Walter H. Judd Oral History Interview, January 26, 1976

Washington, D.C.
January 26, 1976
by Charles T. Morrissey

See Also Additional Walter H. Judd Oral History by Jerry N. Hess dated April 13, 1970

Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the FORMER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, INC. as part of its project THE MODERN CONGRESS IN AMERICAN HISTORY. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
All uses of this transcript and the tapes from which it was made are covered by a legal agreement dated January 29, 1982 between Former Members of Congress (FMC) and Walter H. Judd (Narrator). The transcript is hereby made available for research purposes. All literary rights in the transcript, including the right to publish all or any part thereof, except under the "fair use doctrine," are reserved to FMC, or its assigns. No part of any transcript may be quoted for publication without the written permission of FMC, or its assigns, except under the "fair use doctrine."

The tapes for this interview have been returned to the narrator at the narrator's request.

Requests for permission to quote from the transcript for publication should be addressed to U. S. Association of Former Members of Congress, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Suite 422, Washington, D. C. 20036, and should include identification of the specific passages to be quoted, the anticipated use of the passages, and identification of the user. Upon receipt of such request, it shall be the policy of FMC to notify the narrator and allow him or her thirty days in which to respond. If there shall be no response after that time, it shall be the policy of FMC in most cases to allow such publication.

Opened 1980
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

PREFACE

This oral history memoir is one in a series intended to document the experiences and reflections of the men and women who served in the United States Senate and House of Representatives in the mid-twentieth century (1922-1977).

Under the leadership of Brooks Hays of Arkansas and Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, Former Members of Congress (FMC) was organized in 1970 to help those who had served in Congress to stay in touch with each other and, more importantly, to utilize the experience of former members of the House and Senate in promoting a better understanding of the American federal system of government and especially of the Congress as an institution. Today FMC is a non-profit, non-partisan, educational membership corporation of some 560 members.

As early as 1970 Warren Cikins, first executive director of FMC, and Brooks Hays began recording interviews with Mr. Hays' former congressional colleagues. Oral history began as a program in 1973 with Basil Whitener of North Carolina as chairman of the Oral History Committee. Varying arrangements were made for recording interviews--in some instances a local history or political science professor served as interviewer, or one FMC member interviewed another. This became known as phase 1 of the present oral history project.

In 1976 Charles T. Morrissey became FMC's oral history consultant and in 1977, when a record number of members had left Congress, Jed Johnson, Jr., present executive director of Former Members of Congress, launched a more systematic, comprehensive set of interviews with regional professional oral historians as interviewers. In addition to Charles Morrissey (who conducted two-thirds of this set of interviews) and Fern Ingersoll (who interviewed as well as coordinated the project) the regional interviewers included Michaelyn Chou, resource librarian at the University of Hawaii; Enid Douglass, director of the Oral History Program at Claremont Graduate School in California; Ronald Grele, research director at the New Jersey Historical Commission; G. Wesley Johnson, director of the Phoenix (Arizona) History Project; John A. Neuenschwander, professor in the History Department of Carthage

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College (Wisconsin); Shirley Tanzer, director of the Oregon Jewish Oral History and Archive Project; Morton Tenzer, director of the Institute of Urban Research at the University of Connecticut; and Nancy Whistler, director of oral history at the Western History Department of the Denver Public Library. Forrest Pogue, Dan Fenn, and Alton Frye served as academic advisors. This became known as phase 2, and the entire project was entitled "The Modern Congress in American History."

A grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities--part given outright and part given to match grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, Finance Factors Foundation, the Auxiliary of Former Members of Congress and individual contributions--made possible the processing of the first-phase interviews and the research, interviewing, and processing of the second-phase interviews. The grant from the Rockefeller Foundation financed interviews with fourteen former congresswomen.

In all, over one hundred former members of Congress were interviewed. For phase 2 those congressmen and congresswomen were selected who:

had the vantage point of long years of service (although some short-termers were also interviewed to get their viewpoints);

had served in party or committee leadership positions; and

were recognized by their colleagues as being particularly knowledgeable and perceptive.

Phase 1 interviewees, though self-selected, met one or more of these criteria. In phase 2 an effort was made to interview a representative number of members from House and Senate, from each of the principal parties, and from most states. Both members and non-members of FMC were interviewed.

A year's research in the Library of Congress and regional libraries preceded phase 2 interviewing. Among those working on research were Gregory Sanford (University of Vermont) and interns from the American Studies Program

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at American University--William McCann, Thomas Ficarra, David Jaffe, and Deborah Carlson. To the extent that funds allowed, interviewers did additional research in the papers of the congressmen and congresswomen. The use of the facilities of the Congressional Research Service and the advice of its specialists greatly facilitated research.

After transcription, sufficient editing was done to ensure clarity but not to alter the spoken quality of the interview. Interviewees reviewed their transcripts, sometimes adding and occasionally subtracting material. Diane Douglas, Mary Jo Deering, Carolyn Hoffman, and Jean Tucker did much of the editing. Dorothy Bageant, Sue Urbanski, Carol McKee, and Betty. Giles did most of the transcribing and final typing.

A copy of each edited transcript will be in the Library of Congress and in a regional library of the interviewee's choice. Unless an interviewee has restricted his interview transcript for a period of time it will also be in the microfiche collection of the Microfilming Corporation of America which will list all interviews in the series in its catalogue. Most of the tapes from which the transcripts were made will be in the Library of Congress although interviewees were given the choice of having the tapes of their interviews returned to them.

Charles Morrissey served as director of oral history from 1977 through 1979, but continued into 1980 to advise the coordinator on questions of editorial format, legal releases, and the like. Robert L. Peabody, who became project director in 1980, reviewed many of the transcripts. Henry P. Smith III, as counselor,

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assisted with legal and financial questions. Fern Ingersoll coordinated the project, directing research and moving the transcripts through the varied states to completion. She directed the Rockefeller-funded part of the project focused on former congresswomen. Ann Brownson contributed many hours of proofreading.

Washington, D. C.
May 12, 1980

BIOGRAPHY

JUDD, Walter Henry, a Representative from Minnesota; born in Rising City, Butler County-, Nebr., on September 25, 1898; attended the public schools; was graduated from the University of Nebraska at Lincoln in 1920 and from the medical department of the same university in 1923; during the First World War enlisted in the United States Army in 1918 as a private and was discharged as a second lieutenant, Field Artillery, in 1919; second lieutenant, Field Artillery, Officers Reserve Corps, 1919-1924; instructor of zoology, University of Omaha, 1920-1924; traveling secretary, Student Volunteer Movement in Colleges and Universities in 1924 and 1925; fellowship in surgery, Mayo Foundation, Rochester, Minn., 1932-1934; medical missionary and hospital superintendent in China, under auspices of American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1925-1931 and 1934-1938; returned from China in 1938, speaking throughout the United States in an attempt to arouse Americans to menace of Japan's military expansion and to get embargo on sale and shipment of war materials to Japan in 1939 and 1940; engaged in private medical practice in Minneapolis, Minn., in 1941 and 1942; elected as a Republican to the Seventy-eighth and to the nine succeeding Congresses (January 3, 1943-January 3, 1963) unsuccessful candidate in 1962 for election to the Eighty-eighth Congress: contributing editor, Reader's Digest; radio commentator and lecturer on international relations and government; is a resident of Washington, D. C.

From Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971
United States Government Printing Office, 1971

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CHARLES T. MORRISSEY: One of the most persistent questions in our history, and currently one of the most urgent questions, is how this nation finds leadership to run its national affairs. And I'd like to hear you describe how General Eisenhower got to be the Republican nominee for
president in 1952.

WALTER H. JUDD: After the election of 1948 when Mr. Truman won in a victory that wasn't a surprise to some of us but was to most people--and then the Korean War came along, and then a great deal of graft and corruption in his administration was exposed--I think it was about fifteen people went to jail for corruption, particularly in the Internal Revenue Service--I felt that Mr. Truman wasn't really in charge. And the rate at which we were moving more and more into government-from-the-top-down, government bureaus and agencies being set up all over the place to run things for us--not to promote the general welfare, but to try to provide individual welfare--I felt such trends were contrary to the fundamental philosophy of this government and would lead to disaster. Hitler controlled everything, but he hadn't succeeded. Stalin controlled everything, and he had a breakdown in production. A little later Khrushchev had to decentralize in order to increase production. I felt we had to stop the trend toward more and more centralization of power that had been going on here for twenty years, really since 1933.

It's one thing to give extraordinary powers to a government for an emergency--famine, flood, earthquake, war, depression, any disaster. But if the war or the depression or the serious emergency lasts too long, the pattern of centralized control gets established and how do you get back to the original successful pattern of putting your primary trust in people--government-from-the-bottom-up instead of from-the-top-down? The key thing then was to interrupt this twenty-year

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trend, try to reverse it, and resist any further expansion of bureaucratic-dominated government.

Well, who was the best Republican to do that? Bob Taft was a man of magnificent intellect. I think he was the ablest and greatest senator we've had in Washington this century. He had a tremendous mind, but he was not so good as a candidate; he didn't turn people on. And in politics a party has to choose not necessarily the best man, but the best man who can get elected. You can put up the Angel Gabriel, but if, for whatever reason, he doesn't get elected, he won't be able to solve the problems. I had grave doubts that Taft could get elected, although he was a close personal friend of mine. His wife was an even closer friend of my wife's.

Ike had a charisma that would win voters. I first met him personally when he came out to make a speech at the Minnesota State Fair shortly after he got back from the war in Europe. He was now chief of staff of the United States Army. I met him then and talked to him personally for about half an hour. He said, "I'm undecided what to do the rest of my life. I'm interested in young people: I've worked with young people in the army all these years. And I'm considering going into some kind of educational work." He told me he'd been offered the presidency of a college or two; I'm not sure whether or not he mentioned Columbia by name.

Well, I liked him and all he said. He was direct, straightforward and concerned about the country. He'd fought for it: he wanted to consolidate and conserve the gains that had been made, the opportunity to build a better world. And he had a special charm; people responded to him. But the main question was: what did he believe, basically, about government? So, in the spring of 1951, I talked with Chris [Christian A.] Herter about it. He was one of my closest friends in the Congress. He later became governor of Massachusetts and secretary of state. We had come to Congress in 1943, the Seventy-eighth Congress, we belonged to the same class, so to speak. And we talked about who would be the best candidate for our party to nominate for president in 1952.

At that time the Foreign Affairs Committee needed to study how best to succeed with the effort to build a North Atlantic Treaty Organization1with armed forces to check the glacier of tyranny that was moving over eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. It had gained control of Poland and East Germany and was threatening West Germany; Western Europe was

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practically defenseless. Ike had been sent over by Truman to try to pull those countries together into an effective North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ike asked for a group of congressmen to come over to see the situation and consult. I don't think he was quite sure he was going to succeed. He wanted us to see what his problems were, and how we could help him most from this end.

So we set up a study mission of congressmen; some from the Foreign Affairs Committee, some from the Appropriations Committee, and some from the Armed Services Committee. About twenty of us went over in early June. Chris and I got Ike off alone in his office in Paris for half an hour or so and told him there was discussion of selecting him as our Republican candidate. But questions were being raised as to what his political philosophy was, what did he really believe would be the best kind of government for our country at this time? Actually, we got into that question before we mentioned the candidacy, so we wouldn't be influencing his reply. We said, "Ike,"--we always called him Ike in those days, he was very informal when a civilian, although he was back in uniform as a general--we said, "We wonder just what direction you think our government should be taking? We don't know your political views." In substance he said, "Well, when I was in uniform I never said a word about my political opinions. I'm back in uniform temporarily, but it's not like when I was on full military duty, concerned only about military operations." So he gave us a straightforward statement of his political faith and philosophy. He was a Kansas Republican! He had never revealed any of this when he was in uniform; he stuck strictly to the rules of that game. Naturally, we were pleased that his ideas agreed with our own. We came home and talked about it a lot with our colleagues and friends, and decided that if he would be willing to be a candidate, some of us were going to work for his nomination.

In November I went to Strasbourg to participate in the First Consultative Assembly for Western Europe. We now had a North Atlantic Treaty Organization to build military strength. We had the Marshall Plan to build economic and support military strength. Rut how were the policies to be determined that the economic and military strength were to defend? Alliances almost always break down when one member is called upon to support another member's policies which it had no hand in formulating. When the showdown comes, if country B calls in country A to help it defend policies that country A doesn't agree with, country A generally doesn't

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keep the alliance. There has to be some means by which the common policies are agreed upon which the countries in the alliance are to defend with their armed forces. So in coming through Paris on the way back from Strasbourg, I had opportunity to call Ike and ask for an appointment. He said, "I'm leaving within an hour to go to Italy." He had to go to make a speech at some meeting or dedicate some military project--I forget what.. I said to him on the phone, "A group of us at home wants to start working for you for the Republican nomination, unless you absolutely forbid it." His answer was so direct, and straightforward that the minute I hung up I wrote it down. This is what he said: "Walter, no man who loves his country can refuse the bona fide request of his political party to be its candidate for the presidency of the United States. But," and he didn't draw a breath, "I have not sought it; I do not seek it now; and I will not be maneuvered into appearing to seek it." I said, "Thank you, General. Get on your plane and go down to Italy. That's all we wanted to know."

