
Secretary of State. Usually you have to deal with an Assistant Secretary.
people have a lot of clout and they can deal with the President, but
not many. They represent the President, ambassadors do,
but very few can write him a letter -- except of resignation.
MCKINZIE: When Bonesteel came, how did you happen to get tied up with
the European Coordinating Committee so quickly?
MATLOCK: That was my only reason for going to London. The European Coordinating
Committee existed already, but it didn't have a staff. Tick became the
Executive Director, which is chief of staff. I was sent over to fill the
slot of political adviser. Dick Freund went over to handle production.
A fellow named A1 Lindley was there and he did something economic. There
were a couple of others. So we covered the main sectors of activity, economic,
political, and military. There was a military assistance regional organization
for operations headed by General Kibler with HQ in London. General Biddle
was his deputy, Bill
Biddle. But here were a regional policy office, and our service was to
our principals, the membersbof the European Coordinating Committee, and
Washington. The members were Ambassador Douglas, Chairman; General Tom
Handy, who commanded U.S. forces in Europe, EUCOM; and Averell Harriman,
who was in Paris and head of what was left of the Marshall Plan and anything
else going on that was economic. By now, "defense" was polite; but what
would have been called Marshall Plan aid before became defense support.
And the rationale had changed. Since the Marshall Plan was over, and since
they wanted to give some economic aid, there had to be a new name for
it: it was "defense support."
MCKINZIE: This was still 1949, technically the Marshall Plan was supposed
to run from 1948 through '51.
MATLOCK: I think it ended in 1950. I suppose defense support was in by
1949, but I heard more about it
in 1950. It was a way of re-instituting economic aid, but it wasn't called
Marshall Plan. It was an adjunct to defense by that time. But before NATO
it wasn't proper or politic to talk about defense. Up until that time
we were going to hold Germany and Japan down as a demilitarized nation,
and Russia had been an ally. Up until the Korean war, the thought of European
rearmament was still a token thought. Political alliance was real, but
the rearmament was a kind of a token operation.
MCKINZIE: Could I get you to amplify on that a little bit, "Alliance
was real but rearmament was token"?
MATLOCK: Well, there weren't any substantial rearmament goals spelled
out, and the American appropriation proposed of l billion dollars was
to buy surplus equipment out of the U.S. stockpiles, and that theoretically
would get a lot of surplus equipment. In practice it wouldn't have, but
theoretically it would. The equipment wasn't
there, as I said, but in any case it would not have been serious rearmament.
You couldn't get ready for the next war by rearming with World War II
MCKINZIE: And there was no serious discussion of asking European nations
to undertake defense production.
MATLOCK: Defense production in every allied country was urged. It was
urgently urged after the beginning of the Korean war which changed the
Western defense perspective. The Korean war was a signal for the west
to "scramble" -- in the Air Force sense of the term. Our defense budget
started up again, and we put up our guard.
There had been very serious consideration by May 1950 of the military
position in Western Europe, which was not good, to put it gently, in case
we were attacked. It's fine if you're not attacked. And there were a lot
of reasonable understandings of the economic situation, which was not
too bad. Politically Europe was not united, and not really
broken up. It was doing pretty well. De Gasperi was a strong and constructive
figure in Italy, and Adenauer was leading Germany well. Britain was being
led very well by Attlee and Churchill, one at a time.
MCKINZIE: To what extent were you sympathetic with the goals of the Marshall
Plan people who wanted the economic program, one way or the other, to
foster European integration, particularly economic.
MATLOCK: Well, what I thought of it didn't matter much to anybody. But
what I thought was that integration was a good idea within a framework
that our interests could tolerate. At the time England didn't want any
part of European integration.
I remember one cartoon somebody cooked up; I don't believe it was ever
published. But Hoffman, who was pushing integration, was arriving at Heathrow
Airport and Mr. Attlee shook his hand at the airport and said, "Mr. Hoffman
we are so glad to see you in England. Are you going to
Europe too?" It was a nice way of answering the question expected from
Hoffman before it ever came up.
Well, I thought it was a good idea, but I remember pointing out from
time to time during the three following years, that we had fought two
wars to prevent the integration of Europe by Germany, and it made a great
deal of difference how it happened. So, reflect on that. What we want
is integration in a way that brings a peaceful, reasonably democratic,
strong Europe, friendly, or at least not hostile to the United States,
and, hopefully, ready to join us in any great defense effort that
might be required if Russia or China should cut loose.
I never knew who decided to reverse the policy on German and Japanese
disarmament, except that it had to be the President's formal decision.
I was part of the chorus to explain why we had to arm Germany and Japan.
But it was a great surprise to me when
the policy was changed. But then when I thought about it, it was obviously
going to be necessary on the ground that the United States could not afford
to have Germany, Russia, and Japan, and maybe China aligned against it
as a solid bloc. That's too strong a combination, we couldn't win that
Therefore, if Russia was going to be an enemy (and it had decided it
wanted to be an enemy, because it saw opportunity for expanding communism,
and friendship with the United States wouldn't permit that), then we had
to make friends and allies of West Germany and Japan. We couldn't do it
by making them peasants.
So, disarmament policy was made armament policy. I didn't hear about
it until May 1950, and it didn't break out in the open until September
in New York, when the U.S. proposed it and the French blew their gasket.
MCKINZIE: I think in Acheson's book he talks about
a meeting in May of 1950 in which he was still taking the position the
Germans should still be disarmed, and then he began to make some changes.
MATLOCK: Well, in May 1950, I don't know what his discussions with McCloy
and Ambassador Douglas were -- but John J. McCloy, I think, was in Germany.
MCKINZIE: High Commissioner.
MATLOCK: Yes. Well, he and Harriman and Douglas had been together and
then there was a meeting of the European Coordinating Committee. Tick's
staff, Bonesteel's staff, all prepared papers for the committee to look
at. I prepared papers on the political side. One of them was a short statement
on the policy regarding Germany, and I simply reiterated it. I quoted
a sentence from the State Department policy paper. During the meeting
Douglas picked that one up and said, "Are there any comments on this."
Harriman said (he
was sitting right next to me at the table), "We might add the words,
'at this time,' at the end of that."
Neither of the other two disagreed and Tick was instructed to tell the
State Department to add the words, "at this time."
So, since I had quoted verbatim from the policy document, it was possible
to put it in those terms, and we telegraphed Washington that the European
Coordinating Committee recommended that the phrase "at this time" be put
at the end of the statement of policy to keep Germany demilitarized. So,
that was the first indication I had that the policy was changing, May
MCKINZIE: By saying "at this time" it implied that there was a change
MATLOCK: It meant that we were opening the door to change. Nobody does
that in the U.S. Government unless he's already got a change in mind,
or thinks one is entirely possible. So, I just concluded
that they'd been together, didn't want to talk in front of the staff,
but they'd been together about it. They didn't discuss it, they just approved
the change. And from then on it went fast. But nobody decided to have
a real defense of Europe until the Korean war came along. Then it got
serious. In August of 1950 the U.S. Government raised the estimated scale
of U.S. expenditures on European rearmament from 1 billion to around 5
billion per annum and proposed that all NATO members step up their own
defense expenditures. We were thinking in terms of 9 or 10 percent of
GNP. By December of that year Attlee apparently had decided that England
ought to have a defense, even if England had to pay for it, which the
U.K. didn't want to do. Then Attlee adopted a policy of British rearmament,
which was duly published. That was the kind of thing the U.S. liked to
see at the time. It was so much of an undertaking that when Churchill
became Prime Minister again he "stretched it out," to use his phrase,
down in other words as a annual cost.
MCKINZIE: It seems to me that when these proposals for European rearmament
that came out in August of 1950, and were pretty well firmed up I think
by December, that there would have been economists in the ECA mission,
attached to the embassy and in other capacities, who would have said,
"Look, this is beyond the ability of these economies to sustain; and more
than that the inflation which is going to be sparked by rises in prices
of raw materials due to U.S. rearmament effort is going to throw this
all into a whole new bag, and don't you think this is too much too fast?"
Which is in effect what Churchill had to say was too much too fast, actually...
MATLOCK: For England.
Excited economists may have talked one another into a blue funk. But
those working with us were aware of the defense priority. As for England,
Churchill was depending upon the United States to do
the defending, don't forget, and Churchill's a man who, up until the
hydrogen bomb experiments in the South Pacific and the sick Japanese fisherman
80 miles away, basically wanted to challenge Russia and get the question
of war or peace settled while Russia was still weak. He gave that up when
he found out what a weapon the hydrogen bomb was. I think he said that
if you dropped three of them in the Irish sea it would destroy England
by generating tidal waves. But he depended upon us. So, don't assume that
England's defense was just whatever England could do, in the mind of an
Remember, we inherited the English Commonwealth for a while. When I made
a State Department study in 1954 of what had happened to the Commonwealth
as a result of the Second World War, I got down to the basic question
of what does a government do, what does any ruler of a territory
do? Well, for one thing he has to defend the territory, or he won't
Second, he has to shore it up economically if it has troubles. If you've
got a weak point you've got to put aid in. So, you have an economic aid
program that can flow from the metropole to the parts, or from the head
country of commonwealth to the member countries, or from a country to
its less endowed allies -- which is the U.S. case.
The third thing a government or head of commonwealth has to do is a combination.
It's one or the other. It has to govern and it has to lead. The more it
leads the less it will have to govern, because if it has the qualities
of leadership it will have a following, and the disciplinary problems
won't be as numerous or as severe.
Those are the functions of England in the Commonwealth. What has happened
to those functions? You look it over for yourself. The U.S. took on the
function of defending a good part of the Commonwealth and even of defending
England. England was depending on us. Australia decided
it would have to depend on us for future defense when the Prince of
Wales was sunk out near Singapore. The Prime Minister published an
article saying that thenceforth Australia would look to the United States
for defense; it was public print, look it up. I think Madden was the Australian
MCKINZIE: Madden, Kenneth.
MATLOCK: That was an illuminating comment by him. Well, is England defending
the Commonwealth? On trade too, our proportion of the trade with virtually
every Commonwealth country increased in relation to England's proportion.
Our aid to the members of the Commonwealth, including England, had become
substantial at one time or another. We were defending the realm, and we
were doing the economic function of supporting it at weak points. Actually,
our "commonwealth" was most of the free world in the sense of defense,
economic aid, and leadership -- but we had no power to govern. Neither
does England govern Australia.
On the Marshall Plan Hoffman was criticized for giving England help when
England was helping India, because of the frozen sterling balances and
things like that. Hoffman said, "We're helping England as a going concern
and we're not going to ask England to act like a pauper," which was the
right answer, he was exactly right.
All right, there's that.
Then on leadership. That's a difficult question for -- as a matter of
governing -- England can govern the colonies only with difficulty and
can't govern any of the "dominions." What were dominions are now
just Commonwealth members. Every time there's a new coronation the British
revise the style and titles of the sovereign and you can read the evolution
of the Commonwealth and empire by reading each new description of the
sovereign's supposed authority. The phrase "Empress of India" and that
sort of thing is not in there anymore.
Well, anyway, the U.S. had taken over an increasing proportion of each
responsibility, and in some cases virtually all of it. England itself,
the presumed source of all hope, defense and help to Commonwealth members
was getting its help from us. And so we had, in fact, inherited several
of the principal responsibilities of leader of the Commonwealth.
A man in Ottawa told me once that if we had the wit to realize it we
had inherited the Commonwealth. That was in 1942, in Ottawa. He was a
Well, he was glad of it. He was a great admirer of Roosevelt's too. But
it wasn't until 1954 that I studied this question, documented the thoughts
I had and so on, and went on to another job. I think you need to keep
those functions of a ruling, or governing, or leading power in mind.
Now, for example, England has to lead Canada. It's never been able to
The Canadians always got the advance in autonomy before others. (We were
first, but we fought for it.) The French in Canada are so independent
that they've never been able to have conscription in Canada. The British
did not consult Mackenzie King before the Second World War to see whether
Canada would back Britain if Britain got in the war. They were asked not
to consult Canada, but just "Don't worry, don't consult us, but don't
Now, if the U.K. had consulted Canada, the Canadian Government would
have had to consult the Cabinet, and that would have meant consulting
the French Canadians. The latter would have said, "Go to war for England?
What for?" So, the best thing was just to leave it to events.
As it happened, the events put England in a good moral position. The
whole Nazi movement, either at its conception or later on, and certainly
later on, was an evil thing. There's no doubt in my mind about
it. It wasn't just a bad thing,
it was an evil thing. And therefore, it was not difficult for
the members of the Commonwealth to support England. But some of them warned
England that it wouldn't be automatic in the future. England would have
to be morally right. That came out on Suez. And of course, in England
there was a bad split over Suez.
MCKINZIE: Well, in 1950 I understand that England would be very touchy
about its losing its former empire, but...
