Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum


Oral History Interview with
Matthew J. Connelly

Chief investigator for the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (the Truman Committee), 1941-44, Executive Assistant to Senator and Vice President Truman, July 1944-April 1945; and Appointments Secretary to the President, 1945-53.

New York, New York
November 28, 1967
By Jerry N. Hess

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional Connelly Oral History Transcripts]


NOTICE
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened May 1969
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional Connelly Oral History Transcripts]



Oral History Interview with
Matthew J. Connelly

New York, New York
November 28, 1967
By Jerry N. Hess

[1]

HESS: Mr. Connelly, the primary interest in our interview is, of course, your relationship with Mr. Truman. What was that relationship and when did it begin?

CONNELLY: I did not meet the then Senator Truman until the day I walked into his office. I was recommended by Senator Lister Hill of Alabama. I was purposely trying to establish another relationship which Senator Hill had suggested as a trouble-shooter for the White House. Senator Hill called me one afternoon and said he would like to see me and to call him off the Senate floor. I made that appointment, and

[2]

Senator Hill took me back to his office in the Senate Office Building and there he said, "We just had a meeting today of the Military Affairs Committee," of which he was a member and of which Senator Truman was a member. Senator Hill told me that Senator Truman was going to have to have a very important investigation, and he wanted me to work on his committee. I was not very happy about it because of the original understanding I had with Senator Hill, however, I kept the appointment with Senator Truman on the following morning. I walked into his office; I had never met him, as I said before, so he said, "Come in." He said, "I know all about you. I know what you did in Missouri, Chicago, and other committees you've been on. We have a very peculiar situation here. I have been authorized to become chairman of this committee, however, it has not been determined what our appropriations are going

[3]

to be. I do not know what I can pay you, but I will say this to you, if you go along with me, you will never have any reason to regret it."

I replied, "Senator, I came in here to say no, but the way you talk is refreshing in Washington and you've got yourself a deal."

"Well, we're agreed, so we'll arrange for space and some of the mechanical things like handling the mail."

I said, "I'd be very happy to." And that's where it began.

HESS: Who was the first one hired for the staff of the Truman Committee?

CONNELLY: Matthew J. Connelly.

HESS: In one of the books I have read by Harry Aubrey Toulmin, Jr., Diary of Democracy, he mentions that "Fulton's first step was to

[4]

organize both a legal staff and a staff of investigators; in that he showed his capacity and from that organization much of the success of the Committee grew. One of his smart moves was to pick Matthew J. Connelly as his chief investigator, a keen, diligent and discreet man with an unusual grasp of governmental procedures," but Mr. Toulmin just had his chronology wrong, is that right, in saying that?

CONNELLY: Yes, he was in error on that, because Mr. Fulton was not hired as counsel to the committee until after I'd been appointed by Senator Truman.

HESS: He was hired the last day of March--March 31, 1941. Tell me about the staffing of the Truman Committee. You were the first one that Senator Truman got for the staff. Who came next? Just how was this staff set up and organized?

[5]

CONNELLY: The second appointment of the committee as far as I know, was Charles Patrick Clark, and Charles Patrick Clark did not know of my conversation with Senator Truman. We had previously worked together on the Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures under the chairmanship of Senator Gillette of Iowa. Charles Patrick Clark later told me that he was appointed to the committee through the good offices of Senator Smathers of New Jersey. He knew nothing about my previous conversation with Senator Truman, and amusingly he later took credit for getting me the job. So the first two appointments were myself and Charles Patrick Clark.

HESS: Toulmin goes on to say, "The first staff primarily consisted of Hugh Fulton as chief counsel, his assistant and later his successor, Rudolph Halley, Harold G. Robinson, its auditor,

[6]

Matthew Connelly, its chief investigator, and its present chief counsel, George Meader." So he left out Charles Patrick Clark but included the other men which we will get to here in just a minute.

One question I would like to ask before we get on to the men who served on the Truman Committee, could you tell me a little bit about the committees on the Hill that you had served for before this time? Just a little bit of your background on the Hill.

CONNELLY: Yes, my first experience on the Hill was an investigation of the relief program in Washington, D.C.

HESS: What time was that?

CONNELLY: That was in 1938. It was a joint committee of the House and Senate. We conducted an investigation of the relief program

[7]

in Washington, D.C.--in other words, the local welfare program. That lasted for a period of, I would say, about six months. Senator Thomas of Oklahoma was the chairman of that committee. From that I went to the House Appropriations Committee to investigate the WPA. The chairman of that committee was Congressman Tabor of New York--no, he was the ranking Republican member--the chairman was Clarence Cannon who was also chairman of the full Appropriations Committee. So from there I went to the Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures in the election in 1940. That was under the chairmanship of Senator Gillette. On that committee was Senator Hill of Alabama who I had worked under as chairman of the subcommittee to investigate the Kelly-Nash machine in Chicago. This was about four weeks before the election of 1940. From there Senator Hill, after the conclusion of the hearings in Chicago, asked me to go to

[8]

Alabama to make an investigation of the Willkie campaign. He was then campaigning for President. Which I did. After completion of that investigation, I returned to Washington and that is when Senator Hill suggested to me that he wanted me to go with Senator Truman.

HESS: Did you find that the background that you gained in serving on those other committees helped you in your duties on the Truman Committee?

CONNELLY: Well, it certainly did because I was conscious of one thing, I learned what members of Congress had to do--what their responsibilities were, what their problems were--and my number one job was to do the bidding of the chairman of that committee which I always found to be fair.

HESS: Mr. Connelly, what positions did you hold

[9]

on the staff?

CONNELLY: I held the position of Chief Investigator and that is all.

HESS: I have read that you and Charles Patrick Clark at different times held the job as Executive Assistant. Is that title incorrect?

CONNELLY: That title was never used on the committee.

HESS: Never used on the committee. Well, I have read in a couple of books that someone was assigned to help the chairman with some of the various duties and their title might have been Executive Assistant. That was just incorrect?

CONNELLY: That was incorrect.

HESS: Now, let's review a few of the people who served on the committee and if you could tell me what their respective backgrounds were,

[10]

roughly why these particular people were called in to be members of the committee--this is asking you to remember back quite a ways, but if they have any specific duties that you recall--any times that you may have worked with them--anything that might help scholars out in a better understanding of the people who served on the Truman Committee? Now the list I have is not complete.

CONNELLY: Are you referring to the members of the Truman Committee?

HESS: The staff.

CONNELLY: I think it should be the staff.

HESS: The staff of the Truman Committee, that's right. I'll ask you about the Senators a little later. That is quite right. Sometimes I say Truman Committee and what I mean is the staff and not the Senators, but we'll get into

[11]

those later. Now the ones that I have listed here I have in alphabetical order. The first is William Boyle, Jr.

CONNELLY: William Boyle, Jr. was a native of Kansas City, Missouri. He was hired by Senator Truman, the chairman. He had practiced law in Kansas City; he had been known to Truman for many years. When he arrived in Washington Senator Truman called me to his office and told me that while Boyle did not know much about the Washington pattern, he was going to put him under my wing, and he would appreciate it if I would steer and guide him through the maze of Washington, which I was happy to do. William Boyle became a very successful investigator for the committee. He later became secretary to Senator Truman when his then secretary, Harry Vaughan, had been called to active duty in the Army. So Bill Boyle

[12]

left the committee and worked directly in the office of Senator Truman. He later became an assistant to the chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Bob Hannegan, and then following that became chairman of the national committee.

HESS: Do you recall anything that he may have had a hand in--any particular assignment he may have had in the days of the Truman Committee?

CONNELLY: Well, specifically no, but I think one of the major projects he was on was the housing problem. I know he had worked on other phases of the Defense Program but I'm sure that was one of them.

HESS: How were the various assignments allotted to the committee members, to the staff members?

CONNELLY: Assignments were allotted three ways: either by Senator Truman himself, by Hugh

[13]

Fulton, or by myself.

HESS: Did you try to pick a person who may have some special competence in a field or did it depend on who was available at the time?

CONNELLY: The recruiting was largely done by Charles Patrick Clark who was associate counsel. Charles Clark would interview these boys first; then he'd refer them to me and if we agreed that the fellow had the potential then that fellow was appointed. In some instances members of the committee's staff were recommended by Senators but in most instances on the basic force that we had, it was done through that channel. Sometimes Hugh Fulton also picked his own men for investigators on the committee.

HESS: After the men were already hired and on the committee though, how were the assignments made?

[14]

CONNELLY: It all depended on what we thought each investigator was particularly qualified for. It's hard to say why each one would get a certain assignment. Sometimes it might have been the fact that he would be available when other investigators were engaged in something else.

HESS: Fred Canfil.

CONNELLY: Fred Canfil was an old wartime buddy of Senator Truman. Fred Canfil was on the committee, but Fred Canfil I would not say was one of the most qualified investigators we had on that committee. He was kind of an independent operator and reported only to Senator Truman.

HESS: Only to Senator Truman?

CONNELLY: That's right. If Canfil had a little problem or was getting mixed up in something, Senator Truman would call me and ask me to

[15]

check on this or find out whether Canfil had the facts, could they be corroborated, and in other words, complete the investigation that Canfil had originated.

HESS: Was there any particular field in which he was particularly qualified for?

CONNELLY: Canfil reported directly to Senator Truman. Senator Truman, I don't believe, many times knew what Fred Canfil was doing, but after he would roam around on his own--he never reported to me, he never reported to Fulton--but after he roamed around and got his nose into something, he'd tell that to Senator Truman and then Senator Truman would tell me to check it out.

HESS: A man we mentioned several times, Charles Patrick Clark. Just what was his background?

CONNELLY: Charles Patrick Clark was graduated from

[16]

Georgetown Law School. He had worked on several congressional committees. In fact the first time I met him was as a member of the staff of the then Gillette Committee to Investigate Campaigning Expenditures in 1940, so I got to know him on that committee. Then later he was appointed by Senator Truman to the committee staff and then he became associate counsel.

HESS: Were there any particular areas of investigation that he spent more time on than others?

CONNELLY: No, I don't believe he ever made any investigations. He handled the administrative side of the committee.

HESS: For that matter did Hugh Fulton, who was chief counsel, take part in any of the investigations?