When I got back, about twenty-five of us began to work for his nomination. I went right to Bob Taft and told him I was going to work for Ike. He asked, "Why?" I said, "He'll get more votes than you will." I didn't say also this to him--although I might have--that although he, Taft, had greater legislative experience, he was our greatest senator, the qualifications for a great senator, the brains to analyze, draft, persuade, and so on, are somewhat different from the qualifications necessary to be a good executive. I don't think John Bricker was as brilliant a senator as Taft, but he was an excellent governor of Ohio. He knew how to direct things, get people to work together and so on. He was an extrovert, loved to deal with people whereas Bob was more of an introvert, dealt more with ideas. So I said, "Ike will get more votes than you will. He'll get the regular Republicans that support you when they find out what he believes, and we know what that is now. He'll get more youth; they fought under him and trust him. He'll get more parents of soldiers; they'll say, 'He was in charge of my boy and my boy came back.' And though women don't know much about him now, I think he'll get more women." Taft didn't turn people on and Ike tended to, he was a hero. "So when you put it all together, Bob, he'll get more votes. Maybe you'd get enough to win, but this is a life and death matter for our country. We've got to win this election to stop the trends and try to reverse them, both in international affairs and national affairs. If you've got a king and an ace, and this is the crucial trick, you don't dare take a chance on your king. You're the king, Bob, but Ike's the ace, as far as getting the votes are concerned."

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He never batted an eye. He was a real pro, as you know. He said, "Well, I think you're wrong, Walter." But he didn't get angry or steamed up, and he never held grudges. Ike, on the other hand, was kind of tempestuous. His first reaction might be, "Blankety-blank-blank," and then he'd cool down. And that quality of strong feeling came across to people. He was more vital, not so much a sheer intellect as Taft.

So, this is how the original push for Ike's nomination got started. What happened in the New Hampshire and Minnesota primaries and at the convention is on the public record.

These are some key questions that need to be considered when deciding whom to work for in elections to any public office.

First, is he able to do the job? And the first consideration there is, "What's his character?" A lot of guys are awfully smart. (Lenin was smart, believe me.) But that doesn't necessarily mean that he will be a good, wise, sound, dependable leader for the United States.

Second, "Why does he want this office?" Primarily to promote his own career? Glory? Power? Or is he motivated primarily by a desire to serve, to promote policies that will be good for the country, not just a good position for himself? I sometimes put it this way to students, "Please don't go into politics and public life right after you get through college." For more and more of them are doing that, which I regret and try to discourage. "What have you got to offer at present? You've got enthusiasm. You've read books. You want to work for your country but you haven't had experience in solving problems. I would urge you to decide, first, what you want to do with your life--law, medicine, business, whatever, prepare yourself and make good in your own chosen career and then be willing to sacrifice that career to go into public office, if need and opportunity come, as a service to your country, just as in time of war we ask men to sacrifice their careers, perhaps their lives, to go into the armed forces as a service to their country."

And third, "How good has he been in his own career, business or profession? Is he really competent?" If he hasn't been able to manage his own business or profession successfully, what reason is there to believe he'll be competent and successful or a genius at handling public affairs? I don't want to turn my affairs over to the management of somebody who hasn't been proved good in his own field.

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These are some of the qualifications I feel are necessary. Character, motivation, competence. And, frankly, I'm concerned about our present dependence on television as the main means for many of evaluating public figures. TV is made to order for the glib, the facile, the clever master of repartee who can come up with quick quips .People are used to and like that. So they go after the fellow who's got that kind of cleverness, even though he may not be very profound or wise or capable as a public servant.

In fact, if I may digress and say something you didn't ask me about, I'm opposed to televising the sessions of Congress. Perhaps the final sessions to celebrate or sign at the end, yes, after the decisions have been made. But when they're working out the details in committee or in the Congress, what happens is that the glib person comes up with a quick comment or answer and the viewer tends to say, "Gee, he's smart, clever, able; he makes sense." Then some other fellow is asked a question and he says, "Uh, uh, uh, uh,"; he looks dumb. But he's thinking before he sounds off and generally he's the better legislator. Our country's held together by the 75 percent or so in the Congress who are conscientious; solid, thoughtful, careful, despite the fact that the headlines go to the facile ones who can respond, verbalize, quickly, but who are not necessarily the ablest and best public servants.

MORRISSEY: You mentioned Senator Taft and Christian Herter as two members of the Congress that you respect. I was wondering if you could elaborate on that? What are the characteristics of an effective congressman, and who are some of the effective congressmen that you worked with during your twenty years?

JUDD: Yes, in the House.

The first thing I would like to know about a congressman or a candidate, other than the ones I have mentioned, the personal characteristics, is this: What is his philosophy of government? What's his concept of what the United States government is supposed to be, or should be? Let's take a look at how our country came into being. Our forefathers came here, most of the influential leaders, because in Europe they'd been under governments run from-the-top-down, kings, landed gentry, the aristocracy, blue-bloods, the elite, the land-owners and so on. The pioneers were determined to be free to worship God as they pleased, which they were denied in some of the countries--religious liberty. They had discovered they couldn't have religious liberty without political liberty, and so they came here, most of the Puritans to New England,

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and of the Dutch to the Hudson Valley, the Quakers to Pennsylvania, Catholics to Maryland, Huguenots to two or three areas, to get political liberty so that they could have religious liberty.

They soon discovered that they also had to have economic liberty because if you weren't self-supporting, if you didn't have the ability to feed your family while you resisted actual or potential tyranny, you would have to knuckle under. Gradually their philosophy expanded in that direction; they wanted the right to earn and own property in order to be independent. When increasing controls, even some oppression, followed them across the Atlantic, they resisted. They didn't want to rebel against the mother country; they wanted Britain to change its policies toward the colonies. They were proud to be British citizens if they could have the same rights as British citizens in the homeland. But if it were necessary, they were willing to fight for their independence in order to have these rights--religious, political, economic liberty.

What did they say when they wrote their Declaration of Independence? The second sentence is a classic. It has six foundation stones:, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created...". There was the first one, the belief that there is a Creator who had created men different from any other animal. He's got something unique in him, including the desire to worship, and to have control of his own life. He has the capacity to make moral judgments, quite apart from all his conditioning, and to make independent decisions--YES or NO--based on those moral judgments.

Second, "Created equal." Did they mean equal in ability? Of course not. No two persons are equal in ability. No two children in a family are equal in attitudes or aptitudes. How then are they equal? In only one sense. They're equally important, they're equally precious to their parents. If one is a little less gifted than another, the parent tries to give that one a little extra encouragement or assistance if it can be done without being too obvious or discriminatory. Therefore, a good government must have laws under which all are equal in rights. Not one set of laws for the rich, another for a poor. Not one set for the white, and another for the non-white. Not one set for the educated, and another for the illiterate. Not one set for the employer and another for the employee. Our fathers set out to provide "Equal Justice under Law."

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Third, they wrote that all are "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights." They aren't endowed by their government or their landlord; but by their Creator with certain rights from which they cannot be alienated or separated. They can be thrown in jail or concentration camp; they can be deprived of their property, they can be beaten and persecuted, they can be doped and treated as mental patients, as in the Soviet Union; they can be banished or they can be executed, but they cannot be separated from that which is in them from their Creator--the desire and the will to have something to say about their own lives.

And, fourth, what are the inalienable rights? Three are mentioned, "Life." The government must be such that nobody, including the government itself, can deprive you of your life without due process of law. Or deprive you of "Liberty," including your liberty to do what others, even the government, may regard as foolish or mistaken. And "the pursuit of happiness." No guarantee of getting happiness, but only of the right to pursue it in your own way--just as long as you don't interfere with other people's rights to pursue it in their way. And the government's role is to see that no citizen does so interfere; its responsibility is to ensure, as far as possible, not equalization of results, but equalization of opportunities.

Fifth, they wrote, "to secure these rights governments are instituted among men---". Not to secure prosperity for them or to solve their problems for them, but "to secure these rights---."

And sixth, "---deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,"--government-from-the-bottom-up.

The rest of the Declaration, except for the first few sentences and the last, was a list of the things they were against--as I recall, forty-some. Some of them small and some of them major oppressions that were being imposed on them by King George and his agents.

They fought a long hard war and got their independence. And then they almost lost it because they didn't know quite how to ensure the things they had fought for. For example, Congress was the legislative body, the executive body, the judicial body. They had to have a better thought-out more workable organization than that.

So, eleven years after the Declaration they sat down

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again in Philadelphia and this time they wrote something very different. This time they wrote, "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union." Now they were working on what they were for, moving on from what they were against.

What did they do first of all? Having been under tyranny, they were afraid to trust anyone with too much power. So they divided the powers so that the executive branch could check the legislative and the legislative could check the executive--and the judicial could check both--under the laws enacted by both. In short, it seemed safer and surer to trust, not the goodness of each, but the greed of each to check the greed of the others. This division made the government they formed slow, and it made it inefficient in some ways, and it made it wasteful, you can say; certainly wasteful of time. But it protected freedom and freedom was the first essential. The objective was "to secure the blessings of liberty"! They'd rather have slowness and inefficiency and wastefulness than too much control from the top down.

Even with this division of powers, some of the new states would not adopt the Constitution without further guarantees--the Bill of Rights. That Bill of Rights isn't a list of guarantees of what our government must do for the citizen. It's a list of guarantees that our own government cannot do this, that or the other thing to the citizen. The Rights are what our government cannot do to us, not what our government must do for us.

Well, they set it up, and that philosophy and form of government is what has made possible our goodness and our greatness for two hundred wonderful years. It released the creative capacities that are in people of all races, and from all countries, and climes, and cultures. In the old countries, the boy whose father was a farmer generally became a farmer, even though he had the capacity to become, perhaps, an artist or a scientist or a musician or a great leader of men. If his father was a cobbler, the son was a cobbler. My, what the world was deprived of in all those centuries. But here, better than anywhere else in history, it was possible on the whole and on a major scale, for a boy or a girl to make the most of what was in him or her. The result was the greatest outburst of imagination, invention, energy, effort, organization, production, progress, that the world has ever seen. The government's role was to regulate to prevent abuses, but not to manage people's lives for them.

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As I said earlier, in a war, a depression, famine, flood, earthquake, you have to concentrate power, supposedly temporarily, to manage the emergency. And almost always you have to concentrate it in the executive who can make decisions quickly. But does a person who's been given such great power, or does the executive branch with subordinates who have been given such power, willingly give it up--especially if the emergency is long-lasting as was the depression of the Thirties followed immediately by a long war? It's only human to trust yourself and doubt that anyone else can manage as well. So, little by little, responsibility and power shifted from private to public resources, from local authorities to national--to Washington. That's what has been happening in America, and that's why one of the main questions you must ask, I think, of a person before supporting him for high public position is: what is his philosophy of government? What does he want the United States to be? A great white father to do things for people?

Well, the whole history of mankind is that such power corrupts; those with such power are sure of their own goodness, wisdom and skills, and they resist any who disagree with them. Little by little you get tyranny.

This has been my own philosophy from the beginning. I started out as a Democrat because I believed in the philosophy enunciated by Woodrow Wilson. I was a soldier in World War I and Woodrow Wilson was our great leader. He said something like this: "The history of man's struggle for liberty is the history of his struggle to hold down the powers of government,"--I believed that and still do. But now the philosophy of so many is that that government is good which does most for you. But it runs out of money with which to give you what you want. This is where democracies so often go down. Officials seek to win votes by spending money they don't have--always, of course, for good purposes. After a while the currency is debased and there isn't so much to hand out. Step by step, unrest increases and finally violence erupts--or more rarely, a non-violent reversal of the deterioration can be achieved. It was when I saw the Democratic Party leadership departing more and more from the philosophy of Jefferson and Wilson that I switched to the Republican Party as nearer right on the most important issues--or, as some would put it, as the lesser evil!

Now, even though one comes into Congress with the philosophy of government I've talked about, the temptations are enormous to modify or abandon it. It's said, "You can't save the country if you don't get elected--and re-elected."

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Well, how do you get elected--and re-elected? By advocating to the voters this philosophy of limited government? The temptation is, rather, to say, "Vote for me and I'll help you with federal funds for your rent, or with your kids' education," or whatever it may be you need or want. Or, I'll get your taxes reduced. That is, promise greater benefits with less cost! And little by little, without quite realizing it, you get into a position where you've promised more than can be delivered. Then you start taking more and more money from A to give to B. After a while A doesn't have enough, so you just print it until inflation destroys its value. All through history this is a main way nations have gone down. Generally it was not because those in the governments were bad, but because they were trying to do what seemed good.

I have often thought of it this way: I could work my little girls' arithmetic problems for them better than they could work them for themselves. I could get the right answers almost every time. They'd like to have me do it for them; they'd probably even vote for me if I did. But I didn't. Not because I didn't love them, but because I did. For the main objective was not just to solve one day's problems, but to help them develop the capacity to solve problems on their own. This is my idea of what our government was established to try to do.