MATLOCK: Not too. The French I think were far more touchy. The British
are pragmatic people. They take it the way it comes. They can be a little
browned off about something that happens, like Suez. But the thing about
Suez that hurt them, that angered them most, the British people, all the
British people, was the paragraph in an American statement by John Foster
Dulles that we agreed with our friends and allies about
most things but not about "colonialism," and it was aimed at Britain
Well, the British were in the process of liquidating an empire and transferring
power as fast as they could, and to have Dulles say that just sent seething
anger through both sides of the argument in Britain. I checked this out
with John Chadwick (U.S. Embassy Commercial Minister) later on at luncheon
one day. My impression was that the most sensitive point about Suez for
U.K.-U.S. relations was not the argument over whether England should have
gone in -- a question which divided England -- but that Dulles comment
about American virtue and British colonialism.
MCKINZIE: Well, did anyone, to your knowledge, sit down in the summer
of 1950 with the statistics that were available on the future of the British
economy and projections and say, "You can afford this much, but
you can't afford that much."
MATLOCK: No. No, not that way. We asked all to do more than they were
doing. We believed that they all could do more. Our approach was in terms
of higher percentages of GNP for defense. The "Lisbon goals" of 1952 set
by the North Atlantic Council have never been realized. They probably
haven't been half realized. I among others argued at the time of the Lisbon
meeting that the European countries would not -- not that
they could not -- put up the men and resources to meet requirements of
that order of magnitude even if the U.S. financed it all, which the U.S.
would in no case have done. But nevertheless those Lisbon goals were adopted.
I know the point. I am or I was an economist, and I think it's a fair
discussion; but then defense was the important question, and whether
we could afford it was a question of capability and not of preference.
It was something that had to be done if it could be done.
The Europeans never were prepared, or willing,
to do what we thought they ought to do and what we tried to get them
to do. There’s a tale to be told on that when we get around to it. But
you see, the goals were set in a Council Meeting -- Ministerial level
-- in Lisbon, February 1952.
As far as I know they are still the paper goals of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. A stretch-out or "long haul" policy was adopted in
April 1953 in Paris. One reason the European countries wouldn't act as
urgently about defense as the U.S. proposed was simply that they didn't
think the Russians were that much of a threat. We always estimated the
Russian threat to be a little more serious and immediate than they did.
Years later one German in NATO remarked to me in Paris that he couldn't
see why we in the U.S. were so upset about Cuba. He said, you know, "We've
been living right next to the Russians all this time, and we don't get
so excited about it." He was a senior officer in NATO at the
time we talked. It was along in the '60s, after the Cuban crisis. That
was years after I left Paris duty. But I went back to Paris a number of
times on Far Eastern business.
I'm willing to believe any economist who tells me that the question of
economic capability was a big issue in his office, but I'm not willing
to believe that it was a big issue in the State Department, or White House,
or the European Coordinating Committee. Harriman never said anything about
it that I can remember. But don't misunderstand. Economic questions are
always mentioned. The question is as to the degree of their urgency.
If you want to find out about this look up Tick Bonesteel's office's
papers. I think most of them were confidential, administratively controlled,
but confidential or secret, and there were economic papers prepared parallel
to the political and military papers. I prepared the political papers.
Others, Dick Freund, maybe Al
Lindley, maybe Chris Merrilat got into it, and maybe Bob Macy had something
to do with it. Macy might say you are absolutely right in what you said,
that there was a flaming issue over Europe's economic capability to take
MCKINZIE: I know there was in a few people's mind, I don't mean to imply
that . . .
MATLOCK: It must have been. It must have been in someone's mind who was
cubby-holed, an economist who was cubby-holed on the problem. He might
see his whole effort going down the drain because of this great rearmament
business. On the other hand, we were working against a theoretical D-Day
sometime in 1954. We were getting ready for war in other words.
MCKINZIE: Now how did that come up?
MATLOCK: Well, when you're doing military preparations you always assume
something. One question is when you have to be ready for war. You can't
say, "Let's do as much as possible, as soon as possible." That has conflicting
criteria. You have to say, "Let's do X -- a set goal -- as soon as possible,"
or "Let's do as much as possible by a specified date."
There was a time when I was in Iran when some benighted soul sent a dispatch,
round robin circular, big new policy. We had to get some "impact" aid
projects. Impact was the word, maximum impact, the greatest effect in
the shortest possible time. And I remember a fellow said in the ambassador's
staff meeting, "The only thing we can think of that meets both conditions
is an explosion of a hydrogen bomb."
So, you have to have an assumption, and militarily there is always an
assumption, and as I recall it was mid-1954. Fortunately Stalin died and
also maybe we didn't need to be that worried. But I think the U.S. was
always a little more concerned about the Soviet threat than any of the
European Allies, and that their reluctance to
put out effort, men, resources and money, but effort, that's what it
all represents, was based on a slightly different set of priorities reflected
by this difference in estimate of the Soviet threat, "the menace."
The Japanese had the same difference about Communist China. Dulles wanted
the Japanese to be more worried than the Americans were, because they
were closer to "the menace." And the Japanese said, the Prime Minister
said, "You must remember that Japan accepted civilization from China and
there is an affinity between the two peoples." I took the minutes, that's
how I know what he said.
MCKINZIE: Could I ask you to comment on a theoretical explanation for
the switch of emphasis from economic reconstruction to defense?
MATLOCK: I think the Korean war had a lot to do with it. Now, the North
Atlantic alliance is a normal development suggested before the Second
World War was over, I think, but maybe not that soon. Anyway
Mackenzie King was thinking in terms of a few countries, maybe just three
at the beginning. I think there was Canada, England and the United States
and he was thinking of Canada's problem in maintaining good relations
with the other two, something like that.
But then it got expanded to eight and then it got expanded to 12, and
then there was the issue over Greece and Turkey, which was a real issue
because some European members argued that Greece and Turkey were not Atlantic
area, that they were a different kind of culture, Near Eastern, and therefore
it wasn't any longer "community," it was just more alliance.
MCKINZIE: Well, along with that go rising and falling fortunes of individuals
within the State Department.
MATLOCK: Oh, that always happens. If you try to follow all those things
you'll be deep in the mire.
MCKINZIE: I guess my question would be, "Were the rising and falling
fortunes part of the cause, or were they the result?" If I can expand
just a bit
MATLOCK: All right.
MCKINZIE: George Kennan's fortunes within the State Department were extremely
high in 1947 and 1948 at the time of the Marshall plan and the Policy
Planning Staff was doing a lot of things and economic solutions seemed
to be getting a good hearing at the very top.
MATLOCK: But he was author of the containment policy, he was the "Mr.
X" who wrote the article, and containment wasn't just economic.
MCKINZIE: That's a very good point, but he did, when it came to hammering
out specifics, tend to emphasize economic things, and that eclipsed Jack
Hickerson, and, well, Theodore Achilles, I suppose, in the European Affairs
MATLOCK: Hickerson and Achilles still work together, they are working
on Atlantic community now, up in Washington. It's a private organization.
MCKINZIE: But their stock seemed to rise in 1948 and 1949 after the Berlin
Blockade and the clear need for something like NATO.
MATLOCK: I thought Hickerson reached his peak of influence almost when
I was there -- 1949. He was later made the Assistant Secretary for United
Nations Affairs and then he was an Ambassador to Finland, and even later
he was Ambassador to the Philippines. He's a nice fellow, I like him.
I've seen him frequently at the Metropolitan Club. He stops in for lunch
at the members' grill and I used to do the same thing. Off and on he'd
be at the table, but I always liked Jack, a real fellow. I wouldn't say
that his influence declined but that I was astonished that they didn't
leave him in charge of European Affairs. They put a man named Perkins
in to succeed him, and Jack would
have been far better. Perkins, might have been a man of great ability,
but I think he was a novice by comparison with Hickerson.
MCKINZIE: Well, I meant that as Kennan's influence declined Hickerson
and the European Affairs Division increased, because they had after
all been sponsors of NATO.
MATLOCK: I would say Acheson was the sponsor of NATO and whoever
else Acheson agreed with -- they didn't tell me. But I don't think Hickerson
and Achilles coined the idea of NATO. They were both important in giving
the idea political reality and organizational substance.
MCKINZIE: At one point before we went on the record, you mentioned that
you had worked with Walter Surrey in connection with European defense.
MATLOCK: Yes. That was just before I went to London.
MCKINZIE: Could you talk about the work with him?
MATLOCK: Well, Surrey was the principal person in
charge of a great deal of preparatory work. He was extremely competent.
He was, I think, Deputy Legal Counsel of the State Department and he had
a certain amount of staff and he was doing coordinating jobs for Lemnitzer
and Berkner. It was very important work, extremely important, and he was
the one who sent me to London, he and Berkner. Walter has a law firm now,
a big outfit; it has about 40 attorneys in it.
MCKINZIE: You were political officer to the North Atlantic Council?
MATLOCK: I was a political adviser under Achilles in the office
of the American delegation to the North Atlantic Council deputies. That
was Ambassador Spofford's office, Charles N. Spofford, who was international
chairman of the Council Deputies and head of the U.S. delegation. Achilles
was under Spofford.
MCKINZIE: You attended those meetings as early as
1950, you were in very early meetings of the...
MATLOCK: I was at the first meeting at Lancaster House and I think most
of the rest that were held in London (13 Belgrave Square). There were
usually eight or ten Americans there. I was there when Eisenhower took
I didn't attend any of the meetings in Paris. I think the meetings Acheson
attended were the ministerial level meetings. For example, the meeting
in Lisbon in February 1952. I didn't leave London. Spofford went with
Achilles and a couple of others and my secretary -- he called me up before
Lisbon and said he had to have her, she was one of the best ones there,
awfully good, an admiral's daughter. Anyway, they went to Lisbon and adopted
the Lisbon "goals," the military requirements.
MCKINZIE: Right. But in these very first meetings there weren't clear
military goals nor were there very clear possibilities for...
MATLOCK: Well, there was an intention to have a North Atlantic force.
And then before very long it was decided that Eisenhower would be asked
to command it.
MCKINZIE: That was in December of 1950.
MATLOCK: Yes. And he came over and accepted the command.
MCKINZIE: The work that was done in the North Atlantic Council was very
important work and Acheson contends in his book that he pushed very hard
for what he called a "one-package" deal. Do you recall that, it was going
to be an increase in U.S. troops to Europe, there was going to be increased
commitment by European nations to the NATO collective force and it was
going to be an American commander, and at one point they were asked all
of that in one package. Did argument for that fall to you?
MATLOCK: No, not to me. I didn't negotiate anything like that. I was
working essentially within an American organization advising Americans,
didn't negotiate with the other governments. Neither did Tick. The Ambassadors
MCKINZIE: Well, wasn't it necessary to backstop American officers...?
MATLOCK: Oh, yes, we had all kinds of material flowing to the embassies
from Tick's office. And certainly all those things were part of the package,
we didn't call it a package, but then John the Baptist wasn't called the
Baptist until after he was dead.
MCKINZIE: That's true enough.
And in 1950 when the emphasis was so much on the rearmament of Western
Europe, was there any talk at all about social objectives of NATO? There
are social clauses in the NATO treaty.
MATLOCK: Yes, we kept talking about them every time there was a ministerial
session. I mean for the top level cabinet people. Something was always
done, and maybe three "wise men" would be appointed
to see what could be done to give balance to the treaty of alliance so
that there would be social and economic things going on side by side with
the military. And nothing much ever came of it, same as SEATO.
We had a project every year for SEATO, like the Cholera Research Center
which was and is a very good project. We were going to do it anyway, but
SEATO needed a project, so we put it in. Same problem: balance out the
military with something civilian and peaceful and all that. The reason
was more cosmetic than substantive.
MCKINZIE: Well, was the social clause in your opinion just necessary
for acceptability in the countries that were participants or was there
something more than that? I understood the Canadians were very, very concerned
MATLOCK: The desire for social and economic balance in the treaty was
real, but what you have to remember is that everybody was being social
economic on his own national initiative. What they had to do that was
new was create a defense. You don't have to make people be social and
economic, but you have to bring some pressure to bear to run conscription
in a dozen countries and train armies for defense in the event of attack
by an enemy. So, the hard things were the ones that got the attention
in NATO, and then of course you've certainly dealt with the question of
the EDC, European Defense Community. Have you ever had an estimate given
you by anyone as to why the French proposed the EDC?
MCKINZIE: Well, it would enable Germany to contribute to the cost, without
contributing large amounts of troops...
MATLOCK: If they could be persuaded. But there is more to it. EDC, technically,
was a coalition army. The Committee of European Jurists wrote a very fine
report on that for the group that meets at Strasbourg, you know. It's
worth looking up.
It was published, and they decided that essentially the proposal was
for a coalition, that the integration aspect of it was overrated in the
publicity about it. They analyzed it and I read their report with interest.
But my opinion is that the French proposed the EDC to delay German rearmament
and for no other reason. NATO, if it had adopted the American proposals,
would have brought the German Federal Republic into NATO on a national
basis with national forces. And the French said, Alphand said, that of
course the French knew that an ex-enemy couldn't be held down indefinitely,
but there was a virtue in doing it as long as possible. That's about the
essence of it. I think he used words very much like that in terms of delaying
and limiting Germany rearmament. So, German rearmament was not welcome
to France. It was not entirely welcome to the British. There were also
strong elements against it in the U.S. Government.