CONNELLY: He took part in some of them on the

[17]

basis of initiating them, but the leg work was left up to the staff members who were investigators.

HESS: The next one in line is William S. Cole.

CONNELLY: William S. Cole was appointed to the committee by Senator Truman through the influence of Senator Owen Brewster of Maine. He was a personal friend of Senator Brewster, and in the interest of harmony--Mr. Truman took a bipartisan attitude toward the committee--he never asked one person who was employed by the committee what his politics were, and Senator Truman insisted it be bipartisan. Cole was a very able lawyer from Maine, and Cole did a very thorough job.

HESS: Hugh Fulton, the next name in line. We've mentioned him several times, but what was Mr. Fulton's background?

[18]

CONNELLY: Mr. Fulton was a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School. He came to the Truman Committee from the Department of Justice. He was an assistant United States Attorney in New York and later, I believe, on one case, the Associated Gas and Electric Company, he was made a special assistant to the Attorney General to prosecute that case in New York. Mr. Fulton came to the committee on the recommendation of the then Attorney General, Robert Jackson. When Senator Truman called Mr. Jackson to his office and told him he was going to have this committee, and he wanted the best lawyer in the Department of Justice to become counsel for him. So that's how Mr. Fulton came into the Truman picture.

HESS: Was he a good chief counsel?

CONNELLY: Hugh Fulton was a very good lawyer, but he was completely inept in the political

[19]

conditions that you must face in any job of that nature working for the Congress of the United States.

HESS: Could you give me an illustration of that statement?

CONNELLY: Mr. Fulton had the opportunity once in a while to step on other people's toes because Mr. Fulton moved pretty quickly--very bright--but sometimes not quite the right judgment.

HESS: Rudolph Halley?

CONNELLY: He was a protege of Mr. Fulton's. He was U.S. Assistant District Attorney in New York and he worked under Mr. Fulton in the case that Mr. Fulton worked on as a special assistant to the Attorney General.

HESS: And then when he resigned in '45, he went into practice with Hugh Fulton, too.

[20]

CONNELLY: That's correct.

HESS: Walter Hehmeyer?

CONNELLY: Walter Hehmeyer was also an appointee of Hugh Fulton's. He was designated to handle the press, because he never had experience in investigation, so he became the press officer with the title of investigator.

HESS: Just how was that done? How was the committee's relationship with the press carried on?

CONNELLY: Well, Hehmeyer was the contact with the working press. In other words, if they wanted to know something about the committee's activities, their first step would be to go see Walter Hehmeyer. He was liaison between the committee and the press.

HESS: Was the relationship between the committee and the press very good?

[21]

CONNELLY: Very good.

HESS: Could you give an illustration?

CONNELLY: Well, an illustration would be after the completion of the first report of the committee, it was very widely seized upon by the press, and after that first report the press picked up more interest. They realized that this was going somewhere and this would be news.

HESS: Were there any problems of information being leaked to the press, information that the committee would really not want to be known?

CONNELLY: Not that I knew of.

HESS: Did Mr. Hehmeyer conduct most of the business himself or was anyone else on the committee assigned to help him in that field?

CONNELLY: He conducted that himself. He reported directly to Fulton.

[22]

HESS: Robert L. Irvin?

CONNELLY: Robert L. Irvin, he was also hired by Charles Clark. He was graduated from the University of Michigan and he was a very able investigator.

HESS: Donald M. Lathrom?

CONNELLY: He was also hired by Clark, so when he arrived on the committee, I talked to him and told him we wanted to know something about what was going on in our program of defense in the Air Corps section, so he was assigned to conduct the investigation of the air program, which he did, and that's the only thing he ever worked on with the committee.

HESS: Did he do a pretty good job on that?

CONNELLY: He did a very good job.

HESS: Frank E. Lowe?

[23]

CONNELLY: Frank E. Lowe was a brigadier general from Maine. Now, exactly how he became tied up with the committee, I do not know, except it was through the influence of Senator Brewster of Maine, also a member of the committee. Lowe's activities were always kind of a mystery to me because he never reported to me, but he established himself as sort of a liaison between the committee and the War Department, so whether he was on the committee's payroll, I don't know but I don't believe he was.

HESS: One of the items I found that concerned General Lowe came from Toulmin's book and he says, "One of the most important factors in the cooperation of the Committee with the War Department was the appointment of Major General (then Brigadier General) Frank E. Lowe. He was not a liaison officer but he was the executive

[24]

officer of the Committee." He served from August 11, '44 to May 16, 1946. That's what Toulmin has about it.

CONNELLY: Well, it may be that he became an executive assistant after I left the committee, this I don't know.

HESS: They called him executive officer, in the lower case, so I don't think that was a specific title.

CONNELLY: He never made any investigations.

HESS: Getting off the track just a little bit, how were the relations between the War Department and the Navy Department and the committee? Were they good or not?

CONNELLY: Initially they were very difficult.

HESS: Why?

CONNELLY: Because the Army and the Navy, as you

[25]

know, are very close knit. They resented any intrusion by a congressional committee or anyone else. During the course of back and forth, the Navy and the Army finally found out that it would not be in their own interest, or the interest of the country, to refuse to cooperate with the committee. As a result of that, the resistance was broken down and we got very good cooperation from the Army and the Navy.

HESS: Do you recall the names of the people that usually carried on the business with the committee, with the War Department and with the Navy Department during those years. When the committee would want to contact somebody in the Navy Department or at the War Department, who would they contact?

CONNELLY: We established liaison with both Departments. General Arthur Wilson was the initial

[26]

contact we had with the War Department. General Wilson had known Senator Truman. General Wilson was then in the office of General Marshall. General Wilson through his intercession and his knowledge of Senator Truman and his intimate relationship with General Marshall was designated by General Marshall to be the liaison from General Marshall's office with the committee. He did a very good job. He brought together without knocking heads the interests of both. He remained in that capacity until the war started and then he went into active service and was transferred to Australia.

HESS: Who took his place?

CONNELLY: Colonel Knowles, Miles Knowles, from Michigan, and he worked with then Under Secretary [Julius H.] Amberg. After General Wilson departed Colonel Knowles took over.

[27]

He worked very closely with the members of the committee and with myself.

HESS: Did he do as creditable a job as his predecessor had done?

CONNELLY: Well, it was difficult in the beginning but gradually, because the ice had been broken, he worked in very well; he was a very bright attorney. I think at one time he was a partner of Amberg who, I believe, was Under Secretary, and I got to know him very well--we got along very well and we cooperated very well.

HESS: Did you have any times that the military was trying to bring some pressure on the committee when the committee was going out to the Army camps and things of that nature and finding evidences of waste?

CONNELLY: No, we never had any objection of that kind. General [Brehon B.] Somervell was then

[28]

moved from Quartermaster to construct all these Army camps. Now, I personally made some of the initial investigations of the Army camp sites that were being constructed, and in each of these General Wilson accompanied me on these investigations.

HESS: Before the Truman Committee was established, Mr. Truman took a trip around to see several Army camps. As I understand, that was one of the reasons behind the establishment of the Truman Committee.

CONNELLY: That's correct. He made a personal investigation of his own and didn't completely like what he saw, and he proposed this investigation. It was voted on and agreed to by the Military Affairs Committee of the Senate.

HESS: Do you recall hearing Mr. Truman speak of that trip?

[29]

CONNELLY: Oh, many times.

HESS: Roughly what did he say?

CONNELLY: Well, to the point that he was not satisfied, he thought that some improvement could be made on what the Army was doing with Army construction, camp construction, and that was the first phase of the investigation of the program that we got into.

HESS: Did you ever hear Mr. Truman sort of put in capsule version what he thought the purpose of the Truman Committee should be?

CONNELLY: He thought the purpose of the Truman Committee should be the investigation of how the program was being constructed, but he did not want any part of telling the armed services how to run the war. He thought that that should be left to the generals.

During the Civil War they had a committee

[30]

to investigate the conduct of the war. Mr. Truman, as you know, was a very good historian, and he did not want any repetition of what happened during the Civil War by any congressional committee.

HESS: You mentioned General Somervell. Do you recall anything in particular about the relations between the committee and General Somervell?

CONNELLY: In the beginning stages General Somervell was very hostile. General Somervell was a very brilliant general, but he was also a martinet, and he resented any intrusion or stepping on his toes, but that did not impress Senator Truman, he went ahead anyway.

But after we completed our survey of camp construction, General Somervell finally agreed, and so testified, that the Truman Committee saved the Government two hundred million dollars

[31]

on Army construction alone.

HESS: Who was the liaison from the Navy Department--we discussed the War Department--do you recall?

CONNELLY: Hugh Fulton handled the Navy Department. He had a friend who had been a law partner of his named Eugene Dunn, who was in the Navy, so Hugh Fulton hand-picked him as the Navy liaison. He served in that capacity while I was there.

HESS: Were the problems with the Navy fundamentally pretty much the same as with the War Department?

CONNELLY: Oh, certainly because this combination--well, let's not say combination but a contrast of interest between civilian and brass, as we call the Navy and the Army.

HESS: Our next man on the list, Harry S. Magee.

CONNELLY: I believe he was hired by Charles Clark. Harry Magee was a very amiable fellow, but I

[32]

would not consider him as one of the top investigators of the committee. I believe his major assignment was to investigate mica mining in connection with defense procurement.

HESS: In your roll as chief investigator did you also take part in investigations or were you more a coordinator of what the other people were supposed to do?

CONNELLY: Both.

HESS: On that, just for a minute, what were a few of the investigations that you personally helped in?

CONNELLY: Well, I personally conducted the initial investigations of new Army camp construction. I covered Fort Stewart in Georgia, Fort Davis in North Carolina, Indiantown Gap in Pennsylvania, and on all of those excursions I was accompanied by General Wilson.

[33]

HESS: What type of conditions did you find?

CONNELLY: Principally, lack of planning. The construction program between the two World Wars was handled by the Quartermaster Corps. Now the Quartermaster Corps in the interim apparently had done nothing. So now they were faced with a big buildup and no plans for it. My first exposure to that was at Fort Stewart in Georgia. They sent a general down there or colonel, I forget now, to initiate the construction, so he reported to the Pentagon--not the Pentagon at that time, the War Department--and he asked for a layout of plans. The only thing he could find was some blueprints of a camp which was designed for World War I and that was for an infantry brigade. He was building a camp for antiaircraft, so he just put the plans under his arm and started from the ground, and had to improvise to complete

[34]

what was required of him. Now the result was they would provide initial allocation of say eight million dollars. That would eventually pyramid into something like twenty to thirty million. It was all done catch as catch can.

