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Establishing a Position: July 2-5, 1950 |
 The President and his advisors consider the necessity of securing a resolution from Congress supporting Truman's action in Korea. There is discussion on whether to address the American people and send a Presidential message to Congress on the situation. Tension continues between the State and Defense Departments. The first American ground troops meet the North Koreans.
The President called a meeting for that afternoon.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey 
[Secretary of State] Dean Acheson was highly regarded by Mr. Truman. He was an intellectual, he knew foreign policy, he knew the operation of the State Department, but in my own opinion, Dean Acheson, more or less because of his intellect, educational background, and his experience around Washington, impressed Mr. Truman to the end that anything Mr. Acheson did, as far as Mr. Truman was concerned was correct. I never quite held that opinion myself. In my book Mr. Acheson was above and beyond the realms of Government operation. Mr. Acheson, in my vernacular, would be considered an egghead, not a practical administrator, and not a man who represented the opinion of America, or of the people of America. . . . In my opinion, these things conflicted with the viewpoint of Mr. Truman, who was all American.
Appointments Secretary to the President Matthew Connelly
[Press Secretary] Charlie Ross called me into his office and told me that at four the president was going to hold an off the record conference at Blair House. We hoped it would not be known but feared it would leak out. He then told me he had just heard from the president an "incredible story," which was entirely confidential between us. [Special Assistant to the President W. Averell] Harriman came in to see the president--Charlie thought it was the day before we left on the trip, which would have made it last Thursday--and he was white faced and upset. He told the president he had been in the office of Secretary of Defense [Louis] Johnson and in his presence Johnson talked to Senator [Robert A.] Taft of Ohio on the telephone and congratulated Taft on a speech he made a few days ago criticizing the president for not consulting Congress before acting in the Korea crisis, and calling for the resignation of Secretary of State [Dean] Acheson. Johnson told Taft it was something that needed to be said. After he finished talking to Taft, Harriman said, Johnson turned to him and told him that if they could get Acheson out he (Johnson) would see that Harriman was made secretary of state. Harriman told the president that he could not be bought that easily. Both Charlie and I felt the story was almost incredible except that we both feel that Averell Harriman's integrity is above any suspicion and that anything he said would be the absolute truth. We both know that Johnson has been opposing Acheson, that he apparently is ambitious for power and has his eyes set on the presidency, although, as Ross said, he can never possibly become president . . . .
Assistant Press Secretary Eben Ayers
Well, . . . [Special Assistant W. Averell Harriman’s] value to the United States was that he was one of the few remaining figures in Government from the wartime. He was one, certainly the one who had the most experience negotiating with the Russians [having been ambassador to the Soviet Union]. He had this sixth sense. He was, for those reasons, a valuable adjunct. He knew how to get along with people, which is also one of the reasons why Truman used him in the coordination of [the] State and Defense [Departments].
Counsel to the Special Assistant to the President Theodore Tannenwald
[Special Assistant W.] Averell [Harriman] came back [from overseas and administration of economic aid in post-World War II Europe]; it was a vast source of strength to the President, and to me, and to the whole administration. There never was the faintest suggestion of any sort of friction or difficulty of any sort between any of us; it was quite the reverse. [Secretary of Defense] Louis Johnson was one of the people who assumed that what he hoped was going to happen was about to happen [Acheson's replacement by Harriman], and immediately began some operations which led to a great deal of trouble on his [Johnson's] part, in trying to involve Averell in various machinations . . . .
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
I want to say that when I got back from Paris, among other things I recommended to the president was that he get a Joint Resolution from Congress . . . . Mr. Truman said he had considered such a move; if he got a Joint Resolution it would tie the hands of a successor. He was always thinking about his responsibility to the presidency . . . . I thought it was a mistake and so did many others at that time. But the President's inclination to protect the office--not to allow anything or anybody to weaken the authority of the president of the United States--that was something to which President Truman paid a great deal of attention.