In any case, the French found themselves up
against it. When Acheson and his top level crew in New York in September
1950, at the time of the United Nations meeting (but of course not in
it), proposed German rearmament -- this was no doubt in a secret meeting
-- the French blew their top and made public statements denouncing the
whole idea. From then on it was negotiation.
Well, it was getting to the point where the French weren't really blocking
NATO movement. They needed a stalling device. So they proposed a European
army to be called the European Defense Community. And they proposed that
it be negotiated in Paris with France as the host government and chairman
of the negotiations. And then they set about negotiating the EDC for about
three years. And when the EDC was negotiated it had to be ratified. So
finally it had been negotiated, and it had been ratified by everybody
but France, which had proposed it and negotiated it. And then along about
February 1954 the French Assembly killed it. That delayed German rearmament
from 1950 to 1954
and in my opinion that's what it was for.
MCKINZIE: All along.
MATLOCK: All along, from the first day. Unless an historian gets down
to the question (he can decide I'm wrong), but unless he gets down to
that question what was it for, he will be
losing a main point. Now, in addition to its being for that, since the
French were proposing it, and against the possibility that it might somehow
get ratified, they had to build in a certain French preeminence, and French
leadership would be a normal thing for them to hope for. But the EDC was
in fact a reasonable arrangement, and we were strongly in favor of it,
but our being in favor of it wasn't enough to get the French Socialists
to vote for it.
Now, look at it this way. Dulles said the EDC was the only way to rearm
Germany. He said it publicly. Our organization, Draper, was working on
that premise. Some of us on his staff
said, "If everybody does everything that everybody can do for the EDC,
it has a 50-50 chance at best of getting all of the ratifications."
Now, if the U.S. had been Machiavellian (we weren't, we were very forthright
about the whole thing), we might have gotten the French ratification.
We told everyone the Dulles position, i.e., that the EDC was the only
way available for German rearmament.
Now, the Social Democrats in Germany wanted German rearmament within
limits. They didn't want to be excluded from NATO and excluded from European
defense arrangements, so when they were told that the European Defense
Community was the only way of rearming Germany, they cooperated to get
the Karlsruhe decision (West German supreme court) that it was constitutional
for Germany to have a defense force of the kind proposed. Then they voted
with the Government, the governing party, Adenauer's Christian Democrats,
to ratify the EDC.
So then everybody had ratified the EDC but France. But the rack-up of
votes in the French Assembly by our fellows in our embassy in Paris showed
that there were 50 French Socialist votes (that's anti-German), of which
at least 25 would be needed to ratify the EDC. And we knew that for at
least six months and maybe a year before they ever voted on it. I don't
So, the thing would have been to tell the French that we had told the
Germans that EDC was the only way to rearm Germany because we preferred
the EDC and didn't really want an independent German army stomping around
and conceivably threatening France, but that we had a reserve position
which was to bring West Germany directly into NATO with national German
forces if the EDC were not ratified. So when the French National Assembly
was voting on EDC ratification, it should remember that a vote against
the EDC would be a vote for a German national army. That would have put
it through the French Assembly. But we didn't.
Now, if you tell a man who wants Germany never to be rearmed, and who
has the crucial vote, that he holds the vote that will defeat German rearmament,
he'll use it. And so the EDC proposal died where it was born, in France.
And then Dulles sulked in his tent like Achilles (I don't mean Ted, but
the other one). According to the newspapers -- this isn't internal, this
is just press stuff I'm judging by -- Dulles sort of glowered from Washington
and Anthony Eden took his own briefcase and went around the next week
to all the principal NATO governments and got them all to agree to bring
in West Germany into NATO on a national basis. So, to me, the EDC was
simply a French effort to delay German rearmament, and it succeeded for
MCKINZIE: Do you think that the EDC in any other way, any way other than
slowing up the development of the German components, slowed the growth
of strength of NATO?
MATLOCK: Not too much, no, I don't think it had too
much influence. Parallel to the French desire not to have Germany armed,
there was a German desire, a young German desire, not to have any
part of it, and that helped the French point of view. There was the Ohne
Mich (without me) movement, and that, I think, slowed up the German
side of it enough to please the French. It was enough so that if we hadn't
had EDC delays or had been trying from the outset to negotiate Germany
in with an army, we might have gotten Germany in formally, but we would
have been a long time getting the German army going, something like that.
It would have been a real impediment to development of the German force,
this Ohne Mich attitude.
MCKINZIE: Obviously you had to be concerned a lot with the rearmament
of Germany, but there is another element of this.
MATLOCK: Yes, the German problem was the heart of the Europe problem.
MATLOCK: That's a quote from Churchill about 1952 and I happen to agree
with it as of that date.
MCKINZIE: Until 1950 it appeared that very many people in the State Department
did not particularly see it that way.
MATLOCK: You mean they didn't favor German rearmament?
MCKINZIE: They didn't favor German rearmament or German industrial redevelopment
MATLOCK: That's right, the whole U.S. policy until 1950 was to hold Germany
down and deny it military strength. The British were still dismantling
German industry as reparations when I went to London. They were getting
the stuff out. Germany was trade competition. The British always thought
about trade. They don't much anymore, but they did then. So they were
among the last I think to stop dismantling German industry.
Well, you know, I was just a staff man, I didn't raise any objections
to the demilitarization policy. I don't remember thinking there was anything
wrong with it.
MCKINZIE: There was some talk too that unless Germany were given
a full part in NATO that the influence of the occupying powers would begin
to decline, that there was a kind of natural life of occupation after
which you get out and make friends or you...
MATLOCK: That's right. Well, there was a real issue within Draper's immediate
staff, and David Bruce's staff, involving me and Tommy Tomlinson and some
others. One point of view, which I espoused, was that the occupation was
over. The Contractual Agreements had not been signed, but I said, "The
occupation in substance is over. We have told Germany (the West German
Federal Republic of course) that we want it for a partner in alliance
against Russia. The occupation is therefore over,
forget it. All we do now is negotiate our way out of it and we are going
to have to treat Germany as if we were in favor of reunification. Politically
we have to be in favor of reunification. The Germans will not expect us
to go to war about it, but they will expect us to be really in favor of
reunification of Germany, not just lip service." That was what I was saying,
and some others too.
And then there was another point of view that we should keep Germany
occupied for another ten years if necessary to get the EDC ratified and
Draper was quite clear about it. He could see the picture quite clearly
and he didn't hold any false hopes about holding Germany down or he didn't
want to. Once the U.S. Government had told him that Germany was going
to be a partner, then he had to act as if we were going to negotiate a
partnership, which indeed we were. But then, around the partnership, there
was in NATO a framework
of strength and opportunity, so that Germany could have a big part in
a large international grouping and also be subject to a big restraint
in the same grouping.
You see, that's the framework within which we were working, the conceptual
framework. But then there was the other framework of thought which was
that France ought to be subsidized in a position of superiority over Germany.
That was a very intense feeling at some points on the U.S. side. And then
there were a lot of English people who still hated "Jerry." Believe me,
they didn't give up lightly. I'm not criticizing any of them, the French
or the British I'm just saying that's how they felt. But our government
had committed itself to a North Atlantic Defense and the job of the people
working in it was to say how it was to be worked out. If you're going
to have Germany for a partner you've got to treat it like a partner.
Now that left open the question of who would have atomic weapons. Of
course you know the U.S.
position against proliferation. But the idea about Germany was to have
so much strength around that no matter what Germany had, it still would
not be able to go renegade safely. I do not know the present situation,
but I suspect that the U.S. still does not share either strategic or tactical
atomic weapons with German forces.
It is desirable to have Germany, a strong Germany, a strong, healthy,
contented Germany as an ally in a framework full of opportunity for Germany
as the West has been full of opportunity for Japan where Japanese trade
is oriented. And it is also desirable to have so much strength in the
total NATO community that the Germans wouldn't ever think of trying to
go against it.
The Germans don't like to go into a war they can lose. They thought they
were going to win both of the world wars. They are peculiarly disinclined
to go into war if they think they are going to lose.
Now those North Vietnamese are different. They may not think they are
going to lose, but
they've taken casualties that would for us mean about 15 million or more
dead. That's incredible. No European country would take casualties like
that. [As I review this in May 1975 the North Vietnamese have just won,
but at a terrible cost.]
MCKINZIE: In 1950 there was all of this negotiating about what the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization ought to be, and there were even some
committees set up...
MATLOCK: Lots of committees. I heard the expression "can of worms."
MCKINZIE: ...to determine what each country would commit to the unified
command, but 1951 at least Dean Acheson in his book indicates this, was
a pretty dismal year for things in Europe, it was a year of disappointment,
that it was a year of recognizing that no one was going to be able to
deliver that which he had been assigned to deliver.
MATLOCK: Yes, but even later in February 1952 they adopted the Lisbon
goals, which were rather ambitious, too much as it turned out -- unless
there is virtue in unattainable goals.
MCKINZIE: What were you doing in 1951?
MATLOCK: Oh, just sitting around London doing what came up next, whatever
my bosses wanted. I was working hard.
In '50-'51, you know, Spofford was there and Ted Achilles was there,
and I was going to all the meetings and listening and writing reporting
telegrams. I was also studying in depth all of the NATO problems.
MCKINZIE: What did you think of this man Spofford You know, he was doing
an almost impossible job, in a way.
MATLOCK: Well, I'm trying to stay out of the infighting. There's always
infighting. I don't want to say anything about anybody who was there and
what they thought of somebody else. But Spofford was probably what I
call a Dillon-Read "public administration society" man. Draper, and Spofford,
and Paul Nitze, and Dillon himself, and it seems to me a couple of others,
have all been vice-presidents of the Dillon-Read firm except for Dillon.
I guess he was president of the Dillon-Read Corporation, investments and
things, and did break loose from the company and take a Government job.
They're all public servant types and they're all awfully good. Nitze is
one of the most capable men I've ever met. Now, Spofford was capable and
I liked him very much. He wasn't as sharp as Douglas, for example, and
he wasn't as insistent upon his prerogatives as Acheson would have been.
And he might remark sometimes, "Well, if they don't give me some negotiating
power I'm going to chuck it," you know, something like that, some sentiment.
But then, everybody says that sooner or later, so don't think that's different,
because no one ever
gets enough freedom in negotiations to do what he thinks he needs to
do. But Spofford, I think, may have lacked enough delegated authority
from Acheson, or he may have lacked that kind of Irish self-assurance
that says "I'll take it because it's mine, or if I take it, it will be
mine." You know there is that. I was told once by a very famous man --
a close personal friend -- at a tete-a-tete at the Metropolitan Club when
I was young in Washington, "If you want something, act as if it's yours,
and maybe you'll get it." Now that's the technique that is not true to
my soul. I just can't do it.
MCKINZIE: But you've seen a number of people do it.
MATLOCK: I've seen it succeed, yes. I think George McGhee's very good
at that. His father-in-law discovered some of the biggest oil fields in
the United States, a man named [Everette Lee] De Golyer, and George was
a millionaire before he was 30, from oil. He was a Rhodes scholar too,
smart. But George
has aggressive ways; Labouisse doesn't, the two of them worked
together but you didn't see a complete sympathy of method or empathy between
the two. I think George would have been a good Senator if he had wanted
to be one, he might have been a good President. I think he probably wanted
to be President, although he never said so to me. In other words, a fellow
who's got a big vision for himself and goes after it and acts as if it's
his, may sometimes get it. Look at the Kennedys.
MCKINZIE: But Spofford never did take this kind of approach...
MATLOCK: Spofford wasn't a person who put himself forward as Mr. Big,
he just did a steady job. I'm sure Achilles would have something to say
about it, and no doubt Acheson would. I was in Spofford's office, but
that didn't mean anything in that sense. I couldn't give you an estimate
of him, though I respected him highly.
I know that when a couple of questions came up that were very serious
matters of NATO membership, and he had a view, he wasn't asserting it.
And the question is, what do you do when an important subject comes up
and it's in your area and the telegrams are buzzing between others and
you're not saying anything?
MCKINZIE: There was a meeting, they finally came up with a goal that
they wanted to achieve.
MATLOCK: February 1952, in Lisbon, yes.
MCKINZIE: But before that the goals were pretty much hammered out or
constantly being revised by people at Spofford's level and...
MATLOCK: Well, not so much Spofford. I can give you a case in point.
Stan Emrick [Paul Stanley Emrick, Lt. Gen., USAF, Ret.] who's up in McLean,
Virginia, if you're up that way, was in Frankfurt or Wiesbaden with the
Air Force before he was assigned to Paris. Stan Emrick was a full colonel,
Air Force, in
European Air Force headquarters before he was assigned to work with Draper's
plans and policy staff in Paris. That's where I met him. He is certainly
the most brilliant military officer I have ever met and he has a lot of
original ideas about how to fight wars. He's usually, I think, running
10 or 20 years ahead of the establishment. He was J-5 (one doesn't hear
of this "J") for a while and in 1968 I introduced him to [Clement C.]