HESS: How would you handle a problem when you would go out and find something like that?

CONNELLY: Well, my job was to find out what was going on, so the first thing I would do was report to the camp commander.

HESS: Conditions as they stood then.

CONNELLY: Right. Then I would look at the records-- what the accomplishments were, what the initial cost estimate was, what it developed into, then I would go to civilian appointments. They appointed architect engineers to help the camp commander build the camp, and these were civilian engineers, so, of course, they were always

[35]

in a hassle with the brass, and after I got the camp commanders position, then I would talk to the architect engineers and they were never hesitant to tell me what the truth was, what was going on on that base; so after getting the Army's side and the civilian engineer's side, I got a pretty good picture of what was going on at that camp site. And on that I based my report.

HESS: Did you also make recommendations about what should be done to correct the matters, or did you just report the matters as you found them?

CONNELLY: I never made any recommendations.

HESS: What other investigations come to mind that you worked with?

CONNELLY: Well, I investigated the DuPont operation in Indiana.

HESS: Which one was that?

[36]

CONNELLY: It was near Albany, Indiana. I investigated the construction of a plant, the Hercules Powder Company, in Kansas.

HESS: The Sunflower Ordnance Plant near Lawrence?

CONNELLY: That's right.

HESS: What did you find wrong there, do you recall?

CONNELLY: Faulty construction. I had pictures which I took with a small camera; I had pictures of cracks in the foundation and other defects, and based on that they had a hearing on the thing in Kansas City. It was just cheap, shoddy construction and the Government was paying a good deal for it. They didn't like the fact that I took pictures, and they found out about it the day after I took them. I went back to the base and their Public Information Officer decided he would like to have the pictures or he'd like to have my camera, and that day I

[37]

did not have my camera. The prints of the pictures were already sent to the committee in Washington. On the basis of the pictures alone plus the information I got, they decided to hold a hearing in Kansas City, and the hearing didn't establish anything very good. That was it.

I investigated the Willow Run Plant in Detroit. The Ford Motor Company was making B-24 bombers, and that investigation was with the cooperation of the Ford Motor Company. That was assigned to me by Senator Truman himself because Senator Ferguson was on the committee, and he was from Michigan. So with the cooperation of the Ford people, I was in the plant for about two weeks making my own observations, and because of security they had given me a badge. They looked around at all their executives to find out who I would pass for--they had a badge and photograph of each one. They finally picked one

[38]

of the vice presidents and temporarily took the badge away from him and they gave it to me. I was in that plant about two weeks, and finally I thought it was time to go in and see the colonel who was in charge for the Air Corps, so I walked into his office after two weeks and I identified myself. He says, "What can I do for you?"

I said, "I'd like to talk to you about your program."

So he started in detail to give me the usual story. I said, "Colonel, before you get too much involved, it's only fair to tell you I've been in this plant for two weeks."

"Well, how did you get in here?"

I said, "That's not the point, Colonel. I'm only fair to you. I have been here for two weeks, so forget the book and tell me what's going on."

[39]

HESS: Did he?

CONNELLY: Up to a point. He couldn't kid me. I'd been there, and he knew it. A very funny one, while I was in that plant General [William S.] Knudsen was in charge of the Air Corps production. He arrived at the Willow Run Plant but fortunately I saw him first because that would have caused quite a hoopla because he would have recognized me on sight. He had been in the office of Senator Truman regularly.

HESS: You mentioned an investigation that they held in Kansas City. What was the procedure of setting up these field investigations? Were they usually held on some of these more minor cases?

CONNELLY: You mean on committee hearings?

HESS: Committee hearings, yes.

[40]

CONNELLY: Not unless they thought there was some valid reason for them to make a hearing on the thing not just take an investigative report.

HESS: Now some of the more important hearings such as the Curtiss-Wright, the Canol Project, those were held in Washington, is that right?

CONNELLY: Most of the hearings were held in Washington.

HESS: What would be the criteria for holding one in the field as opposed to holding the hearings in Washington?

CONNELLY: It depended on the interest of the committee and how they voted, whether to have a field hearing or to have it in Washington. That was determined by the committee itself.

HESS: When they would hold one in the field, who

[41]

would go to hold it? Would one of the Senators go?

CONNELLY: Yes, one of the Senators. If it was important enough, the chairman would go, with probably three or four other Senators. The full committee would not go.

HESS: Would Hugh Fulton usually go to the field hearings?

CONNELLY: Yes.

HESS: How was a field hearing conducted? Would Mr. Fulton do most of the cross-examining, or would Senator Truman...

CONNELLY: Mr. Fulton would initiate the examination and each Senator in turn would be provided an opportunity to ask questions that were of interest to him.

HESS: And the next man on our list is Herbert Maletz.

[42]

CONNELLY: Herbert Maletz was hired by Charles Clark. He was a graduate of Harvard Law School and I believe he worked in Washington for about a year or maybe more, not much more, as an attorney. How he became connected with Clark I do not know, but he arrived on the committee and Clark, of course, asked me to screen him which I did and he was appointed, and he developed into one of the most competent investigators the committee had. He has gone on to other activities in Washington. He was in private practice. He was counsel for the antitrust committee of the House, and has now just been appointed to the Court of Claims as a judge.

HESS: And he will be here in New York City.

CONNELLY: In New York City.

HESS: Do you recall any investigations in which

[43]

he may have had a hand--may have been assigned to?

CONNELLY: Yes, he was on the investigation, I believe it was housing with Boyle. They worked as a team for quite a while. When Boyle first came in, as I know, he did not have any experience around Washington, Maletz had some, and then they would report directly to me and if I felt something was not going right, I would direct it to the proper channel.

HESS: What comes to mind when you look back on that housing investigation?

CONNELLY: Frankly...

HESS: What was involved? What were the big things involved?

CONNELLY: Well, naturally, most of the big things involved were defense housing, and I never got

[44]

into the details but I worked on the report with them while they were writing it, and it was largely with the Defense Department program, and housing of personnel, civilians and otherwise.

HESS: What were the big bottlenecks? Getting the materials?

CONNELLY: Materials and Labor.

HESS: Joe L. Martinez?

CONNELLY: He was a protege of Senator Chavez from New Mexico, and he was a lawyer who graduated from law school in Washington. He had worked around the Hill as deputy Sergeant at Arms, patronage jobs, and he was recommended to Senator Truman by Senator Chavez. He reported to me, and he worked largely under my direction.

HESS: Do you recall any investigations that...

[45]

CONNELLY: Well, he worked with me in that Sunflower Ordnance job.

HESS: Did he also have a camera?

CONNELLY: No, he did not.

HESS: George Meader?

CONNELLY: George Meader was a personal friend of Hugh Fulton's, he hired him, and I believe he gave him a title of assistant counsel.

HESS: Assistant to the chief counsel.

CONNELLY: That's right, and he reported directly to Fulton; of course, he coordinated with me on special investigations. Matter of fact, he did not do very much on investigations because he was under the impression that if he was given an assignment, he had to spend time with it. A congressional committee is not like a law court. A congressional committee

[46]

wants to know the story, but George was a detail man, he later became a member of Congress, but George reported directly to Fulton, and I think he would probably spend six months on one case. In a congressional investigation you have to have it ready for the committee.

HESS: And he was appointed chief counsel on October 1, '45.

CONNELLY: That was after Fulton left.

HESS: Franklin N. Parks?

CONNELLY: Franklin N. Parks was graduated from Georgetown University. He also was hired by Charles Clark. Frank Parks was one of the best investigators we had. He was diligent, bright, and did a very commendable job. I believe he's now with the Atomic Energy Commission.

[47]

HESS: Do you recall any investigations in which he had a hand?

CONNELLY: Off hand I don't remember.

HESS: Harold G. Robinson?

CONNELLY: Harold G. Robinson was an appointment of Hugh Fulton's. He was a former FBI agent; worked with Fulton when he was in New York in the Justice Department, so Hugh Fulton brought him in there and he thought that Harold G. Robinson should have my job on the committee. For some reason Senator Truman disagreed with him.

HESS: Hugh Fulton thought this? Is that right?

CONNELLY: Hugh Fulton wanted him to have the job of chief investigator, and apparently he discussed it with Senator Truman and Senator Truman didn't agree with him. So he became

[48]

an investigator on the staff.

HESS: I believe they named him chief investigator when you left, is that right?

CONNELLY: That's correct.

HESS: Do you recall anything he worked on?

CONNELLY: Well, the boys on the staff gave him a nickname, "Two Case" Robinson. In other words, if he'd get an assignment to investigate an ordnance plant, which he did, the one I remember was the Wolf Creek Ordnance Plant in Tennessee, and he spent over six months on it. He was trained in the FBI pattern. He had every I dotted and every t crossed, so he was meticulous, but slow, whereas another investigator would complete his case in a week or two, he would probably take six months on one, but he was a very good investigator of that type, but not the type for a congressional committee.

[49]

HESS: Haven Sawyer?

CONNELLY: Haven Sawyer was an appointee of Owen Brewster, the Senator from Maine who was on the committee, but that was one of those things; he just came in, cut clippings, but never made an investigation.

HESS: Wilbur D. Sparks?

CONNELLY: Wilbur D. Sparks was a personal appointment of Senator Truman. He was a very good investigator after he learned the ropes. He later became a law partner of Fulton's after he left the committee.

HESS: There was a time when he was in charge of the committee's staff office, is that right? He was in charge of administrative details.

CONNELLY: That was after Truman left if it happened at all, I really don't know, but he

[50]

was an investigator when Senator Truman had the committee.

HESS: Hendrick Suydam?

CONNELLY: I don't know who recommended him. I believe he was appointed by Clark, and I think he had some financial background and I think his field of activity while he was with us was some sort of investigation of the financial trust like RFC--some of the financial agencies in Washington.

HESS: On that subject, what were the relations between the Truman Committee and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation? Were they pretty good? Mr. Jesse Jones was over there at that time, correct?