Special Assistant to the President W. Averell Harriman
There are no adequate records, and memories vary, on the subject of congressional action to ratify the President's decisions on Korea. [Special Counsel to the President Charles] Murphy says he does not remember any discussion at all on a congressional resolution. . . . G.M.E., on the other hand, has a clear recollection that the subject of a congressional resolution was discussed half-heartedly from time to time but the issue was never clearly threshed out. . . . On Monday afternoon, July 3, 1950, the President held an off-the-record meeting at the Blair House at 4 p.m. . . . A number of the members of the Congress were exceedingly restless over what they regarded as excessive Presidential independence, and failure of the President to consult Congress before acting in the Korean crisis. . . . After obtaining the views of all those present, the President decided that he would not send a message to the Hill at this time, nor would he address the Congress, but would postpone the matter for at least a week. By July 7, the military situation should be more clear than it now is and the President would know at that time what recommendations he might have to make to the Congress.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
[Special Counsel] Charles Murphy and I, standing on the sidelines at the time, were alarmed at first at the thought that there might be a speech as early as the 5th [of July, as recommended by the State Department] and we were clearly relieved when it was postponed. Realising that a Presidential speech or Message to Congress was inevitable--and desirable when the situation stabilized and the President would be in a position to make specific recommendations--we began to do some homework.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
On Tuesday, July 4, [probably at the suggestion of Special Assistant W. Averell Harriman] the President and [his daughter] Margaret rode to Leesburg, Virginia, to visit with [former Secretary of State] General [George C.] Marshall. The President and General Marshall discussed the situation in the Far East. The President reports that he was very much heartened by General Marshall's warm endorsement of the President's recent actions.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
After the debacle north of Seoul, very few of us gave the ROK [Republic of Korea] forces any chance of holding the South bank of the Han [River]. However, the promise of US support, the presence of US aircraft and the visit of Gen[eral Douglas] MacArthur stimulated the Koreans to renewed and sometimes heroic activity. . . . In fact, the south bank was well contained from June 28 to July 4, afternoon, when the enemy began to get tanks across the repaired bridges. Starting that afternoon ROK forces commenced a somewhat disorderly withdrawal. I think, however, they are to be commended very much for the fight they put up along the Han. From this conflict two combat weaknesses have been evident in the ROK soldier: he has a great fear of tanks and of artillery. It was these instruments above all else which enabled the enemy to reach Seoul as he did. The enemy, for his part, had good solid tanks and knew how to operate them; he also seems to have maintained very good lines of supply. He had very adequate artillery support and let loose a tremendous amount of it. . . . As I write this the US forces are forming up a line between here and Suwon. It will be necessary for the US forces to stop the enemy thrust on this line and regroup the ROK forces falling back southward; it will also be necessary to rearm most of them. We will also have to check small-scale enemy thrusts to the southeast of us, but perhaps ROK forces can be mustered for this purpose. I think we need not expect a quick victory merely because US forces are here. In my opinion a good deal will have to be done before we can mount an offensive north that will encompass Seoul. . . . The Ambassador [John Muccio] and all the staff here have given their all to retrieving the situation. The Ambassador slept only a few hours during the first week of this crisis and we were worried for his welfare; however, he has now had two nights’ sleep and is his old self. . . .
Counsellor of the Embassy in Korea Everett Drumright
The war had broken out on the 25th of June, Sunday, and by the 29th it looked like the North Koreans were going to win. So my paper decided to send me out there to do a series of stories on the Red conquest of Korea. . . . I’m going to start in Japan and then I’m going down to Hong Kong and Malaysia, all around. Homer Bigart of the [New York] Herald-Tribune staff was assigned to cover the war. The two of us left here, I think, on the first of July. . . . We landed in Tokyo the next day, of course. These were all prop planes. We flew to Edmonton, Alberta, to Anchorage, Alaska, to Attu and on down. We landed in Korea on the 2nd or 3rd of July; I guess it was the 2nd. Soon the troops were engaged, and we were behind them in a town called Osan. . . . It could have been the 4th because [General Douglas] MacArthur wanted to have the first engagement on the 4th. It could have been the 5th, but it was right in that period. . . . [MacArthur] . . . had a sense of drama; I wouldn’t put it past him [to engineer the date for the first use of U.S. troops], let’s put it that way. I’m not a great admirer of MacArthur’s, you understand. He had a firm conviction that the minute anybody heard MacArthur was in Korea they’d all turn tail and run, see. They ran all right, but the ran right at us. I was in the big retreat.
Correspondent, New York Daily News, Frank Holeman
On Wednesday, July 5, the President had a private luncheon at Blair House for the following guests:
General [George C.] Marshall Nimitz was unable to come at the last minute and sent [Naval Chief of Operations] Admiral [Forrest P.] Sherman. Since the President had not expected to have anything resembling an "official meeting, and he had wanted Nimitz personally rather than his representative, the President found Sherman's presence slightly embarassing. The President said that Marshall and Eisenhower asked Bradley many penetrating questions about the military situation in Korea, and about the readiness of our military forces for action elsewhere. The President said that he found the questions and Bradley's answers highly illuminating. Sherman made a number of constructive comments on the role of the Navy, and what the Navy would need in case extensive Naval operations were necessary.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
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