Zablocki, who wanted him to testify before a committee on the security
of the Pacific basin. Stan considered it and then decided that held better
not be a witness because what he would say would be so revolutionary in
terms of defense strategy that it would confuse the fellows he had been
working with. He'd been working within established policy and things can't
change very rapidly in a big organization. So he thought it would confuse
them, they would wonder why he was saying things like that to a congressional
committee. Emrick had been Chief of Staff at
CINCPAC in Honolulu during the Vietnam war before his retirement as a
Lt. General, Air Force.
He used to ask me questions that showed that he was moving way beyond
current strategy, but all of his ideas it seemed to me were conceived
in terms of situations that were already beginning to form and were going
to exist within ten to fifteen years -- clear as day to him, almost as
if they were already happening but not visible to virtually everybody
else, just not visible, and therefore not discussable in most circles.
People think it's a radical idea and say, "0h, we can't do that," or "That's
not according to the policy," or something.
But he is a man of vision and he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans
to [General Curtis E.] LeMay in the Pacific during the war. He was one
of the architects, maybe the principal architect, of the Tokyo fire raids
where they did a very radical thing. As I recall his telling me, they
took all the armament off of the bombers, and sent all the bombers they
had in at 6,000 feet instead of 25 thousand, and loaded them with incendiaries
with the object of starting a "conflagration" -- a fire nobody could put
out, which is what they did. They didn't know for sure whether their bombers
would come back, you know, what the Zeros would do to them, at six thousand
feet and defenseless. They must have sent in a thousand bombers, but actually
no Zeros came up, or nothing to speak of. But that takes nerve.
Well, he works out a unique way of doing something. It takes a lot of
nerve, but works. Well, he's got a lot of ideas about future defense and
I think he's become quite interested in social and economic relationships
too. He got bitten by that bug when he worked with us civilians in Paris.
But if you could ever get him to talking, he is the author of the Paris
plan for Air Force, and some of those Air Force figures that he put on
the first work sheet are still in the list of NATO requirements, at least
still were when I left the business and nobody would have a reason to
change them, they have never been realized, but he would just sit at his
desk and sketch out what kind of an Air Force Europe would need long before
anybody said anything about it. I think that his superior officer was
a little embarrassed that he had an officer doing that. Then one day an
Assistant Secretary of Defense came in and told the boss, "We're getting
into this question of what kind of an Air Force Europe will need, NATO
And the boss said, "You know, I've had an officer working on that for
So, they called in Stan, and sent him back to the Pentagon with the Assistant
Secretary on temporary duty to work on it. Now that came out as NATO requirements.
That's how you get it done. Somebody in the Army was also doing something
In the Navy they had a different technique. I'm not an expert on it,
and no naval men ever told
me, but a civilian who worked on the requirements committee told me how
he had it figured out. He said the Navy had an absolutely unbeatable thing
for budget, that NATO assumed the defense of the whole North Atlantic
area, even though a practical military assessment would be that part of
Europe would be overrun during the first wave of shock. But for purposes
of requirements it was a political necessity to assume that no NATO country
would be overrun by the enemy. You couldn't get the governments of those
countries to agree in a statistical committee that there would be no need
to provide wartime supplies for them because they wouldn't be there.
So, therefore, they had to have all the requirements of those countries
built in too. That gave them a basis for an estimate of the merchant shipping
tonnage that had to flow into European ports. Then all the Navy had to
do was say how much Navy was required to protect the merchant fleet, and
that was their budget presentation. And it was a
MCKINZIE: For the Navy.
MATLOCK: Yes, for the Navy. I'm expressing bureaucratic admiration. I
don't think the Army and Air Force had anything as fool-proof as that.
It was just a windfall you know, but good budget strategy. The Army and
Air Force were competitors. The Army believed the way to defend Europe
was on the ground, and with atomic weapons; of course, you need air cover
and some bombing. The Air Force, presumably, believed that the air was
more important than the ground or something like that, I don't know.
Emrick was very impartial. He never put the Air Force in a biased position
in the work we did, he never put in anything to lobby for Air Force. He
was absolutely objective and one of the best and ablest men I've ever
He told me about ICBMs, space platforms, weapons control from outer space,
from space platforms, back in 1952. He said the ICBM was
the thing that would ultimately unify the services. You've got to decide
whether it's artillery or an airplane, you see. But the thing was that
the technical requirement would have to be standardized and you would
have to have people who could move back and forth among the three services
on the same kind of devices. Whereas before there's been a real difference
between Army equipment and Navy equipment and all that. But he is a very
imaginative man, intelligent and courageous. He was commander of a few
squadrons of bombers, the big ones. He was inspector general of the Strategic
Air Command after he left Paris.
MCKINZIE: Did you see him as one of these early visionaries about what...
MATLOCK: I'd say he had far sight but was not a visionary. He's the fellow
who designed the first skeleton chart of NATO air requirements, and when
they needed a requirement chart they took that in the Pentagon.
When the U.S. put forward a proposal it was
basically based on what he had been doing, scribbling in European Air
Force headquarters. But that was the right place to do it, only he did
it on his own initiative. He just said, "Well, they are going to need
it, aren't they, let's go to work on it."
Now, you get a fellow like that in the Army, and a fellow like that in
the Air Force, and another one like that in the Navy, just one, and that's
how your requirements began to develop. And when Spofford and Acheson,
people like that, get into it, they say, "Well, who knows something about
it? Anybody been working on it? Anybody have any ideas? Is there a piece
of paper?" They don't have any other way.
MCKINZIE: Acheson says in his book that sometime in 1951 they decided
they weren't going to make the goal by 1952...
MATLOCK: That puzzles me. We were just getting well started in early
1952 -- it takes a while. I didn't
hear in London that anyone thought "the goal" could be reached in 1952.
Requirements weren't established until February 1952. Draper wrote a letter
to President Eisenhower in February 1953 that was highly classified. It
wasn't top secret but it was secret. It was carried by a Navy captain
directly to the White House; he was flying home and took it with him for
Draper. It wasn't given to the State Department or the Defense Department
by Draper. It attached a chapter called Chapter IV that Emrick and I had
co-drafted. It covered political, economic, and military aspects of U.S.
defense policy for Europe. The chapter said that the U.S. wouldn't pay
for European rearmament up to the Lisbon goals, and the Europeans wouldn't
do it even if the U.S. would pay for it. So there needed to be a review
of North Atlantic strategy to see what to do.
We soft-peddled modern [atomic] weapons. That was coming later. We didn't
quite know how to fit them in. We mentioned them, but we didn't say
anything like that, but what we said was that there was a problem, because
the Lisbon goals would definitely not be met.
President Eisenhower responded to Draper very quickly. He also sent a
copy of Draper's letter to the Secretary of State, to the head of the
economic agency, the Foreign Operations Administration, Stassen's outfit.
He sent it also to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And he asked all for comments.
I saw the Joint Chiefs comment. It was in effect: "United States policy
is contained in President Eisenhower's letter to Ambassador Draper," which
was the President's answer to the letter Draper had sent. President Eisenhower's
letter said in about two or three paragraphs on one page (I paraphrase
in quotes), "Well, Bill, I'm glad you're so interested in all of this,
but I was over there and I understand the problem, and it's not too much
for them to do. They can do it."
Now, that was in February 1953. But in April 1953 there was a NATO ministerial
meeting in Paris. Dulles, Secretary [Charles E.] Wilson of Defense, [George
M.] Humphrey of the Treasury, [Harold E.] Stassen of FOA, and Livy [Livingston]
Merchant. He had gone home from SRE, Paris, to be Assistant Secretary
of State for European Affairs, but anyway he came back on that plane.
And by that time the policy had been changed. They went to the NATO meeting.
The U.S., Dulles, proposed a "long haul" policy. It's like the stretch-out
with Churchill, a long haul policy to achieve the Lisbon goals. NATO would
not try to do it by 1954 or whenever it was, and that meant abandoning
the goals for the foreseeable future -- not abandoning the buildup, but
abandoning the goals, because the goals were too high to achieve. If you
didn't set another deadline, or if you set one so far away that it wouldn't
concern you, you were off the hook. But that represented Eisenhower's
new policy, and it was just two months after he told
Draper that he understood the European situation and it was perfectly
possible for them to do all of that, which meant a hundred divisions or
more, an Air Force to match, and a Navy to back them up, including American
elements. That's why I say Eisenhower did not understand the problem he
I asked an officer (State) once how the policy got changed -- where and
when. He knew. He said, "Well, it was practically changed on the airplane."
In other words, they all got together to go to Paris. They had to do something
about this and on the plane going over they got all their briefings and,
"What will we do about it?" And Dulles, of course, would make the final
decision, and by the time he got to Paris he said, "Well, we'll stretch
it out, call it long haul." And that's how policies are made, especially
the important ones. When you have to, at the last minute, and by people
at that level. People at my level never make policy. They may create situations
require someone to make policy, but they never make policy.
So, by April 1953 Eisenhower had changed his policy and in effect said,
"Draper is right." In February he said, "Draper is wrong." On his own
personal knowledge and basis. The Joint Chiefs weren't going to have anything
to do with it. It was an outgoing team, I think -- short timers. Anyway,
they just said, "Policy is in the President's letter to Ambassador Draper."
The President's last word is always a policy no matter what's in the document,
NSC or anything else. The President can make new policy fifteen minutes
after he's made an old one. And the usual comment in the State Department
is that policy is made in the telegrams. That's why there is such a fight
over clearance of telegrams. That's a big battle always. Anybody who is
studying Eisenhower and who has access to the documents ought to try to
figure out how Eisenhower could be in Europe, have access to all the heads
of Government, all the
heads of State, and every military commander, and still not know
that those Lisbon goals were unrealizable.
MCKINZIE: Eisenhower had a prior view.
MATLOCK: He had a fixed and poorly informed prior view. The Army, I think,
was in favor of "not rocking the boat," because it didn't like this notion
we were booting around that the Lisbon goals wouldn't be realized. Bradley
was over there and [Albert M.] Gruenther was over there and Draper cleared
his letter with them, in a way. He asked if they had a "serious" objection.
They saw it and they said they had no "serious" objection. The word "serious"
was the key word. So, Draper signed it and sent it. But you see, if you
say there is a deficiency in defense, it is inadequate and the adequacy
we have provided for will never exist, then you must also say, we must
regroup and re-examine our basic strategy for defense. That will suggest
Well, Dulles, on a political level, spoke of "massive retaliation" --
which really meant Air Force, or ICBMs, or submarines with atomic weapons,
or all three. It meant emphasis on a different complex of force from that
agreed at Lisbon.
Every service is parochial and looks after its own. This was a threat
to Army relative position, you might say. Anything that said ground defense
was inadequate would suggest that maybe there ought to be more air. And
to me massive retaliation does emphasize strategic bombing as of that
year. Now it would be something else, missiles or something, Polaris submarines,
Poseidon missiles and all. But Eisenhower didn't understand the problem
although he was in a better position than any other man on earth to understand
it. We didn't have access to the people he did. We knew what the ambassadors
said in the NATO meetings. We knew what the newspapers said We saw the
telegrams. We knew the facts that we
had to go on. And we did a lot of thinking. But he had at his fingertips
every man of responsibility in Western Europe who would be delighted to
receive or go and see Ike and tell him what he thought, and yet he came
up even later as President without any appreciation of the problem. He
didn't know the Lisbon goals were unrealizable. How come? I've never understood
Now anybody else almost I would have understood, because anybody else,
like me, had a fractional responsibility. But Ike was sitting over the
whole thing. He could get confidential off-the-record, golf course comments
that nobody would ever make in a meeting or to an American they didn't
know. So, I hope an historian fifty years from now will tangle with that
MCKINZIE: I'm sure one will.
MATLOCK: I regard all the men I worked with and saw as extremely capable.
There were a good many clashes of personality -- here and there a little
bit of murder. But everybody involved was capable and competent and the
clashes were normal, sometimes just human, sometimes policy.
Now I have great respect for Tommy Tomlinson. He died of a heart attack
about a year after I left Paris. This might be an interesting footnote
for some scholar to read someday. I had written a memorandum for Bill
Draper's benefit and it was incorporated in these other documents. It
went on later to the President. But one of the things that we had said,
I had said, and the men around me, was that we had to be in favor of German
reunification. We didn't have to go to war for it and the West Germans
wouldn't expect us to go to war for it, but they wouldn't be good partners
in an alliance if they didn't believe that we honestly would like to see
Germany reunited, either as a friendly neutral, at the minimum, or a friendly
ally, at the maximum. If we had that view we'd be all right.
Well, I wrote this stuff in a lot of different things and one day Tommy
came to my office and he leaned over my desk (this was in that Hotel Talleyrand
where Talleyrand used to live, you know), he leaned over my desk, and
his eyes bulged a little, and as he spoke I thought "the Savonarola of
the 20th century." That went through my mind. (Tommy's "thing" was European
political unification.) But he said, "You can plunge the world into war
with that memorandum." (No one else ever thought I was that influential:)
And then he said that he and [David] Bruce had been at the Peterhof (Bonn)
and had talked with Adenauer alone, and Adenauer had leaned across the
table and said, "Don't trust us, don't trust us." I did and do believe
Tommy's statement about Adenauer. You could check it with David Bruce,
who is still active.