CONNELLY: Well, Mr. Jesse Jones was there. Originally Mr. Jesse Jones was not cooperative with the committee, but after having a few experiences

[51]

of the committee throwing things in his face which he apparently ignored...

HESS: Do you recall an illustration of that?

CONNELLY: Well, one of the things was that at the beginning of the war the Alcoa Company had a monopoly with the RFC in aluminum. The Reynolds Company was trying to get into the act but they were completely frustrated by the RFC; so the Truman Committee took a look at that and through its interest in the RFC operations, Reynolds was finally given funds to begin the operation of aluminum plants. Up to that point they were making tin foil for chocolate bars and cigarette wrappers but had no facilities for construction. As a result of the Truman Committee breathing down Jones' back, the Reynolds Company was finally given some contracts through the RFC.

[52]

HESS: What had been the reasons for his opposition, do you recall?

CONNELLY: Well, I'm not able to answer for him, but I do know that it was a closed door to anybody but Alcoa. So that was the beginning of the breakthrough on the monopoly on aluminum. Then Kaiser came later. That was a result of the Truman Committee, too. So instead of having one source of supply during the war, we had three, Alcoa, Reynolds and Kaiser.

HESS: Do you recall any other illustrations of connections between the RFC and the Truman Committee--the relations between the two?

CONNELLY: After John Snyder, who was a banker in St. Louis, became a deputy to Jesse Jones, the ice was broken because John Snyder, Harry Vaughan and Senator Truman were three

[53]

World War I colonels from Missouri in the field artillery; so with that closeness, Snyder finally persuaded Jesse Jones that he'd have to relent. So that was how that was accomplished.

HESS: And that was really brought about by John Snyder?

CONNELLY: That's right.

HESS: What was the relationship in those early years between Senator Truman and John Snyder?

CONNELLY: It goes back to World War I when because of their association during the war they became close friends.

HESS: Do you recall anything about their association after Mr. Truman got to Washington?

CONNELLY: Well, yes.

[54]

HESS: Before his appointment as the Secretary of the Treasury and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion--while Mr. Truman was still Senator.

CONNELLY: Certainly. Now, the inner workings of Senator Truman's office in his early days I knew nothing about, I didn't even know him until the day he hired me, but I later found out that John Snyder had one of the girls in Truman's office reporting directly to him.

HESS: Do you recall her name? It wasn't Reathel Odum was it?

CONNELLY: I wouldn't use it.

HESS: As I understand it Mr. Truman had asked Mr. Snyder if he could have someone from his staff to help him when he came up to Washington.

[55]

CONNELLY: That could be true. I know that John Snyder had a pipeline in that office.

HESS: She was reporting directly to John Snyder what was going on in that office?

CONNELLY: That's right.

HESS: That's interesting. All right, let's move on to one more. The next name is Marion Toomey.

CONNELLY: Marion Toomey was classified as an investigator, but she was actually secretary to Hugh Fulton.

HESS: And another lady, Agnes Strauss Wolf.

CONNELLY: She was an investigator for the committee She had some background in social service. Her activities on the committee were a little vague to me; she reported largely to Hugh Fulton.

[56]

HESS: As I mentioned earlier those are not all of the names that I could have put down on the list. Are there any major omissions, anyone else whose name should be mentioned, who I just did not include on the list?

CONNELLY: We had a boy named Morris Lasker who graduated from Harvard and Yale Law School and he was hired by Charles Clark. He became a fine, good investigator. He is now practicing as a lawyer here in New York; I know he's been recommended for a Federal judgeship, but he was very good. Another fellow that Clark hired was Peter Ansberry. Peter Ansberry was somewhat of a socialite. He was editor of the law journal at Georgetown University, but as an investigator he never measured up. He was too opinionated, so I tried to help him and say, "Now look, did you ask this fellow this in the interview?"

[57]

"Well, no."

Then I'd say, "Well, this is quite important."

But he was always a little hostile to corrections. I would say he was not one of the top boys on the staff.

HESS: On that question, what makes a good investigator?

CONNELLY: The ability to get along with people, number one. Number two, not to act like a copy. Number three, to know how to listen, and number four, not to antagonize a witness, and, of course, an appreciation for facts not fancy.

HESS: How did Mr. Truman handle his relations with the committee staff?

CONNELLY: His relations with the committee staff were largely handled through Hugh Fulton, but

[58]

if he had anything he was particularly interested in, he would call me and say, "What is going on on this?"

So I would report to him that the case had not been completed and I thought he should wait for a report, and then he could judge, which was always agreeable to him because he wanted the whole story. So he had good relations with the staff, all of them including Fulton. They all liked Senator Truman because he gave them respect. He was never an authoritative type chairman. He'd say what is this, and let them explain to him what they thought, and if he didn't agree, he'd tell them, and tell them why. So the relationship between Truman and the staff, I would say, was excellent.

HESS: What was the relationship between the staff members themselves other than just petty

[59]

frictions; what was the general relationship of the staff members?

CONNELLY: With whom?

HESS: With each other.

CONNELLY: We were very congenial. Of course there were little irritants but it was a very congenial operation. In fact, 1 don't know of any great dissent we had with each other in any case, other than personalities, which you're bound to have in any family.

HESS: Was there any one member of the staff that was in charge of speech writing chores, and was that a very big task?

CONNELLY: No, because there was not very much speaking. Truman did very little speaking when he was head of that committee. He might go to a Masonic meeting and make a speech

[60]

or to some type of civic organization. I would say that there was very little of that, and Truman in those days was not a very good speaker anyway and he was not very often invited, and furthermore he was not known out of the state of Missouri, because nobody in the country ever heard of Truman until he had that committee, and that was a springboard to his being selected for Vice President. We never had an official speech writer on the committee, never.

HESS: I understand that the committee staff held a portion of its meetings in the so-called "doghouse" in Mr. Truman's office, is that right?

CONNELLY: As a complete unit? No, he would call individual members in, Fulton, Clark, or myself, but that was about it.

HESS: Informal meetings more or less?

[61]

CONNELLY: Yes, just personal reports to him on what was happening and he wanted to know what it was.

HESS: Now, of course, the "doghouse" was in his…

CONNELLY: Senatorial office.

HESS: His senatorial office.

I have read that Donald M. Nelson who was chairman of the War Production Board quite often visited Senator Truman's offices and also the Truman Committee staff room is that correct?

CONNELLY: No. He visited Senator Truman, and I believe that on a few occasions he may have come into the staff offices.

HESS: What was the relationship between Donald Nelson and the War Production Board and the

[62]

Truman Committee? Was it pretty good?

CONNELLY: Not initially, no. Donald Nelson was appointed, of course, by Roosevelt, but I made an investigation of the War Production Board myself and Bob Irvin worked with me on that case. They were reluctant because it was principally staffed by people from private industry. Now, private industry was reluctant to give up productive or profitable business of their own to contribute to the war effort. It was largely staffed by so-called "dollar-a-year" men. Now, the "dollar-a-year" men were divided in their loyalty to the company which had loaned them to the Government or to the Government itself, and if there was a question of balance, it usually went in favor of their own industry. Until that was broken down, things were not being done like they should be done. As a result of the Truman Committee

[63]

exposing the dragging of feet, the War Production Board finally was made to contribute something to the war effort. In the initial stages it did nothing or very little.

HESS: Do you recall if Senator Truman said anything in your presence about his opinion of "dollar-a-year" men?

CONNELLY: His opinion was just what I said, that he didn't have complete trust in them because of their divided loyalty.

HESS: In his statement to the Senate on August 7, 1944, when he resigned, the only man mentioned by name in a derogatory manner was a person, as Mr. Truman mentioned, a "dollar-a-year" man, and so I wanted to know what his attitude was.

CONNELLY: Well, that was his attitude about all of them. It wasn't a question of questioning

[64]

their honesty; it was a question of how could they do a job for the Government when they were so tied by loyalty to their own industry. And there were very few exceptions to this.

HESS: Edwin A. Locke, Jr. worked for the War Production Board at that time, too. How closely did Edwin Locke work with the committee?

CONNELLY: He was the liaison man from the War Production Board with the committee, and I worked with him very closely. He was a very able fellow and a very fair fellow. He turned out, in my book, to be one of the best public servants from private industry in the War Production Board.

HESS: How were the relations between Senator Truman and the other Senators who served on that committee? Now 1 have a list of them

[65]

listed in the order of their appointment to the committee. The first is Carl Hayden from Arizona.

CONNELLY: Well, he served very shortly, and he was never very active on the committee.

HESS: Tom Connally of Texas?

CONNELLY: Tom Connally of Texas was, well, he was quite a prima donna, but he and Senator Truman got along very well.

HESS: James Mead of New York?

CONNELLY: James Mead of New York succeeded him as chairman of the committee, and Jim Mead was very conscientious as a member of the committee.

HESS: Did he get along with Senator Truman?

CONNELLY: Oh, very well, in fact, Senator Truman recommended him to take his place as chairman

[66]

when he left to run for Vice President.

HESS: This is asking you a question about something after you had left also, but what kind of a job did it seem to you that Senator Mead did in comparison with the job that Senator Truman had done?

CONNELLY: There was no comparison. Senator Mead never could come up to the chairmanship that was Senator Truman's.

HESS: Why?

CONNELLY: Well, whether he didn't have the ability or whether he didn't have the interest, I don't know, but I know he was never considered as a successful chairman of that committee.

HESS: Mon C. Wallgren of Washington?

CONNELLY: He was very close to Senator Truman. He was very active in committee hearings.

[67]

As a matter of fact, Senator Truman later appointed him to the Federal Power Commission.

HESS: Quite a friend of Mr. Truman's.

CONNELLY: A very close friend.

HESS: Joseph Ball of Minnesota?

CONNELLY: Joseph Ball of Minnesota was a kind of progressive Republican and he and Senator Truman never had any problems. They cooperated very well. As a matter of fact, it's a matter of record that the Truman Committee never had a minority report.

HESS: Was there ever a danger of someone not going along with that? Did you ever have a report that someone sort of held out on to the last minute?

CONNELLY: That was resolved by having the full committee meet in Senator Truman's "doghouse,"

[68]

and they would discuss their differences and left in agreement.