Let me give you one more illustration of what I believe is the proper philosophy for our government. It is essentially the same as the philosophy on which our traffic rules are based, especially since we got automobiles and fast moving traffic. We set up the red and green lights. When the light is red, all vehicles have to stop whether giant trucks or motorcycles or pedestrians. When the light is green, all go. But no one can tell you where you are to go. One car goes to the races, another to the church; one goes to the university, another to the job; one goes to the ballpark, another goes to the movie--or home. Each of you can go where you please. But in going where you please, you must not interfere with the rights of others to go where they please. And the government itself cannot interfere unless you are breaking some law or committing a crime.

I think that almost the most important thing we Americans have to do today is to rethink what we really want our government to be and do, because we're sorely tempted to go the way other governments have gone when they put too much power in the hands even of good people. Hitler came to power by doing good things for the German people. He

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abolished unemployment, he abolished poverty, he put the youth in uniform; they were not in vandalism or delinquency, they were marching for what had been made to seem important. He gave everybody, not just old people, free medical care. People thought this man had a heart; he was concerned about people and they voted for him. What was wrong? They lost their freedom--and then the benefits, too.

It is thoughtful reexamination of basic principles like these that I feel we need most desperately now in our America.

MORRISSEY: Is the job of a congressman really more than one person physically can absorb in terms of keeping up with legislation, with representing their constituents against the federal bureaucracy and so forth?

JUDD: Yes. This is one reason that I announced in 1960, right after I was re-elected for the tenth term--that I wasn't going to run again. (That was a political mistake in that I was prevailed upon to run again after the district was changed so there was no possibility of my winning in this new district. But I agreed to run because I wasn't going to let down the people who had worked so hard for me all those years and who thought there was some chance. Defeat is no disgrace. Default would be).

JUDD: The main reason I had decided to retire was because I was having to spend 80 to 90 percent of my time fixing up things for my constituents. Mrs. Jones finds that Mrs. Smith across the street is getting $2.75 more in her social security check. They are both widows and she thinks her government is cheating her. She can't afford a lawyer, so she writes to her congressman. Now, you have a staff that can handle most of such cases. They call up Social Security and usually find in such a case, that Mrs. Smith's husband had a bigger salary, he paid in more, and so his widow gets more back. You report this to her and that solves the problem. But there are other cases that your assistants can't handle.

In Mrs. Jones' case, the agency hadn't made a mistake. But sometimes the agency has made a mistake. And, as Harry Truman used to say, "Government agencies or officials never correct; they just cover up." In 1943 I was teamed with him on a speaking tour rallying support for what became the United Nations--a senator and a representative, a Democrat and a Republican on each team. He was chairman of the Senate sub-committee to investigate expenditures by the government agencies conducting the war, both those procuring arms and ammunition and equipment from contractors, and those that were using them in

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the war. Over and over again as we traveled from city to city, he would repeat that observation. Why do they cover up? Because if an official admits he made a mistake, it goes into his record. It reflects also on his superior who also covers up and holds back the subordinate's promotion. In such a case: and there are many, the congressmen's staff can't get it corrected. Only the congressman himself, because he votes for an agency's appropriation, has enough influence to get the mistake corrected.

More and more government programs were established during and after the war--social security, veteran's benefits, educational benefits, subsidies for farm products--the list seems endless. You can't have benefit programs for millions of individuals without a lot of them getting mixed up. I felt that I was becoming primarily a service agency for helping constituents with their government benefit programs. And nowadays there are delegations calling on you almost every day from your home district. You have to have your picture taken with them on the Capitol steps. You take them to the floor of the House or into the galleries if the House is in session. You explain why and how members are in committee sessions and so few are in the House Chamber--except when actually voting. I repeat, when does a man have a chance to think?

Well, if I was to become mainly a service organization, I'd go back to my own medical progression. As a physician, I could control my time and how I dealt with human beings. I knew I was useful as a doctor. But as a congressman, how could I decide wisely on vitally important questions for the nation if I didn't have time to study and think? The result is that more and more of the thinking and planning is done, not by the congressmen, but by their assistants. They're smart, they're clever, they're well-educated. But they haven't had enough practical experience. Most of them are idealistic in the sense of believing that government should be all-powerful; because government agents are supposedly broader in their background and therefore abler. Frankly, I was frustrated. I thought maybe I could be more useful helping people see what was happening in government that endangered their futures, their freedom--and thereby maybe could help reverse the trends. I'm troubled about our government, as you can see. I don't know how we can decentralize the powers and programs and get things back closer to the people. I'm 100 percent in favor of what [Gerald] Ford's been advocating along these lines; but I doubt if he can get it back there. [Richard] Nixon tried before him. And Eisenhower did make some headway before that.

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I was present with Eisenhower on one occasion—this is a little diversion--when the advisors and some from Congress were wanting him to make and announce a certain decision. It would have been dramatic and the press would have played it up with kudos for a great strong leader, etc. He sat there, studying it and finally said, "No, I'm not going to do it that way. The people themselves will come to this decision within a few weeks. It will be theirs, not mine, and that's better for the country. How are the people to make sound decisions unless they make the decisions and grow in wisdom in the process?" Again and again Ike refused to take some dramatic action in such a situation. He'd rather have it worked out on a decentralized basis by people themselves for which I respected him so very much.

But if you've got an itch to be president or senator or congressman, either to serve the public or promote yourself, how do you get there unless you do or say attention-catching things that the people will applaud, and say, "Now that's the kind of leader I want in charge." I admit that a good executive or president, as I've said earlier, needs to be able to make tough decisions and to give effective political leadership, can inspire people, challenge them to think and to support with enthusiasm and loyalty. Mr. Roosevelt was a master of that. Abraham Lincoln was. Woodrow Wilson was. And John Kennedy had some of it--not so much, for he didn't yet have the depth that the others had. But the qualifications of the best congressmen are somewhat different. As we said earlier, charisma isn't so important as thoughtful studiousness, solid examination of merits and demerits, weighing them against each other. Will the gains justify the probable costs, or the benefits outweigh the possible risks? In trying to cure evil A, you may create evil B. Sometimes what you enact is worse than what you are trying to correct. I could give you plenty of illustrations of this.

So, I'm a devotee of limited government. As I said, I started with Woodrow Wilson, but in the depression more and more power was centralized in Washington, more and more things were decided by a few men at the top without the people even knowing what was going on or who was really responsible for this or that action. So I shifted to the Republican party. Not that I agreed with everything in that party--you can never find any organization or person with whom you agree entirely. But I thought the Republican party was nearest right on the most important issues. I

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would support it where it was right, and try to change its policies from within where I thought they were not right. I'm not sure but that, since Eisenhower, the Republican party, particularly under Nixon, has pretty much gone down the same road that the Democratic party went down under and after Roosevelt. It's not impossible that another party will develop that will go back to fundamental principles in order to go ahead again, just as the Republican party under Lincoln took over from the Whigs and had a rebirth. That is what I hope the Republican party can do now if Ford can stick to these principles and get them back into operation; or that Reagan, if he is nominated and wins, can inspire a deeper understanding of and belief in the fundamental principles on which this nation was founded and grew great.

I think there's going to have to be, under God, such a rebirth of freedom, a realignment in our politics, or else the kind of nation we've had for two hundred years will go the way of previous republics.

MORRISSEY: Many Americans have an impression of congressmen as people who don't tend to their work, but always seem to be running for the presidency. And when you look back over recent American history, you do see Harry Truman, [Barry] Goldwater, [William] Miller, [Hubert] Humphrey,[Edmund] Muskie,[John] Kennedy, [Lyndon] Johnson, and of course, many people now, 1976, are running for the presidential nominations from the Congress. Do you think it's proper for a congressman to become a national political figure with his eye on the higher office?

JUDD: It's proper, yes, but not usually desirable. Sometimes persons in public office, appointive or elective, demonstrate such qualities of leadership and wisdom and balance, maturity, judgment, that a movement develops to move them to higher office. That's good. That was the case with Eisenhower. But the man who gets into appointive or elective office merely as a hoped-for stepping-stone to the presidency, no sir. He already has two strikes against him in my view. Yet it's a disease we've all seen afflict so many people. It's called "Potomac Fever." Or, sometimes, "A Messiah Complex." I don't really understand it. It never afflicted me. One of my weaknesses, I'll tell you frankly, was that, in certain situations, I didn't promote myself to positions that would have given me greater influence for the causes I was most deeply interested in. I tried to persuade colleagues on a basis of the merits of a cause, and, looking back upon it, I didn't realize early enough that you have to gain certain position and power

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yourself in order to have the necessary influence.

When I announced in 1961 that I was not going to run again for the House--I wanted to spend the rest of my public life in our colleges and high schools, trying to help our young people see what was happening in our government and what their generation had to do if they were to save it and their own futures. Ike called me up and said, "Walter, you're making a mistake." I told him just what I have said here, that I was having to spend eighty-five percent of my time on things that were not my greatest concern. He said, "I know. I'm for what you're trying to do, to help the next generation see these things. But you don't realize that ten percent of your time and efforts from the position of congressman, gives you greater influence than one hundred percent of your time without the position." I thought he was wrong, but he was right. The minute you are no longer in the office, the umbilical cord is cut, and who pays attention to an ex-congressman or his views? Certainly the news media don't. And increasingly people's minds are made up and their positions determined, not so much by the real facts, but by how the media present and interpret them--or ignore them.

The person who is afflicted with this disease of wanting above all else to get into the White House tends to make his decisions on legislation, and his presentations to the public, in terms of what reaction he thinks he can produce in their minds regarding himself. The particular issue or cause becomes secondary to promotion of his own career, and that's too bad from the standpoint of real public service.

MORRISSEY: Likewise in the country, often the Congress casts an image, or an image is stuck on it, such as Harry Truman calling the Eightieth Congress a "do-nothing Congress," when in fact, it's record was quite outstanding. And I think I've heard you say yourself that there are many legislative proposals that you supported that were the same thing that John Kennedy was advocating as part of his New Frontier.

JUDD: Well, you've got two points there. On the first one, Harry was a good politician, and he was smart enough to do what the communists are masters at--attack somebody else where they're really strongest. If we and our candidate had managed, in that campaign of 1948, to get across to the people the record of the Republican Eightieth Congress, [Thomas E.] Dewey would have won. But he was not at all skillful in presenting the Republican case and record. He thought he had it in the bag, as the polls said, and the

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main thing was just not to lose any votes by saying anything important or controversial. He didn't come across as a strong person they should rally around and support. But if you look at that Congress and at the feeble campaign made, it is clear we lost in part because of our patriotism. We put it and "unity" in the nation ahead of a strong partisan presentation of the facts which would have won.

Almost all the basic foreign policy legislation that has worked successfully in these post-war years came out of that Republican Eightieth Congress: The Greek-Turkey Assistance Program proposed by Truman. We didn't sabotage it on the basis that he would get credit for it as the Truman Doctrine; instead we improved it and we put it through. The Marshall Plan, which enabled devastated Europe to recover, the United States Information Service, the Cultural Exchange Program, the World Health Organization, the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction in China, a pattern Truman expanded into his Point Four Program, the beginnings of NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--these all came out of the Eightieth Congress, a Republican Congress with a Democratic president:

There are times when the best legislation comes with a split government--if both sides put the country first, rather than politics first. When one party had an overwhelming majority in Congress, as Lyndon Johnson had in 1964-65, they could put almost anything through the Congress. They brought up bills in the House and passed them without debate, bills that hadn't even been considered in committee. Roosevelt had done the same thing in the years after 1936, when he had an overwhelming majority in Congress. That's bad legislation for the country, whoever does it. On the other hand, if you've got a Congress and an executive who will both think first and solely of the well-being of the country, then nothing gets enacted unless it's good. If it has to get the approval of a Congress of one party and an executive of the other party, it almost invariably is good legislation. But when you get either a Congress or a president that puts politics first, Congress won't pass it if a president of the other party will get the credit--and more votes at the next election. Or if the president won't support legislation just because it originates in a Congress controlled by the other party which will gain votes thereby, then a split government is bad

Another illustration: there were communists in the government including the State Department: During the war we were allied with the Soviet Union. Our thinking, if you can call it that, had gone like this: We are fighting Hitler; we

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are a peace-loving democracy. The Soviet Union is fighting Hitler; ergo, it, too, is a peace-loving democracy. That, of course, was not a valid syllogism. But a lot of national thinking went that way. So communists got into key positions in our government because all communists were helping to defeat Hitler who was invading Russia.. After his defeat, they weren't working for the United States; they were working for their primary loyalty, the world communist movement which was and is dedicated to overthrow of our kind of society.