But it's understandable. We were recommending that Germany be
brought into a system of strength where if Germany ever got another thing
like Hitler, or any other firebrand who ran away
with popular support, and he had weaponry and wanted to go renegade,
he wouldn't have anyplace to go that it was safe to go, and therefore,
wouldn't be a danger.
Now, that represented a policy of not completely trusting Germany. We
weren't afraid France would do that. We weren't afraid England would do
it, but we all realized that Germany could.
Stan Emrick used to tell me that the thing that worried him was the day
of the 50-cent atom bomb, made in the kitchen sink. He said someday
people would understand the problem so well that they could make a cheap
model, and everybody would have it -- i.e., every country.
Well, the Germans may come up with something better. The laser is the
weapon of the future, it can disintegrate anything. So, I believed Tommy
when he said Adenauer told them, "Don't trust us." I think Adenauer was
a great man and a great
German. I think he was interested in a Germany that was decent. He went
to a concentration camp, you know, under Hitler, and after V-E Day he
was pulled out of trouble by the British and the Americans and made the
head of Germany. He was a great man and I admire him without limit. He
was an autocrat. He was no democrat, he ran Germany with a firm hand.
The Embassy always would tell us when we talked with them in Bonn, "Don't
misunderstand Germany. It’s got a democratic apparatus, but this is an
authoritarian state. Der Alte runs it." De Gasperi [Alcide de Gasperi,
Christian Democrat] in Italy was the same thing as Adenauer, only he had
more troubles, more conflicting elements to deal with in Italy. But De
Gasperi and Adenauer, two Christian Democrats, were a stabilizing force
for all Europe, and a great support for NATO and all that. But Tommy was
opposed to everything I was trying to get done in my comments to Draper.
Of course, my view was that Draper should not say what I thought or what
he should say what he thought. But I did think he ought to know
what we all thought, and then make up his own mind and then say that.
And there were people who thought he shouldn't say anything, because nobody
had asked his opinion. But he did, bless his heart, he was a brave man
and he said it all to the President on paper. It's all there, if
you fellows look it up, in the Archives.
Well, anyway, I respect Tommy Tomlinson. He was fervently interested
in a unified, integrated, politically united Europe and he fervently believed
that Germany had to be held down in relation to France, and France had
MCKINZIE: And that was not incompatible in his mind at all.
MATLOCK: It wasn't incompatible to him, and he was willing to hold Germany
down under occupation for ten more years if necessary to get the EDC,
which France would dominate. I didn't think it was practical. If I had
thought it was practical
I might have said it was all right. I don't know, it never came up that
way because I didn't think it had the least chance of being practical.
(Of course, France, not Germany, killed the EDC.) But France is an interesting
country and Frenchmen are what Frenchmen are. But if I had to choose between
France and Germany to live in, I'd go to France.
You've got everything in France. I have a German friend who is one of
the most lovable men I've ever known, just radiant personality. I used
to go and see him when I went to Paris, just to have dinner or something.
He was a senior official of NATO in the 1960s. One day he said, "Paris
is every man's home."
Now, he was a German artillery officer in the occupation of Paris in
the Second World War. I think he probably was too gentle about something,
because somebody sent him to the Russian front where he was wounded and
captured and he now has one withered arm. The Russian women, nurses, nursed
him back to health. He said they treated him as if he were their own
baby. He was just a young man of course. He said, "I could go back to
Russia and kiss every one of those women," and look what Germany had been
doing to Russia. Yet with that personality, they thought he was a darling,
and they took good care of him.
Well he said, "Paris is every man's home. It's a cultural home for any
man with a rich perspective who has wandered up and down the byways of
literature and so on and political thought and philosophy." And then he
said something else. He said, he walked the complete periphery of Paris
and he didn't get one unkind word. This was about 1962. Every Sunday he'd
go out and do another segment of the circle, you know those big avenue
rings around Paris? He said the people he met had to know he was German,
because he’d stop and get coffee or something, ask directions or comment
on the scenes. He said all the way around he never got one harsh comment,
never a rebuff or an abrupt thing. Well,
that was the kind of man he was. But he said, "France, Paris is every
man's home." So, if I had to choose between the two countries, Germany's
cleaner and more energetic, but I would go to France.
MCKINZIE: Well, can we talk a little bit about your move to Paris in
April of 1952?
MATLOCK: Well, NATO moved and I just went along and did what I was assigned
MCKINZIE: I notice that you worked under Henry Tasca.
MATLOCK: Well, the first head of that office was Tick Bonesteel, but
by the time I got to Paris, which was in the middle of April, Tasca was
head of it and Livy Merchant, who was head of the political office on
the State Department side, had a full staff and didn't have a job for
me and suggested that I be the State Department man on the Tasca staff.
That was all right with Tasca, and with me, so I became a member of that
First, I became the political officer, the only political officer as
such, on the Tasca staff, which was called the Plans and Policy Staff.
Then after a while Tasca made me deputy director of the staff instead
of simply a member of the staff. Then about the time that Dulles and Humphrey
and Wilson and others came over in April of 1953, Tasca got next to Stassen
and got a job surveying the Korean post-war rehabilitation requirements.
He took Martin Tank with him from our staff, and went over and made a
study of that. He had a lot of European assignments and he liked Rome,
Paris, and Bonn. Recently he was ambassador to Greece. But he left Paris
for the Korean trip, and Draper and Anderson made me director of the staff.
Using materials that we had already produced, we completed a booklet of
about 70 pages, single-spaced, called something like "Certain Issues Affecting
U.S. Policy in Europe," with the thought that Ambassador Draper would
need something to say to Washington. What he did was say it to the
He said he had five bosses in Washington, the President and three Cabinet
members, that's four, and the Joint Chiefs is five.
Well, anyway, something like five bosses, but the President was his boss
and he really was quite well aware of it. He reported to the President.
Draper was the most powerful ambassador as far as I know the U.S. ever
sent abroad. He was the arbitrary boss of that organization. He knew he
had power. Dulles, and Eisenhower, having acquired offices in Washington,
emasculated the whole structure.
William Draper was ambassador by statute, as his deputy was by statute.
There was another ambassador (personal rank) under him, Livingston Merchant
who was the third ambassador, because the State Department didn't want
to be left out of the influence line within the organization. That made
four ambassadors in Paris, because there was one down the street at the
Embassy. There were
really five, because David Bruce was there too. But he called himself
a Class 1 Foreign Service officer, reserve officer, for that job. Bruce
had been ambassador to France before Dillon and he was trying to be inconspicuous
in the French scene. He had so much prestige he didn't need to be ambassador.
So we really had five ambassadors over there and the people in our different
embassies in Europe who really resented anybody with Draper's power and
prestige coming to town and going straight to see the foreign minister
and the heads of the government in their town, their capital, began
to say, "Four ambassadors in Paris, four ambassadors in Paris -- what
Well, it took its toll, that idea. But when Dulles came in, he was a
man jealous of his power. I think anyone would say that. He didn't want
anybody of any consequence on U.S. foreign policy anywhere
who didn't report directly to him, or who could go past him even
if he did report to him. It would go to Dulles and stop, the way
it does with the State Department. If a man states his views to the Secretary,
he's done his job. What the Secretary says to the President is the Secretary's
That's good organization too. But Dulles and Eisenhower, when they were
both in office, President and Secretary of State, got the Congress to
reorganize the Paris operation. They got a law passed that abolished Draper's
job and the one under him, Anderson's job, and rewrote it so that it was
a new operation. A man named Hughes, who was in the cotton industry, was
appointed to head it. He was a nice fellow but timid by comparison with
the two men who had been there, and he had no authority except to coordinate.
He couldn't direct the different offices under him. The minister
from the Defense Department, Luke Finlay, was defense minister when I
was there. He was a good guy. I liked him very much. Bill Batt was minister
for the economic side, and then Livy Merchant was there as
ambassador on the political side. Now when Draper was there he could
and did tell those people what to do.
I remember once when he said to Merchant, "Livy, I'd like you to drop
everything you're doing and do this for a month."
And Livy said, "Very well, Bill," or something to that effect, and that
Now when Hughes came along he couldn't have done that. It wouldn't have
been possible. Moreover Hughes reported only to Dulles, not to the President
or the other Cabinet members, whereas Draper considered he reported to
the President and to the others.
MCKINZIE: Well, he was their special representative.
MATLOCK: Well, that's right, the way Kissinger's a special assistant
to the President, which keeps one foot out from under the blanket you
might say. He doesn't have to clear something with the Secretary of Defense
to go to the President, that's
what it means. A fellow who is head of a State Department office has
to clear with other office directors on something before going to the
boss so they can submit their views in parallel, or else object, or stop
it; and a Secretary of State who takes up a matter that's defense and
diplomacy theoretically should clear with the Secretary of Defense or
go with him to see the President, but if a man is not only Secretary of
State, but also Assistant to the President, as Secretary of State he will
duly respect the prerogatives of all the other secretaries; but as Assistant
to the President, who's going to stop him from seeing the President?
Now, I had a lower level combination of titles like that that was very
useful. It was a small rank, but I was special assistant to the bureau
chief for foreign aid to East Asia for about seven years. I was special
assistant for political-economic affairs, something like that. Then in
the last three years I was there I was also director
of the East Asia Technical Advisory Staff. Rutherford Poats got me to
take the job, and I told him I would take it if I didn't have to give
up the other title, special assistant.
He said that was easy, so I then had two titles and I put it on my business
card: Special Assistant to the Assistant Administrator and Director of
East Asia Tech. Occasionally there was some fury when the Assistant Administrator
would make a decision such -- well, for example, spending half a million
dollars on a project that I had initiated, and saying, "We're going to
spend that half million," when the program office that controlled the
money hadn't been consulted. It was enough to make a program officer blow
a gasket, but I didn’t have anyone who could tell me I couldn't see the
Now, Draper could see the President anytime and not ask permission of
the Secretary of State. Hughes couldn't see anyone but the Secretary of
State, and he might not be able to get to him. He might be told the Secretary
was busy and the Under Secretary would see him, or the Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs would take care of it. If he were in disrepute and
on the way out he could be told that he should just wait and they'd let
him know when and if the Secretary wanted to see him. And he might sit
around for a month or two while somebody waited for him to resign. There
are various ways of doing it, and they're all used at one time or another.
There was one prominent ambassador who was wondering whether he would
be re-appointed by Eisenhower. He was a strong Republican. He wondered
whether he would be re-appointed to stay for another tour of duty after
having been put there under a Democratic President. Eisenhower with great
finesse and calm and I suppose the skill that made him great, said something
like the following: "I do hope you can stay on for a while until so and
so gets ready. He's not ready to go yet, and I'd
appreciate it if you could stay for a couple of months until he's ready."
And then the man who was sitting there in front of him didn't say a word,
but he had his answer, "I'm fired." And he came back to the post and told
the staff, "I've had it," so they could get ready for the next man.
These techniques save embarrassment. He wasn't actually fired, he was
asked if he wouldn't stay on. In the AID the latest term was "indefinitely."
When the new administrator came in, appointed by Nixon, everybody was
told, all the key people, "We'd like you to stay on indefinitely."
One man was told that, and then given the name of his successor within
48 hours. Another man I knew, who was my boss, a Bureau chief and a Democrat,
stayed around about five or six months and then a Republican took his
job. Another man who was a close friend of mine was the deputy administrator
for the whole program and he was a Democrat; he stayed on for quite a
long time until
one of the Bureau Chiefs who was a Republican got his job.
But that word "indefinitely" can cover a lot of territory, because it
doesn't mean it's not one day, and it sounds like a long time, so it takes
care of the situation and leaves the field wide open.
Anyway, Dulles and Eisenhower got Draper's job abolished and made a small
job out of it, and instead of direct real authority over the parts, the
man on top was a coordinator and he really had to negotiate with his subordinates.
I was there with him for a few months. Bill Draper left in May 1953 and
I went home in October.
MCKINZIE: Could you talk about the relationship between the work of General
Draper and the commander of...
MATLOCK: Of course, Draper was a general and so was his deputy, they
were both combat generals, and they knew their business. I wasn't close
any of their relationships with the military commanders after I left
London. My job was different. I was in a "think tank." Whereas, in London
I had heard pretty much everything that went on. I don't know a thing
about that subject. I never heard that there was any trouble.
MCKINZIE: Well, I didn't mean to imply by the question that...
MATLOCK: No. I'd say those relationships must have been very good.
MCKINZIE: Could you describe the think tank that you were in?
MATLOCK: Well,, it was the first and only, up to now I think, of its
kind. There were two military men. One was Army, a colonel, later a major
general commanding a division of airborne troops. The other was Colonel
Emrick who later became a lieutenant general in the Air Force. Those two
colonels were first class, they were military. Then there was a man from
Stassen's operation who knew about foreign economic aid. There was also
a man who was an economist. His name was Chris Merrilat. I think he's
around Washington somewhere. This staff was set up to be inter-disciplinary,
inter-service, military and civilian, economic and political.