HESS: Was this done very often?

CONNELLY: There were always differences. On every report that was being made there may be some minor differences, but they were always resolved before they left that office with the result that they went out completely in accord for any report that was put out by the committee.

HESS: They were all unanimous.

CONNELLY: Unanimous.

HESS: I was just wondering if there were any one or two times that it really came down to the wire, if it was a very close thing?

CONNELLY: Those things I cannot answer because I was not at the meetings. They were just for

[69]

the members of the committee and Hugh Fulton.

HESS: Owen Brewster of Maine?

CONNELLY: Owen Brewster of Maine was on the committee. Owen Brewster, I would not quite say was completely bipartisan, but when the decision was down, he joined in. I would not say he was one of the most effective members of the committee.

HESS: Why?

CONNELLY: Because the other Senators on the committee didn't have complete trust in him.

HESS: In his Memoirs, volume one, page 189, Mr. Truman states that:

Senators Brewster and Vandenberg tried at times to make another Committee on the Conduct of the War out of our committee by attempting to bring the Congress into control of the operations of the military establishment, but we never permitted that to happen.

CONNELLY: That's right.

[70]

HESS Did Senator Brewster give Senator Truman rather a difficult time on the...

CONNELLY: At times. Of course there was a clash, but that was what I meant by saying that I wouldn't call Senator Brewster completely bipartisan on that committee. As far as I know, he was the only exception on that committee to Truman's policy of maintaining the committee on the basis on which he wanted, not to interfere.

HESS: This was the only Senator that really gave him trouble on that point, is that correct?

CONNELLY: That's correct.

HESS: Do you recall Senator Truman making any statements about Senator Brewster at that time along this line?

CONNELLY: Senator Truman would make a little ad-lib

[71]

comment to me on many things and on many members of the committee. He'd say, "Oh, he needs to be slowed down, he'll be all right." It was never serious.

HESS: Do you recall anything he may have said about Senator Brewster?

CONNELLY: Not offhand, no.

HESS: Carl Hatch of New Mexico.

CONNELLY: He was a very close friend of Truman's.

HESS: Clyde Herring of Iowa?

CONNELLY: Well, he was on the original membership of the committee, I believe, but he did not participate very actively. He was pretty old at that point.

HESS: Harley Kilgore of West Virginia?

CONNELLY: Harley Kilgore of West Virginia was a

[72]

so-called liberal. He was largely a labor Senator, and he used to have big ideas about what the committee should do and suggest investigations. Now unless it had some merit Senator Truman never went along with it. Occasionally he would say, "Well, you had better go take a look if Kilgore wants it, but I don't think you'll find much."

HESS: And he also served as chairman for a short time, October, '46 to January, '47, I believe.

CONNELLY: Well, that was after I left.

HESS: That was after Mead.

Styles Bridges of New Hampshire?

CONNELLY: He was on the committee but never very active, but he and Truman got along well.

HESS: Harold Burton?

CONNELLY: Harold Burton was probably one of the

[73]

most dedicated members of that committee--fair minded, astute, and Truman thought very highly of his ability and his intelligence. And as is a matter of record, he later appointed him to the Supreme Court.

HESS: And Homer Ferguson?

CONNELLY: When Homer Ferguson first joined the committee, I attended a hearing, and I had never met Senator Ferguson before, so after the committee hearing that day, Senator Truman called me and we talked about some other matters which I forget, and he said to me, "I think we've got a good man in this Ferguson."

I said, "Senator, I don't like to disagree with you, but I don't think you have."

He said, "Why not?"

I said, "I noticed at the hearing today that he asked questions for the sake of asking, and that can get somebody in an awful

[74]

lot of problems."

HESS: What did he say then?

CONNELLY: He said, "That didn't occur to me." He said, "I'm glad you brought that up because I'll be watching for it."

HESS: All right, those are the Senators that served during the time that you were with the committee and that Mr. Truman was chairman of the committee.

CONNELLY: That's correct.

HESS: There were others that came along later, but we won't go into those.

Did the committee have problems with military secrecy in its investigations?

CONNELLY: We never got involved in military secrets. If it was restricted material, we regarded it that way.

[75]

HESS: Do you recall anything about the committees coming across evidence of the research on atomic energy that was going on during those years?

CONNELLY: I remember that very well. Fred Canfil, who as I said before, used to browse around practically on his own, and report to Senator Truman, arrived up in Hanford, Washington, he called me--"Something's going on up here, I'm going to find out what it is."

I said, "O.K." So he browsed around and he tried to crack into the Hanford Project, which was part of the atomic bomb deal. Very shortly after that General Marshall came up to see Senator Truman and he said, "Senator, we've got a very important and top secret project out in Hanford and one of your investigators has been out there and he's trying to find out what's going on. I'd appreciate it if you would stay out of it."

[76]

And Senator Truman said, "I didn't know this, but your wishes will be respected."

Canfil was pulled off, quickly.

HESS: Did Canfil ever tell you where he got the tip to go out to Hanford?

CONNELLY: The only thing he knew was that there was a lot of construction going on up there--there was Government construction and he wanted to find out what it was all about.

HESS: Did he ever talk to you after he got back and tell you what he found out there, just in a personal way?

CONNELLY: No, I just got word to him, "Get the hell out of there."

So, he came back to Washington and said, "What's the idea of pulling me out. There's something going on out there."

I said, "The orders are that you're to

[77]

stay out of there, period."

HESS: Did he take that order?

CONNELLY: He took the order.

HESS: Can you tell me what you recall about the problems caused by Albert B. Chandler's swimming pool?

CONNELLY: Yes, I was assigned to that case. Senator Truman called me one morning and he said, "I want you to go to Kentucky. I was just talking to Senator Barkley. Apparently 'Happy' Chandler is involved in some difficulty."

So I said, "Well, what's it about?"

He said, "Oh, something about the opponent who's running against him for election has accused him of having a swimming pool built of critical materials that a contractor supplied." He said, "I want you to go down there and find out what it's all about." He

[78]

said, "I know that Barkley wants Chandler back in the Senate."

I said, "Oh, one of those."

He said, "Well, you go see Chandler and get his side of it," which I did. Chandler suggested I contact some people he knew down there and they could fill me in on what the story was, but then it was up to me how it should be handled; so because of Barkley's interest, he was then majority leader, it had to be handled with gloves, especially knowing that Barkley wanted Chandler re-elected. So I went to Kentucky and on the train I thought of how I was going to handle this. So I reasoned the best thing to do was to meet the plaintiff first who was running against Chandler. I stopped there in Lexington, went to see the fellow the next morning in his law office, and when I arrived in his office, he had all the press there, cameras, the full treatment. I

[79]

went in to him and I said, "There's a reception committee out front."

He said, "Yes, I know."

"Now what is your complaint?"

He said, "Well, the swimming pool that this contractor built for 'Happy' Chandler."

I said, "Have you ever seen the swimming pool?"

He said, "No, but here are pictures of it."

So, I talked to him maybe for half an hour, asked him questions. I said, "Now, that's very interesting. Would you reduce that to an affidavit form?"

He said, "No. I can't sign an affidavit; this is hearsay with me."

I said, "Thank you very much," so I walked out and I met the press and said, "No pictures, no interviews, I make my report to the committee, period. I say nothing and

[80]

my orders are no pictures."

"Well, when you go to Louisville they will have pictures there."

I said, "I will make a deal with you. I know you guys work for a living, too. There won't be any pictures in Louisville either, and no interviews."

Well, they didn't like it but they had to take it, so I left. I met the contractor, went through his records, went out to see the pool and while I was there with the state chairman of the Democratic Party, Chandler's wife came out, she didn't know me, and she said, "Bob [his name was Bob Humphreys, he was the state chairman], what are you going to do about those OPA people? They're raising hell about me getting a couple of new tires?"

Well, the state chairman practically went into the pool himself with this little demonstration. I ignored it, it was all right

[81]

with me, so we left there and he said, "Oh, brother."

I said, "I know what you mean. I didn't hear it."

Well, after getting the whole thing wrapped up, I got all the records, found out that the steel in the pool was, you know, used steel; it wasn't good for structural steel--it had been used before. So I got the thing all wrapped up, came back to town, and I reported to Truman directly. He said, "Well, Barkley is edgy. What are we going to do?"

I said, "Well, all right. Now," I said, "when you report to the Senate that there has been an investigation, that you just got a personal report of the investigation, I would suggest that after you go on the floor, let me write out a statement for Senator Hatch, the father of the Clean Politics Bill and let him follow you and read his statement."

[82]

So I dictated this statement to one of the girls, and went over and gave it to Senator Hatch. Truman made a little speech about the pool. Hatch followed with the statement I had written, then Barkley took it over from there. Well, all it meant was I put holy water in the swimming pool, but that was what you call politics.

HESS: A few of the more well-known cases that came before the committee were the Canol project, the question on the tank lighters, the matters of the Curtiss-Wright airplane engine. Do you recall anything in particular about those?

CONNELLY: Yes, I recall. The Canol project I had nothing to do with. That was handled directly by Hugh Fulton. That was one they developed in hearing, based on a complaint, of course. On the Curtiss-Wright thing, that was handled

[83]

by Donald Lathrom, and I collaborated with him to some extent. What was the other project?

HESS: The tank lighters.

CONNELLY: That tank lighters I had nothing to do with. That was handled by Hugh Fulton himself.

HESS: What other important cases come to mind, looking back on the days of the Truman Committee?

CONNELLY: I would say those two things.

HESS: What was the relationship between Mr. Max Lowenthal and Mr. Truman during Mr. Truman's days in the Senate?

CONNELLY: Mr. Max Lowenthal served as counsel for Senator Truman during the hearings on the setting up of the Civil Aeronautics Board. That was long before I had met Senator Truman. Now, I believe, he was recommended as counsel on that

[84]

committee by the chairman of the full committee to Senator Truman, who was then Senator Wheeler of Montana. I believe that's how their relationship was established. As a result of that, they always had mutual respect for each other and it has continued up to the present day.

HESS: Did you know Mr. Lowenthal when you were on the Hill?

CONNELLY: No, I did not. Oh, I may have met him casually. He came into the Senator's office, I may have met him, but I got to know him intimately during his White House operation.