In that Eightieth Congress, I was responsible for setting up a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, as it is now called: The subcommittee's work had no publicity; we didn't seek it. We got 134 communists or communist sympathizers out of the State Department during that Eightieth Congress without a single headline. If we had been playing politics, we could have embarrassed the Democrats by exposing this situation, as the other party has done to Nixon and Ford with the Pentagon Papers and various other exposures. We were getting rid of them because they didn't deserve to be in those important positions when many of them weren't really true patriots, primarily loyal to the United States. So, after we had supported Truman's sound programs and didn't publicly expose the bad conditions, he came out during the 1948 campaign charging that the Eightieth Congress "had stabbed the farmer in the back," and the like. It was smart politics; he won by turning the public against the Republican Congress which had done the most for his own programs.

Now, come down to 1960 and '62, the other half of your question. I could get elected in Minnesota in the first place in 1942 only because we had three parties in the state--the Republican, the Democratic and the Farmer-Labor party. Republicans were a minority in most of Minnesota and had been for decades. But when the opposition was split so there were three parties, a Republican could get elected much of the time. By the time Mr. Humphrey got the Democrats and Farmer-Laborites together into the DFL (Democrat-Farmer-Labor party) when he ran for the Senate in 1948--(this uniting of them was his greatest accomplishment in Minnesota politics)--the DFL had a big majority in most of the state. But I had been the Fifth District congressman for six years and had won enough local following so I could get enough DFL votes, along with the Republican votes, to win. In 1960 the DFL won control of the Minnesota legislature, both Houses, for the first time in several decades. Also, after the 1960 census, Minnesota had to go down from nine to eight members of Congress. That gave the DFL legislature the chance to

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redistrict the state, and they "gerrymandered" my old district so no Republican can ever get elected from that district as far ahead as you can see.

After the 1960 election I had announced I wasn't going to run again, not knowing what was to happen to the district. After the redistricting, my own supporters came to me and said, "Walter, you've got some chance; nobody else has any. We've worked our heads off for you for eighteen years; please go ahead and run again." Well, I could see they'd think I would be letting them down if I didn't run. They didn't coldly analyze the actual vote picture the way I did. They would always feel that probably I could have won. And I've tried to never let anyone down. So I ran. They put on the biggest and most expensive campaign ever. At first I thought we'd probably lose by 25,000, but we came within about 6,000 of winning. I think no Republican has got within 30,000 since in that district. Under the circumstances, I never felt bad about that defeat.

When I agreed to run, it was already in mid-1962. The Congress was in session until late October with the Cuba missile crisis. I was in Washington working for what I regarded as the soundest courses for us to take as a country. John Kennedy was out in Minnesota campaigning against me in my district while I was in Washington helping to pass some of his legislation. He made a speech in Baltimore shortly before the election of 1962, in which he said that on the domestic front there were seven--I think it was seven--major pieces of legislation he was for. Well, I had voted for all but two of them, because I thought five of them were good for the country. But, politics being what it is, if I wasn't of his party and had opposed his election in 1960, then I should be defeated. I didn't blame him too much for that. After all, the man who was running against me had worked hard for Kennedy in Minnesota in the 1960 campaign, so when it came to '62, Kennedy was under obligation, in a sense, to campaign for whoever was of his own team. If you belong to the Dallas Cowboys and you're fighting the Pittsburgh Steelers, maybe you think your own quarterback didn't call the right signal; still you go with the signal your quarterback calls and do your best to make it succeed.

Some people were pretty bitter toward Kennedy. I wasn't. I think the president probably had to do that, although I had been more useful to him and many of his programs, domestic and even more, foreign, than many in his own party had been. The five measures dealt with problems with which I had had first-hand experience. I thought his recommendations were sound in those particular issues. I had written in every

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one of my campaign brochures, beginning with the first in 1942, this pledge: "I pledge to support every measure that after study I think is good for the United States as a whole, no matter by whom the measure is proposed; and to vote against every measure, no matter by whom proposed, that after study I think is against the best interests of the United States as a whole."

Now, as I look back upon it, my judgment was faulty sometimes. But I adopted and followed that principle, and I think that unless we come back to that principle as almost the first requirement of a good public servant—outside of some ability and integrity and honor and competence our representative form of government won't endure. Our form of government is not that the public dictate specifically what the Congress is to do: rather, the public is to choose persons to decide policies and programs--just the same as stockholders choose as their directors, persons they consider able to run the corporation well. The stockholders don't run the corporation; they elect to the board of directors persons in whom they have confidence and the directors run the corporation. Just so, if our government is a republic, the voters don't vote directly for or against pieces of legislation. They elect those persons whom they consider soundest and ablest to do that.

But how can a citizen who works eight or ten hours a day at his job and has only a few minutes to listen to television or to read the papers, be expected to make wise decisions on all sorts of complicated matters? It's hard for the congressman, giving his full time to it, to make the study that's necessary. So our form of government is founded on the assumption, or faith, that the American people can and will pick out of the citizens in their area, a man or a woman in whose basic judgment, character, industry, integrity, they have confidence, to go to Washington and give full time to thinking through what are the right or best things to do with the various problems. Somebody objects, "But that isn't democratic." Yes, it is. Every two years, or six years in the case of the Senators, their representative comes back home for an accounting. They can vote to keep him in or to replace him, based on whether they think the judgment he has demonstrated was sound or not sound.

May I use this simple illustration: when a mother calls on me as a physician to look after her child, sick with appendicitis, she doesn't say, "Now, doctor, I want you to operate and on the side I determine." What she wants is for me to get her child well. She calls me because she thinks I have some ability in the field, and I

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am to decide or recommend whether to operate and where and how to do it. But nowadays in politics, they say, "Well: I'll vote for you only if you agree to vote the way I want you to on this issue." It would be too bad if you did that with the doctor and your sick child, and it's too bad if you do that with your congressman. Choose persons who are fundamentally sound, trust them to do what's good for the country, and then keep them in or replace them in terms of whether what they do, vote for, stand for, work for, proves to be good or not good for the country.

MORRISSEY: Were there occasions when your judgment of what was best for the nation was not in accord with many of your constituents, that something else would be best for the district?

JUDD: Oh, yes. Again and again.

MORRISSEY: How do you resolve that?

JUDD: Well, I don't think you can lay down an absolute rule. There are times when it's better to yield on a minor point, if you have to do that to win for a major point.

I'll give you an example. I went home one time and a man said to me, "Walter, I see you voted against a bill last week which would have been good for our city. It would have brought,"--I forget how much, a million dollars, we'll call, it--"of federal funds into your own district, and you voted against it. Why?" I said to him, "May I ask you a question: Where do federal funds for Minneapolis come from? Washington has no money of its own." He hesitated. I asked, "Do so-called federal funds for Minneapolis come from St. Paul, across the Mississippi River? Well, where then do federal funds for St. Paul come from? Don't they come from Minneapolis? Can we avoid paying them ourselves by calling the funds federal? Or public funds? Does the government earn money? Well, it has had one commercial operation, the Post Office. Does that earn money? Actually, you see, there is no such thing as public funds, in origin. All there is is private funds that workers, and businessmen and professional people and farmers and secretaries earn. The government takes some of those private funds for what we call public purposes. But by calling it public funds doesn't mean it won't cost us anything." This is where democracies so regularly go down; spending money they haven't got, just because it's for a good purpose. I had to resist that temptation again and again and again.

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To tell the truth, I often wondered why or how I got re-elected, because I tried conscientiously to stick to this principle. In my first platform, I wrote; "I think your representative's first task is to be a window, not just a mirror." That is, his job is to study what's right, vote not what the voters' opinion may be at the time, but what he believes their opinion will be when they see what he sees. He is then to come home and explain his reasons to the voters. If, when he gives the reasons why he voted for or against a given proposal and they don't agree with those reasons, then at the next election, they can and should elect somebody with better judgment as their representative. I stuck to that philosophy for twenty years, "A window, not a mirror."

There were other occasions when I'd say, "Here's a bill with four parts, four separate titles. It's really four bills but under one number. Frequently one or two provisions have been hooked into the overall bill which aren't too good, in the hope the good ones will carry them through." There are so many, many examples of this. Now, if you could vote seventy-five percent AYE and twenty-five percent NO, that would be easy. But you have to vote AYE, as if it were all good, and choke on some of the bad. Or, in order to kill the bad, that "rider" that was slipped in, you have to vote N0, and thereby kill something that's very good and that you may have been working for for years. These are the tests that try men's souls. It's a matter of judgment: does the good outweigh the bad? Or vice versa.

One day Chris Herter and I were sitting there during the debate on such a bill. I said, "I can't decide how to vote, Chris. Is this bill fifty-one percent good and forty-nine percent bad, or the other way around? I'm going to wait, frankly, until you vote, Chris, because you have had more experience in government and with this particular issue than I have had." His name beginning with "H" came before mine, beginning with "J". So when he voted "Aye," I voted the same way. Just as a doctor who is a specialist in diseases of the heart follows the advice of the eye specialist when his patient has an eye problem too. I'll give you a concrete illustration. The Civil Rights Act of 1964--I think it was '64--had nine titles. It was really nine bills under one number. Senator Goldwater made a speech which was a classic, I thought, and it helped defeat him. He said, in effect, "Seven of these titles have to do with genuine civil rights. One is the right to vote: that is a civil right, and when people are denied it, the federal government has a responsibility to move in and see that they have that right. Another is the right to go into court to get a trial by a

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jury of one's peers on a wrong a person believes he has suffered. That's a civil right; and some have been denied it. The right to freely associate," and he went down the list.

"Seven titles have to do with rights that are being denied to citizens. I want to vote for those titles. But two of the nine deal with changes that are good, they're needed and desirable. But they are not rights, and in order to correct those discriminations, I would have to vote to deprive other people of their civil rights, guaranteed them by the Constitution. What am I to do?" he asked. "I stood in the chamber of the Senate and took an oath of office. Was it to provide this or the other desirable benefit for people? No, my oath was 'to uphold, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.' And two of those titles authorize measures that I think are unconstitutional. So I have no choice but to vote against this bill." Of course, he was accused of being against civil rights. No, he was against two parts of a nine part bill which he thought were against the Constitution he had sworn to uphold.

I wasn't in Congress at the time, but if I had been, I think I would have voted for the bill and my rationale would have been this: "I know these two titles are against the Constitution. But I think it's more important to try to correct seven practices which have denied citizens their constitutional rights--in some cases for almost a century-even though to do so compels me to vote for two practices that I think are unconstitutional. I'll try to correct those later somehow. But I have to swallow those two now in order to try to correct those seven long-standing violations of the Constitution." This vote was a matter of judgment, not of morals or patriotism. To vote either way required violation of the Constitution--to vote on the basis of creating two new violations in trying to end seven violations, or to vote to block the two violations though that meant continuing the seven old ones! Senator Goldwater was not against "civil rights." No, he was against violating his oath of office as he saw it. I admired his integrity. I didn't agree with his judgment as to which vote involved the greater and more serious violation of the Constitution.

The issues often are not simple black and white. What do you do when they are grays? When do you decide to accept the lesser evil if that seems necessary to avoid the greater evil!

MORRISSEY: Was there one vote, more than any other, that was the most agonizing for you?

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JUDD: I don't recall one at the moment. I haven't been thinking recently of the tough decisions of years ago. But there were a good many.

I must say this: I can't recall ever having made my final decision in a difficult case in terms of whether it would be popular at home or not. The tough decisions were just whether the good outweighed the bad.

I do recall one on minimum wage increases. There have always been employers who gouged employees or abused child labor or sweat-shopped, if they could get away with it. The minimum wage laws were devised to try to eliminate those abuses. But little by little the main labor forces here pushed increases in the minimum wage decreed by law as a means of raising the wages of all workers including those who already had good wages. Originally, as I recall, the minimum wage was set at 35 or 40 cents an hour. Everybody was for that. And then Congress moved it up--I voted for it--to 70 or 75 cents an hour. And then as costs of living rose, we moved it up to a dollar an hour. Then the propaganda and pressure began to come not from the poor and unemployed, but from labor unions whose members already were getting four or five dollars an hour, even eight or more dollars an hour. Because, if the minimum wage were raised by twenty cents an hour, their wage had to go up by perhaps fifty cents an hour "to maintain the historic differentials." So the main pressure for increased minimum wages for the poor was coming from those who weren't the poor.

When that became the prevalent situation, it was creating unemployment for the very poor it was supposed to help- The ones getting these lowest wages, by and large, were the persons whose skills were still so limited that they couldn't contribute enough benefit to the employer to justify his hiring them. He or she couldn't be expected to pay them more than they earned for his business or her home. So they just weren't hired. It isn't helping the poor to have a high rate of pay for a job that is no longer there.

The hard decision came in 1961 or '62, when there was a bill to raise the minimum wage to $1.15 an hour for that year and the next, and to make it $1.25 an hour the following year. I supported the $1.15 increase but I couldn't vote, say, in 1961 to make it $1.25 in 1963. (How can I diagnose this year what the patient's problems and needs will be next year?). How could anyone know in 1961 what wage and employment conditions would be in 1963? Congress

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would be in session in 1963 and could do then what seemed proper at that time. And to put the minimum up too fast could put people out of work whom we were trying to help.

A drug firm in our area had seventeen stores and the head man said, "When they passed that last increase, I had to let seven"--as I recall--"of my lowest paid persons go just because they couldn't earn that much an hour." The folks the program was supposed to help at the bottom of the ladder were being put out of work--no wage at all.

