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Establishing a Position: July 13-14, 1950 |
 In developing a message to Congress and a speech to the nation, the question of mobilizing the country arises, along with continued concern about the defense budget. Generals Collins and Vandenberg of the Joint Chiefs of Staff hold discussions with MacArthur in Tokyo. General Walker of the Eighth Army assumes command of troops in Korea. An attempt is made to halt the North Korean army along the Kum River.
Assistant Secretary of the Army Karl Bendetsen
On Wednesday and Thursday, July 12 and 13, [Special Counsel to the President Charles] Murphy, [Administrative Assistants to the President Stephen] Spingarn, [David] Bell and I met with (Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB)] Stuart Symington and a number of his colleagues for a description by Symington of the mobilization legislation which NSRB felt would be necessary. Symington laid before us a 20-title Bill entitled, "Draft of Emergency Powers Act."
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
[W]e had to prepare a bill to put the Government in a position to wage war, and there were two main schools of thought as to how far we should go; one, I’ll call the Symington school, because Stu[art] Symington was probably the major proponent of that within circles of Government, and that was--he was then the chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and they had responsibility for preparing the Government’s mobilization plans, and they did have drafts of bills but they were outmoded, I mean they just weren’t particularly applicable to the situation we found ourselves in, and Stu Symington was an all out mobilization man. He wanted to mobilize the country, put it on a war mobilization basis. . . . Well, Stu Symington is a very energetic and dynamic chap. I remember attending meetings in his office and Stu would charge around the desk and pound on it and shout and they were very dynamic meetings. He was a very forceful proponent of his point of view, and sometimes you would come out of there and you would be terribly impressed by the whole meeting but you’d come out and say, “But what did he say?” It was mostly the charge of the energy that got you in there.
Administrative Assistant to the President Stephen Spingarn
At the Cabinet meeting this morning . . . . [t]he Secretary [of State, Dean Acheson,] listed the actions and announcements which must be made: The President's action regarding increased forces must be announced. He must ask for money, and if it is a question of asking for too little or too much, he should ask for too much. He should stress production and ask for powers of allocation and limitation. This last the Secretary thought most important; for what we announce as to military steps will be of some reassurance to our friends, but will not deter our enemies; whereas what we do in the line of stepping up production will strike fear into our enemies, since it is in this field that our great capabilities and effectiveness lie. Finally, the President should state what we are doing in production--one of the great reasons for increased production is to help our allies speed up their own capabilities, so that the free world can deal with obvious dangers. The President said he agreed.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson
. . . President Truman received two conflicting sets of advice from two competing groups. The first group urged that inflation was "a greater danger to us than the dictators." They urged that to avoid excessive inflation, we should seek to fight the war mainly out of existing product, place major reliance on direct controls for this purpose, and avoid vigorous expansion of the production base and of production generally. They also warned that resorting to a vigorous expansionary program would result in very high unemployment and economic collapse when the war was over-forgetting, among other things, the smooth transition from World War II to peace. The second approach urged upon President Truman was to the effect that expansion of the industrial base and great enlargement of total production would be preferable for a variety of reasons and would even be the best long-range approach to the restraint of inflation. I was a leading spokesman for this group. We urged also that the public would not support a limited and distant war of unknown duration if it involved severe curtailment of civilian supplies for many years.
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors Leon Keyserling
On Friday afternoon, July 14, [Special Counsel to the President Charles] Murphy requested [Secretary of State Dean] Acheson and [Special Assistant to the President W. Averell] Harriman to come to his office for a discussion about the speech. [Administrative Assistants to the President Stephen] Spingarn, [David] Bell and [George] Elsey also attended, and we discussed generally the contents of the [proposed] Message [to Congress].
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
When you . . . are an Administrative Assistant to the President, there is no limit to what you're involved in, speeches, writing of statements of messages to Congress, drafting of legislation, representing the White House staff at interdepartmental meetings, working with the Bureau of the Budget. Across the board there was literally no field of the President's responsibilities or the White House role that at one time or another, I and others, young staff members such as I was, were not exposed to.
Administrative Assistant to the President George Elsey
Since I understand thought is being given in the [State Department] Policy Planning Staff to the desirability of a present public commitment on the part of the U.S. to permit the North Koreans anytime they wish to retreat in good order and re-form behind the 38th Parallel, I give you briefly my views as follows: The 38th Parallel was never intended to be, and never ought to be, a political line. The United Nations, has, from the beginning, insisted that equity and justice require a united Korea. The 38th Parallel, if perpetuated as a political line and as providing asylum to the aggressor, is bound to perpetuate friction and ever-present danger of new war. If we have the opportunity to obliterate the line as a political division, certainly we should do so in the interest of "peace and security in the area". I would think that, from a national standpoint, it would be folly to allow the North Korean army to retire in good order with its armor and equipment and re-form behind the 38th Parallel from whence it could attack again the now ravaged and weakened Republic of Korea. To permit that would mean either the exposure of the Republic of Korea to greater peril than preceded the June 25th attack or the maintenance by the United States of a large military establishment to contain the North Korean Army at the 38th Parallel. The North Korean Army should be destroyed, if we have the power to destroy it, even if this requires pursuit beyond the 38th Parallel. That is the only way to remove the menace. Neither equity nor good sense dictates that an unprovoked act of aggression should occur without risk of toss to the aggressor. If there can be armed aggression under conditions such that failure involves no permanent loss, then that puts a premium on aggression. There must be a penalty to such wrong-doing unless we want to encourage its repetition. I do not suggest that we should at this time make any public declaration of intention. Perhaps expediency would make it wise to stop at the 38th Parallel. But I believe strongly that we should not now tie our hands by a public statement precluding the possibility of our forces, if victorious, being used to forge a new Korea which would include at least most of the area north of the 38th Parallel. We should preserve our freedom to act in the way that seems best at the time when a decision is practically needed. That may be months hence and no one can now know the then surrounding circumstances. I would not suppose that a united Korea would necessarily include the [northern provinces bordering on Manchuria] . . . . But most of Korea could be, and should be, united without this involving any territorial threat to the Soviet Union. Also, any reuniting should involve U.N. auspices, not merely U.S. unilateral action.
Special Consultant to the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
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Image: George Elsey at the "Little White House," Key West, Florida, 1949. Source: Truman Library.
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