 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
|
||||||||
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Establishing a Position: July 8-9, 1950 |
 President Truman designates General Douglas MacArthur commander of the United Nations forces in Korea. Previous budget ceilings for defense spending are reviewed. Although U.S. air power scores some successes, ground troops continue to retreat.
Image: A traffic jam of refugees, American and South Korean troops at a Chonan street corner, July 7, 1950. Photo: U.S. Army. Source: D.M. Giangreco, War in Korea: 1950-1953 (Presidio Press).
That night, the 3rd Battalion of the U.S. 34th
Infantry regiment engaged in street fighting with North Korean infantry of
the
4th Division and tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade. Forced to abandon
the
city on the morning of July 8, among the American losses was newly
appointed
regimental commander, Colonel Robert Martin, who was killed trying to
destroy
one of the dreaded T-34 tanks. North Korea claimed to have captured 60
prisoners. As the 34th Infantry retreated along a southwest fork in the
main
highway, portions of the U.S. 21st Infantry Regiment, along with artillery
and
some tanks, took up positions south of Chonui on the southeast fork. On
July 9, airstrikes and the artillery temporarily halted the North Korean
advance. This is continuation of my last letter of about four days ago which I hope reached you. During these days we have seen the first of the US forces come through and take up forward positions. As you know, our most forward positions at Osan, thinly manned by infantry and artillery, were overrun by the enemy [on July 5]. We have since fallen back to new lines and are at present building up our manpower and equipment to prevent a further push southward. I think we will have to assume a defensive posture on the ground for perhaps another two weeks. This will give us time to get enough of our own people in to go on the offensive and at the same time reorganize and regroup the [South] Korean forces. I am hopeful we can hold Taejon, while consolidating and building up. Roughly, US forces are endeavoring to hold the main railway and highway positions north of Taejon, while [South] Korean forces are assigned the responsibility of holding [the eastern portion of the peninsula] . . . . I would rate this area our most dangerous at the moment. A breakthrough . . . might allow the enemy to advance pretty quickly . . . and thus cut our communications. However, some U.S. forces are being concentrated to put a stop to any such thrust . . . . [A]s of today, the [South] Korean Army has an effective strength of about 20,000 men . . . . Possibly another ten to twenty thousand stragglers will be rounded up in the next week, reorganized and re-equipped, thus giving the [South] Korean Army a strength of about 40,000 all told, against 95,000 at the time hostilities started. Steps have already been taken to organize four new divisions . . . for the drive north. . . . Gen[eral Walton] Walker arrived here yesterday from Japan. It seems he is coming in here with his 8th Army to take over. Though this has not yet been made public. Personally, I am glad to see this come about. The enemy has shown redoubtable characteristics so far; he is well trained and very well equipped with the latest Soviet equipment . . . . In view of the enemy strength, we may find it necessary and desirable to commit as many as three divisions, especially if we want to clean up this mess quickly, as I am sure we do. As you may have gathered, ROK [Republic of Korea] Government has scarcely been able to operate since the beginning of hostilities. . . . I am confident that when the tide turns we shall see the cabinet give a better account of itself. There have been a few astonishing phenomena come out of this conflict. Despite the severe defeats inflicted on [the] ROK; there have been no important defections to date. Also, there have been few surrenders of ROK troops to the enemy; they fall back and scatter, but they do not surrender. . . . Another interesting development has been the utter absence of sabotage. As for the general populace, especially the thousands of refugees streaming south, they are resigned to the war. They suffer and dislike the conflict, but hey seem genuinely glad to see the Americans come in and throw out the communists. I believe there is a general public feeling of disgust with the incompetence of the ROK Govt., but this will not result in disturbances.
Counsellor of the Embassy in Korea Everett Drumright
[Press Secretary to the President Charles] Ross came in about 10 and had a statement, which had been submitted to the President, covering [the United Nations resolution of July 7 and] the appointment of General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of the United Nations forces. This we had mimeographed and gave out. It was an historic event, the appointment.
Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers
The President invited the Secretary of Defense, the three Service Secretaries, and the four Chiefs of Staff to an off-the-record luncheon at the Blair House, Saturday, July 8, for a general discussion of the situation in Korea.