MCKINZIE: As early as April of '52?
MATLOCK: Yes, it was as early as April of '52, and even before that,
because Tick Bonesteel was the first head of it. He'd been head of it
before I got there and he had left before I got there. Tasca was head
of it when I got there. Draper put in the preface to that document that
went to the President (I left names out of it altogether,) that first
Tasca, and then I, had been responsible for the development of the material,
with revisions by Draper.
I thought it was suitable for him to take whatever credit there was in
it ,and of course I wasn't just trying to give him the blame, because
I didn't think any blame was due. I thought it was a good piece of work.
But he did put in these two names, Tasca and mine. He didn't mention Bonesteel,
but that particular work hadn't begun under Bonesteel. The documentation
that produced the final document that he gave to the President didn't
begin until Tasca ordered it. Then I wrote political papers. I had been
studying European problems for some years at that time. And I just began
to spit it out. Some of it turned out to be very useful I think.
MCKINZIE: How did this work, if you had a military component, and a civilian...
MATLOCK: Stan Emrick was supposed to write a military paper. Bev Powell
was supposed to write a military paper reflecting an Army man's understandings,
and he wrote one. Martin Tank was writing a paper
that had an economic appreciation in it, and Merrilat was writing economic
papers that were not so much aid oriented as general economics oriented.
I was doing political papers, and Tasca was listening to what we said
and talking about it. He was a very liberal, talented man. He wasn't trying
to force our views into any particular channel. He had a hard time swallowing
some of it, because it was sort of brazen in a way to challenge assumptions
of U.S. foreign policy. But it was an inter-disciplinary, inter-service,
inter-subject group; and it was completely free. This was by permission
of Anderson and Draper. Everytime Draper began to wonder whether we were
free-thinking too much, Anderson would tell him, "It's all right, they're
doing it just right." You know, Anderson had done that kind of thing in
the Pentagon and he valued our work highly. But we didn't stick to any
particular departmental assumption on. policy. We examined policy with
freedom to propose whatever we thought would be
the right policy. Of course, we did look at everything that was going
on. In effect I think we really ratified the existing basic policies,
except that there were some differences about the EDC -- we had to resolve
those because there was conflict over whether you could ever bring Germany
into NATO and so on. But while there were some differences, some of them
very sharp, and some issues, Draper resolved those. This is normal, the
boss takes a hand; he did some revising in an airplane on the way to Rome
and sent the draft back, told me to take it to Bruce and go over it with
him. I did, and sent the draft with Bruce's annotations on to Draper in
Washington. He went over it again and made it final. He checked with a
few friends (one was Bill Foster,) and then, having assured himself that
it was a reasonable piece of work that he and we had put together, he
submitted it to the President in June of 1953 with a covering memorandum
that as I recall was about nine pages. And that was really the main contribution
staff, but it was free to examine the validity of policy assumptions.
No other staff has had that freedom that I know about.
MCKINZIE: Do we have on our record here the title of that paper?
MATLOCK: It was a low key title, deliberately. I think it was called
"Certain Issues Affecting U.S. Policy in Europe," and if it wasn't that,
that paraphrase would ring a bell with the Archivist. You could find copies
in the DOD too, JCS and International Security Affairs.
I think there were about six or seven chapters. It was around 70 pages
single-spaced. I remember that Bill Draper looked at it and said, when
it was in draft double-spaced, "Isn't it pretty long?"
And one of us said, "Well, don't worry, we're going to print it on both
sides of the paper, single-spaced, and it won't be nearly as long as it
So, we all laughed and we went on with it. But he went over the whole
thing very carefully with us two or three times and then he made the final
revisions which he thought accommodated his view of policy and compromised
with the views of others, especially those of David Bruce on the EDC.
It came out a reasonably useful document. I think its main point was on
defense strategy, and I think it was well made, the way he did it. It
was strongly supported by our ambassador in England, Whitney I think it
was, very strongly on that point.
Well, anyway, it was a piece of work and you might say, "Well, we had
a job, what else could we have done except dive in and try to do it."
MCKINZIE: Do you think that's useful -- to have people on the spot, let's
say in Europe, in a kind of protected atmosphere like that dealing with
MATLOCK: It was very useful. It may, however, have created some jeopardy
for the SRE organization, because Dulles didn't like for anybody to issue
policy thought except under his direction.
MCKINZIE: Of course, this had really been originated before Dulles.
MATLOCK: I know it, but by the time he got there he was free to kill
it, and did. Draper left the Government at the end of June in 1953, and
Dulles had come into the Government in January. Dulles was a man extremely
jealous of power and prestige, he wanted it where he was. Once I asked
his sister during the Second World War whether her brother, John Foster
(not Allen), would be interested in the job of Assistant Secretary of
State. Don't misunderstand. I didn't have any job to offer. I was just
a work-a-day bureaucrat, but I was interested in what was going on. Sumner
Welles was Assistant Secretary of State in the main job, and there were
rumors that he might not
stay. So I asked her, "Would your brother John Foster be interested?"
She said, "He wouldn't bother:" You know, not a big enough job. Well,
she was absolutely right, he wouldn't bother, and when he became Secretary
I heard that he made the condition that he wouldn't have to run (administer)
the State Department. I also heard that he had not chosen a majority of
the Assistant Secretaries who were appointed during his tenure. Somebody
else had to worry about that. What he wanted to do was handle foreign
policy, sort of Kissinger style. He wanted to have his own little group
around him, the people he could use. He wanted to deal with the main issues
and let the rest go on by itself, and he didn't want any sour notes from
MCKINZIE: There is a new book by Gaddis Smith, an historian at Yale,
a biography of Dean Acheson, and in it he contends that during the Truman
years the State Department operated a great deal
differently than it did before or after, that it really was...
MATLOCK: Well, you see, you had Marshall during the Truman years.
MCKINZIE: Well, you start with Stettinius, Byrnes, Marshall and Acheson.
MATLOCK: Well, I wasn't there under Stettinius, I was there under Byrnes,
Marshall, and Acheson. When Byrnes was there, I was in an office under
Will Clayton, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. I heard Will Clayton
say something one day I guess we could put on this tape.
MATLOCK: In his office, he was just talking. The days work was over and
there weren't more than four or five people altogether. He had dealt with
the stuff that we had put before him, and that was out of the way. There
was a senior man there, I don't remember who it was, but somebody closer
to him in rank, and he was talking about his latitude as Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs. Mind you he had a five million dollar income from
his cotton brokerage firm in that year. I saw it in the newspaper. Clayton
was a powerful man. And he said, "Those two fellows leave me pretty well
alone." He referred to Acheson and Byrnes. He said, "They know I could
cause them a lot of trouble. I don't, but they know I could."
Now, that's how you get independence in a big job. The boss decides whether
he can cut you down. If he can't he goes around the end. If he doesn't
like what you do, he just has to estimate his strength you see? Never
assume that a man and his deputy are good friends. If I had a bet I wouldn't
give better than 50-50 odds on that. Read Parkinson's law. I think the
Peter Principle also is very interesting, and I worry sometimes sadly
with the thought that maybe it's absolutely true. You know the Peter Principle?
MCKINZIE: Everyone rises to the level of...
MATLOCK: Level of his incompetence. As long as a man is doing a fine
job everybody says he's doing a fine job, and is ready to promote him.
Well, then they promote him, and promote him, until finally nobody's saying
he's doing a fine job anymore, and so nobody wants to promote him, but
nobody wants to fire him either. So, he's risen to his level of incompetence
and that's where he stays. He's a top man in his cubical. That's Peter's
Principle. There's a lot of truth in that. It is funny, but it isn't just
MCKINZIE: Gaddis Smith says that those people in the Truman years, particularly
Marshall and Acheson, really operated the State Department more like a
British foreign office, and that Truman was amenable to that, that really
the State Department was coming out from under the cloud of Cordell Bull,
MATLOCK: Yes, I think so. I wasn't there under Hull,
but I was across the street so to speak in the Foreign Economic Administration,
which took foreign policy away from the State Department, or so General
Hilldring said one day.
MCKINZIE: Roosevelt took a great deal of the foreign policy away from
the State Department.
MATLOCK: Yes he did. He didn't even take Cordell Hull to Quebec when
the Morgenthau plan was adopted.
MCKINZIE: Or to Yalta.
MATLOCK: That's right.
MCKINZIE: Or to Casablanca or anyplace else.
MATLOCK: He didn't bother. He didn't think that Summer Welles was an
outstanding statesman either.
MCKINZIE: Well, so then you had at least what Gaddis Smith argues is
MATLOCK: But you know, I liked Byrnes. Now Marshall was a most interesting
man and I think, in his
way, a great one. Every man has his own style. I thought that Marshall
was a little rigid as Secretary of State in about the first year he was
there, that he began to limber up a little and learn that it's a more
flexible occupation than running an army, after the first year. I often
wondered whether, if he had been Secretary of State first, he would have
let his orders stand the way he did on his mission to China - to force
Chiang Kai-shek to accept Communists in the government, remember that
Of course, one can never answer a question like that. But Marshall grew
with any job he was in and he was a man as honest as some others are not.
For example, when he was testifying as a candidate for the job of Secretary
of Defense before the Foreign Relations Committee -- he was there at Truman's
request -- some member quoted to him a statement he had once made to the
effect that the Secretary of Defense should be a civilian. The fellow
who quoted that to him thought he had
a very good question to ask and of course he did. Marshall said that
he had said that, and when asked whether he still believed it he said,
"Yes, I do."
"Well then, why are you here?"
He said, "The President asked me to." And that's a good answer. That's
a really honest man.
The subpoena question also came up. Subpoenas are now in the news.
There was a short letter of about ten lines, in two or three paragraphs.
It was on the subject of shipping. It had to do with lend-lease ships
or surplus property ships, I forget which. But I was involved as a staff
person. I was in charge of an office on surplus and lend-lease by that
time, tail-end operations. I guess they still have a tail-end operation
on that, but anyway, that was in 1947, and the chairman of the subcommittee
wanted that letter. He knew the letter existed and he wanted it. Now there
was a parent committee too in Congress, but this was a subcommittee. I
don't know its title, but it had to do with ships and
things. And 1 went one day with Acheson to the Hill. Acheson was going
to testify before that committee, and what the committee wanted was really
that letter, and I had the letter in my pocket. Acheson told me in the
car not to take that letter out of my pocket and not to say a word,
"Don't speak up to help," you know, and the time came very shortly when
the chairman of the subcommittee asked Acheson for the letter and he named
the letter and the date of it. He had that information. Acheson said he
was very sorry but he couldn't supply it and wouldn't -- executive privilege,
in effect. It didn't say anything. That letter was vacuous and empty.
There was no substance in it. You wouldn't be interested, nor would the
subcommittee chairman have been if he had seen it. But he didn't know
that. He said he wanted that letter and if necessary he would subpoena
the Secretary of State to get it.
Acheson blandly said something to the effect
that he couldn't supply the letter, and the implication was that if the
chairman wanted to issue a subpoena that was his problem. So, we went
off. The subpoena was issued, I think the next day or so. Then the chairman
of the parent committee got excited. It cut across his political survival
somewhere. He pressured, or talked or ordered the subcommittee chairman
into withdrawing the subpoena, so it wasn't tested. The letter was never
supplied. Then a colleague of mine, George Truesdell, who died not too
long after that year, who was an expert on Russian lend-lease, as well
as a very fine man, was in a car with both Secretary Marshall and Acheson.
He told me that they had discussed that subpoena, and that Marshall had
said that his first reaction was one of haughty irritation that anyone
had dared to issue a subpoena to him as Secretary of State. Then he had
thought it over. He had decided he was proud to be a citizen of a country
where anybody could be subpoenaed. That was his
conclusion. I was glad to hear that. Well, he was that kind of man. He
was straight as a string, and if you read the book about Harry Truman,
the interview with Truman, you know what he told Eisenhower about the
Mamie question. I just read it in the newspaper, I haven't read the book,
but I rather liked Marshall for doing that. Indeed I liked him very much
for doing it; it was very much in order I thought.
But Marshall had elements of greatness in him that make me think of Robert
E. Lee. I think Marshall was a gentleman. He was a stern ruler of an army,
but he was a gentleman. When the generals came over to the State Department
when he was Secretary of State, and he was civilian, they still called
him the "old man" and they behaved like a well-disciplined bunch of school
boys when they were talking to Marshall. What he wanted, they wanted.
We had the best relationship with the Department of Defense. Forrestal
was a civilian and understood civilian problems
and was head of the Defense Department. Marshall was Secretary of State
as a civilian, but the whole military -- maybe not the Air Force, but
the whole Army -- wanted whatever Marshall wanted. It worked out beautifully
-- wonderful relationship there.
I went to meetings where Marshall was presiding. I'd go along with George
McGhee, or Walter Wilds, usually. I was a staff man. Staff men always
get taken along, and learn a lot. I do have great respect for Marshall.
MCKINZIE: Well, Gaddis Smith in his book on Acheson says that Acheson
liked, and Truman was amenable to, the State Department...