One reason we have such high unemployment now is, I think, because the minimum wage, and thereby all other wages, were pushed up faster than the productivity of the individuals concerned justified. To prevent abuses by unscrupulous employers is one thing, but to try to boost the economy by legislating what wages must be paid is another; it produces unemployment of the neediest. It encourages the philosophy of "Don't work for a living, just vote for it." It assumes that employers pay wages and can be safely made by law to pay higher wages. But it is customers that pay wages. And if the wages and the prices of products get too high, there aren't enough customers to keep the business -- and the jobs going. What you wind up with is the present price tag of $2.25 an hour on a job which no longer is there. The owner weeds out those with lowest productivity and they're the ones that we're supposed to be helping.

It was a hard decision for me to vote against those congressmen and those among my own constituents who believed we could determine by, legislation what wages were to be in future years. But I had to vote my conscience and my judgment of the merits. And in that 1962 election the campaign against me was based on that vote of mine against mandating now the minimum wage for a future year more than "Judd doesn't care about the underdog. He doesn't have a heart."

Well, I've said enough on the kind of hard decisions you asked abut. That was one; I thought it would increase unemployment of the neediest, and I think it has contributed to that. To push too fast even when it is for a good goal generally proves to be a mistake.

MORRISSEY: Based on your twenty years in Congress, would you say that the seniority system is worth preserving?

JUDD: Yes, I would, with modifications. You can't get

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any system which is perfect. Every system has some shortcomings and leads to some abuses. But I wouldn't stick to an absolute seniority system if we can get a better one. In a certain committee chairmanship, for example, here's an old dodo, who's been there for years, he's no longer efficient or sharp and he ought to be replaced. There ought to be some procedure by which, say, by a two-thirds vote, or I would prefer a three-fourths vote, a committee chairman can be replaced.

It does not occur too often, but I think it is unwise not to be able to remove a chairman just because of his seniority, when it is clear that chairman is losing his marbles, so to speak, or is so committed to something of yesterday that he isn't able to adjust to new situations that come along.

On the other hand, I don't believe the choice of chairman ought to be just by election by the committee members. That would lead to political campaigning in the committee much of the time. Ambitious young members would be maneuvering to get support for themselves as chairman. Instead of working on legislation that will be good for the country, some will be politicking within the committee to get rid of A in order to get B the chairman's job. The present seniority system, by and large, especially with an escape mechanism such as I've mentioned which would permit taking care of a really bad situation, has fewer drawbacks, I think, than just leaving it up to the majority vote of the members. That would mean politics in every committee from then on rather than sober, careful examination of what legislation to prepare and promote.

A congressman's first responsibility, of course, is his own vote. But his total effectiveness depends on how much expertise he develops in the field of his major specialization, and how much influence he thereby develops in the Congress. That is, how much confidence others come to have in him because of his demonstrated good judgment or ability in a particular field or fields.

Let me give an illustration. Taxes and tariffs are exceedingly complicated. There are hundreds of items in a tariff and tax bill. They are handled by the Ways and Means Committee and if you're on that committee you can't be on any other, even a minor committee, because it has to work on its bills day in and day out. Well, if I studied tax bills all the time in order to decide how to vote on them, how could I know much about foreign affairs or armed services or agriculture or education? I served on the Committee on Foreign Affairs and there are a hundred fifty countries we have relations

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with. If I did my job in this which was one of my two or three primary responsibilities, what time could I give to taxes? So what I did was to pick out the members who seemed to know most about other issues and pretty much follow their lead. If a key Democratic member of a committee and a key Republican member agreed in their field, that carried enormous weight with me. On the Ways and Means Committee, the chairman was Wilbur Mills of Arkansas, who was extraordinarily competent before he had some difficulty with alcohol--and the ranking Republican was John Byrnes of Wisconsin, who also always knew exactly what was in the complicated bill and why. If they, the key Democrat and the key Republican, agreed on a bill from that committee, frankly I didn't even examine in any detail the several hundred pages in their bill. I voted as they recommended.

Now conversely, our foreign relations are enormously complicated and this was my field. After my first four years on other committees, learning the ropes, I got on the Foreign Affairs Committee and I worked as hard there as Mills and Byrnes did on taxes. More and more members would come to me and say, "Walter, I'm too busy with my own committee's work to study all that stuff about our foreign aid to this country and what's happening in that country. You worked abroad, you've studied all these problems. How are you going to vote on this bill? Or that program?" I would say, "Well, if you will be here at about two o'clock this afternoon I'm going to make a statement on the bill and point out the reasons why I'm going to vote for this or against that." And they'd say okay, and go with me. There were a lot of Republicans and quite a few Democrats who consistently voted the way I did on these questions.

This is a thing that the public outside doesn't see. Nobody can be an expert in all fields. He's got to become good in certain fields, to specialize, if he is to be effective and have influence. It's like in medicine. Let's say I'm a chest surgeon. When it comes to brain surgery or orthopedics, I follow the advice of specialists in those fields. Nobody can be able enough to be a specialist in all fields. I think this is a fact which increasingly, as government becomes more and more complicated, we have to recognize as unavoidable. Then when the congressman goes home and constituents ask him about his vote on a matter outside his own specialty, he has to scratch his brain and memory a bit to come up with justifications for his vote. But I thought it never hurt me to say that I had been so busy with some other problem the person is also interested in that I didn't have time to study in detail the question he asked about. I would frankly report to him just what I've been

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saying now, and that I'd get him some material like the committee's report on the bill or speeches of whoever I considered the real experts whose advice I had followed, especially if they were from both parties. When the key Republicans and Democrats, the wise people on the particular issue, recommended a certain vote, generally I followed their judgment, the same as some of them would follow my judgment on something where I had become something of a specialist.

MORRISSEY: How much log rolling is there in the Congress in the sense that perhaps a representative from a dairy state would vote for peanuts hoping that somebody from North Carolina or Virginia might vote for cheese and milk?

JUDD: Oh, there's a lot of it. But I never got involved in it. I don't quite know how to describe this. I read about all the alleged corruption and all the efforts to bribe, or threaten defeat, in order to get some special concessions. Only twice in my twenty years did anybody ever approach me with something which suggested that if I would do some particular thing or vote in a certain way something good would come my way. It was always subtle but I could spot it. At first, I began to wonder if I didn't have enough influence for any of the supposed sharpsters to think I was worth trying to buy off, and that's why they didn't approach me. Or whether they thought there was no point in making their proposition to me because they decided that it wouldn't do any good, that I wouldn't go along with it--although I always listened to anyone's arguments for or against a measure. So I never saw much of this personally, but I saw it around the corner, and there was a lot of something like this, "Don't expect me to support you on what you're after for your district or state unless you support me on what I'm after for my district or state."

There used to be a lot of media talk about a so-called "coalition" of northern Republicans and southern Democrats. There was supposed to be really a conspiracy to defeat forward-looking legislation, New Deal legislation, Fair Deal legislation and so on. The conservatives of both parties were portrayed as almost an organization to get legislation just for landlords, the employers, the rich, the corporations, etc. It wasn't so. There was no "organization." There was no conspiracy, or even a coalition. Except in a very few instances, the southerners voted with us Republicans on some issues, only because their views agreed with ours. When we voted as they did on some issues, it was because those were our views too.

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To get a realignment of parties according to views, not geography, was one of the things that I worked for for a long time. Karl Mundt of South Dakota took the lead in this, even more after he went to the Senate. A few of us of both parties worked at it in the House. Perhaps a realignment of the parties is needed, so that people who think alike can vote alike. But we never could get the southern Democrats and the Republicans together because of one issue: the race issue. If we went along with them on everything, we had to swallow, or appear to accept, their views on racial segregation. They couldn't go along with us without being accused of supporting desegregation because we were for ending segregation. If they were to join a new party of all conservatives--those who want to conserve the basics of our society--they would get denounced in their home states as having sold out to those Republicans who were for full integration of the races and so on. It was the race issue that kept us from getting the desired reorganization of  parties.

Here's a little incident--(you may throw this out, Dr. Morrissey, if you want to)--that's an illustration of how the Democrats by and large are much better party people and have greater party loyalty than the Republicans. In 1960, along about June or July, just before the Democratic National Convention, I had to go over to the Senate for something or other, and I got in an elevator with Lyndon Johnson also in the elevator. He was the majority leader of the Senate. He had the lead, I thought, for the Democratic nomination. After all, [Harry] Truman was for him, Sam Rayburn was for him, the regular party machine was for him. And the opposition to him was split. Mrs. [Eleanor] Roosevelt and others had declared for Adlai Stevenson, other people were pushing John Kennedy for the nomination. Naturally Lyndon thought he had it. He said to me, "Walter, I haven't seen you for a long time. Have you heard the news?" I asked, "What news?" He said, "Jack's pediatricians have just given him a clean bill of health!" And he guffawed. It shocked me; that was one of the most insulting remarks I ever heard. But that was Lyndon's gutsy way. He thought he was going to mow Kennedy down.

Well, when later, I was watching the Democratic Convention on television and Jack got the nomination, a rumor was reported that he was going to ask Lyndon to be his vice-presidential candidate. I said to Mrs. Judd, "Lyndon will never take it," because I knew from his own mouth his low estimate of Jack Kennedy. (I don't need to go into the reasons for that--his lack of confidence in Jack or affection for him). So I figured Lyndon wouldn't accept the

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offer if made. But I underestimated the party loyalty of the Democrats. When Lyndon was asked by Kennedy to join him--in order to bring southern Democrats along so the Democratic party could have a chance to win the election, Lyndon accepted.

And I'll tell you some of the sequel to it. During the campaign I was in Alabama speaking for the Republican party and happened to be in one of the cities down there at the same time Lyndon was there campaigning for the Kennedy-Johnson ticket. What was his line privately? It was, "You should vote for Kennedy and me despite all this bunk about ending racial segregation, the Supreme Court decision on integration of the schools, busing and the rest. You have to elect Kennedy in order to have me in the administration so I, your fellow-Southerner, can defeat his integration proposals." He was campaigning for the election of Kennedy so he could defeat the things that the Democratic platform and Kennedy had declared themselves for.

That cynicism is not all one-sided. Nixon campaigned on the Republican platform of 1968 but when he was in office, he did the opposite on some issues, both in foreign and domestic affairs. He almost boasted that he had had that in mind all along. This is one reason so many people are so cynical about politicians. Some get elected on the basis of going east and once they are in, they go west. One specific example was Nixon's engineering a visit to Peking and downgrading of an ally, Taiwan--which was against the Republican platform and his own statements during the campaign. Later, he called attention to one short paragraph in an article he had in the Reader's Digest a year and a half earlier--a paragraph which could be interpreted as indicating he was going to do this. But in the campaign did he ever tell the platform committee, or his Republican workers or the people that this was what he had in mind? No. This is too bad. This produces a cynicism with respect to politics and politicians which makes the people say "a plague on both your houses." And almost half no longer vote. We can't maintain our form of society and in the long run can't preserve our freedoms if our government doesn't seem worthy of public confidence.

Now I'm back on a point I tried to make earlier: Most of the congressmen aren't as bad as the public tends, understandably, to think. After twenty years I came out of Congress with a higher estimate of the integrity, the character, the patriotism and the ability of most of the members of Congress than I had when I went in. When I went in, about all I knew was what I had read in the papers and the stories

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in the papers are mostly about the members who do dramatic things or make sensational or irresponsible statements. They get the headlines and people assume they're the key people in the work of the Congress. Generally they're not the most influential members. The ones who hold it together are the ones who are working and not making headlines. We watch so much television that we get accustomed to the fellow who is facile, but who so often is shallow and superficial, not to say less than fully responsible.

MORRISSEY: That's an interesting insight. Are there ways in which Congress can present its better side to the American public, through the press, through televising its proceedings?

JUDD: I think televising its proceedings will make it worse, because so many get up and speak in terms not of what's good for the country but of how they will look on TV. If a surgeon--I tend to think all the time as a physician-if a surgeon has to explain and justify to a non-medical person every step in his handling of a case, that's unlikely to be in the best interest of the patient. The doctor's got to concentrate on what his training and experience tell him is best for the patient and then show the relative afterwards why he did what he did when the layperson perhaps thought it was the wrong thing to do. These again are hard questions. There is no sure-fire yes or no answer. But then, in a sense. I suppose, our freedom includes our freedom to make mistakes. Always the crucial requirements are character, experience, judgment.

What if a sincere person's judgment is wrong? One of the reasons I believe so strongly in our federal system is that if one state adopts a questionable program, let it be tried out in that state. The others can see whether it works or not, and not try it for themselves if it doesn't. And the federal government shouldn't pass a law affecting the whole nation forbidding the adoption of that state's experiments just because Congress does not approve the experiment. If one state comes up with a new program that works, then others will observe and adopt it too if they wish. I remember when Huey Long developed a veritable dictatorship in Louisiana, there was pressure to have the federal government move in and take control of that situation. I said, leave it alone. The people of Louisiana will either correct it themselves if they don't like it, or they can move across the border to another state. But if the federal government dislikes what he is doing and moves in to stop him--actually Long wasn't breaking any law as far as I know; it was just that so many didn't like his

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demagoguery--then too much power over the state is put in Washington. One day we could get a Huey Long in Washington. How could we correct that? No, let the pattern be demonstrated as unwise at the lower level. It was hard on the people of Louisiana for a time, (although a lot of them thought it was great). But let's not put that much power in the federal government.