Administrative Assistant to the President George M. Elsey
The situation in Korea is critical. We are endeavoring by all means now available to build up the force nec[essary] to hold the enemy, but to date our efforts against his armor and mechanized forces have been ineffective. His armored equip[ment] is of the best and the service thereof, as reported by qualified veteran observers, as good as any seen at any time in the last war. They further state that the enemy's inf[antry] is of thoroughly first class quality. . . . Our own troops are fulfilling expectation and are fighting with valor against overwhelming odds of more than ten to one. To build up under these circumstances, sufficiently to hold the southern tip of Korea is becoming increasingly problematical.
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
[T]he preceding summer . . . [of 1949, Defense Secretary] Louis Johnson participated with us in the NSC [National Security Council] in the discussion of this budget ceiling. Frankly, I got the opinion, I got the feeling that Louis felt this was probably too low, that the President and the Bureau of the Budget had decreed this, and he was going to demonstrate that he was tough enough to impose it upon the military fellows and carry it out. And in imposing it and carrying it out he really became so enamored of this thing that this became an end to all in itself, and anybody who considered any other-any breaking of this ceiling was anathema, evil beyond any comment whatsoever. . . .
Director, State Department Policy Planning Staff, Paul Nitze
As I recall, . . . Mr. Truman had said there could only be thirteen billion dollars for the military budget [for fiscal year 1951, beginning July 1, 1950]. . . . [Secretary of Defense Louis] Johnson, having seen [previous Defense Secretary James] Forrestal’s [budget] battle, having heard of it, or read of it, never fought for more funds. . . . And Johnson went out making speeches saying, “We’re going to cut out all the fat, but we’re not going to cut out the muscle.” And unfortunately, he said that if we’re attacked at 2:30 in the morning we’ll be ready. And when South Korea was attacked at 2:30 in the morning, we weren’t ready. . . . My impression is he was carrying out orders he had from Truman. My further impression, I suppose, is twofold. One: As I just said, he had seen the results of Forrestal’s fighting for more funds and he had seen you didn’t get them so there was no point in fighting for them. All you got was people on the White House staff who said, “You’ve got to get rid of this guy. He’s not doing what you want him to do.” So Johnson wanted to be the fair-headed boy and he was fighting the President’s battle, and Johnson was always thinking that he might be the Democratic nominee for President in 1952, and therefore, better be a firm adherent of anything that Mr. Truman wants.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Marx Leva
The President . . . had approved a $13 billion budget [for the Department of Defense in fiscal year 1951]. . . . My choice was to make this thing work or resign. . . . I talked with each of the then Secretaries [of the Army, Navy and Air Force] and each of the then [Joint] Chiefs [of Staff] about the 13 billion . . . . I talked to some people besides, in whom I have the greatest confidence in national defense, including some people on the Hill. When I think of all the worry and trouble I had afterward, maybe I made the wrong decision in not resigning. I did not discuss a resignation with the President. At the insistence of some of those men, we went in to do the best job we could with the 13 billion. [NATO Commander] General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower and [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] General [Omar] Bradley cut the troop strength and the materiel down to conform to the 13 billion. I am a little embarrassed . . . because now for the first time in my life it sound like I am passing the buck. I don’t mean it that way. . . .
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson
You may recall that [in 1950] . . . there was the budget ceiling on Defense expenditures, about fourteen billion dollars, and I’ve always thought that Jim Webb [during his period as Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 1946-1949] was primarily responsible for this, although [Defense Secretary] Louis Johnson got most of the blame. . . . This is what the President told him he had to do, and he tried to do it. Louis Johnson had many faults, but in this matter I think this is what he was doing. . . . Jim’s a very effective person. And . . . when the Director of the Budget tells the President, “This is all the money you can afford to spend,” this is pretty powerful stuff. . . . “If you spend more than this it will ruin the economy. This is all the economy can stand,” which I didn’t believe then--well, frankly I didn’t pay a great deal of--you know, I wasn’t very heavily involved in this, as a matter of fact, until we got this paper that got to be NSC-68 and then I began to wonder. I had been hearing that 14 billion dollars is [absolutely] all that you can spend. If you spend more than this it will wreck the economy, and I thought the people that were saying this knew more about the economy than I did, and it didn’t occur to me to question it seriously until I got this paper. Then I began studying the subject . . . .
Special Counsel to the President Charles Murphy
|
| ||||||||
|