HESS: I understand there was an operation conducted under his general supervision to prepare answers to the charges that Senator McCarthy was making in the early fifties, is that correct?

CONNELLY: Not that I recall. He had nothing to do

[85]

with the White House.

HESS: Why did Mr. Hugh Fulton leave the committee in 1944, do you recall?

CONNELLY: To accompany Senator Truman on his campaign for Vice President.

HESS: Did you accompany the Senator on his campaign?

CONNELLY: He arranged for a leave of absence for me from the committee and made an arrangement with Senator Mead who was to follow him that if we won the election, I would stay with him, and if we lost, I would have my job back with the committee.

HESS: Did any of the other members of the committee go on the campaign with Senator Truman besides you and Mr. Fulton?

CONNELLY: No.

[86]

HESS: The reason why I asked that, Donald Lathrom...

CONNELLY: No, he had nothing to do with the campaign.

HESS: ...resigned about that time. His resignation was effective on August 31, 1944.

CONNELLY: Well, he went into the private practice of law in Washington.

HESS: Now, Bill Boyle resigned in March of '44. I believe at that time he went to the Democratic National Committee.

CONNELLY: He was assistant to the chairman, Bob Hannegan.

HESS: Did he provide any assistance to you people during the campaign?

CONNELLY: Oh, yes, through the national committee.

[87]

HESS: Do you recall what forms his assistance may have taken?

CONNELLY: Well, he would communicate with us on the campaign train, suggesting stops we were to make and who were the key people to see and information of that type in connection with the campaign. Truman had to do the campaigning for Roosevelt.

HESS: Before we proceed, Mr. Connelly, looking back on those days from 1941 to 1944, the days of the Truman Committee, have we omitted anything, anything else come to mind?

CONNELLY: Well, I know we've omitted a lot, but you don't want to go into it in detail.

HESS: What stands out in your mind when you look back on those days?

CONNELLY: Well, I thought it was an unusual

[88]

congressional committee because there was very rarely a congressional committee to make any kind of report which is unanimous, and I think it's a great tribute to the then Senator Truman, that he was able to handle the members of the committee up to ten Senators in such a way that prevented or didn't make possible a minority report. For in his ability to get along with other Senators, give each one credit for his part on the activities without any discrimination regardless of politics, was real statesmanship.

HESS: How instrumental do you think Mr. Truman's handling of that committee was in his eventually getting the nomination on the Democratic ticket?

CONNELLY: His chairmanship of that committee made him a candidate for the Vice President of the United States because of the work of that committee, and during the proceedings of the

[89]

committee before he became Vice President in a press poll he was considered to be one of the top ten Senators in Congress.

HESS: On the subject of the 1944 convention and campaign and Mr. Truman's part therein, what was the earliest that you heard a discussion on the possibility of Mr. Truman being chosen to run as Vice President that year? When did you first hear of that?

CONNELLY: The first time it occurred to me was in a conversation with Bob Hannegan who was then National Chairman, and I said, "Bob, who's going to become the next Vice President? Is it going to be Wallace again?"

He said, "God forbid."

HESS: Do you recall about when that conversation was?

CONNELLY: That was sometime during early '44 or late '43. 1 said, "What is the matter with

[90]

Senator Truman?"

He said, "Nothing."

I said, "Well, why don't we do something about it?"

Hannegan said, "We will."

So following that, Hannegan naturally could operate with openness and I could not because I was still on the Truman Committee, but Hannegan and I would compare notes every once in a while, so one day Senator Truman had Hannegan up to his office and he said, "Look, I know what you two fellows are up to and I want you to cut it out."

And Hannegan looked at me and said, "Do you know what he's talking about?"

I said, "I don't have the vaguest idea."

Truman said, "Well, I do and all I want you to do is cut it out. I'm not interested in becoming Vice President. I'm very happy in the Senate."

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Well, we just looked at him like it was complete news to us. Hannegan stayed with him, he had some matters to go over. When he came out to my office Hannegan said, "Hey, kid, what are we going to do next?"

HESS: About what time was that? Early '44?

CONNELLY: It was early '44 or late '43.

HESS: Keeping things in a chronological order, let's move next to the convention. Did you go to the convention in Chicago in 1944?

CONNELLY: No, I did not because I was still chief investigator for the Truman Committee, and as such not active in politics.

HESS: Did you hear Mr. Truman say later about what may have transpired in Chicago that summer?

CONNELLY: Oh, I got reports on that from him and

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also from Bob Hannegan. I knew before the convention started that Truman was going to be nominated for Vice President.

HESS: How did you know?

CONNELLY: Through my association with Bob Hannegan. Now Bob Hannegan was pretty well informed, because he knew the southern delegation would not go for Henry Wallace. Hannegan tried to persuade Roosevelt to go along with Truman. Hannegan, Ed Pauley, who was then treasurer of the national committee, Frank Walker, who had been former Postmaster General and also former chairman of the Democratic National Committee, had a meeting with Roosevelt at the White House and Roosevelt was very reluctant, but they finally agreed that he would take Truman, but Truman was not his first choice.

HESS: Who was his first choice?

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CONNELLY: His first choice, I think, was Wallace at that time, and later, I think, he brought William O. Douglas, who is now on the Supreme Court, into the picture.

During the convention, Roosevelt went through Chicago but didn't go to the convention. The train was parked in the railroad yards in Chicago and he was transferred to the west coast, I believe he was going to dedicate a dam in Oregon. So Hannegan went down and asked him to give him a letter that Hannegan could take to the convention and Roosevelt agreed. Roosevelt dictated a letter to his secretary, Grace Tully, listing the three candidates for Vice President who would be acceptable to him. One on the list was Douglas, two was Wallace, three was Truman. Hannegan got to Grace Tully and rearranged the names and put Truman on top, then Hannegan went to the convention with that letter. Now,

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the Wallace crowd was well organized and they stampeded that convention and almost got Wallace, but Hannegan finally cut the thing off before they could have a vote, and partly through Jackson--is it Jackson from Indiana--the chairman?

HESS: Samuel Jackson.

CONNELLY: Sam Jackson, yes. Sam Jackson didn't want to quit. Hannegan said, "You recess the convention or I'll throw you off that platform." He had the organist playing "Iowa." Neale Roach who is in public relations now in Washington, went up to the organ and on Hannegan's instructions pulled a fire ax off the wall and cut the cable. That's how close it was. So that's the story of how Truman became Vice President.

HESS: About that meeting that was held in the White House, did you ever hear of the name George

[95]

Allen mentioned?

CONNELLY: George may have been there, I'm not sure, because at that time he had an affiliation with the national committee.

HESS: And I believe Ed Flynn from New York.

CONNELLY: Ed Flynn may have been there, I'm not sure. I know Frank Walker was there. I'm not sure about Ed Flynn. I know Ed Flynn was for Truman.

HESS: As you know, Jimmy Byrnes had asked Mr. Truman to nominate him for the post...

CONNELLY: That's correct.

HESS: ...the Vice Presidential post, and in his Memoirs, Mr. Truman says that he now thinks that Byrnes knew at the time that he, Mr. Truman, was also being thought of as a possibility.

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CONNELLY: I'm sure he did, but he did ask Truman to nominate him.

HESS: That's right.

CONNELLY: And Truman agreed.

HESS: Why did he ask him? Was he trying to cut Mr. Truman out?

CONNELLY: Well, of course. Jim Byrnes was a very Machiavellian character, as Truman found out the hard way when he made him Secretary of State with his administration. Because Byrnes then thought he was the real president. I knew Byrnes a lot better and a lot more keenly than Truman did, because I knew in the beginning when Truman started that committee Jim Byrnes didn't want him to have the committee, and Jim Byrnes was chairman of the committee which made appropriations for Senate committees and he gave Truman $15,000 as the appropriation

[97]

for the committee. Truman talked to me about it and said, "What are we going to do to build up the staff on $15,000?"

So I suggested to him that he call the department heads and place his personnel on the department payrolls, which we did. I went on the National Housing payroll. I don't know what payroll Clark went on. It might have been the RFC, I'm not sure, but I know that we were first put on the department payrolls until Truman got more money, then we switched to the committee payroll.

HESS: What was your opinion of Mr. Byrnes later on after you moved to the White House and he was Secretary of State?

CONNELLY: The same thing my opinion was before that, I never trusted him.

HESS: Why was he appointed?

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CONNELLY: I don't know. Truman appointed him. Why, I don't know. When Truman was sworn in as President, Byrnes came in with a fully prepared speech that Byrnes and his boys had written for Truman. I read the thing. Now Byrnes just didn't give this to him as suggestions, he read it to him in his office. After he left, Truman showed me the speech. I said, "Look, we've got ten guys in the Cabinet Room writing your speech, you can't use this, this is Jimmy Byrnes' not Harry Truman's." He threw it in the basket.

And the breaking point came when Byrnes went to Russia. On his way back he called a press conference without consulting the President. So I had to reach him and tell him to cancel the conference, and come down to the Williamsburg--we were down there for the weekend. Admiral Leahy was a staff member at that time. As a result of that, the conference

[99]

was canceled, and Byrnes was told that his job was to report to the President of the United States, not to the public, before him. So that was the beginning of the end for Byrnes.

HESS: Were you on the Williamsburg that weekend?

CONNELLY: Yes, I was.

HESS: What was Jimmy Byrnes' attitude when he got to the Williamsburg?

CONNELLY: Well, he had everything all wrapped up. He announced he was going to make the speech; he was going to have a press conference but that was quickly killed, and he left like a dog with his tail between his legs.

HESS: Did the President talk to him in private?

CONNELLY: Yes, he did, but first when Byrnes arrived we were having dinner and Admiral Leahy sat directly across from Byrnes at the

[100]

dinner table, then Leahy took him apart to a fare-the-well. He never let him off the hook.

HESS: What was the main gist of his conversation--that he should not have agreed to make the address before checking with the President?

CONNELLY: Of course, he was put in his place, which he didn't like.

HESS: What did the President say at that time?

CONNELLY: He was very quiet to a point and he said, "Well, that's the way it's going to be. I'm President."

HESS: Well, back to the days following the convention after Mr. Truman had been chosen over Mr. Wallace. I believe Mr. Douglas did not want the nomination, is that right? Mr. Douglas turned that down.