MORRISSEY! The presidency is now limited to two terms because of the Twenty-second Amendment. How do you feel about tenure limitations on members of Congress?

JUDD: That's another place where there is no absolute rule; there are exceptions. Probably it would be a good idea if most officials should retire after a certain age, although some of the greatest and most useful deeds in history have been done by people who were beyond that age. At the Mayo Clinic where I was trained, Dr. W. J. Mayo, an extraordinarily wise man, made an absolute rule that every member on the staff had to retire at sixty-five and he and his brother both followed the rule. Some doctors are at their very peak at sixty-five but he saw that the Clinic as a whole would go ahead better and win increased prestige and deserved confidence and greater usefulness if it was able to get the ablest younger doctors to stay on or join the staff. For example, Dr. [John deJ] Pemberton was one of the finest thyroid surgeons in the country. He was going strong at sixty-five, when he had to retire--twelve to fifteen thyroid operations a day, and operating three days a week. But one day he certainly would have to give up and the Clinic must have good successors coming along to take his place. The Clinic would like to add this or that young surgeon to the staff to be ready to move at that time to the top in that specialty. If that younger man can see that on such and such a date Pemberton will he retiring and he can move into the head spot, he'll stay at the Clinic. But if it looks as if the head surgeon may be going on five or ten years beyond sixty-five, then naturally the younger surgeon will accept an invitation to some other good clinic or medical school. So, in one case, a fixed retirement age or a prescribed length of service can deprive a clinic or college or the Congress of the great ability and wisdom of the senior person. In another case, lack of a terminal date can prevent equally good service at a future time. I have seen doctors and congressmen who should have been out at not seventy-five or sixty-five, but at fifty-five years of age and their places taken by highest grade younger men.

One reason I worked hard to establish the pension system for congressmen was because I thought it would encourage retirement of the older members. When I entered in 1943 there was no

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pension system for congressmen. In 1947-48, I think it was, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee took the lead in the reorganization of congressional committees and make exactly the same contributory pension system available for members of the Congress as the postal workers and Government employees under civil service had. If a member elected to, he could have 65 percent of his salary each month--(the salary was $10,000 a year)--put into that pension fund. The government matched it and this built up his equity until he retired, provided he had been there six years--three terms in the House or one term in the Senate. If he had been there less than six years, the transfers from his salary were refunded with interest.

Well, when I came to Congress and saw a couple of fine old gentlemen who were past their prime, I thought probably it was because they didn't have anything else to do and no other means of support. I heard members say, "What am I going to do if I'm not here? I have nothing salted away for the future." I thought that if they had some assured economic security, they would retire voluntarily. So I worked hard for the pension system for that reason. I was wrong. They didn't retire any earlier than before. They stayed on because they enjoyed being at the center of power. They enjoyed the camaraderie. They had a sense of importance, of usefulness. It wasn't exhibitionism. They just liked being there; they felt at home. In most cases the reason they didn't retire was not economic, it was psychological. I must confess I never got that feeling. I never liked serving in Congress in the way that I liked practicing medicine. I didn't like being a soldier in world war I; it was my duty and I did it without fuss or resentment. But I didn't enjoy it the way I did enjoy taking care of sick human beings. Partly, I suppose, it was because too much of success in elective office is dependent on publicity, and it was hard for me to seek that. I was trained as a specialist whose decisions are made on the basis of private examination and study, not on how he and his work will look if reported in the press.

To get back to your question on tenure limitations, I have divided opinions. In a few cases, they would deprive the country of great ability and wisdom, but overall, I think the benefits of an appropriate mandatory retirement system at such and such an age or after a certain number of years, would give more gains than losses for the country. But what is the appropriate age, or number of years of service? There's the rub!

Or maybe a system can be devised providing that if and when there are complaints that a member is becoming senile or incompetent, he would be examined by a group, not

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just one person, but three or more non-partisan individuals, one or two to be physicians, and if they decided that he was no longer able, physically and/or mentally, to perform the functions of the office, they should advise him to resign, or at least not to run again. It should be private and not become public unless he is adamant and refuses the advice and counsel. I've thought about this a lot--without coming up with a firm opinion. I could find so many things wrong with every concrete proposal offered that I never strongly advocated any, although I knew something ought to be done about the situation.

MORRISSEY: A congressman no sooner begins a term than he has to start campaigning for reelection. How do you feel about lengthening the term from two years to four?

JUDD: I am in favor of the principle; but there again there are difficulties. The advantage would be that if the term were four years, the Congress and the country would get three years of service and one year of campaigning. Now they get about one year of service and one year of campaigning. Every campaign year the congressman has to keep his eye on the home district and give much of his time and thought to the campaign. If he's down here doing his job. he isn't home shaking hands, and people will criticize him. His opponent will be saying, "Look at that congressman. Since he's gone to Washington he's gotten so big, he's almost forgotten us folks at home. He doesn't pay attention to us and our problems anymore. He's always in Washington, because he likes it down there." On the other hand, if he's home shaking hands, he's not doing his job in the Congress in Washington. It's an insoluble dilemma for the conscientious congressman.

Senators are better off, and so, generally is the country. It gets from them about five years of service to one of campaigning. That's better for all concerned, except in the relatively rare case where the Senator is in office too long and deteriorating--or where he doesn't work very hard for three or four of the six years. But, by and large, the longer term gives better service, better objectivity, better study of what will be beneficial to the nation rather than of just what will be beneficial from the standpoint of his own career, including his reelection.

With respect to the four year term for congressmen, one of the difficulties is this: what year to have the election. Should it be the same year as the presidential election? If so, then some congressmen will win or lose depending not on their own merits, or lack thereof, but on how charismatic and popular, or the opposite, is the presidential candidate of his

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party that year: Six or eight of the ablest members of the House of Representatives from borderline districts, were defeated in 1974 because of the fall-out from Watergate for which they had no responsibility and with which they had no connection. But the mood in the country was to get rid of all who might have been connected with Nixon's cover-up, or at least, belonged to the same party.

And on the other side of the question, a crop of youngsters came in, who weren't quite dry behind the ears. Quite a few of those will be retired this next time unless they've grown a lot by that time.

I was talking with one of them who voted on reorganization of the Congress before he had sat one day in it. All the Democratic electees in November of that year met here in December and decided how the Congress, especially the committee system, should be reorganized and memberships determined. That's like my prescribing for a patient I haven't examined. But I was taught never to diagnose and prescribe for a patient I hadn't examined myself--at least once! So I said to this new fellow, who is just as sure now of what ought to be done about the Congress and the country as he was a year and a half ago, and his view is different now, "Would you say now that your judgment is perhaps a bit better now than it was when you met before you had sat in the Congress?" "Oh," he said, "you have no idea how much I've learned." "Well," I said, "is it possible that two years from now you'll know even more and be even wiser and your judgment even better than it is now?" He equivocated because he's one of those who is sure that what he believes at the moment is the final wisdom.

It's like in the sixties when the youth were out marching or crusading for all sorts of drastic changes and so many thought they knew all the answers. I was speaking at various colleges and the students, particularly graduates, would take me to task on my views on a variety of problems at home and abroad. One day with a particularly vehement one, I asked him, "Would you mind my asking you a question?" "No, go right ahead." "How old are you?" "I'm twenty-four." "Well," I said, "would you say that you had better judgment when you were twenty-one than you have now?" "No-o-o. Of course, I've got more experience now." "Well, isn't it possible that at thirty or even at twenty-seven you might have even better judgment than you have now?" This set him back. because he and so many others hadn't thought about it that, way. They were so sure that everyone over thirty was passé. Some people do decay as they move up from youth. But more people become wiser with experience and therefore sounder. These comments aren't on the question you asked about tenure limitations, but perhaps

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are of some usefulness.

I've talked about making decisions not in terms of popularity but in terms of what in the long run you believe will be good or bad for the country. On the other hand, there's no reason why you shouldn't be smart and skilful in presenting your case and the reasons for the positions you take. My experience has been that a majority of the soundest members of the Congress are among the least effective in presenting their case. It's always easier to sell an inferior patent medicine by all sorts of glowing promises for almost every complaint, than by saying, yes, this is good for certain conditions, but shouldn't be used for any others. A scientist is at a disadvantage in politics where there are so many "medicine men" who sell you quack remedies. I hesitate to say this but I will. There's a public figure I know very well, of whom in his home state it is said, "This fellow can sell you colored water as whiskey so convincingly that if you drink it you get drunk." He's a magnificent salesman. whether the product is really good or inferior, well, you buy it before you find out.

Now, a lot of persons with important responsibilities are inadequate, and I'm one of them, in getting or using clever slogans. People nowadays think and buy, more and more, on the basis of slogans or labels. The communists are masters at this. They never describe us except as capitalists, imperialists, militarists, et cetera. They never describe themselves except as democratic and working only for the well-being of the people. It's like the "People's Republic of China," although the people have nothing to say about the government; it's a total dictatorship. The "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" is neither democratic nor a republic. Yet by hammering away with repetitions of the words, good slogans, the words get into people's consciousness and the programs come to be accepted as what the slogans call them. I was never any good at slogans.

I was at Princeton one time to talk to the Young Republican Club at dinner. The chairman of it, a real sharp junior, said, "You know, I'm Republican because I think the party's positions are fundamentally right on most issues, nearer right than those of the other party. But," he said, "you know, we always look so bad. We always seem to be just "'agin" everything. Why can't we come up with something that saleable, that's positive, that's attractive?" I said, "Well, have you ever heard of the Peace Corps?" He said, "Yeah, that's the kind of thing I'm talking about." "Well," I said, "that was a Republican program." "It was?" "Yes. It was started under Ike [Dwight D. Eisenhower]. What did we call it? International

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Voluntary Service (IVS). It was doing a whale of a good job in Laos, Cambodia, and other places. But who ever heard of IVS? Kennedy came in, took the same program, glamorized and expanded it, called it "Peace Corps" and people said, "Great."

I said to the Princeton Club, "Here's another one. Have you ever heard of Food for Peace?" "Yeah, that's the kind of program we ought to have." "Well, that's another Republican program. It was started in 1953-54 by the Republican Eighty-third Congress. I happened to be the co-author of it and I'm a city congressman. I introduced it and tried to get it through. I got a Democrat, Omar Burleson of Texas, to introduce it with me so it would be bipartisan. The Farm Bureau worked with us on it, because they saw its benefits for agriculture. I testified before the Agriculture Committee but its response at first was negative. Some members said it was just another of what they called "Judd's give-away programs." (Slogan again). The only way I could get it enacted was to get my own Foreign Affairs Committee to put it into the Foreign Aid Act of 1953. You'll find it as Section 550 of that Act. It would use our grain surpluses, already bought and paid for, as a very important instrument in the promotion of the right kind of foreign assistance to needy peoples in the kind of world we live in.

The program had three main advantages. Number one, it used our surplus agricultural products as a very important, increasingly important, weapon, if you want to call it that, in our foreign policy, supporting friends, or winning friends, instead of letting them in discouragement turn to our enemies. The second was, it would save us money. We wouldn't have to send new money abroad. We were appropriating and giving dollars to country X which then used the dollars to buy wheat from Argentina or Australia or Canada while we had enormous surpluses already bought and paid for. The grain was stored here and there and we were paying storage on it. Under the Act's provisions, we appropriated money to reimburse the Commodity Credit Corporation for the surplus grain it had bought and was storing. That is, we transferred dollars from one government pocket to another. Needy people got the grain and we didn't have to pay the storage anymore. So the program saved us money. And third, it would help to reduce the vast surpluses of grain we had in this country which were depressing the grain markets and hurting our agricultural population. I came originally from a farm area and I was acutely aware of the farmers' problems.

The Agriculture Committee just called it a give-away

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program. But we got it through under the foreign aid program and it worked. Harold Stassen, our former Minnesota governor, was head of the aid program at that time. He was a close friend, of course, and he really went to work at it. The agriculture bloc and others insisted that there be a limit on the amount of dollars that could be so spent; not more than $150 million that first year. Well, when he had taken $148 million worth of their surpluses, used it effectively as an instrument of our foreign policy, and by reducing the surpluses was stimulating their grain prices, the farm bloc discovered how it was helping with their own problems. (This was my third reason for the program, but it became their first!) They took the program over, repassed it in 1954 as Public Law 480, and it's in effect today. Well, this was a Republican program and we called it just Public Law 480 in 1954. In 1967 Kennedy came into power and he promptly called it "Food for Peace." Later Senator Humphrey called it "Food for Freedom" at times. Good slogans! Republicans were paying attention to the merits, and the Democrats got and are still getting credit for it by the slogans. There's no reason why some Republicans should not be able to come up with good slogans too, for good programs.