MATLOCK: More like the Foreign Ministry in London.
MATLOCK: I think that's true.
MCKINZIE: Yes, analyzing the problem and then coming up with a proposed
solution which the President
would either accept, reject, or in some way modify.
MATLOCK: I think there's a lot of truth in that. I think that Acheson's
methodology would be at home in the Foreign Office. The British did a
lot of things without memoranda.
I don't know if you ever heard it, but Selwyn Lloyd was British Foreign
Minister at the time of the Suez crisis. In 1957 there was a revolution
in Iraq, and the King was murdered and so was Prime Minister Nuri al Said.
It was no time for jokes, but sometime before that, a few months before,
Acheson and Selwyn Lloyd had been together and the story I heard, or maybe
I read it in the newspaper like Drew Pearson's column, or something, was
that Acheson had said, "I tell you Selwyn, a year from now they won't
be in power in Iraq." And when the two were murdered Acheson got a telegram
from Selwyn Lloyd saying, "I say, Dean, sometimes I think you go too far."
Just jokes, you know, just grim jokes, nothing serious about it, but that
of subtle humor Acheson understood.
Going back to your question, the Foreign Office worked more as you say
by cutting a thing down to the essentials and dealing with the essentials.
Marshall was different from Acheson though. He wanted just the nub of
the problem. But I don't think he would have been at home in the British
Foreign Office, by temperament.
MCKINZIE: A corollary to that would be improved morale in the State Department
during the Acheson period, or certainly the Marshall-Acheson period.
MATLOCK: Well, the State Department was in some disrepute during Acheson's
period. He was in some disrepute. Remember all the trouble with Alger
Hiss and all that. Walter Gifford said in London one day (1952) that he
thought he was responsible for rehabilitating Dean Acheson. He said that
when he was head of the telephone company he began the project to install
the microwave stations and that they were available in time for Dean Acheson
his speech for the Japanese peace treaty signing conference. That speech
had lifted popular estimation of Dean Acheson way up from where it had
been. So Gifford said he thought he ought to get some of the credit. He
set up the facilities. Gifford was just teasing, but he did say it. There
was a serious point: without the television medium, Acheson wouldn't have
been able to register so well with a nation-wide audience.
MCKINZIE: I think you've mentioned it, and many other people have too,
but there was a kind of demoralization when Dulles took over then, because
he wanted more of the prerogatives for himself.
MATLOCK: Yes, that's right.
MCKINZIE: And there was a change in the direction a lot of things took.
For example, it's my understanding that in cases of development he believed
that if development was good -- a little development was good, a lot of
development would be better. In some
cases he wanted to put in more money, especially underdeveloped areas,
bringing in land grant colleges to work with things like that and other
places. Then, if he couldn't see that he was getting results, he cut off
the programs altogether.
MATLOCK: I was dealing, under Dulles in 1957-58, with Japan and Korea.
There was a big Korean aid program. There weren't any special issues about
it at that time. We didn't have any issues with Dulles about our handling
of our problems in Korea, which was essentially a defense problem. He
was very much a defense man. There was no problem on Korean aid. We were
just trying to reduce the aid as fast as we could as soon as they didn't
need it anymore. The same in Vietnam. We thought we were doing pretty
well in reducing economic aid for a couple of years there in a row. Dulles
was very much a Baghdad pact man and I was in on the Baghdad pact, though
the U.S. is (or was) not
a member. He wanted that pact. People often say the British wanted to
push Iran into it, but that's not true. I went to London on my way to
Teheran and they told me at the Foreign Office that the U.K. hoped we
would not push the Iranians into the Pact. If Iran wanted to join, fine,
but don't press them. I was asked to carry that message to the Embassy
in Iran, and I did. In the very end, it was the Iranians' idea, not ours,
that they should come into the Pact when they did. The U.S. joined the
Economic Committee in April 1956. I didn't follow the Pact (later called
CENTO) after 1957 and don't know the later history. Unless a fellow's
reading all the telegrams he doesn't know what the fighting's about. You
have to be really close to it to know what really happened.
MCKINZIE: When you were in work on NATO, your special interest in 1952
and leading up to that paper that was taken to Eisenhower in the winter
was there much talk at that point about how the defense effort was affecting
the standard of living of the people of Europe?
MATLOCK: I don't think so. I don't think we were worried at all about
the impact of the ongoing defense effort on the standard of living in
Europe. We wanted the Europeans to do a bigger share of what was being
done, carry more of the burden.
MCKINZIE: I think this question is relevant only because at the very
beginning of the aid effort the idea was that if you didn't increase the
standard of living you're going to have social revolution on your hands.
MATLOCK: Well, of course, there are some other points to be made about
that, that revolution comes from people who are getting larger and larger
incomes. In Italy, for example, read De Gasperi's speech on the subject,
1952, on the incidence of communism. The impact of radical labor and Communist
was greatest in the high paid areas of Lombardy and there wasn't much
trouble in the poor farmer section of Southern Italy which was treated
as an underdeveloped country by the Council of Europe. There wasn't any
trouble there until the Government and "Europe" decided to help them.
Then there was land reform. Since there wasn't enough land to go around,
and since there were a lot of inefficient government administrators, the
Communists had a heyday, because there was always somebody to criticize
for discrimination or lack of fairness or something like that in the administration.
But De Gasperi said that communism and revolutionary activity, a challenge
of authority and all that, rose when people were getting more and more
of the things they wanted.
MCKINZIE: De Gasperi's explanation is quite different from Truman's explanation
in March 1947 when he said, misery and want are the conditions which breed
tyranny. By that he meant communism.
MATLOCK: Well, just in those terms it isn't necessarily true.
MCKINZIE: At that time did you think it was necessarily true?
MATLOCK: No. Poverty and chaos offer opportunities to bold men. But the
question of revolution rides on the issue of popular confidence in national
leaders. Development may actually pave the way for revolution. The more
people feel they can get, the more they want. But if they don't see that
they can get something, they don't do anything about it. And I've heard
time and again from people in some scholarly sources that effective activist
action from labor unions or revolutionary cells or something, comes when
the people involved are beginning to get good incomes and want more. They
want it to come faster, and they may have more money, a little spare time,
and a little freedom to maneuver. But a fellow who is breaking his back
all day, everyday, trying to eat off a half acre,
isn't a very good revolutionary.
In Russia the Communists promised the peasants land, not communism, land.
That was to gain their adherence in the civil war. Then in 1931 and '32
they killed everybody who had any land. Somewhere between five and ten
million people, Stalin told Churchill. Churchill was having coffee or
chocolate, after a negotiation, in Stalin's little kitchen in the Kremlin
and Churchill mentioned the figure of five million for Kulak liquidation.
Stalin said it was closer to ten, and he added that the hired help did
for most of them. But I've heard from Russians here that that wasn't true,
that Stalin must have been lying, because what they knew from Russia was
that it was the government that killed the Kulaks. However, I would go
to the question of confidence. I drew this conclusion in Europe. It is
not where the people are poor or rich. Turkey is poorer than France, but
who has the communism? You can find a whole roster of countries that are
poorer than some of
the European countries. But it is the latter that have as many Communists
as they have anything else. In Italy, if it's what it used to be, a majority
of the Parliament are opposed in principle to the parliamentary form of
government. If you add the Fascists and the Monarchists to the Communists,
you've got a majority, but since they can't get together the other guys
MCKINZIE: Well, in bluntest terms I guess the question is, was that idea
that poverty breeds communism simply for public consumption or did people
with decision-making power believe it?
MATLOCK: The short answer is that people in power did believe it. In
the U.S. Government many still believe it. I think chaos breeds
competitive voices with ambition to rule, and then whoever convinces the
people that in time of trouble he has their interests at heart and the
ability to do something about it is going to get the following. But I
don't think it's poverty that does it. I
think chaos is a great breeder of competitive government systems. Now
in Germany, there was a time -- say 1931 -- when a very few PhD’s had
a job in their own discipline. One German who was later head of the German
Department at Stanford told me that young Germans at that time, this was
about 1931, didn't want to fight, but they'd rather fight than be humiliated
by not having a job and not being able to support a wife, not being able
to be head of a family, that sort of thing. So he said, "They'll follow
Hitler," and he wanted to get out and come to Stanford, which he did.
He went back and got his girl and married her and brought her over and
stayed in California for the rest of his life up to now.
So, theoretically, you'd have to give a lot of room for variations of
this, but my view is that it's not the question of poverty or wealth,
but the question of confidence in leaders that determines the issue. Leaders
have to care.
Now, I remember once my wife and I asked the valet and the maid in the
Hotel Continental in Paris if they were Communists. I wouldn't have asked
but my wife blurted it out and they said, "Yes, we're Communists."
So then I was interested and I asked them why they were Communists. I
asked them in a teasing sort of way. I said, "Well, then you must be Atheists,
because Communists are Atheists."
"Oh, no, Monsieur, we believe."
I said, "Well, okay, you believe, but then you must be traitors to France,
because Communists are for the Soviet Union, and that's no friend of France,
at least I don't think so."
They said, "No, Monsieur, we are patriots, that dog of a Schumann, he's
a traitor, He was in the German Army when he was young." Schumann was
the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister at the time. I checked and
found that he had been conscripted in the German Army, in Alsace Lorraine,
and they knew about that.
I said, "Well, then if you are not traitors to France and if you're patriots
and you are religious, why in the world are you Communists?"
And they said, "Because Monsieur, we get as much in a week for our wages
as you pay for one day in this room." In other words, "Nobody cares about
Now, it wasn't the fact that they were poor. I think you could have cut
their wages in two, if at the same time leaders had shown that they cared
about those people. And all around the world I've noticed that that's
the issue, do the leaders care, just for themselves, or about the people,
are they leading the people or just living off the people? In Thailand
you've had a lot of military people who've contributed very little except
rule. I talked to an Englishman in Bangkok once about it. He was head
of an oil company operation in Thailand, one of our great Western companies.
He said that the military
didn't really contribute anything except authority in Thailand, that
the Thai-Chinese businessmen were the ones who made things tick, and the
Thai themselves raised rice, or were civil servants, or joined the military.
MCKINZIE: By 1951-52 in Paris, I know that there was some concern over
the fact that economic recovery had occurred and the, "Communist menace"
had not exactly abated. And I've seen one document which proposed that
assistance be cut off to plants in which there were Communist labor leaders
and I know the Renault plant was one such plant. It was, in a sense, a
kind of new look at the problem.
MCKINZIE: The Marshall Plan was supposed to raise the standard of living
and get rid of the menace. Well, the standard of living was raised, in
a sense, and there still was communism. Then I think there
was a psychological warfare committee.
MATLOCK: Yes, there were a lot of operational things going on and I wasn't
involved in them. I just looked at the main issues and so on. We did have
economic papers and although I had been trained in economics and was a
government economist, in all my European and Middle Eastern work I was
a political officer. Overseas, I was a political officer. And the economics
work was done by some others. Of course, a political officer must always
be aware of the economic issues.
Chris Merrilat and Martin Tank and Tasca were the economic officers in
that operation there. Of course, I went over the economic materials frequently.
And in the end I had the responsibility for what was in them (as Director,
reporting to Draper), but I didn't write them. I remember a lot of the
important points, like, "We're at a crossroads, we have to decide whether
we're going to have genuine economic cooperation,
reasonable trade policies with Europe. We have to decide whether we're
going to consult with the Europeans effectively, not just talk about it.
On any problem that comes up, we must reach cooperative solutions." That
kind of thing. And I didn't disagree with any of that, but I don't remember
anything that said that if we don't go to war within France against the
Communists, we've had it. Of course, the U.S. supported the development
of anti-Communist trade unions, etc. A third of Paris voted Communist,
and 21 percent of the total national vote was Communist. That seemed to
contain the problem as long as the French didn't think it wasn't a problem.
Now, a lot of Italian businessmen would say, "Well, they're Communists,
but you know they're not real Communists," that sort of thing.
MCKINZIE: The French said that sometimes too.
MATLOCK: Yes. Well, we didn't think the Italians realized what could
happen. But you know when
the going really gets tough, then the tough guys come out, and when they
start slashing around, everybody feels it, even the Communists they lead.
But the Communists never decided they wanted Italy, I think, too far from
home base, no lines of communication. I think they are more comfortable
being number two or three in Italy, and in France too, than they would
be being number one.
MCKINZIE: As a political adviser did you have to deal with offshore procurement?
MATLOCK: Not in NATO matters. I had done a little about that in respect
of procurement in U.K. for Greece in an earlier year. My job was really
a broad perspective and the heart of central issues. I was more at home
with things that were almost abstractions. I don't think I was that good
about daily operations. I'd go off and think about the implications for
the next five years and get hell from the boss for not spending the
time on the afternoon's work, you know, tomorrow's deadline. There was
an awful lot of stuff that's reported that's just a flow of water (or
worse) back and forth from luncheon tables and never really is rooted
in real forces. I always found it extremely useful to follow the
telegrams and know who was saying what to whom. But when I wanted to try
to figure out what a country would do, I looked at its history, so far
as I knew it, recent history, it's basic interest, its national temperament,
its capabilities and figured out what it more or less had to do. Then
I was likely to predict that, instead of what some minister said.