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CONNELLY: He was lukewarm. He didn't say yes and he didn't say no.

HESS: Wallace wanted it but he didn't get it.

CONNELLY: No.

HESS: What were the decisions that had to be made at that time, dealing with the campaign?

CONNELLY: The national committee had to set up a schedule. Truman came back from Chicago after the convention and the office was a madhouse naturally after his trip back to Washington--photographers, press, so at 5 I locked the door and said, "I think you've had enough for today."

He said, "Yes, it was quite a day. Let's go back to the 'doghouse,' I want to talk to you." There he said, "How about a drink? You. like that damn Scotch, don't you?"

I said, "I'll mix them."

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He said, "No, I'm up to something. I'll mix them." So he made a drink and sat down. He said, "You know, I've got to make a campaign trip?"

I said, "I assumed you would."

He said, "I want you to go along with me."

"You want me to go along with you! What do I know about politics?"

He said, "Never mind that, you've got a pretty good teacher. I want you with me because we have to do the campaigning for Roosevelt."

The campaign trip started in New Orleans, went across into Texas, up on the west coast, we covered practically the entire country except the south.

HESS: Who went along on that campaign?

CONNELLY: Hugh Fulton, Matt Connelly, George Allen was the advance man, he was assigned by the

[103]

national committee, Ed McKim from Omaha was a buddy of his from Battery D, and that was about it.

HESS: Who established the itinerary?

CONNELLY: The national committee.

HESS: Now, Mr. Truman did give several speeches at that time, who wrote those speeches? How were those speeches written?

CONNELLY: Most of them were written by Fulton or myself, or both.

HESS: What was the nature of the relationship between Mr. Truman's staff and Mr. Roosevelt's staff during that campaign, between you people who were on the campaign train with Mr. Truman and the White House staff?

CONNELLY: Very little if any. And any that were handled by George Allen. I think George Allen

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was suggested as the advance man for Mr. Truman by Steve Early who was Roosevelt's press secretary. All the contacts we had were with the national committee.

HESS: On Labor Day in Detroit on September 4th, Mr. Truman spoke at a CIO rally in the afternoon and to an AFL group in the evening. As I understand it, he was invited to Detroit to make one address and when he got there, he found that the AFL and the CIO were feuding and he had to make two, is that right?

CONNELLY: That's right. I found out.

HESS: You found out about that? Tell me about that?

CONNELLY: Well, the AFL in Detroit and the CIO were then separate organizations, of course. The CIO had the big show at Cadillac Square,

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and that was Walter Reuther. The AFL boy up there at that time was Frank Martel. I began to hear the little rumblings that the AFL were going to boycott the meeting. They didn't like the idea of the CIO throwing the show. So I worked out a deal that we do the show at Cadillac Square in the afternoon, then Truman would attend an AFL dinner at night. Everybody was happy.

HESS: It wasn't so bad after all?

CONNELLY: Oh, no, it worked out fine.

HESS: On October the 4th Mr. Truman announced plans for a 7,500 mile campaign trip to make four major speeches: Los Angeles, Seattle, Peoria and Boston, and the Los Angeles speech was in connection with reconversion and national defense in connection with the Japanese phase of the war. Does that ring any bells?

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CONNELLY: That's about right.

HESS: Do you recall who wrote that speech?

CONNELLY: No I do not.

HESS: In Seattle he spoke on light metals and power development. Power development would be natural for...

CONNELLY: For that north country.

HESS: And Peoria was his farm speech, which would be normal.

CONNELLY: That's where the thing broke on that Ku Klux Klan business.

HESS: Tell me about that.

CONNELLY: Well, we arrived in Chicago and Truman always got to bed early. Some of the boys in Chicago--politicians--had dinner with me, and when we got back on the train to leave for

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Peoria that night, I guess around 1 o'clock, Truman was asleep and McKim was in his own room. The press boys were at the station trying to get the story on the Klan, I think it was in the Chicago-American. We knew nothing about it and we said we had no comment on it. George Allen was on the train that night, too. So the next morning we were getting into Peoria. George Allen said to Truman, "Look, Senator, is this really true? You know I come from Mississippi, and hell, if I was in politics down there, I would have been in that damned Klan."

So he said, "No, George, it's not true."

When Hugh Fulton indicated he wanted to sue the paper for the story based on some phony affidavits, I said to the Boss, "The less you say about this the better. Just leave it alone."

We left Peoria and finally wound up in

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Worcester, Massachusetts, and on the program we had the former Governor, Jim Curley. The Klan thing was planted in time to hit the Boston area where the Irish were, so on the program, Jim Curley got up to make his little speech and he said, "We have a very unusual candidate for Vice President. He goes to California, the word comes back to us he's a Jew; he arrives in the great Midwest, the word comes back to us that he's a member of the Klan." And he turned, "Mr. Vice President, I invite you to join my lodge, The Ancient Order of Hibernians. We'd be glad to have you as one of our members, and I assure you, we will get out the vote."

I said to Mr. Truman, "That takes care of the Klan," which it did. After that you never heard any more about it.

HESS: Did you or anyone else in Washington do any research to try to find the basis of that

[109]

charge?

CONNELLY: Hugh Fulton did. It was later disproved, the affidavits were proven false. We discounted any suit because we wouldn't accomplish anything. Fulton wanted to sue but the rest of us did not.

HESS: When you were up there in Massachusetts, do you recall anything about the situation regarding Senator Walsh and the charge by Senator Truman that he was an isolationist?

CONNELLY: Yes, I remember that very well. We arrived in Massachusetts and Senator Walsh was scheduled to introduce him at a speech in Worcester on a Saturday night. I think we had fifteen radio stations. Walsh hadn't shown up and I called his home, in fact, Walsh's sister was a high school teacher of mine, so I called her and asked her where

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the Senator was. She said, "Well, I haven't the faintest idea."

So he didn't appear on the program at all that night. It was a Saturday. So apparently some of the local politicians up there got to Walsh and told him to avoid it. We had a speech set up for Lawrence, Massachusetts on the following Sunday afternoon. Walsh showed up on that one, so he introduced Senator Truman. After the meeting I got a couple of local politicians up there and I instructed, "You've got to walk Senator Walsh out to the car. He will not want to get in. You make sure he gets in and make him ride back to Boston with Senator Truman."

And they did. They threw a body block into him and got him into the car. They were not very cordial and Truman wanted to be polite so he said, "Senator, you know I have a

[111]

boy from your hometown on my staff."

"Oh," he said, "I know that very well. I recommended him for the job." But Walsh had nothing to do with my appointment.

When we arrived in Boston, Walsh would not come into the hotel; he said he had to go home and have dinner with his sister.

The following day Truman made a speech in Providence, that's when he took out after Walsh. He didn't make it in Massachusetts. He made it at a luncheon speech in Providence.

HESS: Do you recall Senator Truman saying anything about the state of President Roosevelt's health during those campaign trips?

CONNELLY: Oh, yes, very definitely. He went down to see Roosevelt which was one of the few times he did see him, but they had to get pictures and so forth and they took them standing on the White House lawn under the

[112]

Andrew Jackson tree. He came back and told me he was a little worried.

I asked, "Why, what's the matter?"

He said, "They're putting the Secret Service on me. I hope nothing happens to the President."

So I said, "Well, it's a terrible responsibility, but what will be will be."

That was the first time he showed any outside worry about Roosevelt. I say outside; he may have felt so personally. I know I did, because I went to his inauguration; Roosevelt was there, naturally--'44--and I saw Roosevelt and I knew it was not going to be long off. He didn't get mixed up in the reception after the inauguration. He took off for Yalta.

HESS: Was there any communication between Henry Wallace and Mr. Truman during the 1944 campaign?

CONNELLY: Not that I know of unless it was some matter affecting agriculture.

[113]

HESS: If I recall correctly, they both spoke at Madison Square Garden at a Liberal Party rally, isn't that right?

CONNELLY: That was after Truman's nomination.

HESS: Yes, during the campaign.

CONNELLY: As a matter of fact, Wallace came very near embarrassing Truman at that meeting, too.

HESS: How's that?

CONNELLY: They were both to speak at a meeting that was sponsored by the garment workers' union, and Wallace dragged his feet getting to Madison Square Garden which was stacked for Wallace, because at that time [David] Dubinsky was a Wallace man. They had Truman in the bullpen to bring him on, and I was there. I said, "Where is Wallace?"

He said, "Well, he has not shown up yet."

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I said, "I'm going to tell you something, you're not leaving here until he arrives and you're going to walk in with him--not separately--because he's going to get an ovation and you're not, so if you walk in with him, you'll be part of that ovation."

So when Wallace finally showed, and he was about a half hour late, they walked in together. The place was stacked, of course, but that's how that happened.

HESS: And according to the New York Times in Senator Truman's remarks, he was quite complimentary to Vice President Wallace, and Wallace sort of slighted Mr. Truman, is that correct?

CONNELLY: That's right. Well, Wallace was very bitter--he was very bitter--because Wallace knew full well the state of Roosevelt's health. He saw him every week. He knew. Everybody else in politics knew, so Wallace

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became very bitter.

HESS: Anything else come to mind about events that may have transpired before the election?

CONNELLY: Well, when Truman was nominated to be Vice President, it was a foregone conclusion that he would be elected, because Roosevelt was a sure thing for re-election and whoever was his Vice President would be his successor. Everybody in politics knew that. And I'm pretty sure, although he never mentioned it to me, that Truman knew it, too. He didn't want it, but he knew it. He never mentioned it to me, but I know he knew it.

HESS: What was your position when Mr. Truman became Vice President?

CONNELLY: I was chief investigator on the committee.

HESS: Didn't he appoint you as his executive assistant

[116]

when he was Vice President?

CONNELLY: Oh, yes.

HESS: You were no longer with the committee then?

CONNELLY: No, I resigned after the election. Then I became his secretary.

HESS: When he became Vice President. Just what were your duties?

CONNELLY: Well, I ran the office, made the appointments, screened his interviews, just ran the office and so forth, supervised correspondence.

HESS: What do you recall concerning Mr. Truman's decision to attend the funeral of Tom Pendergast in Kansas City while he was Vice President?