I asked the Young Republican that night about a third program, the Alliance for Progress. He was strong for that, and, of course, had no idea that it was also from the Republican Eisenhower administration. Ike had set up a commission to help our South American allies in sound ways. He put as chairman of the Commission his brother Milton who was an expert in agriculture, had been president of Kansas State Agricultural College and was president of Johns Hopkins University at the time. The Commission studied the situation on the ground and came back in 1960 recommending a program of help in Latin America of the kind that experience elsewhere had shown is sound and effective. The bill authorized a total of $600 million. $100 million of it was set aside for Chile, mostly for relief after an earthquake and severe disaster there. $500 million--I wouldn't gamble on these exact figures, it's been a long time, but I think that is right-$500 million was to be made available to countries in Latin America--and here was the key--if, as, and when they did certain things to help themselves. It was not to be just handouts-temporary relief. The recipients had to do something about desperately needed land reform to give incentive and opportunity for farmers to produce more. They had to do something about education of their peoples. They had to do something about the health of their peoples. They had to do something about roads to open up back areas, and so on and on. To the extent that they did these long-neglected things, with and

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for their own people, we would match their efforts with our dollars up to that amount. We would not just turn money over to them as had so often been done in the past with fast using. up of the money without long-lasting benefit to the peoples. Well; that bill was passed by the Congress in 1960 before John Kennedy was ever elected. What did we name it? Latin American Development Program. Not much glamour in that title!

John Kennedy came in and promptly renamed it "Alliance for Progress." That was a wonderful slogan and people applauded. Tragically, the program largely failed because he didn't stick to the conditions in the Act. It became practically a scandal. He hadn't been in office, as I recall, more than about three weeks when of the $500 million, he made $375 million available--I think that's the right figure--as grants--just handouts. By just giving them dollars he was showing them how much we loved them, I suppose, and how noble and generous his administration was. But he didn't stick to the conditions and everybody will tell you now that the program was a flop. It was to be an inducement, a challenge for them to carry out some necessary reforms. There was no reason for American taxpayers to give them our money when in Latin America itself, there was lots of money. They were taking more than $400 million a year--I can't be sure of that exact figure--out of Latin America and putting it into Swiss banks or into investments on Wall Street and so on. As long as they were doing things like that, we had no right to give them United States money. Without their fulfilling the purposes for which ours was given, it was neither an Alliance nor Progress.

The program was sound and could have succeeded if carried out. Just giving dollars to those countries doubtless showed them that Kennedy and his administration really cared about the Latin Americans, but it discouraged rather than advanced the kind of development and progress that might have been achieved.

You have to package attractively a good product to make it saleable. And title a good program attractively so get people to support it. That's as true of candidates for office as of products and programs. Slogans, dramatics, salesmanship are essential--and good if they are honest and accurate and responsible. '

What else can I say in this so-called oral history that might be of some interest?

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Perhaps because the media generally identified me with China--and understandably--I ought to discuss that part of my public service. I had worked in China for ten years under nationalists, under communists, under Japanese armies, so I knew something about China and Asia. First of all, I could look at the map and see the importance of China to Asia and our own future. One reason I went there as a medical missionary in the beginning was because of the geopolitical situation which Napoleon had described: "There lies China, a sleeping giant. Don't awaken her, for once she's awakened, she'll change the face of the earth." Well, China was awakening after the Revolution which overthrew the 267 year old Manchu dynasty in 1911. Nobody was going to be able to put her back to sleep. Which way was China to go? Was she to be a peaceful friend? Or a troublesome factor in the world? This could be one of the most important questions of the twentieth century. Which way is Russia to go? Which way is China to go? And now, which way is the United States to go, basically? The answers to these questions can determine much of the fate of ourselves and of the world.

So I went to China as a missionary to help turn it in the direction of cooperation and peace. And by the 1930's it was going in those directions in a remarkable way. But for a whole series of reasons which are too long to go into here, the opponents of what Chiang Kai-shek was trying to do for the country slandered him as a tyrant, not a patriot who was trying his best to overcome almost impossible difficulties. The communists had six adjectives that they incessantly repeated--and soon many sincere but uninformed Americans were shouting them too--Chiang and his team were said to be "inept, incompetent, inefficient, undemocratic, corrupt, and reactionary." The leftists knew they had to discredit and destroy Chiang if they were to take China for the communists. Lenin had said, "The way to Paris (meaning the West) is through Peking." To get to China would be like getting first base in baseball. The rest of Asia would be second base. The rest of the underdeveloped world--Africa and Latin America-would be third base. But plainly, the ultimate objective all along, just as in baseball, was home base: the North Atlantic and the United States, where the power, industry, wealth of the free world are. That's been their aim and strategy all these decades, repeatedly proclaimed by themselves.

I worked in an area in South China that was under the control of communists five times--once in 1930 for eight months. There isn't anything new now in their goals and the deceptive methods they use. Then I was working in North China when the Japanese attacked in 1937. The communists pretended

[41]

to join Chiang in fighting the Japanese, but most of their efforts were to weaken Chiang and build up their own power to get total control after the war. Lin Piao was their ablest general and at that time in command of the Communist Eighth Route Army in my province of Shansi. His headquarters was in a village six or so miles outside the walled city where our hospital was. He was a patient of mine. I didn't talk to him about war or politics. I talked to him only as a doctor, correct and courteous; but I could not be friendly with so powerful and ruthless a tyrant. They claim that later he even tried to overthrow Mao—or assassinate him.

I report this only to indicate I had gained some knowledge of communist strategy and tactics. When I got out in 1938, after five months under the Japanese armies, I tried to point out here what the Japanese militarists and the Chinese communists were doing. The communists weren't Chinese patriots, "democratic agrarian reformers--trying to eliminate "landlordism." There was relatively little of that in China, actually less in China than in the United States. But "agrarian reformers" was a great slogan and it was sold to the American people as a fact. I supported the Nationalist regime as by all odds better for the Chinese people than communist or Japanese control--and, clearly, better for the United States; China was still a loyal ally and friend of ours in peace as in war.

The way for the leftists to discredit my position and arguments was to try to discredit me. So it was said over and over, "Judd is just emotional about the Chinese. He's an Asia-firster. He's a partisan of Chiang Kai-shek. He's "China lobby." Again, slogans, slogans, slogans. They didn't try to refute my facts; they couldn't. They sought to discredit me and my efforts on behalf of freedom for the peoples of Asia. and ourselves. And to a considerable extent with the general public, they succeeded.

Then in 1950, the North Korea communists with Soviet assistance attacked South Korea. Actually we had encouraged that--practically invited it.--when we took every last American soldier out of South Korea in 1949. I fought that withdrawal tooth and nail--and failed! Somebody in the administration sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff to testify before our committee that they didn't have any objection to withdrawing all our troops, because, they said, if any attack came on South Korea, they could handle it as well from Japan as from South Korea. Some of us with experience in Asia contended that there wouldn't be any attack, if we kept some American forces there; and there doubtless would be if we didn't. The Chiefs said, "Well, they

[42]

can run over Seoul now." I said, "Certainly. Just as the Soviets can run over West Berlin--any weekend. We have only one beefed-up American regiment there. So why don't they take West Berlin, which they'd surely like to have? Just because there is that regiment there, and the American flag. Please, keep a company or at least a platoon of our forces in Seoul with our flag, as the visible evidence of American determined interest in giving this new nation, South Korea, for whose creation we ourselves are largely responsible, a chance to make a go of it. If we do, I can't believe the communists will be so foolish as to start a war against South Korea with U. S. forces there. They know our power; they know who has the atomic bomb. But if we take every American soldier out of South Korea we give them a green light, and actually invite attack. Do communists ever pull out from anything they are interested in holding?"

Well, we pulled out, left a vacuum and as soon as the Soviets could get the North Korean forces ready, they invaded in June 1950. Whereupon we had to turn around and drive them out, at a cost of 33,000 American lives. The communists were indignant at our action, as they had a right to be. After all, if we were interested in keeping them out of South Korea, why in the heck did we leave? They felt we had double-crossed them, left the door open, encouraged them to move in--and then went to war to drive them out!

When we were finally on the verge of success in Korea, Truman, in what I think was a grave blunder--he had done so many good things--pulled MacArthur out in disgrace. If he had allowed MacArthur or his successor to go ahead, that war would have been over, there wouldn't be two Koreas with only a truce to this day, and there couldn't have been such a war in Vietnam. Vietnam was merely the unfinished Korea war--and look at the cost of that, in lives, treasure, honor, and world confidence in us. MacArthur had said, "A great nation that voluntarily enters into war and does not carry through to victory must suffer the consequences of defeat." He was right. Already we are suffering those consequences, and I fear there may be still worse ones ahead. Countries around the world are less certain they can depend on us.

There's a further story on the Korea policy our government decided to follow after Eisenhower was in the White House. I don't think I put this in my oral history on Eisenhower; perhaps it ought to be in the record here. Understandably, there was deep division of opinion on whether 1) to accept the stalemate in Korea left by the previous administration, or 2) to build up South Korea and our forces there and

[43]

drive to the Yalu River to unite all of Korea with overthrow of the communist north. In a final discussion at the State Department with about twenty members of both Senate and House committees participating, some of us argued for such action, even when Undersecretary of State General Walter Bedell Smith, who had been Ike's Chief of Staff in Europe, reported it was estimated the effort would probably mean 25,000 more deaths and 100,000 casualties of American soldiers. My own comment was something like this: "It's an awful decision to make and especially for this new president. If he goes ahead with military action, critics will say 'Once a soldier, always a soldier; Eisenhower just has to get us into war!'" But in the long run I believed we'd lose many fewer lives if we settled this Korea problem promptly. If we didn't, we'd have wars in other parts of Asia and maybe a war for the world--and a much larger number of lives would be lost. I wasn't surprised that the majority was against it. Secretary [John Foster] Dulles and Undersecretary Smith coolly analyzed the situation with us. It could be done, but they recognized the political fall-out as well as the losses in lives and the casualties. Should a new administration, just starting, one that had been in office only three or four months, take such a military action? They asked our opinion. I didn't blame them and the majority for deciding not to do anything except hold at the 38th parallel and talk--and we're still just talking there today. I may add that four at that conference dissented from the decision: a Republican senator from California, a Democratic congressman from South Carolina, another from Georgia, and myself. And I still fear the majority decision was overall a mistake with probably far greater costs ahead.

Well, what next? China was still the key to Asia. Were the strong Chinese people to be able to rejoin the free world?? Or was the dictatorship in Peking to be built up with our assistance into a constant threat to Asia and the world, a threat involving our own security? Or were we just to drift, and hope for the best?

So that year (1953) some of us opted for the first choice, and organized what we called The Committee for a Million (against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations). We didn't believe Communist China should be given greater prestige and power. There was strong pressure with arguments for admission like the following: Communist China is there; therefore she should be admitted to the United Nations. But that is a non-sequitur. There are gangsters in Chicago, but we don't say that because they are there, they should be brought into the police force. Would that help the

[44]

police force to deal with the gangsters? Communist China's dictatorial leadership was and is against everything the UN supposedly stands for, and yet some were insisting that we should bring them in just because they were there.

It was said we were trying to ignore China, hiding our heads in the sand, pretending it doesn't exist. My answer was another medical analogy: when we isolate a case of smallpox, we're not ignoring it; we're ignoring it if we don't isolate it--until the disease runs its course. We were not ignoring Communist China; we had over a hundred negotiations with its representatives--in Poland and elsewhere--often once a month for years. But does it make sense to bring it into the UN with greatly increased prestige, power, influence, entree to all the world, until it is willing to change its policies so as to qualify for membership? We were not keeping it out; it was keeping itself out. We told the P.R.C. repeatedly we would sponsor its membership if it would qualify by accepting the obligations of membership in good faith.

We didn't want to weaken the UN and cynically ignore its Charter which says: "Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter ...." A first obligation is to "refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force..." But Mao Tse-tung insisted that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"--force. And you can be sure he will not renounce that. If we cynically ignore the Charter's provisions, we will be sacrificing the UN to short-sighted expediency.

Advocates said that membership in the UN should be universal; all countries should be in it. Then why not first get the Charter amended by striking out Article Six which provides for the expulsion of nations which persistently violate the Principles contained in the Charter? Why would it have a provision for expelling countries if all governments of whatever kind were supposed to be in? And when Communist China was admitted 1971--was the Republic of China kept in to make the membership universal? No. It was out.

I have believed and urged all these years that there ought to be a league of all existing governments. That could be useful. But the United Nations was supposed to be a union of peace-loving nations to pool their strength against lawlessness and aggression from whatever source. Communist China was unwilling to qualify.

These were some of the basic reasons for organizing this Committee for a Million. When we had over a million

[45]

signatures to its declaration, we changed the name to "Committee of a Million (against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations)". We sought to get facts to the public and to Congress. We helped to prevent the admission for eighteen years, 1953-71.