I think I had pretty good luck that way. The only country I'm always wrong
about is the United States. I have a perfect record of error on the United
MCKINZIE: What about the national temperament, how did you do that? What
did you read, for example, and who did you talk to about the national
MATLOCK: It's not too hard with the British or French, or other Europeans.
The people I have least understood are the Burmese. Out of thirteen East
Asian countries I worked on, I had Burma at the top of my list of the
countries I didn't understand. Something amusing happened about that.
I'd say, "Well, I don't know what makes them tick."
One day I was having luncheon with Gengo Suzuki, Japanese Finance Minister
in the Embassy of Japan in Washington, and later on the Japanese Executive
Director at the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Gengo was
a good friend and we chatted about a lot of things.
Well, as the Executive Director there (you know, not every country can
have one because there are too many countries), he was representing Nepal
and Burma and I think one or two other countries as well as Japan. So
he got to see the Burmese quite a bit, and he thought he understood them.
He didn't think Japan understood them, but he
thought Gengo understood them, and maybe he did.
Anyway, I told him my problem that I didn't understand them, I didn't
know what made them tick. And then he told me a few things about U.S.
relations with Burma. He said that the U.S. could have better relations
with Burma if it tried to understand them better, and he told me some
of their characteristics.
"For example, in negotiation," he said, "you Americans state a negotiating
position and you're prepared to compromise on it, and you think the Burmese
are doing the same thing. But when you ask them what they are willing
to do, they state what they are willing to do. Then you want to get them
to compromise, and they wish they had never heard of the whole subject,
or you, and they withdraw."
I started laughing, and he asked me why I was laughing. I told him, "Because
that's the way I am," and I didn't understand them. That's the
I feel about it; the Burmese are just like me in other words. There were
some other characteristics: The Burmese don't like too many foreign people
running around Burma. When they finally gave up the thought of building
that highway -- the first leg from Rangoon to Mandalay -- they said, "Well,
it's a good plan and we know you're ready to do it, but let's drop it.
We have good relations with you now. We'd like to keep them. And if we
have a lot of those American contractor personnel running around Burma
we're afraid that we won't keep our good relations. So, let's forget it."
I think they were saying about what they meant. I don't think there was
any adroit maneuvering in it. That was under U Nu. General Ne Win was
out at that time. He has come back since then. He finally took power back
and said he would keep it the second time. The first time he took it and
said he'd give it back as soon as he straightened Burma out. He would
let the civilians have power again. They had an election. U Nu won and
Ne Win gave power back. After a while he said, "They don't know how to
do it." So he took it again and kept it. He put some people from both
extremes in jail and kept them there.
MCKINZIE: In France in 1953, then, when we talk about national characteristics,
how do you use them in evaluating the Frenchmen's negotiating tactics...
MATLOCK: It's more than negotiating tactics, it's basic temperament.
I remember a remark I made once casually at a staff meeting with Henry
Tasca. I had read a preface of a book about the French language by a University
of London professor who either was a Frenchman, or was an Englishman who
seemed to understand them. He said that it was necessary to understand
that the French nationally have a feminine personality, and that Jeanne
d’Arc (Joan of Arc) is the exemplification of it. You remember de Gaulle
said that he would like to be remembered like Joan of Arc.
De Gaulle wasn't going to take power. He could have, I thought, but he
didn't. He went off to the country. He wanted France to ask him. Now,
that's the way a Frenchman is about women. The whole strategy is to make
them ask for affection and attention. Well, de Gaulle wanted France to
ask him. He didn't want to seize power as Mussolini had, or as Hitler
had, but he wanted France to ask him to save France. Then he'd be glad
to do it.
Well, I remarked to just a half a dozen of us, "You know, the French
are like a woman. They dare a man to rule them and they love him if he
does." Tasca, who was an old hand in France and Germany and Italy, said,
"You know, a person has to understand the French to realize that's true."
If you come down to it, we have some of that temperament too.
Well, now that's what I mean about temperament. Then they have this thing
"For the glory
of France." It's more important than money, as it is not in every country.
The glory of France is meaningful to a Frenchman. You couldn't talk to
a lot of Americans about the glory of the United States in terms of flags
and swords and holding provinces and things like that. You can talk about
"American interests," and that nobody can tell us what to do, but you
can't pull out that old French style, honor and glory, and collect
an army for it as they could.
Then there is a feeling about logic. Everything should be logical, and
this should be a matter of principle.
The French negotiate in terms of logic and acceptance of principle. The
British are pragmatic, they want to know what would be a tolerable deal.
They'll explain it their way at home, and leave it to us to explain in
our way here, and everything's all right.
MCKINZIE: Thank you, very much.
[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Appendix | List of Subjects Discussed]
Appendix "American Credo", Written Into Their History by the American People.
[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Appendix | List of Subjects Discussed]
List of Subjects Discussed
Acheson, Dean, 9, 38, 51,
72, 73, 94, 96,
97, 102, 113,
126, 162-164, 168-174
Achilles, Theodore C., 38, 41, 92,
93, 94, 95, 96,
Adenauer, Konrad, 136-138
Agency for International Development, 151
Air Force, U.S., 54, 120-122, 124
Alphand, Herve, 101
American Colleges and Universities, Board of Trustees, 59
Anderson, Frederick, 53, 54, 143,
Army, U.S., 124, 132, 133
Atomic bomb, 53, 54
Atomic weapons, 111, 112, 127
Attlee, Clement, 70, 71, 75
Bagdad Pact (CENTO), 175, 176
Batt, William L., 39, 42, 46
Bean, Louis, 5
Bell, John, 60
Berkner-Lemnitzer Committee, 43
Berkner, Lloyd, 49, 51, 95
Biddle, William, 66, 67
Blum, Leon, 1111
Bonesteel, Charles H., 49, 50, 64-66,
73, 74, 98, 142,
Bradley, Omar N., 132
British Commonwealth, 1, 77-83
British Foreign Office, 164, 171,
British loan, 1946, 7-11
Bruce, David, 109, 136, 145,
Byrnes, James F., 162, 163, 165
Canada, 81, 82, 91
Chadwick, John, 84
Chiang Kai-shek, 166
Churchill, Winston, 75, 76, 77,
Clayton, Will, 3, 9, 10,
11, 14, 15, 162,
Collado, Emilio G., 10
Committee of European Jurists, 100
Communism, revolutionary appeal of, 177-185, 187,
Crain, James K., 43-45
Crowley, Leo T., 14
Cuba, 86, 87
Davis, Charles, 30
Defense Department, U.S., 170, 171
De Gasperi, Alcide, 70, 138, 177,
De Gaulle, Charles, 193, 194
Dillon-Read Corporation, 115
Douglas, Lewis, 49, 67, 73
Draper, William H., 103, 109,
110, 114, 127,
128, 130-132, 135,
138, 139, 143-147,
149, 152-160, 186
Dulles, Eleanor, 5
Dulles, John F., 83, 84, 90,
103, 104, 106,
129, 130, 133,
143-147, 152, 160,
161, 174, 175
East Asia Technical Advisory Staff, 149
Eden, Anthony, 106
Eisenhower, Dwight D.,45, 46, 96,
97, 127-134, 144,
Emrick, Paul S., 118-122, 124-127,
137, 153, 155
Europe, integration of, 70, 71
European Coordinating Committee, 66-69, 73,
European Defense Community, 100-107, 110,
139, 140, 157,
Finlay, Luke, 146
Finletter Committee, 54
Foreign Economic Administration, 1, 2,
Forrestal, James V., 37, 170
Foster, William H., 157157
France, 10-12, 62, 72,
100-107, 111, 139-142,
180-184, 187, 193-195
French War Settlements Committee, 11, 12
Freund, Richard, 66, 87
General Assembly, United Nations, 24
Germany, Federal Republic of, 68, 70-74,
100-112, 135-142, 157,
Gifford, Walter, 173, 174
Greece, 17-21, 23-28, 30,
32, 40, 41
Greek-Turkish Aid (Truman Doctrine), 17-20, 22-28,
30, 32, 40, 41
Green, Marshall, 56, 57
Grosvenor House, London, 61-63
Gruenther, Albert M., 132
Halifax, Lord, 9
Handy, Thomas, 67
Harriman, Averell, 49, 67, 73,
Havlik, Hubert, 3, 4, 5,
Hickerson, John D., 38, 42, 48,
56, 92, 93, 94
Hilldring, John H., 165
Hoffman, Paul G., 33, 34, 70,
Hooker, Robert, 13
Hotel Crillon, Paris, 62
Hull, Cordell, 164, 165
Humphrey, George M., 129, 143
Hydrogen bomb, 77
ICBM's, 124, 125
Iraq, 172, 175, 176
Italy, 138, 177, 178,
181, 187, 188
Japan, 90, 112, 120,
Joan of Arc, 193
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 128, 131
Karlsruhe decision, 104
Kennan, George F., 92, 94
Keynes, John M., 3
King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 38, 82,
Kissinger, Henry, 147
Korea, 46, 47, 69,
Kulak purge (USSR), 180
Labouisse, Henry R., 11, 12, 17,
32, 33, 35, 36,
37, 60, 117
Lee, Frank, 3
Lemnitzer, L.L., 49, 51, 95
Lend-Lease, 1-6, 12-14, 167,
Lend-Lease Termination Committee, 2
Lindley, Al, 66, 87, 88
Lisbon Conference, 85, 86, 96,
114, 127, 128,
Lloyd, Selwyn, 172
London, England, 61-66, 96
McCloy, John J., 73
McGhee, George C., 17-19, 30, 32,
33, 35, 37, 38,
116, 117, 171
Macy, Robert, 88
Madden, Kenneth, 79
Marshall-Balfour Agreement, 18
Marshall, George C., 19, 20, 164-167,
Marshall Plan, 14-17, 20, 26,
30-37, 39, 40,
42, 60, 67, 80
Memorandum of Settlement-Lend-Lease, 3
Merchant, Livingston, 129, 142,
144, 146, 147
Merrilat, Chris, 88, 154, 156,
Military Assistance Institute, 56, 57
Monnet, Henri, 11
Mount Royal Hotel, London, 61
Murphy, John, 33
Navy, U.S., 122-125
Nazism, 82, 83
Ne Win, 192, 193
Nitze, Paul H., 15, 115
North Atlantic Council, 85, 95-97
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 38-40,
42, 47, 48, 68,
75, 85, 86, 90,
91, 94, 96-98,
100-102, 104-106, 109-114,
118, 122, 123,
125-138, 176, 188
North Vietnam, 112, 113
Office of Economic Warfare, 15
Office of European Affairs, 32, 38,
Office of Financial and Development Policy, 15
Paris, France, 62, 140-142, 144
Pentagon, 18, 19, 30
Perkins, Milo, 93, 94
Poats, Rutherford, 49
Policy Committee on Arms and Armament, 43-45, 50,
Pound sterling, convertibility of, 6, 7
Pound sterling, devaluation of, 55, 56
Powell, Bev, 155
Rearmament (Europe and German), 43-45, 50,
51, 68, 69, 71-76,
85, 86, 88-90,
96-98, 100-108, 127-137
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 165
Schuman, Robert, 183
Security Council, United Nations, 23
Self, Sir Henry, 3
Smith, Gaddis, 161, 164, 171
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 99
Soviet Union, 1, 12, 13,
23-26, 28, 32,
37, 48, 53, 54,
68, 72, 77, 86,
89, 90, 109,
140, 141, 180
Spofford, Charles N., 95, 96, 114-118,
Stalin, Joseph V., 180
Stassen, Harold, 129, 143
State Department, U.S., 2, 7, 9,
15, 29, 32-34,
37, 44-47, 51,
59, 65, 73, 74,
77, 87, 91, 92,
95, 108, 131,
142, 144-150, 161-165,
Suez Canal crisis (1956), 83, 84
Surrey, Walter, 49, 94, 95
Suzuki, Gengo, 90, 91
Tank, Martin, 143, 155, 186
Tasca, Henry, 142, 143, 154-156,
186, 193, 194
Thailand, 184, 185
Thompson, Llewellyn, 48
Thorp, Willard L., 56
Tokyo, Japan, U.S. air attacks on, 120, 121
Tomlinson, Thomas, 109, 135, 136,
Treasury Department, U.S., 7
Truesdell, George, 12, 169
Turkey, 17-20, 41
United Kingdom, 1-12, 17, 18,
22, 24, 25, 55,
56, 61-67, 70,
75-84, 108, 176,
United Nations, 22, 23, 24
U Nu, 192, 193
Van Fleet, James, 19, 20
Vietnam War, 47, 112, 113
Vinson, Fred M., 3, 7, 9,
Welles, Sumner, 160, 165
Wilds, Walter, 19, 171
Wilson, Charles E., 129, 143
World communism, 25, 26
World War II (Japan),120, 121
Yugoslavia, 28, 29
Zablocki, Clement C., 119
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