CONNELLY: I recall it very well. He was in New York for the weekend, I believe, with Bob

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Hannegan and Paul Porter, he was then publicity man for the national committee, and he came back to the office on Monday morning. In the meantime, I had a call from Kansas City telling me that Pendergast had died, so I got busy and made reservations for him to fly to Kansas City, in fact, I got a plane loaned to him by Patterson who was then Secretary of War, he had a personal plane. I made all the arrangements for the plane. When Truman came back in, I walked into his office and he said, "Well, what's new?"

I said, "I've got some bad news for you."

He said, "What's that?"

I said, "Tom Pendergast died."

"Tom died?" He said, "What do you think I should do?"

I said, "I know what you're going to do. You're going to his funeral."

He said, "That's right."

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I said, "I made the reservation. Your plane is all set."

So, he took off--he was supposed to make a speech that night in Philadelphia, so, of course, he was in Kansas City, I went up to Philadelphia to fill in for him until he arrived, so I walked in and that was the subject of discussion, "Now there's a guy, there is a guy. He doesn't forget a friend. Why can't we have other people like that around here?"

That was one of the greatest things he ever did in the minds of the political public. This fellow has guts. He didn't squirm a bit."

And I think that really helped us and it was popular, but he is that kind of a fellow.

HESS: When he was Vice President, was he instrumental in the confirmation of Henry Wallace as Secretary of Commerce, do you recall?

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CONNELLY: No.

HESS: Shortly after the inaugural, president Roosevelt had written Jesse Jones and asked him if he would step aside so that he could give the post of Secretary of Commerce to Henry Wallace as a reward.

CONNELLY: That was something that Truman had nothing to do with. That was strictly Roosevelt's department.

HESS: Back to that campaign, was there very much communication between Mr. Roosevelt himself and Mr. Truman during the campaign?

CONNELLY: No. I recall one incident in, I believe it was Seattle, and Roosevelt was going to ride in a parade here in New York and Truman tried to dissuade him. He called him from Seattle and tried to dissuade him from making that appearance here in New York, but

[120]

Roosevelt wouldn't hear of it. It was a very filthy time of year, it was raining, and in Roosevelt's physical condition Truman didn't think he should do it. Roosevelt did it anyhow.

HESS: As I understand he rode in a convertible with the top down and got a bad cold.

CONNELLY: That's right.

HESS: Did they have very much communication during the time he was Vice President?

CONNELLY: No.

HESS: How many times do you think that Vice President Truman saw President Roosevelt in that short time, January 20 until April 12?

CONNELLY: I would say at the most would be two or three, if that. Maybe just once.

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HESS: Well, one question that sort of dovetails through all of this time, dealing with Mr. Hugh Fulton. Was there some talk about Mr. Fulton being appointed as chief counsel to President Truman after he became President--to take Sam Rosenman's spot?

CONNELLY: Well, I'll tell you how that came about. We went to Roosevelt's funeral up in Hyde Park, and I looked at the Washington papers that we had on the train. There was a press conference that Fulton had had in Washington without Truman's knowledge announcing that he would either be counsel to Truman or Attorney General, he wasn't sure which. So I just clipped that, and he was taking a nap on the train coming back from Hyde Park and I put the clipping on his bed. When he came out he said, "Did you put that there?"

"Yes." I said, "I thought you might

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be interested." So while he was perturbed, he didn't say much. So he said, "It is interesting."

So he went back and resumed his nap. But that was self-designation on the part of Fulton which did not appeal to Truman.

HESS: I have read that President Truman and Hugh Fulton "broke." Do you think that was the cause of their breaking or had they had other conflicts before this?

CONNELLY: No, it was a series, well, not exactly a series. Fulton arrived at the White House the morning after Truman was sworn in. He had his nose up against the gate and Truman was then in his own apartment, he was not in the White House, so Fulton and one of the reporters went out to Truman's apartment and they rode back with him from his apartment to the White House. Truman had to make two speeches; so he had George Allen, Eddie Reynolds, who was

[123]

a speech writer with George, and a couple of other boys in the Cabinet Room, and we started preparing his speech. Well, Fulton came in and he sat in, he announced that he was going to write the speech, so the other boys told me, "We're going to leave."

I went over to see Truman and I said, "You have a little revolution on your hands."

He said, "Yes, what's up?"

I said, "Fulton just announced that he was going to write your speech and the other boys said, 'If he's going to write it, we're leaving."'

He said, "Send him in to me, I'll take care of it. Tell the other boys to stay where they are."

So he brought him into his office and he said, "Hugh, I want you to do something for me. I want you to go back to New York and stay there until I send for you."

[124]

So that was the departure of Hugh Fulton.

HESS: Continuing on chronologically, this gets us up pretty well to April 12, 1945. Mr. Connelly, would you tell me about your thoughts on that day when you heard about the death of President Roosevelt?

CONNELLY: Well, on that day I was in a separate office from the Vice President's, with Eddie Reynolds who was helping us write speeches, and we went back into the Senator's office and one of the girls just had the phone in her hand when we opened the door. She dropped it and screamed, "My God! The President's dead."

So naturally we were not quite sure what she meant. I asked her, "What was that?"

She was in complete jitters, but repeated it, and I asked, "Where is the Boss?"

"He's over in Sam Rayburn's office."

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So I called over there and they told me that he had left for the White House. He got a call from Steve Early and went to the White House, so then when he got to the White House, he called and told me to come down and bring Harry Vaughan and Eddie Reynolds, the fellow who was writing the speech. (The speech, I believe, was for the Masons of Detroit which he was going to make.) So we left and went down to the White House and by the time we got down there, he was waiting for the Cabinet officers and he had very little to say, as a matter of fact I didn't even approach him. Frankly, I felt like everybody else, I was in a state of shock. Bob Hannegan was there, the National Chairman, so after the swearing-in, we left and Bob Hannegan said, "Let's go to my apartment, we have things to do."

So Vaughan and I went to Bob Hannegan's apartment at the Mayflower. His wife was there

[126]

and he talked to his wife a little bit, then he came out and he said, "Would you fellows excuse us." He said, "My wife and I want to go to church and say a prayer for the President."

So Vaughan and I left. The next day we reported to the White House, and I told--we only had four girls who had been with him in the Vice President's office, Vaughan and myself--so I told them that we'll do our business in the Cabinet Room, don't touch a pencil on any desk until Roosevelt is buried, and after the funeral we'll go to work and take our respective places. But that was his staff when he arrived at the White House.

HESS: Who was there that morning; what regular members of the Roosevelt staff, do you recall?

CONNELLY: They were all there.

HESS: What was their general attitude at that time?

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CONNELLY: Well, the same as everybody else's. They were confused, shocked, stunned. "What's happened? What's the new fellow going to be like?" Because none of them knew him and he didn't know any of them. Because he walked into something completely unknown to him; he was never consulted by Roosevelt, so he walked into a job with complete ignorance of what the job involved. And I hope it never happens again.

When Eisenhower came in, Truman agreed to have Eisenhower send his key people in before Eisenhower became President to find out what the ropes were, what was done, what had to be done, what each member of the staff did, so they were briefed before Eisenhower came in.

HESS: This is jumping ahead just a little bit, but do you think that the transition between the

[128]

Roosevelt and the Truman administration and the Eisenhower administration was fairly smooth?

CONNELLY: From Truman to Roosevelt's there was no transition, it was just there, but in the Eisenhower transition, if you want to call it that, Truman suggested that Eisenhower send his key people in advance so they would know what was going on, and the transition could be accomplished smoothly, which it was.

HESS: Were there any hitches? Did Sherman Adams get along all right?

CONNELLY: Well, Sherman Adams at that time was not on the scene, but the key people with Eisenhower who were to staff his office were on the scene, and they had access to any information we had. They interviewed different people in different departments.

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HESS: Let me ask you just a general question of what were your duties during the time that you were in the White House?

CONNELLY: Well, it was a little complex. Officially, I was appointments secretary, I handled all the appointments for the President. In addition, I had to act as a sort of contact man for the politicians from all over the states. Every politician who came into Washington could not get in to see him, it would be impossible, so that job fell on me with the result they could go home and say, "Well, no I didn't see the President, but I talked to his secretary and he's going to get me some help," because it saves face for them in their home state, or have dinner with them or go to a cocktail party for a state delegation and that was all left to me just to keep politics a little bit smooth. I handled all the politics in the

[130]

White House except for Truman and at his own level and their level, he would handle it. And we maintained a liaison with the national committee, to see about political things--working together is part of the game--it is a game.

HESS: Any other duties? I know you had many and they were varied.

CONNELLY: Yes, well, I attended all the Cabinet meetings.

HESS: Tell me about that.

CONNELLY: Well, I'd make longhand notes, and it was suggested, I believe, by Jimmy Forrestal, who was then Secretary of the Navy and later Secretary of Defense, that we should have a shorthand report on Cabinet meetings, what each fellow said, period. So Truman suggested that to me and I said, "No. You have found out now that Roosevelt never really had a

[131]

Cabinet meeting. He would hold a meeting but members would not talk in front of other members, because he played one against the other so they'd go around the other way and talk to him personally. But if you have a record of what's going on in the Cabinet, they're not going to speak for that record, where if they could speak off the cuff, they will say more and you will have closer cooperation between them," and he agreed. So I took just longhand notes like, "Forrestal took this position," and so forth. He'd go around the table, always in the same order, he'd go from his left around to his right.

HESS: Did you sit in on all of the Cabinet meetings for Mr. Truman's full period of his administration?

CONNELLY: With a few exceptions.

HESS: And those are the notes that you tell me that

[132]

are now out at the Truman Library, is that right?

CONNELLY: That's right, but not in the Library, according to what Dr. Brooks told me. They're in Mr. Truman's personal possession.

HESS: How did President Truman look upon the Cabinet? Just what did he think the duty of a Cabinet was? Were the Cabinet members his principal advisers or did he have other advisers in regular Government agencies that he would place as much or more credibility on their advice as he would a member of the Cabinet?

CONNELLY: No, definitely not. Each Cabinet member was responsible for his own department, and whatever came from that department to the President came through the Cabinet member. He never used anybody to undermine any Cabinet

[133]

member. When he appointed them he said, "This is your job, you're not going to have any interference; you run it, period. You can pick your own people."

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