Along about 1958 it was said, "Communist China's admission is inevitable." It did not happen. In 1961 admission was said to be inevitable. Recently I replayed the tape of a nationwide broadcast debate I had with Hugh Gaitskill, who was head of the Labor Party in England at the time. This was in August, 1961. He said, "What are you going to do when they're admitted at the U. N.'s meeting next month? It's inevitable." I said that I refused to believe that. He pressed me, "But what are you going to do then?" I said, "Sir, when I'm called to see a patient, I don't say to the relatives, 'Now, what are you going to do when the patient dies? You call me in order to keep the patient from dying.'" I don't agree that admission is inevitable. And it wasn't admitted. Then in '65, it was said to be inevitable. But just then Mao Tse-tung started the Cultural Revolution which was such an outrageously inhuman catastrophe that our government couldn't accept it. And those eighteen years, from '53 to '71, gave the Chinese on Taiwan the time and opportunity to show the world what the Chinese people can and will do for themselves when they're under a government that represents them, not under an international conspiracy that's totally un-Chinese. Peking was avowedly dedicated to destroying what Mao called the "FOUR OLDS": old ideas (Chinese philosophy), old culture, old customs or traditions, and old habits or ways. Everything truly Chinese must be destroyed, "washed out of peoples' minds."

In contrast, the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan was working to preserve Chinese values and culture. Why shouldn't they be proud of and seek to preserve and strengthen the longest continuous civilization in all of human history? And that's what they've been doing so successfully on Taiwan. They've demonstrated for the whole world to see what the Chinese people can and will do if free. And as a result Taiwan with seventeen million people has about eight times as much trade with the world as the huge so-called People's Republic of China on the mainland has. The Republic of China on Taiwan is the greatest success story in all the underdeveloped world: remarkable progress in land reform, housing, health, highways, education, village industries manufacturing, prosperity, freedom of travel, residence, choice of jobs, plus increasing political freedom and increasing freedom of speech and of the press; more than 10,000 copies

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of TIME and NEWSWEEK are sold on news stands each week and frequently one or the other has an article somewhat critical of the Republic of China. But there they are; anyone can buy and read. It's really surprising how relatively little censorship there is now, considering that they're still under martial law because still at war with the mainland regime constantly threatening them.

So pushing that Committee of a Million and its work was one of the most useful things I ever did, I think. We prevented acceptance of Communist China until Americans and other peoples had opportunity to see the difference: what the Chinese peoples will do for themselves when they are relatively free under a government, like the Republic of China on Taiwan, that represents their history, their traditions, their character, their way of doing things, their true interests, as contrasted with what has happened and is still happening to people in the People's Republic of China under Mao in Peking, a regime that represents nobody but itself: a self-selected, self-imposed, self-perpetuating clique--a total dictatorship that announces its determination to destroy the Chinese culture. We should be proper and correct in our relations with the PRC--it is there. But we don't need to bow down before tyrants or effervesce about them or pretend they aren't what undeniably they are.

I'm unhappy about the way I fear Secretary of State Kissinger is leading us into potential disaster in that part of the world. He went to China a year ago to prepare for President Ford's visit, and the foreign minister of China started right off in his welcoming toast to say: "There have been many changes in the world since you were here last time, Mr. Secretary. There is great turbulence and disruption in the world which is good. Out of this will come progress...". He thereby boldly announced that they are for disruption; obviously he believed it would weaken us and our efforts to provide order in the world. Then he became proper and polite in his remarks., But he had not hesitated to declare his side's position. Henry got up and thanked him and then said, "The process of normalizing relations between the United States and the People's Republic. of China is a fixed principle of American foreign policy. It was no accident that the President of the United States (Ford) saw your ambassador in the white House only a few hours after he was sworn in." That is, the very first representative of a foreign country to be seen by Gerald Ford the very afternoon he became President of the United States at noon was the representative of Communist China, from its liaison office here in Washington. Not a representative of any of our solid friends in Europe or elsewhere, but of Communist China. Well this was a signal to both the friends and the enemies of the United States: a signal that the United States can no longer be counted on to be a truly dependable ally.

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This was the kind of cause for which I worked in the Congress and out. My primary interest never was in the Chinese, friends or enemies. My primary concern has always been for the security and well being of my own country. If the Chinese people are free, they will be friendly and there's no insoluble problem in the Far East for them or us. Difficult problems, yes, but not insoluble (except perhaps for Bangladesh. I don't quite see how Bangladesh can make it). On the other hand, if the communists had been able really to unite the Chinese people----. (Let me interrupt myself here to point out that fortunately for us, they haven't yet been able to, and that they won't be able to, without our help. If they drive the Chinese people into hopeless despair, well, the people will yield--outside, though not inside. They've learned through centuries to be realistic, even fatalistic, Like the "Wise bamboo," they'll bend, not break--so that, like the bamboo, they can come back up again whenever, even after a hundred years, they regain their freedom. I hope and believe they will make it).

Well, I got off the track with that interruption--so I'll repeat: if the Chinese communists had been able really to unite the Chinese people and develop the full potential might that is there, then there's no solution for the problems of other countries in the area. That tip of a thumb, South Korea, hasn't got a prayer against North Korea and the giant China behind it. Japan announced last week she's going to Peking to sign finally a treaty of peace from World War II, pretty much on Peking's terms. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko is warning Japan not to do it. But Japan obviously is willing under the circumstances to antagonize even Russia, because Japan knows that in the long run she has got to be on the same side as the China mainland. The Philippines don't want to be on that same side, but they look at the map and see where they have to be. How can they hold out against Peking's enticements and pressures when the United States goes to Peking looking almost like a supplicant. If the strong, like the U.S.A., embrace, how long can the weaker resist?

Secretary Kissinger works to get agreements with communists that aren't worth the paper they are written on. He seems to think communists will act as diplomats of Europe did in the last century. His special study was of those diplomats; they were tough bargainers but there were codes of chivalry and honor; once they gave their

[48]

word, they kept it. But today there is a new brand of diplomacy, and a new breed of diplomats. Communists have a world goal. With them deception is a virtue, not something reprehensible. In short, when you become a communist you're no longer a nationalist of whatever is your native land. You are not a patriot of Russia or China or the United States or England or France or Japan; you're a world revolutionist. I've been a poor salesman for that idea for forty-five years, ever since I came home from China the first time in 1931. It is a simple fact, but you can't get it across to most people in this land. We Americans insist on projecting our ideas, our values; our codes, our methods into their minds, and on believing that they are going to conduct their affairs according to our standards. It is not so.

Also, we tend to assume that every government operates in terms of its national interests and therefore if we help it meets its national problems--food, health, security, peace, prosperity--it won't be a threat to anybody else. If it's a government in Moscow, it must be that it's just working for the well-being of the Russian people. If it's a government in Peking, it must be that it's working just for the well-being of the Chinese people. This is, I fear, the number one error of our time. Communists are not nationalists; they are world revolutionists.

Well, Communist China was finally admitted in 1971 into the United Nations. Our Committee of a Million against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations was reorganized as "The Committee for a Free China." This is one of the causes I've been working for ever since. I wrote a letter yesterday that I hope will raise some money for it. It is not a committee to support just the present free China on the island of Taiwan. It is The Committee for a Free China, all of China. For there won't be any real solution to problems in the Pacific until the Chinese people are free again. That doesn't suggest any invasion of the mainland, or use of force from without. It does mean that we should not help build up the tyrants on the mainland. The Chinese will ultimately pull them down, I am confident, if only we don't help build them up. We don't have to take hostile action; we can just wait--as the Oriental does. He has patience; we don't. We demand a quick solution--and it can't be achieved that rapidly. We must do better at this.

So this is a sketch of my own work as a missionary, as a congressman and as a crusader for human freedom--freedom everywhere. It's the most basic and important thing

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I've worked for all through the decades. At times we have succeeded marginally; we haven't succeeded too well with the main task as yet. But one has to work for what one is convinced is right, no matter how long, or what the odds!

MORRISSEY: You timed that very well because we're coming to the end of this reel of tape.

Charles T. Morrissey

Charles T. Morrissey, designer and director of phase 2 of the Former Members of Congress project entitled "The Modern Congress in American History," is a full-time oral history consultant and writer, interviewer, teacher, and editor. He has an A.B. (Dartmouth) and an M.A. (University of California) in history.

Professor Morrissey has been oral historian of the Harry S. Truman Library; interviewer for the John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Project and later chief of the project; director of the Christian A. Herter Oral History Project, Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History, Harvard University; director of the Ford Foundation Oral History Project; director of the Dartmouth College Oral History Project; and director of the George D. Aiken Oral History Project, University of Vermont.

He has taught history at the University of California (Berkeley), Dartmouth College, and the University of Vermont and has given oral history courses throughout the United States. He has traditionally given a summer oral history course at the University of Vermont.

He has been consultant and evaluator for numerous proposed and existing oral history projects including those of the Republic of Indonesia; the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore; Baylor University; the National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health; Massachusetts Institute of Technology and many others.

The most recent of his numerous publications, Vermont, A Bicentennial History, reflects his deep interest in the state where he resides.

Agriculture Committee-House of Representatives, 37
Alliance for Progress, 38, 39

Bill of Rights, 9
Bricker, John W., 4
Burleson, Omar, 37
Byrnes, John, 27

Catholics, 7
Chiang Kai-shek, 40, 41
China, 40, 41, 43-48
Civil rights, 22, 23
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22, 23
Committee for a Free China, 48
Committee for a Million, 43-46
Committee on Government Operations, 18
Congress, seniority system, 25, 26
Congressional pension system, 32, 33
Congressional term of office, proposed change of, 34, 35
Constitution, U.S., 23
Constitutional Convention of 1787, 9

Declaration of Independence, 7, 8
Democrat-Farm Labor Party, 18, 19
Democratic National Convention of 1960, 29
Democratic Party, 10, 28-30
'Dewey, Thomas E., 16, 17
Dulles, John F., 43

Eightieth Congress, 16-18
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1-4, 13-16, 36, 38
Eisenhower, Milton, 38

Food for Peace, 37, 38
Ford, Gerald R., 13, 15, 18, 46
Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, 2, 3, 26, 27
Foreign Aid Act of 1953, 37

Gaitskill, Hugh, 45
German Democratic Republic (East Germany), 2
Germany (Nazi), 1, 11, 12, 17, 18
Goldwater, Barry M., 15, 22, 23
Great Britain, 7, 45
Gromyko, Andrei, 47

Herter, Christian A., 2, 3, 6, 22
Hitler, Adolph, 1, 11, 12, 17, 18
Huguenots, 7
Humphrey, Hubert H., 15, 18, 38

Internal Revenue Service, 1
International Voluntary Service, 36, 37

Japan, 40, 41, 47
Johnson, Lyndon B., 15, 17, 29, 30

Kefauver, Estes, 33
Kennedy, John F., 14-16, 19, 29, 30, 37-39
Khruschev, Nikita, 1
Kissinger, Henry A., 46, 47
Korean War, 41-43

Labor, 24, 25
Latin America, 38, 39
Lenin, Nikolai, 5, 40
Lincoln, Abraham, 4, 15
Lin Piao, 41
Long, Huey, 31, 32

MacArthur, Douglas, 42
Mao Tse-Tung, 41, 44, 45
Marshall Plan, 3, 17
Mayo Clinic, 32
Mayo, W. J., 32
Miller, William, 15
Mills, Wilbur, 27
Minimum wage legislation, 24, 25
Minnesota, State of, 18, 19, 21
Minnesota State Fair, 2
Mundt, Karl E., 29
Muskie, Edmund, 15

New Frontier, 16
Nixon, Richard M., 13, 15, 18, 30
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 2, 3, 17

Peace Corps, 36, 37
Pemberton, John, 32
Pentagon Papers, 18
Philippines, 47
Point IV, 17
Poland, 2
"Potomac Fever", 15
Presidential Election of 1948, 1, 16-18
Presidential Election of 1960, 29, 30
Puritans, 6

Rayburn, Sam, 29
Republican Party, 10, 15, 18, 19, 28-30
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 29
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 14, 15, 17

Segregation, racial, 29, 30
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1976, 47
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), 40, 41
Slogans, political, 36-39
Smith, Walter Bedell, 43
Social Security, 12
South Korea, U.S. military evacuation of, 1949, 41, 42
Soviet Union, 2, 8, 17, 18
Stalin, Joseph V., 1
Stassen, Harold, 38
Stevenson, Adlai E., 29

Taft, Robert A., 2, 4-6
Taiwan, 30, 45, 46
Truman Committee, 12, 13
Truman Doctrine, 17
Truman, Harry S.:

Administration of, corruption in, 1
80th Congress, attacks on, 16-18
Judd, Walter, midwest speaking tour with, 1943, 12, 13
Kennedy, John F., support for, 1960 election, 29
MacArthur, Douglas, dismissal of as UN Commander in Korea, 42
Presidential Election of 1948, victory in, 16, 18
Truman Committee, and the, 12, 13
Twenty Second Amendment, 32

United Nations, 43, 44, 45, 48
United Nations Charter, 44

Ways and Means Committee, House of Representatives, 26, 27
Wilson, Woodrow, 10, 14

Yalu River, 43
Young Republican Club, Princeton University, 36-38

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